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Turns out the military could do a speedy withdrawal  from Afghanistan after all

Turns out the military could do a speedy withdrawal from Afghanistan after all

But questions remain about private security contractors and the ongoing debate over counterterrorism capabilities.

Analysis | Asia-Pacific

The New York Times is reporting that U.S. forces should be out of Afghanistan by July — a full two months before President Biden's imposed Sept. 11 deadline, and two months after the original May 1 deadline under the Doha Agreement.

Well, well, well. This kinds puts to rest all those hysterical warnings about the logistical nightmare the U.S. military would face if Biden went along with the total withdrawal of (2,500 troops) earlier this year. It just couldn't be done, critics said. These things take time.

"Where there is a will there is a way," says my colleague, Adam Weinstein, who deployed to Afghanistan as a Marine and has been advocating for withdrawal from the start. He acknowledged that there was always some "inflation" of the real logistical acrobatics that might hinder a rapid withdrawal, but once Biden laid down the marker, the military snapped into action.

This of course means leaving a lot of stuff behind, and destroying a lot of U.S.-taxpayer-paid materiel, too. According to a Newsweek article earlier this month, 1300 pieces of equipment have already been trashed while the military broke up Bagram air base. That would include sensitive items that the military says they don't want to get into Taliban hands. They may also be trashing vehicles and other equipment that no longer work. Of course Afghan scrap sellers are angry because a lot of the stuff being destroyed could be sold —they say — if it were left intact, like tents and office equipment. One wonders why these things couldn't be given over to some of our partners, you know all of those Afghan civil organizations we helped to fund?

There was a similar critique in 2014 when, during a big withdrawal of U.S. forces, the military ended up leaving $6 billion worth of gear (170 million tons) behind, including, as I reported at the time, 850 MRAPS (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles.

Interestingly, the aforementioned New York Times article points out that the approximately 17,000 U.S. contractors, which include over 6,500 Americans, will be leaving too. That doesn't quite square with other reports that contractors are hustling for new deals or planning to stay under old ones.

From New York Magazine on May 12:

So far, nothing is changing,” said a contractor working for a U.S. company based in Bagram. News from the Pentagon has yet to trickle down. “I am not aware of any changes to my job or of any contracts being passed to the Afghan government. These are American companies and these contracts will remain under private payroll.”

Perhaps he didn't get the memo. However, as the piece by Lynzy Billing points out, there are contractors paid for by other government agencies like the State Department who will staying, and a flurry of new contract bids going out for post-withdrawal work:

In April, 70 American security and defense firms started advertising more than 100 new security and intelligence positions, some with year contracts that go beyond September 11, 2021.

One such company is Triple Canopy, which is owned by Constellis, a company that also owns Academi, the most recent iteration of Erik Prince’s notorious Blackwater private-military contractors. Triple Canopy is hiring armed guards at Bagram to provide security for remaining U.S. personnel at four sites across the country. Raytheon Technologies is posting for logistics and intelligence analyst positions in Bagram. CACI and BAE Systems both posted jobs for signals intelligence specialists for an estimated term of 12 months. SOSi posted openings for intelligence analysts for yearlong deployments, where “the work environment could require 100 percent of time spent outdoors.” PAE, Inc., who scored nearly a billion dollars’ worth of contracts with the Pentagon over four years, is hiring for a contract for the State Department. Fluor Corporation is hiring for technicians, working for both the U.S. and the private sector. Louis Berger, who built and maintains the country’s largest power plant, inside Bagram, is posting more than 20 new positions at the base.

Of course the post-withdrawal security question is a big one. Billing's piece suggests that private contractors would be providing security for U.S. personnel at remaining sites, but a new report suggests that some 600 active duty troops will be left behind to secure the U.S. embassy compound. That hasn't been confirmed of course, but sources say that it is a possibility — especially after Gen. Frank MacKenzie, head of Centcom, told Congress in April that Afghan troops could not be counted on to protect the American compound once we leave.

This begs the question of whether the military might use the embassy as an excuse to leave a military thumbprint for more than just protecting the personnel and facilities. MacKenzie was adamant that the Afghan forces will likely fold in the face of a Taliban offensive without help, and there is ongoing speculation about how Washington will conduct "counterterrorism" there in the future without a standing force.

So while it is good news the military is "leaving" ahead of schedule, as always the devil is in the details.


Seabees assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 board a plane at Naval Air Station Point Mugu to begin an eight-month deployment to Afghanistan. NMCB-5 is deployed to Afghanistan supporting Operation Enduring Freedom.|A Soldier from Aztec Company, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, keeps watch from the gunner’s position of a Ground Mobility Vehicle in eastern Afghanistan, July 28, 2018. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Christopher Bouchard)
Analysis | Asia-Pacific
Trump Zelensky
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Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

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This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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For the better part of a decade, China has served as the “pacing threat” around which American military planners craft defense policy and, most importantly, budget decisions.

Within that framework, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has become the scenario most often cited as the likeliest flashpoint for a military confrontation between the two superpowers.

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