The Senate’s 2022 National Defense Authorization Act empowers the Pentagon to establish a strategic competition initiative for the U.S. Africa Command. If the bill passes, this will be the first security initiative expressly authorized by Congress since the Cold War to funnel military aid to African forces to counter Beijing and Moscow. The proposal lays new legal groundwork for a long-term bid to expand U.S. military influence in Africa. But the security initiative it authorizes will likely be dogged by U.S. military and diplomatic negligence and sow instability in Africa and U.S.-Africa relations. It should be cut from the bill before the 2022 NDAA is signed into law.
The proposed initiative aims to fight “coercion by near-peer rivals” against African governments by strengthening their militaries and addressing myriad “sources of insecurity” across the continent. If it’s established, high bipartisan consensus around both U.S. Africa policy and the threat posed by China and Russia suggest that its scope and funding are poised to grow quickly. This proposal warrants more public scrutiny than it has received, particularly given that the United States charted a similar course during the Cold War and African reformers are still facing the aftermath. A long history suggests that the proposed military aid for Africa will escape congressional oversight while the Pentagon and State Department will do little to monitor and account for its consequences.
Near the Cold War’s conclusion, while the Reagan State Department publicly deemed U.S. military aid to Africa “measured and moderate,” a classified Pentagon memo labeled key aid programs “a tragic joke,” “not demonstrably necessary and not sustainable,” based in “intuition and popular wisdom,” with “no success stories to date and none on the horizon.” There has been progress since then but much of that memo could have been written yesterday. U.S. training for coup leaders in Mali and Guinea, funding for rampaging battalions in DRC and Cameroon, and military aid to repressive governments in Uganda and Niger tell much the same story. It’s one that reflects not only a U.S. impulse to prioritize counterterrorism over peace and democracy in Africa, but also inept monitoring and assessment of U.S. “train and equip” programs for African armed forces.
The Pentagon, for example, rarely fails to tout its human rights training for African militaries. But the Government Accountability Office recently deemed its assessments of the scope and quality of this instruction unreliable. The Pentagon has no protocol in place to assess the impact of its human rights training on the “behavior, practices, or policies” of African militaries. It simply doesn’t know, and it doesn’t have a good means of finding out.
According to a Pentagon Inspector General report released through FOIA, the U.S. Africa Command also has a “personnel accountability” problem and is often unable to track the whereabouts and status of the numerous military contractors it employs throughout the continent.
State Department surveysofU.S. defense articles and services licensed for commercial export to Africa often indicate good chances of them falling into the wrong hands. Surveys during the Trump administration revealed record highs in the percentage of these exports deemed “unfavorable,” primarily because they were delivered to “unlicensed” or “unreliable” foreign parties.
Likewise, the State Department often had little idea where military equipment donated through its flagship Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership ended up. Rather than conducting site visits or relying on satellite technology to keep track of the armored vehicles and other equipment it donated to states like Cameroon and Niger, the agency often trusted social media to determine if it was being misused. Earlier this year, the House passed a reform bill for this floundering security partnership. The bill was rightly opposed by a handful of Africa experts and progressive House members because it would’ve also formally authorized the initiative. Its key reforms were written into the House's 2022 NDAA, but they aren’t in the Senate version, and they are sorely needed.
The 2017 NDAA passed even broader reforms to improve monitoring and assessment of U.S. security cooperation programs. Two years later, the Senate Armed Services Committee deemed the Pentagon’s progress toward this goal “wholly inadequate.” Nonetheless, this year the Biden administration requested budget cuts for these activities, from a paltry $8.9 million to $7 million out of a security cooperation budget of more than $6.5 billion.
This void of oversight should be kept in mind when assessing the failures of U.S. security policy in Africa. It should be scrutinized before U.S. soldiers are killed during security cooperation missions in Africa and U.S.-trained troops commit human rights violations and overthrow governments. The Senate’s new security initiative will inherit this legacy of negligence. It's more than enough reason to discard the proposal before the 2022 NDAA reaches President Biden’s desk.
Sobukwe Odinga is an Assistant Professor of African American Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. He holds a PhD in Political Science, and his research examines African security politics and the role of race in US foreign policy.
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DJIBOUTI (May 12, 2010) Marine Cpl. Robert Wood, assigned to the armory of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), instructs Ethiopian Lt. Col. Sultan Ebu, a coalition officer for strategic communications at CJTF-HOA, on the proper procedures for firing an M-16 service rifle before a U.S. Marine Corps Enhanced Marksmanship range evolution at the Djibouti City Police Department gun range. Nearly 20 military members deployed to Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti participated in the exercise, which focuses on advanced tactical weapons training. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Marc Rockwell-Pate/Released)
Ukrainian soldiers hold portraits of soldiers father Oleg Khomiuk, 52, and his son Mykyta Khomiuk, 25, during their farewell ceremony on the Independence Square in Kyiv, Ukraine 10 March 2023. The father and son died in the battles for Bakhmut in Donetsk region. (Photo by STR/NurPhoto)
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is over two years old, and Kyiv is facing a population crisis. According to Florence Bauer, the U.N. Population Fund’s head in Eastern Europe, Ukraine’s population has declined by around 10 million people, or about 25 percent, since the start of the conflict in 2014, with 8 million of those occurring after Russia began its full-scale invasion in 2022. This report comes a week after Ukrainian presidential adviser Serhiy Leshchenko revealed that American politicians were pushing Zelenskyy to mobilize men as young as 18.
“Population challenges” were already evident before the conflict started, as it matched trends existing in Eastern Europe, but the war has exacerbated the problem. The 6.7 million refugees represent the largest share of this population shift. Bauer also cited a decline in fertility. “The birth rate plummeted to one child per woman – the lowest fertility rate in Europe and one of the lowest in the world,” she told reporters on Tuesday.
Combat losses and civilian casualties have been hard to accurately tally, as Kyiv treats them as a state secret. Best estimates from late 2023 put the number around 70,000, and Bauer confirmed that they are in the “tens of thousands.”
Further decline in Ukraine’s population will likely occur as the war drags on and includes draftees aged 18-25. According to Leshchenko, “American politicians from both parties are putting pressure on President Zelenskyy on the question of why there is no mobilization of those aged 18 to 25 in Ukraine.”
When the war ends, Ukraine will need labor for rebuilding and continued losses are likely to have long-term consequences. George Beebe, Director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute, says,
“Demography is not necessarily destiny, but such shocking projections bode ill for Ukraine’s economic prosperity and societal dynamism,” Quincy Institute Director of Grand Strategy George Beebe wrote in RS last year. “The future they portend is a vicious circle of decline. Under such circumstances, simply manning a substantial standing army as a counter to much more populous Russia would be a challenge for Ukraine, let alone mastering and maintaining a large arsenal of NATO-standard weaponry.” Beebe added, “the more resources it must devote to its military, the fewer it will have for launching new commercial ventures and building a productive civilian economy.”
Ukraine is already dealing with war fatigue, evident from shifts in polling, and in the report that a staggering 51,000 soldiers have deserted from the army this year.
Beebe also points to a demographic study that predicts that Ukraine’s working-age population will decline by a third by 2040, with the number of children declining by half, and adds that “mounting damage is likely to discourage many refugees from returning to Ukraine anytime soon.”
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Top image credit: Moldova's incumbent President and presidential candidate Maia Sandu casts her ballots at a polling station, as the country holds a presidential election and a referendum on joining the European Union, in Chisinau, Moldova October 20, 2024. REUTERS/Vladislav Culiomza
Moldova’s election result has left incumbent President Maia Sandu damaged.
An EU referendum delivered only a wafer-thin vote in favor of membership of the bloc. And in the first round of a presidential vote that Western commentators predicted Sandu might edge narrowly, she fell some way short of the 50% vote share she’d need to land a second presidential term. She will now face a unified group of opposition parties in the second round with her chances of remaining in office in the balance.
Where did it all go wrong?
Sandu’s mistake was in making the Moldovan election about a binary choice between Europe and Russia.
Even before the final votes were counted, Sandu was claiming widespread electoral fraud sponsored by pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor. Reports that pro-Russian groups paid voters to come out to vote are credible. If that achieved anything, it was to mobilize voters in Moldova naturally inclined to want ties with Russia, rather than flipping votes of pro-Europeans. With a 33% turnout needed to legitimize the plebiscite, a final roll of just 50% hinted at widespread voter apathy in Moldova.
In a country where only 9% of the population identifies as ethnically Russian, an almost 50% vote against EU membership illustrates wider concerns that the government in Chisinau has not addressed domestic issues important to ordinary people. For example, many Moldovans are worried about the race to EU membership undermining small farmers and local traditions.
Sandu’s claims of interference must also be set against a concerted effort by Moldovan authorities to make it harder for Moldovan voters in Russia and breakaway Transnistria, to vote. A mere 10,000 ballot papers were sent to Russia, where the Moldovan population is thought to number over 150,000 people. The population of Transnistria is 367,000, but they were only allowed to vote in Moldova itself. (For the record, Moldova insists that Transnistria is part of Moldova.)
Meanwhile, Shor’s political party was banned and media channels linked to him closed down. In the end, the pro-European referendum passed with a tiny majority, made possible by a large number of pro-European votes by members of the Moldovan diaspora, who don’t live in Russia.
This will make it difficult for Sandu to claim a resounding endorsement of future EU membership. It will almost certainly stoke anti-EU sentiment in the Russia-backed breakaway Transnistria where a majority of the ethnically diverse population wants closer ties with Russia. Pro-Russian sentiment will also be fueled in the autonomous status of Gagauzia in the south, where 95% of voters did not choose a European future in the referendum.
Of course, the Transnistria question, nor, to a lesser extent, that of Gagauzia, shouldn’t necessarily create a bar on possible future EU membership by Moldova, as Cyprus has shown. But by making the referendum about ethno-nationalist politics, Sandu will have stimulated the secessionist tendencies there, making the process of EU integration more problematic.
She also exposes herself to the accusation of letting Moldova become a geo-strategic test-tube for Western influence, something that Russia will undoubtedly look to exploit. European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen was in Chisinau shortly before the vote exhorting Moldovans to express their free choice. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte chose to weigh in with concerns about Russian efforts to derail Moldova’s European future.
These pronouncements are imbued with notions that Moldovan membership of the EU would stabilize Europe’s eastern border and strengthen security against Russia.
But that ignores the lessons of history.
Those same arguments were used in Ukraine in 2014. Making the Moldovan election a zero sum tussle between Europe and Russia — rather than a vote about what ordinary Moldovans want to see happen domestically — risks making Moldova a new, much smaller, more economically vulnerable, version of Ukraine.
And the critical point is that Sandu has yet to make the economic case that EU membership, rather than Moldova maintaining balanced relations with all countries, including Russia, will provide the boost that the country needs. A pro-European report from 2014 shows that significant economic benefits accrue to countries in anticipation of possible membership, but that EU membership won’t necessarily benefit every new member, mentioning Greece.
The reality is that annual economic growth in Moldova since the signing of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU in 2014 has been significantly lower, on average, than in the first 10 years of the Millennium. That anticipation effect has not yet been seen in Moldova.
A key reason is that Moldova’s trade with Russia has fallen sharply since the DCFTA was signed. Sandu talks about 65% of Moldovan exports going to Europe as a triumph. In fact, Moldova imports twice as much from Europe, stoking a stubborn current account deficit. To some extent, that has been offset by inflows of foreign investment into Moldova. But it is nevertheless clear that strengthened relations with Europe haven’t been enough to make up for the cutting of trading relations with a country — Russia — that had previously been a key trading partner with Moldova.
The other key reason is demographic. Moldova has the fastest shrinking population in the world. Over a quarter of Moldova’s population have taken advantage of EU citizenship, by virtue of their entitlement to Romanian passports. That has led to an emptying of talent from Moldova as young, talented workers seek better pay elsewhere, mostly in Europe, but also in Russia. The economy would need to be growing at a brisker rate than it is to entice the most talented Moldovans back to their country. But, making Moldova the next frontier state for the West’s battle with Russia will place a heavy drag on encouraging diaspora Moldovans to return.
Moldova is a country that I am deeply fond of and have visited many times. As it happens, I have always considered that it is a country that would benefit from closer economic ties with Europe. I also believe that a politically stable and economically prosperous future for Moldova rests on that beautiful country maintaining close relations with Europe and with Russia. Maia Sandu may come to rue her failure to make this election about Moldova itself.
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Top Photo: Visitor passes the Raytheon Technologies Corporation (RTX) logo at the 54th International Paris Air Show at Le Bourget Airport near Paris, France, June 22, 2023. (REUTERS/Benoit Tessier/File Photo)
Indictments of arms contractors for corruption and malfeasance are not uncommon, but recently revealed cases of illegal conduct by RTX (formerly Raytheon) are extraordinary even by the relatively lax standards of the defense industry.
The company has agreed to pay nearly $1 billion in fines, which is one of the highest figures ever for corruption in the arms sector. To incur these fines, RTX participated in price gouging on Pentagon contracts, bribing officials in Qatar, and sharing sensitive information with China.
Engaging in illegal conduct on this scale suggests that, far from being an aberration, this behavior may be business as usual for the company. Given the scale of RTX’s malfeasance, the Justice Department should take a close look at the practices of other arms contractors to determine whether these infractions are industry standard.
The company’s approach is reminiscent of the way arms companies did business in the 1960s, when, for example, massive cost overruns on Lockheed Martin’s C-5 transport plane drew fire from internal critics like Ernest Fitzgerald and congressional gadflies, like the-Democratic Sen. William Proxmire of Wisconsin.
Resorting to bribery has been less prevalent since Sen. Proxmire pushed through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which was a response to a massive scandal involving the bribery of officials in Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia. The exposure brought about by the scandal – which covered events going back to the 1950s that were not known to the general public until a set of 1975 Senate hearings on the activities of multinational corporations showed the world how bribery was used to sway the decisions of foreign policy makers. This resulted in major consequences, including the conviction of former Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka, along with 10 other business people and government officials.
These days, with the exception of egregious cases like the recent conviction of Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) for taking bribes from the Egyptian government, most arms companies are more subtle in their efforts to influence foreign government officials, as far as can be determined. Bribery as blatant as passing along bags of cash, as happened in a number of cases in the 1960s and 1970s, is no longer prevalent. Now bribes are hidden amongst business deals. For example, a precondition of most major U.S. arms sales is the creation of an “offset” or kickback agreement. Basically, if a country spends billions of dollars on a U.S.-supplied weapon system, the company making the sale is expected to give something back to the purchasing country.
These offsets can include things like letting the host country build components of the system they are buying, to subsidizing military-related activities like the UAE’s cybersecurity industry, or even investing in unrelated items like hotels and entertainment venues. These deals are complex, and the U.S. government generally gives the companies involved free range to make whatever deals they need to make to secure an arms sale.
This regularity allows for a perfect avenue for currying favor with the potential recipient country. For example, it’s easy enough to throw part of an offset agreement to a relative of a member of the ruling elite with little chance of being detected or held accountable.
The story of RTX is about more than just money. For example, its weapons have been used to kill civilians in Yemen, Gaza, and other war zones. In addition to not showing remorse or regret for its part in these atrocities, RTX is also lobbying to reduce government vetting of weapons exports, a move that could make it easier to arm reckless and repressive regimes.
In the case of the Saudi war on Yemen, RTX lobbied aggressively to block any effort to cut off weapons supplies to the Saudi regime through visits to Congress and coordination with top Trump administration economic officials like Peter Navarro.
And it could get worse. As the Pentagon budget soars towards $1 trillion a year, and the wars in Ukraine and Gaza put a premium on pushing weapons out the door more quickly, opportunities for corrupt behavior will multiply. One potential way to head off a new wave of corruption in the weapons industry would be to adopt the kinds of reforms championed by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.). She has endorsed policy changes which could prevent price gouging and work to reduce the power and influence of ex-military and congressional officials who work as board members or lobbyists for weapons contractors after leaving government.
Better regulations and more vigorous prosecution of bribery and price gouging could well reduce corruption in the arms industry. But the ultimate solution would be to scale back America’s “cover the globe” military strategy and resist the tendency to arm allies regardless of their behavior. We see this happening now with the Biden administration’s continuation of arms sales and military aid to Israel, even though the International Court of Justice has said that it is “plausible” that Israel is engaged in a campaign of genocide in Gaza. When waging war and selling weapons are viewed as the royal road to global security, companies can take advantage of urgency, as Sen. Harry Truman found out when he chaired a Senate committee on war profiteering in World War II, and as did John Sopko when he served as the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction.
Netanyahu’s war is bad for almost everyone — not just the direct victims of the violence. Future U.S. administrations will find that current, uncritical support for Israel will make their jobs extremely difficult when they attempt to present the idea that the United States is a reliable partner that believes in promoting adherence to the “rules-based international order.” Furthermore, the people of Israel will find that their nation is treated as a pariah by many countries, including ones which had recently been open to developing a positive relationship with Jerusalem. As for the goal of eliminating Hamas altogether, it is a long shot. And even if the organization is completely eradicated, a new organization could pop up composed of people who lost family members and had their lives turned upside down by Israel’s brutal campaign in Gaza.
The war is not bad for companies like RTX. Although they did not lobby for increased aid to Israel, they benefit from the chaos that comes from war and conflict, even if they aren’t the primary cause of this frightening condition. But if we could build a world where cooperation and diplomacy supplant the use of force as the first resort in U.S. foreign policy, companies like RTX could see their revenues reduced dramatically. Demilitarizing our society will require us to reduce the power and economic clout of companies like RTX, but it will also have to involve a change in the current U.S. foreign policy, which elevates force and the provision of arms above common-sense diplomacy.
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