Wednesday's dual ballistic missile test in the North and submarine-launched ballistic missile test in the South underscores yet again the urgent need for diplomacy, both between the United States and North Korea and between regional stakeholders. An apt metaphor for the current situation may be a ticking time bomb, one that President Biden could have prevented through diplomacy in his early days in office. In the midst of a brewing arms race between enemies of the Korean War, the Biden administration must take stock in how we got here and U.S. responsibility for the militarization of the Korean Peninsula.
It is critical for American policymakers to understand that the United States is not an innocent bystander to this slow-moving crisis. So far, the Biden administration has yet to offer details of its “calibrated” strategy to reduce tensions on the peninsula or proposed specific confidence-building measures that could lead to a resumption in talks. Nor has it offered a clear strategy on when blunt tools of economic warfare such as sanctions are justifiable in the face of evidence that they disproprotionately harm noncombatants and impede humanitarian aid delivery.
A more flexible sanctions regime that is linked to progress in denuclearization, or other types of threat reduction steps such as eliminating North Korea's chemical weapons, could offer a more practical pathway to tackle harder questions such as denuclearization. Yet the United States so far has not demonstrated leadership in the North Korea challenge, leading Koreans on both sides of the 38th parallel to conclude that only an expensive arms race could provide security.
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Sung Kim’s recent comment that the United States would be willing to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea regardless of progress in denuclearization is a good first step, but much more is needed to reduce tensions on the peninsula. Ever since the Hanoi talks broke down in February 2019, there remains a near-total absence in trust between Washington and Pyongyang. Both sides blame each other for the summit’s failure and accuse one another of sabotaging prospects for dialogue, whether it is through the U.S.-ROK joint military exercises or testing of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.
The current situation has serious implications beyond geopolitics, with potentially negative consequences for eradicating the COVID-19 pandemic. As a North Korea and public health expert told me, North Korea is unlikely to accept any aid from the United States, including COVID-19 vaccines, because it believes Washington will politicize it.
The Biden administration has placed a great deal of emphasis in engaging with allies to restart talks with North Korea but the merits of such an approach has not been fully scrutinized, to the detriment of sound policy making and public accountability. Key questions remain about President Biden’s North Korea policy. For example, are Japan and South Korea aligned with the United States in a plan of action to achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula? What about a strategy and timeline for implementing such a plan? At what point would Japan be willing to set aside the abduction issue, or would South Korea be willing to impose a moratorium on developing strategic weapons, or would the United States provide partial sanctions relief, in order to advance peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula? Perhaps most vexingly, how exactly does the trilateral, allies-based framework contend with Beijing’s equities on the North Korea challenge?
Answering such questions would help all sides find off-ramps from the current diplomatic stalemate and reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. It would also prevent President Biden from getting dragged into a large-scale conflict in defense of its ally South Korea.
A significant portion of the American public is open to the hypothetical idea of deploying U.S. troops into active combat. A public opinion survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 52 percent of Americans supported using the U.S. military to defend Taiwan from China. But the war in Afghanistan demonstrates that public attitudes shift once costs are incurred as a Pew poll found that 54 percent of Americans supported the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Americans today are more attuned to the perils of open-ended conflicts and policymakers must realize the costs of a conflict in the Korean Peninsula would dwarf the post-9/11 wars.
Jessica J. Lee was formerly senior research fellow on East Asia at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Previously, Jessica led the Council of Korean Americans, a national leadership organization for Americans of Korean descent. Prior to CKA, Jessica was a Resident Fellow at the Pacific Forum and a senior manager at The Asia Group, LLC
President Joe Biden participates in a press conference with South Korean President Moon Jae-in Friday, May 21, 2021, in the East Room of the White House. (Official White House Photo by Cameron Smith)
The ceasefire in Gaza is not yet a week old, and Washington is already sending private U.S. security contractors to help operate checkpoints, a decision that one former military officer told RS is a “bad, bad idea.”
This will be the first time since 2003 that American security contractors have been in the strip. At that time, three private American contractors were killed by a roadside bomb while providing security for a diplomatic mission in Gaza.
Axios reports that two U.S. security companies will operate as part of a multi-national group, as laid out in the Gaza cease-fire deal, and Israel and Hamas have already approved them, as required by the deal.
The contractors will be inspecting vehicles that are moving into northern Gaza via the Netzarium corridor to ensure that no heavy weapons enter that part of the territory.
Israel had previously considered using security companies to distribute aid to Palestinians in Gaza last year as the Knesset was discussing banning the United Nations relief organization, UNRWA.
The Qatari government will likely fund the security forces. An Egyptian security company has also been selected for the mission. Safe Reach Solutions is one of the American companies providing security assistance and is credited with drawing up the plan. The other company, UG Solutions, is known for employing former soldiers from American and foreign special forces, according to Axios.
As part of the deal, these contractors will likely remain in Gaza during the first phase of the cease-fire, which is expected to last six weeks. Critics are already raising alarms about the potential safety issues.
“This is a bad, bad idea. This is a cauldron of angry people who are quite hostile towards Americans because most of the bombs that have fallen on Gazans have been U.S. provided,” said Lt Col. (retired) Daniel L. Davis.
“Gaza has been turned into a moonscape by Israeli Defense Forces actions, and thus any operation inside the Strip going forward should be IDF, not American,” Davis added. “The chances that angry Palestinians may target and kill Americans are uncomfortably high, in my view. Nothing good will come of this.”
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Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump participates in the presentation of the United States Space Force Flag in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, U.S., May 15, 2020 (Department of Defense photo)
Upon its creation as part of the Department of the Air Force in 2019, the U.S. Space Force, whose mission was previously described on its website as being “focused solely on pursuing superiority in the space domain,” was often a subject of ridicule.
Mocked on Saturday Night Live, the Space Force’s logo has been called an “obvious Star Trek knockoff.” In 2021, Politico reporter Bryan Bender described the Space Force as “still mired in explaining to the public what it does.” The Force even inspired a short-lived satire series on Netflix.
Despite a rough start, Space Force has persisted, almost doubling its annual funding since its creation. It has its own network of satellites to boot. And now, Air and Space Force leadership is pushing for more funds and resources in an increasingly militarized space domain. With their founder President Donald Trump returning for a second term, the skies, it would seem, are no limit.
Proponents say Space Force expansion is key to maintaining American military superiority as space becomes the new military frontier. But ramping up Space Force investment and growth in the name of power competition could ultimately promote an unpredictable, perhaps dangerous, militarization of space amid already tenuous geopolitical conditions.
Space and Power Politics
According to now-departed Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall, the Space Force needs to “expand to several times its current end strength.” To this end, Kendall wrote in a report last month that “major and transformative investment” in the Space Force is required to ensure adequate robustness for geopolitical challenges ahead.
“Space is going to be the decisive [geopolitical] domain,” Kendall explained in a recent talk, which highlighted his report, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The ability of the entire joint force to project power depends upon our success in space.”
Critically, the perceived Russia and China threats are front-and-center in Kendall’s calls to bolster the Space Force.
War between the U.S. and China and/or Russia “can happen at any time, even if the probability is only five or 10 percent. You've got to take that seriously, and…deterring that is the reason we have an Air Force and Space Force,” Kendall said at CSIS. “And winning, if we get into a fight, is the reason we have the Air Force and Space Force.”
Highlighting adversaries’ bolstered capacities, Kendall posited in his report that China was working to utilize emerging technologies, especially air and space technologies, “to defeat the United States in the Western Pacific.”
But Kendall’s push to bolster U.S. space military capabilities, coupled with frequent discussion of China and Russia as threats, rather than as parties to find common ground with, stirs the pot when relations are already weak.
“I think any militarization of space is undesirable, to be honest. I think we have enough militarization on earth, we don't need to also expand it to new domains,” Jennifer Kavanagh, Senior Fellow and Director of Military Analysis at Defense Priorities, told Responsible Statecraft. “Rather than trying to out-compete China and Russia by militarizing space more than [them], I would push for…a real concerted effort at some kind of arms control regime to put the militarization of space off the table.”
“It would require going to the negotiating table, willing to give things up,” Kavanagh said. “I don't see [doing so] as a weakness. I see it as a smart and a smart investment in diplomacy to prevent a militarized outcome that is undesirable.”
Looking ahead
Kendall has called for increased Space Force capacities to ensure U.S. space superiority; a new Trump administration appears likely to follow suit.
Namely, President Trump has tapped Troy Meink, principal deputy director for the National Reconnaissance Office, which operates spy satellites, to replace Kendall as U.S. Air Force head. Noting Meink’s close work with the Space Force at the NRO, Breaking Defense reporters Michael Marrow and Theresa Hitchens wrote the appointment signaled space “will be a focus for the next administration.”
Like predecessor Kendall, Meink has played up the threats posed by China and Russia in space. “It’s…very concerning that the Russians may be considering the incorporation of nuclear weapons into their…counter space systems,” Meink remarked at a talk held by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies last year, parroting vague U.S. allegations made last year about possibly nuclear Russian space capabilities.
“China is looking to deny our ability to operate in…space, creating a heightened threat environment. They are also building proliferated architectures of their own,” Meink explained. “That is a big challenge for us to stay ahead of.”
Trump vowed last year to create a “Space National Guard” if re-elected, which he said would act as “the primary combat reserve of the U.S. Space Force.” Upon taking office, he even called for sending astronauts to Mars, saying "we will pursue our Manifest Destiny into the stars."
“Our military budget is already almost $1 trillion,” said Kavanagh. “It is a hard sell for me…that we need to do something that's going to increase the force structure of an already too big military.”
Zooming out, Kavanagh challenged the need for U.S. space superiority, an idea those at Space Force have repeatedly pushed, as a prerequisite for U.S. security.
“The U.S. does need space assets and space capabilities to be able to project power in ways that defend the homeland,” Kavanagh explained. But that “the U.S. may need to be dominant in space if it wants to maintain unmatched global military primacy… it is clear to me [this primacy] is not a good goal...is not the goal the US should be aiming at.”
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Top image credit: President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia (L), President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (C) and President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia sign the Dayton Agreement peace accord at the Hope Hotel inside Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in this November 21, 1995 file photo.REUTERS/Eric Miller/Files
In December 1995, the Dayton Accords brought the horrible, nearly four-year long Bosnian War to an end. Thirty years on, 2025 will likely bring numerous reflections on the “Road to Dayton.” Many of these reflections will celebrate the unleashing of NATO airpower on the Bosnian Serbs in 1995, which supposedly forced them to “sue for peace.”
The truth, however — which has only become clearer as more documentation has become available — is that the United States forced the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government to the negotiating table at Dayton and granted large concessions to the Serbs that were unthinkable in Washington when the Clinton administration entered office in 1993. The Dayton Agreement was, in essence, a belated admission of American failure.
‘A tough and resourceful foe’
The clearest and most rigorous expression of the foreign policy establishment’s narrative about Dayton is probably Derek Chollet’s 2005 book, “The Road to the Dayton Accords”. Chollet, who worked as an adviser to key Clinton administration diplomats Richard Holbrooke and Strobe Talbott, argues that “the United States had initially encouraged the Europeans to take the lead in Bosnia,” but “as time went on, Europe’s response proved feckless, and the introduction of European troops under a United Nations mandate did little to stop the horrendous bloodshed.”
Finally, “in the course of six months between June and November 1995, President Clinton and his team dramatically reversed months of indecision by setting a bold course, defying expectations both in the risks they undertook and the success they achieved.” Ultimately, Chollet concludes, “the Bosnia experience has taught many lessons, but the most important one is this: when it comes to solving global problems, American leadership remains indispensable.”
The first catastrophic U.S. error was widely predicted at the time: the decision to recognize the new state of Bosnia-Hercegovina in April 1992. This decision, which was, in many ways, prompted by German recognition of Croatia in December 1991, was disastrous because Bosnia’s secession from Yugoslavia was spearheaded by a short-lived alliance between Bosnian Muslim (later called “Bosniak”) and Croat political leaders against the Bosnian Serbs. The CIA predicted, in a December 1991 report ominously titled “Bosnia-Hercegovina: On the Edge of the Abyss,” that recognition would “prompt the Serb and Croat areas [of Bosnia] to attach their respective areas to Serbia and Croatia,” which would then “set a chain reaction of violence in motion as local groups seek to promote or prevent annexation.”
When the “abyss” arrived, Bosnian Serb forces, with assistance from the Yugoslav National Army, took control of Bosnian territory with large Serb populations and “ethnically cleansed” this territory of Muslims. In a December 1992 memo summarizing the views of the intelligence community for the Clinton Transition Team, two intelligence officials wrote that “attempting to reclaim all of the territory the Bosnian Serbs now occupy would require massive Western military intervention.” The Bosnian Serbs — who were not foreign conquerors but had been living in Bosnia for centuries — could be beaten back by such an intervention, but “once recovered from the initial shock,” they “would prove a tough and resourceful foe.”
“A more manageable objective,” the memo concluded, “would be the survival of a fragmented Muslim-majority state following a partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina.”
‘Legitimizing ethnic cleansing’
“De facto partition” is essentially what the Dayton Accords ended up achieving. While Dayton formally upheld the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina and allotted 51% of Bosnian territory to a Muslim-Croat Federation, it allotted the remaining 49% to a contiguous Bosnian Serb state-within-a-state and gave this “entity” almost total autonomy over its internal affairs, as well as the right to “special parallel relationships” with Serbia. These were significant concessions to Serb interests that the Clinton administration had, until 1995, been unwilling to make.
While Albright’s memo has often been celebrated (including by Chollet and by Albright) for its call to unleash NATO on the Bosnian Serbs, the memo also suggested that the U.S., in a settlement of the conflict, “could be more forward-leaning on the Serbs’ right to secede peacefully from Bosnia and join a potential ‘Greater Serbia.’”
Albright added that “it may be necessary to consider proposals to trade Federation territory for Serb-held territory, especially if the Federation agrees and if the exchange makes the Federation more durable. This means population transfers that we have previously been unwilling to countenance.”
Albright, who was probably the biggest hawk in the Clinton administration, went from refusing any “legitimization” of ethnic cleansing through even minor concessions to the Bosnian Serbs in 1993 to not only “legitimization” of ethnic cleansing, but support for further “population transfers” and even a Serb right to secede.
In this context, while the administration publicly condemned the Serb takeover of Srebrenica and Žepa in July 1995, a July 17 National Security Council discussion paper optimistically suggested that this development “may open the way to more realistic territorial solutions,” facilitating “a heart-to-heart discussion with the Bosnians aimed at eliciting greater flexibility on the map, constitutional arrangements, and possibly the Bosnian Serbs’ right to secede from the Union after an initial period.”
Although a right to secession was not, ultimately, included in the Dayton Accords, and the Serbs fulfilled their earlier promises to make territorial concessions, the new U.S. push for compromises on all sides infuriated the Bosnian government. “The Bosnians still wish us to believe that they are getting a lousy deal,” Holbrooke, Clinton’s chief negotiator at Dayton, wrote in a memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher on November 17, 1995. “But they know it is not only a good deal but the very best they will ever get.”
Holbrooke, who had privately advocated for bombing the Serbs as a means to “strengthen our image” with the government in Sarajevo, then accused Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović of showing “remarkably little concern for the suffering his people have endured.”
Holbrooke, for his part, showed “remarkably little concern” for the fact that Izetbegović and his government had been led to believe that America would help them defeat, rather than “appease,” the Bosnian Serbs. Clinton’s team said as much during the 1992 presidential campaign and in office, while their actions — such as air strikes, brutal sanctions against the civilian population of Serbia, and deliberate failure to enforce a U.N. arms embargo against anyone other than the Serbs — reinforced the impression that the “cavalry is coming.” The U.S. Congress’s repeated efforts to lift the arms embargo only piled on more false hope.
The “Road to Dayton,” in the final analysis, is a cautionary tale about false hope. The Bosnian government was strung along by an administration that struggled to admit that it had promised more than it could deliver. Dayton, at least, recognized this reality. A similar reality may soon be recognized in Ukraine — or even again in Bosnia if the current façade of a unitary Bosnian state, which is only sustained by Western money and threats of force, collapses. The lesson, here, is not about the virtues of American firepower, but the need for American leaders to learn, from time to time, how to swallow their pride.
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