U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s speech to the Lowy Institute in Australia featured many points he has made before. Prominent among these was a focus on allies and partners, a hallmark of the Biden Administration. Sullivan took pains to assure his audience that he is committed to America’s friends.
Sullivan artfully dodged answering a question on French ire over the announcement of AUKUS, the new alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, by saying he is looking to the future. France was deeply upset that its previous submarine contract with Australia was summarily abandoned over a new deal to build long-range nuclear submarines. It won’t be so easy for Washington to bring the relationship with Paris back to the good old days.
But it was the question of AUKUS that deserved the deepest probing from the event moderator. Sullivan primarily portrayed AUKUS as a technology-sharing initiative that demonstrated how the United States enables the scientific progress of its closest friends. Sure AUKUS is about technology, as it includes (other than sharing methods for fabricating highly sensitive nuclear-propelled submarines) collaboration in areas such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing.
More to the point however, AUKUS isn't some high-minded scientific endeavor like curing cancer. It is an explicitly military alliance about arming Australia with offensive, blue-water capability that goes way beyond national and coastal defense (which the French diesel-electric submarines were primarily designed to do). AUKUS-built submarines will be much more expensive than the diesel-electric ones they replaced. Though their deployment may be up to two decades away, the submarines will have chief utility as an additional sword arm for projecting power in the open oceans.
AUKUS may be less about ensuring allies can defend themselves and more about their conversion to frontline states, perhaps in a future coalition of the willing aimed at China. No wonder key Southeast Asian states, who do not want to be run over in a self-interested contest of the great powers, are deeply concerned. They may not belong to the select Anglosphere club, but are America’s friends no less.
If Sullivan had a rationale on AUKUS as a region-wide offensively-oriented pact, and the potential transformation of Australia’s role in U.S.-led plans on China, this was an opportunity to get at it. But in failing to probe the U.S. National Security Advisor further on the nature and intent of this pact, the event moderator missed his chance. The American and the Australian people, as also the people of Southeast Asia, need to know more about the geopolitical logic behind AUKUS, and the risks this entails to their lives and their interests. Mr. Sullivan has yet some explaining to do.
Sarang Shidore is Director of the Global South Program at the Quincy Institute, and member of the adjunct faculty at George Washington University. He has published in Foreign Affairs and The New York times, among others. Sarang was previously a senior research scholar at the University of Texas at Austin and senior global analyst at the geopolitical risk firm Stratfor Inc.
NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană, Jake Sullivan, US National Security Advisor and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in October. (NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Flickr)
Protesters continue anti-government demonstrations against bad governance and economic hardship, in Lagos, Nigeria August 5, 2024. REUTERS/Francis Kokoroko
Nigeria is on edge as individuals linked to the deadly protests that recently shook the West African country are to be put on trial on charges that carry the death penalty.
Their arrest is part of a wider dragnet that has been triggered in part by the president's fears that the demonstrations are part of a Russian-inspired plot to overthrow his government.
Adaramoye Michael Lenin and nine others were arraigned on Monday Sept. 2 at the Federal High Court Abuja on charges of treason, insurrection and terrorism. They are part of over 2,000 protesters arrested in different parts of the country during the #EndBadGovernance protests that broke out last month in response to the harsh economic situation in the country.
According to reports, the initially peaceful youth-dominated protests, inspired by Kenya's Gen-Z anti-finance bill protest, degenerated into deadly clashes leading to the killing of about 22 protesters by government security forces.
The events leading to their arraignment have been nothing short of dramatic, as security agencies fearful of a foreign plot embarked on a frenetic crackdown on anyone remotely connected to the protest. The list, which is still growing, includes journalists, bloggers, prominent trade unionists, civil society actors as well as a group of visiting Polish students and a lecturer arrested for filming a protest in the historic city of Kano.
Although the Polish nationals have since been released, their ordeal demonstrates the panic mode authorities are in as growing anger over soaring food and energy prices has evoked fears of a Russian plot to overthrow the government of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who came to power last year.
What has particularly piqued the interest of security agencies is the sudden appearance of Russian flags among some demonstrators in the northern States of the country where the worst violence occurred. Reports claim that some of the demonstrators were chanting, “Tinubu must go,” while calling for a military coup.
According to a court affidavit sworn by Elizabeth Ogochukwu, a litigation secretary at the Nigeria Police headquarters, “The suspects/defendants herein were found to have been carrying Russian flags, banners, placards and slogans agitating for a sovereign invasion of Nigerian territory to destabilize or overthrow the sovereign state of Nigeria by the Russian government.”
Soon after, the police put two men suspected of sponsoring the plot on their wanted list. They are Lucky Obinyan, a member of the country’s opposition, and Andrew Wynne, described by the police as a British national but with a Russian-sounding moniker, Andrew Povich.
No doubt, the prevailing geopolitical landscape in West Africa, where Moscow has recently made incursions across the Sahel to the detriment of Western powers, provides a probable cause for the government’s suspicion. Not only does Nigeria’s pro-Western president double as the head of the regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which the three Sahelian pro-Moscow juntas recently exited, but Nigeria is also the largest democracy within a region that has seen a rise in military coups amid waning Western influence in recent years.
On July 26, 2023, Niger became the latest country to fall under Moscow’s growing influence when General Tchiani overthrew the democratically elected government of President Mohamed Badoum in a coup. Russian military personnel and equipment are now stationed in Airbase 101, previously occupied by some of the 1,000 U.S. military personnel who have withdrawn from Niger, near the capital city of Niamey, about 600 miles from Abuja. The Tchiani junta had previously evicted French troops as well, acting on a pattern already established by pro-Moscow regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso.
Since the coup, the relationship between Abuja and Niamey has soured mainly because of sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on the Nigerien junta. But this is not the case with the people on both sides of the 1,000-mile-long border that divides both countries who share centuries-old trade and familial relations. According to the International Trade Centre (ITC), cross-border trade, mainly in petrol, tobacco, dates, cement, cattle and other agricultural products, between Niamey and traders and communities in Nigeria’s North was worth roughly $226 million in 2022.
Five of Niger's eight regions — Zinder, Tahoua, Maradi, Dosso and Diffa — all border Nigeria’s northern states of Sokoto, Kebbi, Yobe, Katsina and Jigawa. To Nigeria’s security agencies, it is hardly a coincidence that it is in these States that calls for a military coup and the display of Russian flags emerged during the protest.
Nonetheless, the allegation of a Russian plot appears at best circumstantial. For instance, one of the protesters, Adaramoye Michael, was arrested only because his nom de guerre is Lenin, the name of the 20th-century Russian revolutionary, Vladimir Ilich. Likewise, Wynne, who runs a bookshop at the Abuja office of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), is better known in the country’s trade union and activist circles as Drew Povey — and not the Russian variant contrived by the police to bolster the allegation of a Russian plot.
Moscow has been linked to a number of undemocratic changes of government in the Sahel and for nurturing an extensive disinformation network across the region. But Nigeria’s friends in the West should not allow the state to cynically manipulate national security concerns to violently put down legitimate dissent at home. The ultimate consequence of this would be the further discrediting of the democratic values that the West wants to rebuild in order to regain influence in the region.
As it is now, Nigeria’s status as Africa’s most populous country, its largest economy, and a symbol of enduring democracy brings a lot of benefit to Washington’s agenda of regional security and stability in the Sahel. The oil-producing country is also the West’s most enduring partner in the fight against terrorism and cross-border crimes that plague the region.
As Gen. Michael Langley, Commander of the US-Africa Command (AFRICOM) noted during a visit to Nigeria earlier in January, "Cooperation and training between the U.S. and Nigerian militaries is vital in addressing the evolving security landscape in West Africa and advancing common interests.” Therefore, the maintenance of proper democratic virtues and respect for human rights and civil liberties in the country are of great importance as much as countering any threat to peace and security.
Suffice it to say, the Nigerian state’s continuous show of force, instead of dialogue with protesting groups inside the country, may backfire. African governments should define a more civil framework for managing protests and unrest — something which has become more frequent as Africa’s huge public debt crisis continues to cut into the abilities of the continent’s governments to provide basic services to the poorest and more vulnerable sectors of their societies.
If the state is allowed to utilize measures that erode civil liberties to counter a perceived Russian threat, it would be doing exactly what pro-Moscow juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso are doing to their own citizens. In that sense, the West would have lost the fight for influence over the region to Vladimir Putin.
The past year has witnessed a growing chorus of alarm in Washington regarding the military utility of space. From the proliferation of space debris to the hastened tempo of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons development by China and Russia, there is a fear that U.S. space assets are held in peril by the threat of direct attack and the destruction of orbital usability. In November of last year, Chief of Space Operations General Chance Saltzman went as far as to designate China’s adoption of ASATs in 2007 as a key moment of inflection in the militarization of space.
These worries have a legitimate basis — scientists have posited that space debris has the potential to render certain orbital clouds such as low earth orbit (LEO) unusable through cascading collisions. ASATs only compound this risk, as even individual tests can generate thousands of pieces of debris. Further, LEO and other orbits are a vital terrain for U.S. military satellites, whose uses range from communication to positioning systems and intelligence collection. This led the Biden administration to adopt a unilateral moratorium on ASAT testing in 2022.
While limiting testing is necessary and prudent, it has done little dissuade testing or proliferation of ASATs. For one thing, in the short termism of contemporary armed conflict, the ability to eliminate space-based command and control architecture and other systems, particularly those of an adversary operating far from their shores, confers a powerful rationale in favor of ASAT use in war. Because of this, there is little to motivate Chinese and Russian action towards disuse absent a wider, multi-national negotiation.
This contention is well documented and understood in Washington, as well as in Beijing and Moscow. What American national security planners seem to understand less well is that the current trajectory of ASAT proliferation does not start abroad but at home.
In the hubris of the unipolar moment, when much of the multilateralism that undergirded the official if imperfect and uneasy peace between the U.S. and USSR was traded in favor of muscular interventionism, the root cause reemerged. Indeed, insofar as the current ASAT problem can be understood as an arms race, it is a second iteration of the old Cold War problem of competing logics of deterrence and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology.
As soon as the missile age dawned with the launch of Sputnik aboard a Soviet R-7 rocket, methods for countering ballistic missiles entered development. While many of these early programs like Nike Zeus were fraught with technical limitations, a fear emerged that successful ABMs would undermine classical nuclear deterrence and promote preemptive nuclear use should one power or the other gain a protective ABM curtain. These fears eventually lead to the U.S. and USSR ratifying the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, under which each country was limited to one ABM site per country.
To understand why this is the case it is first necessary to understand where the overlap between ABM and ASAT weapons systems exists. Not all ABMs can be used in an ASAT role. This is particularly true of point-defense ABM systems intended to intercept missiles in their terminal phase or those used to intercept shorter range missiles where less of the flight takes the missile outside the atmosphere. However, some other ABMs are capable of striking missiles in their midcourse phase in space. For these weapons, minor adjustments can be made to be used in an ASAT role and vice versa. Consider the U.S. Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), which has successfully engaged both missiles and satellites in kinetic testing.
Because of this overlap, the development of direct-ascent ASATs that overlap with ABMs have been governed by the same regulations as ABMs. Direct ascent ASAT development largely fell by the wayside following the ABM Treaty’s ratification, and other systems like directed energy weapons were technically infeasible.
Despite this, a coalition of hawkish anti-communists working in defense policy and academia mounted concerted opposition to the ABM treaty. Much of the opposition coalesced in think tanks like the Hudson Institute and Heritage Foundation, whose members helped serve as the intellectual primogenitors of the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). While technologically fantastical at its time, the enduring legacy of SDI proved more ideological than material, as the rejection of deterrence in favor of active defense gained ground as a cornerstone of neoconservative national security policy in the 1980s and 1990s.
These voices would go on to exploit U.S. preeminence following the end of the Cold War to land a fatal blow to the ABM Treaty. Following concerted efforts from these same think tanks and others, including the Project for a New American Century and the Center for Security Policy, in 2002 the Bush administration finally withdrew from the ABM treaty, which coincided with a dramatic expansion of ballistic missile defense (BMD) architecture in the U.S. military and amongst foreign powers.
It is no mistake that the contemporary problem of ASAT proliferation followed in the years immediately following the end of the ABM treaty. Much like ABMs, development of ASATs stalled during the Cold War due to technical limitations. However, with the dubious legal basis of ASATs as ABM-adjacent weapons eroded, U.S. development of ASAT capabilities quickly escalated, culminating in the Burnt Frost test in 2008.
That other countries would follow this trajectory is hardly escalatory on their part, but U.S. concern stems from the fact that ASATs necessarily privilege belligerents for whom space based command and control is less essential. Considering that most of the global hot points for renewed great power competition are far flung from American shores, U.S. defense planners are now left to reckon with a hell of their own making, or perhaps more accurately a hell of their predecessors’ making. In a quest for preeminence, the U.S. unwittingly created a threat environment that advantages those it considers current or potential near peer adversaries. The shadow of the ABM Treaty withdrawal, as with much of U.S. policy misadventure, is an unforced error that now holds in peril significant military and civilian space-based infrastructure.
Laudable as U.S. efforts to minimize the impact of its own ASAT testing is, the heightened tensions between the world’s major powers invalidate unilateralism as a solution. Instead, to minimize the risk of ASATs, both to U.S. security and to the globalized world that relies on the peaceful employment of space, diplomacy remains the only path to success.
Mutual risk mitigation necessitates compromise; Russia and China are unlikely to cede the wartime advantage of ASATs absent a framework that preserves stasis for all involved. Perhaps here there is a silver lining to the demise of the ABM Treaty: the hope that in the void it leaves, a more permanent, global settlement can be reached before the threat reaches the levels of nuclear proliferation. As more powers push to acquire ASATs, the strategic imperative for their adoption grows, and with it the risk. The only hope to curb this state of affairs before it crosses a threshold of unacceptable destabilization is a lasting framework for disuse, one that can only come from negotiation, compromise, and cooperation.
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Victoria Nuland in interview with Mikhail Zygar (You Tube)
Victoria Nuland, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and one of the principal architects of the Biden administration’s Russia policy, has now opined on what is perhaps the foggiest episode in a war distinguished by a nearly impenetrable kind of diplomatic opacity: the April 2022 Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.
Furthermore she acknowledges that there was a deal on the table and that Western powers didn’t like conditions that would have limited Ukraine's military arsenal, lending credence to the theory that Ukraine’s supporters had a hand in ultimately scuttling it.
To be sure, neither the topic nor the content of Nuland’s comments is new. She is but the latest in a cavalcade of high-profile insiders, including former Israeli Prime Minister Nafatli Bennett and Ukrainian politician Davyd Arakhamia, whose testimony has shed light on the external pressures possibly informing the Zelenskyy government’s fateful decision to pull the plug on Turkish-brokered talks surrounding a draft treaty that would have ended the Ukraine war.
But, if we are to arrive at something approximating a full and unprejudiced post-mortem, it remains a necessary even if ungrateful task to carefully catalog all of these accounts — especially one from as influential a Russia policy figure as Nuland.
“Relatively late in the game the Ukrainians began asking for advice on where this thing was going and it became clear to us, clear to the Brits, clear to others that (Russian President Vladimir) Putin's main condition was buried in an annex to this document that they were working on,” she said, referencing Russia’s stipulation for hard caps and other limits on military personnel and types of weaponry that Ukraine can possess.
Such concessions, she argued, should be rejected by Kyiv because they would leave Ukraine “basically neutered as a military force.” She intimated, unsurprisingly without indulging specifics, that these anxieties were expressed by Western officials: “People inside Ukraine and people outside Ukraine started asking questions about whether this was a good deal and it was at that point that it fell apart,” Nuland said.
Just who “outside Ukraine” posed these questions and precisely what effect did these pointed queries exercise on Ukrainian officials? The full story of that short-lived diplomatic interlude is unlikely to be unraveled until after the war, in no small part due to the obvious political sensitivities at play. But there is now what appears to be, even in the most conservative estimation, a large body of circumstantial evidence that Western actors, quite possibly hailing from the UK and other countries which were designated as “guarantors” of Ukraine’s security under the Istanbul draft treaty, expressed reservations about the Istanbul format.
The extent to which these Western reservations were decisive insofar as they constituted a hard veto over the peace talks is a trickier question. One can reasonably surmise that Ukraine would have found it difficult to ink a deal that did not command at least tacit support from the Western countries on which it overwhelmingly relies, but it is no less true that the talks were fraught and, though there were positive signs of a slow convergence between the Moscow and Kyiv on key issues, the two sides were a considerable ways off from fully harmonizing their positions when the deal was terminated.
Victoria Nuland's comments lend further credence to the proposition that a settlement between Russia and Ukraine was on the table in Istanbul, that the West played a role in shaping Ukrainian thinking on the desirability of pursuing negotiations, and that Western leaders apparently conveyed the view that it was a bad deal.
Relitigating these details two years later cannot be dismissed as an exercise in political archeology; the facts of what transpired in Istanbul are as relevant as ever in informing our thinking about endgame scenarios as the war roils into its third year.
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