The meeting of NATO defence ministers and Munich Security Conference has left unanswered the question over whether the Biden administration will bring remaining U.S. troops home from Afghanistan by May 1, in accordance with the U.S.-Taliban agreement. The ambiguity of European and U.S. statements following the meeting may be intended to pressure the Taliban and Afghan government back to the negotiating table. But indecision this close to the deadline risks throwing away a one-time opportunity to leave Afghanistan.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s remarks at the NATO meeting assured partners that the “U.S. remains committed to a diplomatic effort to end the war,” but also that the United States will not take a “hasty or disorderly withdrawal” from Afghanistan after nearly twenty years. As a result, the Biden administration is pushing itself into a corner in which it will likely forfeit a one-time opportunity to leave by May without having to broker a new understanding with the Taliban, a path which would be fraught with risk and uncertainty.
The consequences of unilaterally ignoring the May withdrawal deadline will be the dissolution of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, placing U.S. soldiers back in the crosshairs of the Taliban, and an end to intra-Afghan negotiations. A peace agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan government may be unlikely if the United States leaves, but it is dead on arrival if Washington chooses to ignore the deadline altogether.
An endless U.S. war effort will be left as the only remaining option. The passing of the withdrawal deadline will coincide with the beginning of the Taliban’s fighting season and violence will surge even more. This will lead to calls in Washington to cease diplomatic outreach with the Taliban and increase troop levels. If President Biden resists these calls and instead seeks to leave Afghanistan, then any date he chooses will be labeled as “arbitrary” since the May deadline will have passed. This will most likely lead to a doubling down of the counterinsurgency effort of the last twenty years.
NATO partners may also pressure Biden to remain in Afghanistan. The NATO mission in Afghanistan known as Resolute Support was intended as a training mission and that largely remains the case for countries like Germany and Italy. But the majority of combat missions are U.S.-led and the Pentagon provides twice as many troops as the next largest NATO contributor which is Germany. The United Stateshas accounted for 67 percent of all coalition deaths throughout the war in Afghanistan with the U.K. and Canada accounting for the majority of the rest.
The NATO mission in Afghanistan remains a U.S.-led war and it is therefore reasonable for President Biden to pursue an exit that advances U.S. interests. Still, it is crucial that Washington provide partners who have supported Washington in Afghanistan adequate time to withdraw their own remaining troops. This is why the Biden administration should make it clear to NATO sooner rather than later that it is leaving Afghanistan.
Policy reviews are important but the world does not stop spinning as they occur nor do the opportunity costs. Regional diplomacy to push the Taliban toward a ceasefire and Kabul toward an interim government appears to be underway. The Biden administration should participate in such initiatives. But it should not use U.S. troops as a source of coercive leverage in diplomatic efforts because ultimately that runs counter to the goals of diplomacy. Now is the time to bring U.S. troops home before it is too late.
Adam Weinstein is Deputy Director of the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute, whose current research focuses on security and rule of law in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
Then-Vice President Joe Biden during a tour of the largest military training facility in Afghanistan in 2011. (Photo by Chief Petty Officer Brian Brannon/public domain)|Afghan national army Chief of Staff Gen. Sher Mohammad Karimi meets Vice President Joe Biden during a tour of the largest military training facility in Afghanistan in 2011. (
Set to the background of increased diplomatic tensions between their two countries, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa will be making a much-anticipated visit to the White House today to meet Donald Trump.
Ramaphosa is reportedly eyeing the meeting as an opportunity to reset relations, both economically and diplomatically.
On the economic front, a central focus of the South African leader’s visit will be getting the ball rolling on a potential bilateral trade agreement with the United States. This is particularly important given the high level of tariffs threatened by the Trump administration over the past few months.
An economic agreement between the two countries is also important because the multilateral trade deal the United States has with sub-Saharan Africa, known as the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), is unlikely to be renewed by Congress when it expires in September.
Ramaphosa is also expected to rebut President Trump’s claim that white South Africans are suffering a genocide, and are therefore in need of refugee status in the United States.
The American president has been critical of South Africa’s new Expropriations Law, signed into force in January. The law allows for the South African government to take possession of private land without compensation to private land owners in certain cases where the land is not being used. The idea is that the land will then be transferred to black ownership, helping to make up for decades of inequitable land ownership stemming from the 1913 Natives Land Act, which limited the land ownership of (mostly black) native South Africans to only 7%. Currently, white South Africans own 70% of the country’s commercial farmland, despite being 7% of the population.
Though no evidence supports the claim, Trump has said that black South Africans are committing genocide against white Afrikaners, killing them to occupy their land.
In lieu of this, Trump signed an executive order on February 7 requiring an end to all U.S. foreign aid and assistance to the country while also promoting “the resettlement [to the United States] of Afrikaner refugees escaping government-sponsored race-based discrimination, including racially discriminatory property confiscation.” The executive order also called out South Africa for “accusing Israel, not Hamas, of genocide in the International Court of Justice, and reinvigorating its relations with Iran to develop commercial, military, and nuclear arrangements.”
Under Ramaphosa, South Africa has been an outspoken opponent of Israel’s 18-month war in Gaza. South Africa filed a case before the International Court of Justice — the United Nations body responsible for settling disputes between states under international law — accusing Israel of genocide in its current war against the Palestinians.
Meanwhile, under both the Biden and Trump administrations, the United States has been arguably the world’s leading supporter of Israel during the conflict. The United States has provided both military arms and diplomatic support for Israel’s offensive in Gaza, and has opposed numerous resolutions presented before the UN Security Council and General Assembly calling out Israel’s actions in Gaza and demanding increased access for humanitarians. Biden’s National Security Council Coordinator, John Kirby, called South Africa’s ICJ case “meritless” after it was initially filed in January 2024.
In response to South Africa’s support for Israel, members of the U.S. Congress introduced legislation questioning the bilateral relationship, and requiring a review of the United States’ close diplomatic relations with South Africa. The bipartisan measure was initially introduced in March of last year, and was reintroduced last month.
The spiraling diplomatic relations continued into March, when the Trump administration expelled the South African ambassador to the United States after video surfaced of the ambassador making harshly critical remarks of Trump administration policies. President Trump has also announced that the United States will boycott the G20 summit this year, which will be hosted in South Africa, and has banned all U.S. government agencies and departments from participating in the event.
And just last week, the Trump administration followed through on its executive order, granting refugee status to 59 Afrikaners ostensibly fleeing persecution and violence at the hands of black South Africans at home. The Afrikaners were greeted upon their arrival at Washington Dulles International Airport in Northern Virginia by multiple Trump administration officials.
Ramaphosa therefore has several diplomatic spats to try to overcome if he is to successfully thaw relations.
Smartly, Ramaphosa is looking to use Elon Musk’s ties with Trump to South Africa’s advantage in negotiations. Musk, an Afrikaner himself, serves as one of Trump’s top advisers and leads the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). The South African president is reportedly hoping to include in trade discussions the possibility of providing Musk’s Starlink satellite technology company with the opportunity to access the South African market while bypassing a national law that requires a portion of all companies operating in South Africa to be owned by disenfranchised groups.
South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment policy requires that 30% of the equity of subsidiaries based in South Africa be owned by historically disadvantaged groups, mostly black South Africans. Musk has in the past refused to comply with this rule, and has complained about being unable to do business in South Africa because he isn’t black.
By providing Musk a bypass to otherwise standard regulations — or to find a different way by which to allow Starlink to access South Africa’s market — Ramaphosa can work to shore up relations with one of the most senior Trump advisers who harbors a negative view, hardened through personal experiences and connections, with South Africa’s government.
Given how closely Trump relies on an inner circle to help him craft policy, supporting Musk’s effort to do business in South Africa could help thaw tensions between the two governments, and help Ramaphosa’s government gain credibility within Trump’s inner circle.
Part of the challenge facing Ramaphosa is the power imbalance in the relationship between the two countries — the truth is that South Africa needs the United States more than the United States needs South Africa.
The U.S. is South Africa’s second-largest trade partner and the two have maintained a close, though fluctuating, diplomatic partnership since apartheid ended in 1994. Although South Africa has a diverse array of international partners to which it has turned for economic and political engagement — such as China, which is the country’s largest trading partner — shoring up both diplomatic and, even more importantly, economic relations with the United States remains an important goal of Ramaphosa’s foreign policy, and thus of his visit to Washington.
For the United States, rekindling a close relationship with South Africa matters because of the country’s diplomatic, military, and economic importance relative to much of the rest of Africa. Forming a close partnership with a regional power allows the United States greater avenues by which to form close transregional relationships and maintain regional influence.
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Top photo credit: Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth rides in a U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk en route to the New Mexico National Defense Area to assess its role in the operational control of the U.S.-Mexico border, Santa Teresa, N.M., April 25, 2025. (DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)
The U.S. Army is getting ready to fight China. At least that’s how Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Army leaders are selling their new modernization initiative, announced on April 30.
Framed as an opportunity for “generational change,” the overhaul intends to “optimize” the Army’s force structure and equip its soldiers for the Indo-Pacific’s maritime terrain while divesting the heavy armored vehicles and helicopters that have been Army mainstays for a decade.
Like the Army’s past efforts to pivot to Asia, however, the initiative is likely to fail. The Army doesn’t have a game-changing or undiscovered role to play in a potential future conflict with China, and another expensive reboot isn’t going to help it find one. Instead, it’s time for the Army to face reality and double down on the narrow but essential core competencies it can already bring to the Indo-Pacific, including air defense, command and control, and sustainment.
Some of these new programs focused on preparing for future ground wars, but many aimed at increasing the Army’s stake in operations to counter Chinese military expansion, where most of the Pentagon’s attention and money were quickly shifting. Among these were costly and controversial long-range precision missile programs, plans to design new helicopters (future vertical lift), and the resurrected focus on the Army’s fleet of watercraft.
Even as the Army invested billions in the development and procurement of these systems, however, the service struggled to clearly define — and sell Pentagon leadership on — its role in a possible war with China. One fundamental obstacle was the lack of military access for ground forces across the Indo-Pacific region. Outside of South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, the Army found little support for expanding its military presence. Those countries that did welcome Army forces were less enthusiastic about hosting some of its new, advanced capabilities, including its long-range missiles, and its stockpiles of equipment and materiel. This left the Army with expensive systems it could not deploy forward or might not be able to use effectively in a war.
Efforts to overcome these geographic restrictions with more advanced technologies (like longer-range drones and faster missiles) only created additional obstacles, ultimately preventing the Army from fielding planned systems in sufficient numbers to have a real operational impact.
As it tried to balance the competing requirements of geography on the one hand and firepower on the other, for example, the Army’s hypersonic program slipped well-behind its planned schedule and settled on missiles that cost so much ($41 million per missile) that the Army planned to procure only about a dozen. Worse, some programs like the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft and the Strategic Long-Range Cannon were cancelled after running into questions about their viability in the Indo-Pacific.
The Army’s 2018 effort to reorient to Asia thus ran aground on the fundamental tension between the region’s immutable maritime geography and the service’s own limitations as a force that operates mostly on land. Instead of learning from these mistakes, however, Hegseth and his advisers seem intent on repeating them.
For example, Hegseth’s new initiative calls once again on the Army to “increase…forward presence in the Indo-Pacific by expanding pre-positioned stocks, rotational deployments, and exercises,” but offers no new ideas for how this will happen. Here, the Trump administration will face the same challenges as its predecessors: most countries in Asia do not want more U.S. Army forces or equipment on their soil for fear of making themselves targets of Chinese retaliation.
The DoD has, in the past, tried to increase its access by establishing facts on the ground, for example by leaving behind equipment after exercises. But this is not a long-term strategic solution. Questions of military access and basing permissions are political ones that need to be resolved at the diplomatic level, and the Army cannot plan for future roles in Asia that assume more military access than it has now.
Hegseth’s memo also accelerates Army timelines for fielding many of the technologies, including long-range missiles, drones and counter-drone systems, and AI-enabled command and control systems, that the service has been struggling to sustainably develop for years. Hegseth suggests that the problem in the past has been a broken acquisition process, but there is little evidence that this is case. Most of the setbacks faced by these programs have been technical ones exacerbated by Asia’s geography — its long distances, vast oceans, and inhospitable terrain — that a new contracting arrangement can’t change.
Finally, even if the Army succeeds in overcoming these first two challenges, the operational concepts required to guide Army use of new systems and technologies in the Indo-Pacific are missing in action. Equipping every Army unit with drones will not make the service any more relevant in Asia, for example, without a plan for how soldiers will use those drones in a theater made up mostly of water or during a conflict where they will be constantly under threat from Chinese air attacks and jamming that will make the Ukrainian battlefield look like a picnic.
Rather than launching a costly transformation — this one will reportedly cost $36 billion — in hopes of discovering newfound relevance in Asia, the Army should return to the core competencies it has developed over decades, namely, protecting American forces with advanced air and missile defense and enabling U.S. power projection with command and control, sustainment, and logistics support. Both roles will be essential for U.S. military operations in the Indo-Pacific, whether in peacetime or a war.
Here, Hegseth’s new initiative has some redeeming elements. Most importantly, it prioritizes investments in air and missile defense. The risk, however, is that attention devoted to this capability, floated only in the directive’s introduction, ends up being limited or diverted in favor of higher profile programs, such as the long-range missiles and uncrewed systems that Army leaders have been after for almost a decade or Trump’s Golden Dome for America.
Giving up the pursuit of an expanded role in Asia will likely mean larger Army force structure cuts and a smaller Army budget, but narrowing the Army’s Indo-Pacific remit will bring advantages, for instance, it will free up resources for other uses and allow the Army to concentrate its attention on doing a narrow set of tasks well, advancing combat effectiveness and the quality of support provided to the Joint Staff.
After two decades of counterinsurgency where it was the center of attention, the Army may not relish taking a backseat to its sister services. Searching for a new role in Asia, however, will be futile. The Army can do more and do better by focusing on what it already does best.
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Top photo credit: Official X Account of Transparency International Georgia
The U.S. foreign policy community is offered a generational opportunity, necessitated by crises abroad and shifting attitudes at home, to fundamentally reappraise American interests on Europe’s eastern periphery.
Georgia, a eurasian crossroads in the Caucasus, has become an unlikely focal point in the push and pull between dueling visions of U.S. priorities in the region.
The MEGOBARI Act (short for Mobilizing and Enhancing Georgia's Options for Building Accountability, Resilience, and Independence), recently passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, is a series of ultimatums on Georgia that reads as a litany of post-Cold War Atlanticism's greatest hits. The full bill is here, but its stated aim is "examining the penetration of Russian intelligence elements and their assets in Georgia, that includes an annex examining Chinese influence and the potential intersection of Russian-Chinese cooperation in Georgia." A thorough 90-day examination by USAID and relevant Congressional committees will determine who will be punished with sanctions and whether Georgia is worthy of proper U.S ties moving forward.
In other words, to remain in — or, as it were — find its way back into the West’s good graces, the ruling Georgian Dream government must not just cut any ties with Russia but adopt an overtly confrontational stance, including through its enforcement of Western sanctions on Moscow and other measures intended to counter Russian influence (also in the bill).
The legislation, in its insistence that this prescribed stance of maximum hostility to Russia is the only one consistent with the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Georgian people, imposes a steep conditionality not just on Georgia’s path to EU accession or NATO membership, but on its ability to support any kind of constructive relationship with the U.S. and EU.
The act additionally calls on Georgian Dream to commit to a gamut of ad hoc concessions stemming from Western criticisms over the conduct of Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary elections, up to and including the rather striking suggestion that Georgian Dream should determine “whether the elections should be judged as illegitimate.”
The MEGOBARI law, as Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) observed in a March 27 Foreign Relations Committee proceeding, cannot be seen in any other light than as a direct intervention into domestic Georgian politics. It seeks, under the flimsy facade of advancing the interests of the “Georgian people,” to punish a duly elected Georgian government for pursuing a geopolitical course of which a faction within the U.S. foreign policy community disapproves.
This is ipso facto problematic insofar as it intrudes, in the name of defending democracy, on the democratic process inside Georgia to manipulate outcomes in ways that benefits perceived U.S. interests.
The second and more serious problem, from a technical perspective, is that these kinds of pressure tactics are counterproductive to any genuine sense of U.S. priorities in the region. Eleven percent of Georgia's overall trade volume comes from Russia, and the country's economy has been further entangled with Russia's after 2022 in ways that would impoverish the country if severed. Georgia, under President Mikheil Saakashvili, fought and lost a war with Russia in 2008 to establish control over two northern breakaway provinces. A reheating of that conflict at the behest of Western powers would be similarly ruinous for Tbilisi.
Demanding that the Georgians commit economic suicide and risk another war with Russia or face a flood of Western sanctions and restrictions is, as it were, not an attractive invitation. The West cannot offer anything remotely commensurate to the degree of hardship and insecurity that it is demanding from the Georgian people as the price of their Euro-Atlantic path. The 2008 crisis demonstrated that the West not only should not but will not fight Russia over Georgia.
There is a recklessness and more than a whiff of cynicism, not lost on Georgian Dream officials, to the West’s appetite for relitigating this question.
Meanwhile, Russia has signaled, in ways that have only grown more credible since 2008, that it will employ all tools at its disposal to balance against the integration of post-Soviet states into the Western security sphere. Far from an affront to democracy, it is Georgian Dream’s highest duty to the Georgian people to recognize these realities on the ground and steer Georgian foreign policy accordingly.
Furthermore, and for many of these reasons, the MEGOBARI Act will force a set of outcomes in Georgia and the region that are opposite of its intended effect. Attempting to strongarm Georgian officials into running roughshod over their own economic and security interests only incentivizes them to further insulate themselves against Western pressure by cultivating relationships with other powers, including its Russian neighbor.
American overreaction to Georgian Dream's well-founded pragmatism toward Moscow will ironically force Tbilisi into a more conciliatory posture with Russia by depriving it of an American partner with which to pursue a multivector foreign policy between East and West. Georgia will aim to soften the blow from Western punitive measures by doubling down on its trade and commercial ties not just with Russia but China, further distancing it from the U.S. and Europe in the long term.
Full diplomatic normalization between Georgia and Russia, previously inconceivable due to the outstanding territorial conflict from 2008, is now squarely within the realm of political possibility. This would clear the path for additional and deeper forms of Russo-Georgian cooperation, potentially even on security issues, with the effect of further peeling Georgia away from the West.
It is tempting to conclude from this sobering diagnosis that the MEGOBARI law's central conceit lies in its wrong-headed tactics, but that would be mistaking the symptom for the underlying disease. The deeper problem is that this law and initiatives like it proceed from a purist vision of Euro-Atlantic integration that forces not just Georgia but all post-Soviet states to pick sides between the West and Russia in ways that are harmful to these countries and do not advance any tangible American interests.
U.S. policy toward Georgia should instead proceed from the reality that America is not made more prosperous or secure by fashioning Georgia into a forward operating base against Russia whilst punishing Georgians who do not share this vision. The U.S., simply put, has no core interests that would justify the costly, dangerous, and counterproductive agenda of setting up a possible military confrontation with Russia over the right to maintain a web of de jure alliances and de facto dependencies in that part of Eurasia.
Georgia and many other post-Soviet states seek, for readily understandable reasons, robust ties with the West without being dragged into an overtly hostile footing with Russia, the dominant regional player. Washington has every reason to approach relations with countries like Georgia on exactly those terms, as they provide a low-cost, low-risk way of remaining engaged in the region while avoiding security spirals with Russia and thereby supporting regional stability.
It is clear in light of present circumstances that Tbilisi should be encouraged to pursue a multivector policy between East and West as the best course for all involved. Yet this will require part of the policymaking community to divest from the “with us or against us” mindset guiding the MEGOBARI bill in favor of a strategy that embraces, rather than dilutes, the sovereignty of local actors and their capacity to pursue strategies as nuanced as the challenges they face.
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