As tensions mount in Eastern Europe amid questions about whether Russian President Vladimir Putin will order an invasion of Ukraine, a new poll has found that Americans don’t have much of an appetite to go to war to defend the former Soviet Republic, with a vast majority saying U.S. leaders should focus their attention on domestic issues.
According to a survey conducted by YouGov in conjunction with the Charles Koch Institute that was released on Friday, a plurality of Americans (48 percent) said they either strongly or somewhat oppose “going to war with Russia to protect Ukraine’s territorial integrity” should Russia invade. Just 27 percent favored such a move while 24 percent said they didn’t know.
Meanwhile, 73 percent agreed that the United States “should prioritize domestic issues over foreign policy issues,” and just 7 percent agreed that foreign policy should take precedence.
The poll also found little enthusiasm for increasing the U.S. military presence around the world, with 40 percent saying the United States should be less engaged, while 32 percent said it should remain about the same.
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
Top photo credit : Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman reacts next to U.S. President Donald Trump during the Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 13, 2025. REUTERS/Brian Snyder
President Donald Trump's recent whirlwind tour of the Middle East was a spectacle of calculated opulence and diplomatic signaling, highlighting the significance of the visit to the Gulf monarchs.
Fighter jets escorted Air Force One into Saudi, Qatari, and Emirati airspace, and once on the ground, the president’s hosts unfurled lavish displays of hospitality: traditional sword dances, Arabian horses, and gleaming military salutes.
Yet, amid this carefully choreographed fanfare, Israel, the United States’ long-declared major strategic partner, was conspicuously absent from the itinerary. The decision to bypass Israel, particularly at a time of acute regional tension as a result of the Gaza conflict, reveals a core tenet of Trump's approach to statecraft: the relentless pursuit of headline-grabbing “wins” and achievable outcomes that can be quickly packaged for political consumption.
The Gaza quagmire, a gordian knot of historical grievances and harsh contemporary realities, offers no such low-hanging fruit. Speaking in Doha on May 15, President Trump himself condemned the October 7 Hamas attack as "one of the worst, most atrocious attacks anyone has ever seen." Yet, these strong words were delivered from Qatar, a key mediator in the conflict, not from Jerusalem (which Trump controversially recognized as Israel's capital during his first term).
With ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas repeatedly stalling, the prospect of Trump brokering a breakthrough remains increasingly distant. For a president who thrives on the image of a dealmaker, a visit to Israel under current circumstances only risks highlighting impotence.
In contrast, the Gulf states offered a far more fertile ground for success. With their investment-hungry Sovereign Wealth Funds and increasing assertiveness in regional diplomacy, nations like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman have transformed themselves into indispensable economic partners and political mediators. Their financial muscle and sophisticated diplomatic backchannels are shaping outcomes not just in the Israeli-Palestinian arena but across a range of geopolitical hotspots, from Russia-Ukraine to the Indian subcontinent and in ongoing nuclear talks between the U.S. and Iran.
Beyond the Arabian Peninsula, Syria’s carefully curated re-entry into the regional fold provided another stage for Trump to claim a diplomatic victory. At the U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum in Riyadh, he declared, "After discussing the situation in Syria with the Crown Prince [Mohammed bin Salman]... and also with President Erdogan of Turkey… I will be ordering the cessation of sanctions against Syria in order to give them a chance at greatness."
He wished the war-torn nation "good luck," urging it to "show us something very special" — a pronouncement met with roaring applause and a standing ovation.
This move, culminating in a direct meeting between Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, was hailed by al-Sharaa in a subsequent national address where he described the decision as "historic and courageous.” Al-Sharaa added that "it alleviates the suffering of the people, helps their rebirth and lays the foundations for stability in the region."
For Trump, facilitating Syria’s return, however complicated the road ahead, offers a narrative of peacemaking and decisive action.
It would be a misreading, however, to interpret this selective engagement as the death knell of the U.S.-Israel alliance. The strategic partnership is too deeply institutionalized, too interwoven with decades of bipartisan U.S. policy and substantial security commitments, to be undone by a single presidential itinerary.
The U.S. State Department, as recently as April, reiterated that "steadfast support for Israel’s security has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy." This support translates into over $130 billion in cumulative bilateral assistance and an ongoing 10-year Memorandum of Understanding that funnels $3.3 billion in annual Foreign Military Financing and $500 million towards missile defence programs.
The U.S. commitment to maintaining Israel's Qualitative Military Edge remains official policy, enshrined in assessments and legal frameworks such as the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014, which formally declared Israel a "major strategic partner." Indeed, influential policy circles, such as the Heritage Foundation, advocate not for a dismantling of the relationship, but for its evolution into an "equal strategic partnership" by mid-century — one less reliant on unidirectional aid and more focused on “burden-sharing,” as the White House described it.
The Abraham Accords, a signature achievement of Trump's first term, also visibly remain on his agenda. During his meeting with Syria's al-Sharaa, Trump extended an invitation for Syria to join the normalization agreements. This persistence highlights a continued U.S. interest in fostering a broader regional realignment that benefits Israel.
Nevertheless, the immediate optics and objectives of Trump's latest Middle Eastern foray were clear. The photo opportunities with Gulf leaders, the announcements of colossal investment deals, and the facilitation of Syria's reintegration provided far more political points than a visit to Israel, currently mired in the complexities of the Gaza war and the strained international standing of its current leadership.
Even Trump's own musings on Gaza, voiced in Doha — "I have concepts for Gaza that I think are very good. Make it a freedom zone. Let the United States get involved and make it just a freedom zone" — suggest a preference for grand, if vague, U.S.-led solutions conceived from afar, rather than as a result of direct engagement with the intractable realities on the ground.
In Riyadh, Trump proclaimed a new era of American engagement, one where the U.S. would refrain from "giving you lectures on how to live." This rhetoric, appealing to autocratic sensibilities in the Gulf, aligns seamlessly with a foreign policy that values transactional gains over ideological crusades. The Gulf capitals, with their investment windfalls and willingness to facilitate Trump's peacemaker image, currently offer a more conducive environment for this approach than Israel.
Thus, Trump’s decision to skip Israel on this occasion appears less a fundamental strategic pivot and more a tactical deferral. A recognition that, for now, the diplomatic wins he craves lie elsewhere. The enduring structures of the U.S.-Israel alliance may persist, but its operational dynamics under Trump are clearly hostage to the president's unyielding quest for deal-making pageantry.
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Top photo credit: Inmates remain in their cell, during a tour in the "Terrorism Confinement Center" (CECOT) complex, which according to El Salvador's President, Nayib Bukele, is designed to hold 40,000 inmates, in Tecoluca, El Salvador October 12, 2023. REUTERS/Jose Cabezas
A cacophony of right-wing commentators now believes that El Salvador, under Nayib Bukele’s dictatorship, is the “safest” country in the Western Hemisphere. Bukele himself certainly wants us to believe it’s because he’s gone to war with the gangs.
They’re all wrong — and disastrously so.
According to El Faro, the country’s most respected investigative outlet, the relative peace in El Salvador is not the result of a decisive war on gangs, but rather, of a secret pact negotiated directly between Bukele’s own Director of Prisons Osiris Luna and his head of the Social Fabric Reconstruction Unit, Carlos Marroquín, and gang leaders, starting in late 2019. He also took on similar negotiations with gangs as a mayor of San Salvador, from 2015 to 2018.
These revelations are based on extensive access to prison intelligence, government documents, and insiders within the security apparatus and the gangs themselves.
The U.S. Treasury backed these findings in 2021, sanctioning Luna and Marroquín and other Bukele allies for offering financial incentives and prison perks to MS-13 and Barrio 18 leaders in exchange for reducing homicides and supporting Bukele’s party in elections.
Numerous Latin American leaders have gone to jail for these kinds of deals — including Salvadoran cabinet members. Politicians of all stripes, including from Bukele’s former FMLN party, have negotiated with gangs; these pacts in El Salvador go back at least two decades. Negotiated peace isn’t a new solution, Bukele’s deal just worked, for now.
These deals, coordinated through the intelligence service, have been deliberately concealed and officially denied by the administration — because acknowledging they exist within his own government would undermine his image as a no-compromise strongman engaged in a just war against narco-terrorist gangs.
Bukele’s government is jailing politicians from past governments who signed deals, but that is all part of rewriting history. He is also prosecuting critics, purging the judiciary, and aggressively going after El Faro’s journalists, to conceal the truth.
Part of Bukele’s truce is to allow gangs to run their networks within the prisons, while their wealth and power remain untouched. In exchange, they have to keep homicides and violent crimes down. The leader of Barrio 18, one of the country’s two most powerful gangs, also alleges that they helped Bukele rise to power directly.
Data suggests that drug outflows from El Salvador have not stopped increasing, including for cocaine. Peace will be kept as long as the money keeps flowing — yes, that is a narcostate.
Thousands of gang members from El Salvador’s most brutal gangs have bled into neighboring countries, bringing instability, crime, and violence to Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and other countries. Salvadoran gangs are even reaching Chile. The crisis isn’t solved, it’s just moving zip codes.
The truce deal is quite thin; gangs seeking a better cut of the drug market or better prison conditions could, in a moment, plunge the country once again into a bloody war. This time, there will neither be security, nor democracy left.
In Bukele’s crackdown, the rule of law is completely gone, with the Supreme Court being replaced by loyalists, and no term limits or checks on Bukele’s power. He has called those who dare speak out “terrorist sympathizers”, threatening them with jail where “the only way out is in a coffin.”
Thousands of innocent people have been swept up, without a trial, access to a lawyer, or even basic necessities in prison – all while drug kingpins get special privileges. More than 400 detainees have died in extrajudicial detention from beatings, starvation, and untreated illness — their bodies returned to families with signs of torture.
Many Latin American countries, past and present, have tried Bukele’s model of suspending all rights while targeting, jailing, or killing suspected gang members. Bukelismo is now the most popular security philosophy in Latin America. The fact that you haven’t heard it working anywhere else is no accident.
At best, “Mano Dura” (hard hand) has a very mixed track record. At worst, it destroys democracy while reinforcing what social scientist Graham Denyer Willis called the “killing consensus” between the state and gangs.
In Colombia, the Peace Agreement hasn’t been fully implemented, with FARC dissidents having expanded their operations into Venezuela and Ecuador, ELN resuming their attacks in Catatumbo, and a continuing harsh military campaign only fueling further killings and displacement.
In Ecuador, Daniel Noboa’s state of exception has not decreased the homicide rate, while he has used security forces to crack down on protests and opposition. InSight Crime’s analysis points to gang reorganizing as a result.
In Honduras, Xiomara Castro also suspended all constitutional rights, including freedom of speech, association, and assembly, copying Bukele’s playbook. Yet the homicide rate is still one of the highest in the world, as are the violent crime and extortion rates, and there are countless cases of state security forces using torture, forced disappearances, and murders of political opponents.
Throughout Latin America, some of the areas with the highest rates of incarceration and police killings, continue to have some of the highest murder, crime, and violent crime rates in the world.
Almost all Latin American countries have some form of a “state of exception” with high state violence, extreme police power, a corrupt criminal justice system that favors the security state, and extreme incarceration and overcrowding rates. Full martial law won’t improve those odds.
El Salvador already tried “Mano Dura” and “Súper Mano Dura” in the 2000s, jailing tens of thousands of suspected gang members. The outcome was: Gangs grew stronger, more centralized, and more violent, operating directly from prisons.
People want revenge and quick solutions, which is understandable after decades of violence and corruption. But adopting Bukele’s vision is a fast track into a fascist abyss, where power is concentrated in the hands of a small political-criminal elite, while there are no free elections, no free speech, and no dissent.
Bukele and his allies have pushed the dangerous lie that the only way to deal with gangs is to wage war, dismantle democracy, and accept the jailing or killing of innocents as collateral damage. That is dead wrong.
The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.
A triple-bank shot of trouble
The Pentagon loves the number three: think of the nation’s nuclear triad (bombers, subs, and missiles) or the three major military services (Army, Navy, and Air Force). In recent days, each of those services has experienced troubles that shouldn’t have happened. While the specifics vary, the problems are all rooted in the perpetual bane of the Defense Department’s existence: poorly planned programs; too-rosy glasses; poor training and execution. Accountability will largely be MIA when it comes to assessing responsibility. Bureaucracies are far better at removing fingerprints from snafus than dusting for them.
The M10 tank goes belly up
Too bad there’s no Ozempic for U.S. Army tanks. The service blew up its M10 Booker “light” tank program May 1 after it discovered that the nearly 40-ton (!) beast would crack eight of the 11 bridges at Fort Campbell, Ky. Sure, such armor may not sound light, but it is — when compared to its bulked-up M-1 tank cousin, which tips the scales at 73 tons. The Army has long had difficulty developing Goldilocks armored vehicles — light enough to fly to the front, but beefy enough to protect the troops inside once they get there.
The Army awarded a $1.14 billion contract to General Dynamics in 2022 to build the first 96 M10s. It wanted to buy 504 (the service prefers to call such multi-ton tracked machines outfitted with 105 mm guns “armored infantry support vehicles,” but we taxpayers aren’t bound by such Pentagon nomenclatural niceties).
The M10 is “one of the Army’s top modernization priorities,” the service declared in February. Three months later, not so much. “This is not a story of acquisition gone awry,” Alex Miller, the service’s top technology officer, toldDefense One. “This is a story of the requirements process creating so much inertia that the Army couldn't get out of its own way, and it just kept rolling and rolling and rolling.”
Refreshingly, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Army Secretary Dan Driscoll put the M10 out of its misery after GD had delivered 80 of them. “We got a heavy tank,” Driscoll conceded. “We went to the Pentagon leadership and we said, ‘we made a mistake, this didn’t turn out right. We’re going to stop.’”
It's a good start.
One reason why the new ICBM is so costly
The Pentagon has a nearly Pavlovian predilection to assume the best and buy the worst. It’s like that old adage: It’s easier to ask for forgiveness (after the screwup) than ask for permission (when the mission is Permission: Impossible). Take the Air Force effort to replace the aging nuclear-tipped Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles with new Sentinel ICBMs. The Sentinel program’s current price tag of $141 billion — an incredible 81% hike since 2020 — is so high the Pentagon said last year that it is now planning to come up with a “simpler” and “more affordable” plan sometime “around 2026.”
One way the Air Force wanted to save money was to put Sentinel missiles polka-dotted across five states into the existing 400 underground silos now housing the Minuteman IIIs. “Part of the requirements, initially — 10 years ago when this program was started — was to reuse the holes, the missile holes at the launch facilities,” Air Force General Thomas A. Bussiere said April 30. “That was believed to be more efficient, more cost effective, and quicker.” Despite decades of use, and well aware that the Air Force wanted to re-use its ICBM silos, the service recently clutched its warheads and was stunned (wink-wink) to discover they’re too decrepit for the new ICBMs. As Air Force Missileer Emily Litella might have said: “Never mind.”
“As the program continues to undergo restructuring activities, the Air Force analysis continues to confirm unacceptable risks to cost, schedule, and weapon system performance stemming from the original baseline strategy of converting Minuteman III silos,” the service said May 6. “To mitigate this and other risks, the Air Force plans to build new missile silos on predominantly Air Force-owned real estate, which means reusing the existing missile sites but not the 55-year-old silos.”
The Sentinel’s continuing problems have the Air Force considering upgrades so the Minuteman fleet can remain on duty until 2050, 11 years longer than currently planned. Other experts maintain the Pentagon’s nuclear triad can safely be turned into an atomic dyad by amputating its ICBM leg.
It turns out the Sentinel’s problems aren’t so much with the missile itself, but the rotting silos and other ground-based elements of the system, that are driving costs sky high.
Apparently, Air Force dirt ain’t dirt cheap.
Warplanes are designed to dive … but not like this
It’s been a tough tour for the USS Harry S. Truman, the 100,000-ton aircraft carrier whose F-18s have been bombing Houthi rebels in Yemen from the Red Sea. First, one of its F-18s was shot down by mistake by another U.S. warship in December. On April 28, a second F-18 fell off the flattop while it was being towed, after the carrier swerved, apparently to avoid a Houthi drone. A third F-18 ended up in the drink May 6 following a botched landing. Thankfully, there were no serious injuries, except to Navy pride.
The mishaps “have raised questions about the strain placed on the aircraft carrier’s crew,” the Washington Post’s Dan Lamothe reported. Defense Secretary Hegseth has twice extended the Truman’s stay in the region to ensure there are two U.S. carriers in the ‘hood to deal with the Houthis.
THE BOTTOM LINE
There is plenty of blame to go around for all of these snafus. But don’t go looking for finger-pointing. That tends only to happen when those allegedly culpable are no longer around to defend themselves. On May 7, a fourth military service, the U.S. Marine Corps, blamed a 2024 CH-53 helicopter crash that killed five on “fatal controlled flight into terrain.”
The House passed a bill codifying President Trump’s recent decision to change the name of the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America, the Washington Examiner reported May 8.
Defense Secretary Hegseth is wielding a scalpel when it comes to his ballyhooed Pentagon spending cuts when he should be brandishing an ax, Greg Williams of the Center for Defense Information, here at the Project On Government Oversight, wrote May 7 for Just Security.
The Pentagon ordered its commanders May 9 to purge their libraries of all books promoting racial and gender diversity. Up next: an order barring all books about how the U.S. military lost its 20-year war in Afghanistan?
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