The controversial leader of Haiti was shot and killed, his wife wounded, in his home on Wednesday, according to multiple reports this morning.
Interim prime minister Claude Joseph said president Jovenel Moïse was killed by gunmen overnight. He called the attack “odious, inhuman and barbaric” and called for calm.
Haiti has been on a slow boil for the last several months as Moïse was accused of violating the constitution and election law by extending his term as president when he was supposed to step down on Feb. 7, spurring protests. This followed, according to writer-activist Brian Concannon, years of corruption, gang violence and brutal crackdowns on dissent. He wrote in Responsible Statecraft in March that just before Feb. 7, Moïse's police arrested a Supreme Court justice and several dissidents in what he believed was an attempted coup plot, and later fired the justice and two of the judge's colleagues, as police violently cracked down on ensuing protests.
To say the climate was tense before today, and that Haiti has never recovered from not only its devastating natural disasters, but the systematic corruption, autocratic rule, and poverty dominating the island, is an understatement. More details will follow in Moïse's assassination, but unfortunately the script was written long ago, making the plot ring all too familiar.
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is the Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft.
Haitian President Jovenel Moïse on stage at the Miramar Cultural Center. He spoke to a capacity audience about Haiti's progress during his first year in office. (shutterstock/gregory reed)
Top photo credit: The Lockheed Martin Corporation on display during the Seoul International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition(ADEX) 2023 at the Seoul Air Base on October 18, 2023 in Seongnam, south of Seoul. (Photo by Chris Jung/NurPhoto)
President Donald Trump announced some $200 billion in potential arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Qatar a week ago — this is huge potential business for major U.S. defense contractors like RTX, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and General Atomics, all of which deploy armies of lobbyists in Washington each year to influence such contracts.
A new bipartisan bill dropping this week will impose some of the strictest bans to date to make sure former government officials aren’t lobbying on behalf of those big companies or foreign countries to get their share of this massive federal pie. In fact, the legislation will make it a crime to do so.
House Foreign Affairs Committee colleagues Reps. Warren Davidson (R-Ohio) and Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) are planning to introduce the No Revolving Doors in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Act, which aims to tackle a space that has been growing exponentially due in part to major current conflicts in Israel and Ukraine and the desire of partner countries to arm up and enhance “deterrence.”
The Davidson/Jacobs bill will impose a three-year moratorium or “cooling off period” on any lobbying by former Pentagon or State Department officials associated with FMS during their time in government on behalf of new employers in the defense industry and/or foreign actors who have contracts or are seeking contracts for foreign military sales.
“We must keep these deals free from conflicts of interest — they are too critical in protecting our national security. By enforcing a three-year lobbying ban, we close the door on undue influence within this critical process,” Davidson said in a statement.
The DoD currently has a blanket one-year cooling off period for lobbyists (two years for highest ranking officers) but critics have long complained that the rules are inconsistently enforced across departments and there are persistent loopholes that are easily exploited.
“Unfortunately, the loopholes that keep the revolving door spinning allow former civil servants who were involved in foreign military sales to immediately work for the defense industry or foreign actors once they leave the executive branch,” said Jacobs. For example, the definition of “lobbying” is fungible, with former officials instead hired as “consultants” who can do everything to influence their former employer without triggering official lobbying rules.
But the new bill makes it a penalty for former government officials to engage “knowingly” with “any communication or appearance before any officer or employee of any Federal department or agency or Congress to influence such foreign military sales.”
Davidson — who also wants to compel the Pentagon to pass a financial audit — told RS that the new lobbying measure stems from the House Foreign Affairs Committee's foreign arms sales task force and that there's momentum to pass it, whether as a stand alone provision or as part of a bigger bill like the NDAA.
"This is a time where some of this kind of legislation can actually have a chance to move," he said. "You have people that work for the government, do the sales, and then right after they do the sales they wind up working for defense contractors. And you could see an obvious conflict of interest there."
To say the revolving door is a problem is an understatement, especially with the major contractors that stand to benefit the most from these major deals. The aforementioned Trump deal includes $1 billion worth of drones from RTX (formerly Raytheon) for Qatar. Meanwhile General Atomics stands to make $2 billion from selling Qatar its advanced MQ-9B aircraft.
Meanwhile, most of the nearly 2,000 former DoD employees (both civilian and military) who went to work in the defense industry from 2014 to 2019 went to major prime contractors and mostly in those companies’ weapons divisions. According to the GAO in 2021, the most, 315, went to work for RTX.
Over 80 percent of retired generals after 2018 went to work for the arms industry as board members, advisers, executives, consultants, lobbyists, or members of financial institutions that invest in the defense sector, according to a more recent report by the Quincy Institute. Since 2019, defense contractors have spent over $216 million directly lobbying the federal government, according to OpenSecrets.
These dynamics produce two major conflicts of interest: weapons companies have an edge paying former Pentagon and State Department officials big bucks because they know they can influence their former colleagues making decisions in the highly competitive foreign sales space. Second, officials still on the job at these agencies can feather their post-retirement nests with prospective defense companies by helping them game the system while they still have direct influence over government contracts.
While he wasn’t working for a weapons company, Adm. Robert Burke was convicted just the other day of bribery for accepting a job with a $500,000 salary and stock options while he was still working for the Navy. He did this in exchange for help to steer contracts to Next Jump, a technology services company that did work with the military.
Bill Hartung, who wrote the Quincy study, said the Davidson/Jacobs bill was a good start.
“It doesn't address the loopholes that apply to the huge numbers of folks who leave DoD to go to industry each year — over 1,700 in one recent year, according to GAO. But it addresses a critical issue and could serve as a model for strengthening revolving door strictures on other officials leaving DoD to work or industry,” he noted.
A third potential risk that the bill hopes to address is undue influence from foreign countries that hire former government employees as lobbyists and consultants, creating a situation where countries that shouldn’t be getting our weapons because obtaining them may not be in the U.S. national security interest, have a Washington conduit that makes it happen anyway.
“It should go without saying,” said Jacobs, “U.S. arms sales should be made to promote U.S. national security, not to get ahead professionally or cash in.”
keep readingShow less
Top photo credit: Sen. Lindsey Graham (U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) speaks outside the White House following the Oval Office meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and U.S. President Donald Trump, in Washington, D.C., U.S., February 28, 2025. REUTERS/Nathan Howard)
While tariffs make wars more likely, embargoes make wars difficult to avoid. Senator Lindsey Graham’s Sanctioning Russia Act calls for 500% tariffs on dozens of countries and essentially amounts to an embargo.
If this bill were to pass, it would cause an economic calamity on a scale never before seen in our country.
In its insistence that Moscow be a permanent enemy of the United States, the foreign policy establishment is pushing to impose more punitive measures on Russia should they refuse to negotiate a peace deal with Ukraine. The Sanctioning Russia Act seeks to inflict a series of additional sanctions and prohibitions of various financial transactions with Russia.
Yet, the most consequential and outright reckless provision of the bill seeks to enact minimum 500% secondary tariffs on countries who trade with Russia. Though the bill seeks to punish Russia, it will also punish America’s allies and even the United States itself. The global policemen in Washington are so incredulous that they cannot force peace between Russia and Ukraine that they formally abandoned even the pretense that their meddling is in America’s interests.
Specifically, the bill directs the President to impose 500% tariffs on all goods and services imported into the United States from a country that “knowingly sells, supplies, transfers, or purchases oil, uranium, natural gas, petroleum products, or petrochemical products that originated in the Russian Federation.” This tariff is subject to increase by no less than 500% every 90 days, meaning some countries could face 1,000% tariffs in just a few months.
In response to its invasion of Ukraine, the United States and its allies imposed some 16,000 sanctions, froze Russia’s sovereign assets, and implemented a series of severe financial restrictions. As the war wages in its fourth bloody year, it is safe to say that these measures unequivocally failed to alter Moscow’s war aims.
This inevitable failure was, of course, easily predictable to anyone who honestly assessed Russia’s motives for launching the war. The Kremlin views maintaining influence over Ukraine as necessary to prevent Ukraine’s alignment with the West, particularly preventing its efforts to join NATO, as a core national security interest. Countries will go to great lengths to secure what they deem are core interests, and given the tremendous amount of blood and treasure it has expended, Russia is no different.
Therefore, one should not expect additional punitive measures to alter Moscow’s strategic calculus in any meaningful manner.
Dozens of countries continue to trade with Russia directly and indirectly including key strategic allies and even the United States itself. In 2024, the United States imported $624 million worth of enriched uranium and plutonium directly from Russia. The United States, like many other countries, has also seen Russian crude oil imported from third countries who buy Russian oil and then sell it abroad. Are the proponents of this legislation honestly seeking to require the President to enact a 500 % tariff on ourselves?
What other countries would this bill implicate? According to the UN Comtrade Database, Israel imported $10.6 million in plastics from Russia in 2024. Do supporters of this bill really want to slap a 500% tariff on Israel while it is engaged in a multifront war? Last year, Taiwan, who many consider to be key to the U.S. defense posture in Asia, was Russia’s top consumer of naphtha — a petrochemical used in the production of plastics. Does anyone truly think that imposing a 500% tariff on all Taiwanese goods entering the United States will put them in a better position to defend themselves from potential Chinese aggression?
Likewise, Japan, another key ally in Asia, imported some $3.6 million worth of liquified natural gas (LNG) and hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of plastics and rubber from Russia in 2024.
Our allies in Europe would also be severely affected. Despite strong rhetoric condemning Moscow, imports of Russian LNG into the European Union (EU) rose by 19.3% in 2024. In the first 15 days of 2025, EU countries imported over 837,000 metric tons of Russian LNG, with Germany, France, Belgium, and Spain being key importers. According to Trade Data Monitor, Ukraine itself is estimated to have imported over $200,000 in petroleum products from Russia in 2024, and up until January 1, 2025, Ukraine was facilitating the transfer of Russian gas to Europe via its trans-national pipelines.
The country that will be harmed the most under this legislation will be the United States, both economically and strategically. If implemented, these tariffs would make U.S. trade with most of the world untenable, raise prices for American consumers, and risk further weakening the dollar.
It would also degrade our relations with several important allies at a time when geopolitics is increasingly volatile. The United States should be leveraging its allies now more than ever as we face a myriad of pressing priorities, including an unsustainable $36 trillion national debt. Instead, this misguided legislation would drive many of our allies away and into the arms of other trading partners, including China. The bill certainly will not do anything to convince Russia to sue for peace in Ukraine. Rest assured that Moscow would welcome the United States sowing further division with its key trading partners.
Never underestimate Washington’s ability to make things worse. The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 will cut off our nose to spite our face. Congress should reject this misguided bill and instead focus its efforts to advance realistic peace negotiations in Ukraine and pursue policies that advance America’s national interests
keep readingShow less
Top photo credit: Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, appears during a vote in Sudani's cabinet at the parliament in Baghdad, Iraq, October 27, 2022.
When Arab leaders arrived in Iraq last week for the Arab League Summit, they were greeted by a city determined to impress.
Driving into the city from Baghdad International Airport, they passed the statue marking the spot where, on January 3, 2020, a U.S. drone strike killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, commander of Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah militia. The strike, carried out on Iraqi soil without the consent of the government, amplified demands for the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces.
These demands still reverberate in Iraq’s corridors of power — and its streets.
While negotiations were delayed for years, Coalition Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, the 30-nation force formed in 2014 to conduct military operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, finally agreed to terminate its mission and disband its headquarters in September 2025. Importantly, this does not fully end all foreign military presence in Iraq, as a provision in the agreement allows for continued military operations in Syria from an undetermined location until September 2026, as well as another provision that calls for “bilateral security partnerships in a manner that supports Iraqi forces and maintains pressure on ISIS.”
On these two provisions — continued operations against ISIS in Syria from an undetermined location (likely Northern Iraq/Kurdistan) and in-country bilateral security partnerships — there are significant disagreements within Iraq. Some Shia political and religious factions continue to push for a full and immediate withdrawal as do Iranian-backed paramilitary forces. Others argue that the international military support is critical, particularly considering the lingering threat posed by ISIS and regional instability such as developments in Syria.
One former senior official offers a frank assessment of the current landscape.
“Some [Shia] camps want the Coalition Forces to stay for the foreseeable future,” he says. “The pro-Iran militias of the ruling group parrot whatever Iran says. At present, they are lying low awaiting the Iranian position after the talks [with the U.S.]. Meanwhile, they are scared to bits of possible Israeli assassinations of their leadership. The prime minister speaks from both sides of his mouth. The Sunnis and Kurds want them to stay, not so much because of Daesh/ISIS resurgence, but as a counterweight to Iran’s presence.”
Yet for others, the very presence of foreign troops is seen not as a stabilizing force, but as a source of insecurity and foreign interference.
“The presence of any foreign military troops has never been a source of stability. Even if there are still existential challenges threatening Iraq’s stability, facing them would require national unity, regional and international cooperation and solidarity and not breaching international laws and states’ sovereignty,” says Dhiaa Al-Asadi, a former state minister and ex-parliamentarian who once led the Al Ahrar (Sadrist) Bloc. “For these and other reasons most Shia forces insist that the U.S. troops should withdraw as soon as possible.”
Among Iraq’s Sunni population, the sentiment is largely ambivalent, often ranging from indifference to cautious pragmatism. Many Iraqis, across sectarian and political lines, express a desire for a more strategic, negotiated arrangement, rather than a hasty exit. These complex, often contradictory views show how an uncertain future weighs heavily on a nation still struggling to reach consensus.
Al-Asadi remains skeptical of any prolonged negotiations as long as foreign troops remain on Iraqi soil.
“Unless all foreign troops completely and unconditionally withdraw from Iraq, any negotiations would be impacted by their presence,” he says. “All pretexts and excuses used to justify their existence would lack solid ground. The point of departure should solely be ‘the Iraqi national interest’ seen from a pure and genuine Iraqi perspective — not one colored by partisanship, sectarianism or ethnicity.”
Fundamentally, the arguments surrounding the ending of the foreign troop presence come down to two issues: will the troops leave, and should the troops leave?
As is so often the case, the answers are conditional and ambiguous. It is a certainty that the troops of all countries will leave if instructed by the Government of Iraq. They deployed to Iraq in 2014 as the Iraqi military was reeling from the ISIS invasion, and this return was facilitated by the flimsiest of documents — an invitation letter from Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari inviting foreign countries to support Iraq in its fight against ISIS. The invitation letter did not invoke treaty obligations, nor did it elaborate a formal Status of Forces Agreement as was negotiated in 2009 and expired in 2011. Instead, it was an emergency measure crucial to reverse a rapidly deteriorating military situation.
Eleven years later, few would argue that ISIS is an existential threat to Iraq. It was declared defeated in 2017 and the few remaining “rogue elements” and “sleeper cells” in Iraq are primarily handled by an Iraqi Security Forces rearmed and rebuilt by the Coalition. Detractors note that its purpose was to Advise, Assist and Enable partnered forces until the Iraqi Security Forces could independently defeat ISIS in Iraq and to provide longer term security cooperation, but this was completed years ago. For many, the Coalition is no longer necessary, and the time has come to withdraw the invitation letter and end the presence of foreign forces.
Yet should all foreign forces leave? There is still an argument for longer term security cooperation. That implies foreign support, and likely support “on the ground.” The withdrawal agreement provides for a Higher Military Commission to routinely discuss these issues and provides a back door for retaining or deploying forces in the future.
For Al-Asadi, this is not needed. He argues that a strong national army could defend the country without relying on external support if the government provides the funds for training, modern equipment, intelligence support and technological upgrades.
“Building the capacity and infrastructure of the Iraqi army is far better and easier than relying on foreign forces,” says Al-Asadi. A “do-it-yourself” approach, alongside the bitter lessons learned from five years of brutal warfare against ISIS, he believes, is the correct decision.
The former senior official disagrees, noting, “A responsible Iraq position would be to keep the presence of Coalition forces but at the technical and intelligence side working with the counterterrorism forces of Iraq rather than combat troops in secured bases,” he explains.
“I think the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are able to handle a mid-level insurgency on two fronts, but not an invading terrorist army as in 2014. At its peak, ISIS had about 100,000 fighters on the Iraqi Syrian front,” he added. “The ISF cannot handle that.”
In many ways, both positions are correct. The threat from ISIS is diminished and there are few existential threats that require massive security forces armed and trained to first world standards. Even in its current state, the respected Global Firepower Power Index ranks Iraq as the sixth most powerful military in the Middle East, stronger than the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Qatar and other modern defense forces in the region.
Yet, the current Iraqi Security Forces have significant gaps in capability because of longstanding reliance on external support (in particular, effective air defense systems, sufficient fighter and transport aircraft and a near-absence of helicopters). Additionally, the ISF relies on intelligence mostly “fed” to them by allies. As both Al-Asadi and the former official note, the Iraqi Army still needs to mature, although they disagree if this should be done internally or externally.
In the wake of the Arab Summit, the development of the Iraqi Security Forces and the continued presence of foreign troops will return to the center of a national debate on sovereignty, security, and Iraq’s evolving role in a region gripped by shifting alliances and unresolved conflicts.
Instability is the order of the day, with a Gaza crisis that lures in Iraqi militias unaccountable to sovereign control, Israeli and U.S. airspace violations, airstrikes against terrorist targets, and looming aftershocks should U.S.-Iran nuclear talks break down. For these reasons, Iraq needs a competent security establishment to provide external and internal defense. But the question remains: who should safeguard Iraq’s future — an alliance or itself?
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.