The meeting of NATO defence ministers and Munich Security Conference has left unanswered the question over whether the Biden administration will bring remaining U.S. troops home from Afghanistan by May 1, in accordance with the U.S.-Taliban agreement. The ambiguity of European and U.S. statements following the meeting may be intended to pressure the Taliban and Afghan government back to the negotiating table. But indecision this close to the deadline risks throwing away a one-time opportunity to leave Afghanistan.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s remarks at the NATO meeting assured partners that the “U.S. remains committed to a diplomatic effort to end the war,” but also that the United States will not take a “hasty or disorderly withdrawal” from Afghanistan after nearly twenty years. As a result, the Biden administration is pushing itself into a corner in which it will likely forfeit a one-time opportunity to leave by May without having to broker a new understanding with the Taliban, a path which would be fraught with risk and uncertainty.
The consequences of unilaterally ignoring the May withdrawal deadline will be the dissolution of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, placing U.S. soldiers back in the crosshairs of the Taliban, and an end to intra-Afghan negotiations. A peace agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan government may be unlikely if the United States leaves, but it is dead on arrival if Washington chooses to ignore the deadline altogether.
An endless U.S. war effort will be left as the only remaining option. The passing of the withdrawal deadline will coincide with the beginning of the Taliban’s fighting season and violence will surge even more. This will lead to calls in Washington to cease diplomatic outreach with the Taliban and increase troop levels. If President Biden resists these calls and instead seeks to leave Afghanistan, then any date he chooses will be labeled as “arbitrary” since the May deadline will have passed. This will most likely lead to a doubling down of the counterinsurgency effort of the last twenty years.
NATO partners may also pressure Biden to remain in Afghanistan. The NATO mission in Afghanistan known as Resolute Support was intended as a training mission and that largely remains the case for countries like Germany and Italy. But the majority of combat missions are U.S.-led and the Pentagon provides twice as many troops as the next largest NATO contributor which is Germany. The United Stateshas accounted for 67 percent of all coalition deaths throughout the war in Afghanistan with the U.K. and Canada accounting for the majority of the rest.
The NATO mission in Afghanistan remains a U.S.-led war and it is therefore reasonable for President Biden to pursue an exit that advances U.S. interests. Still, it is crucial that Washington provide partners who have supported Washington in Afghanistan adequate time to withdraw their own remaining troops. This is why the Biden administration should make it clear to NATO sooner rather than later that it is leaving Afghanistan.
Policy reviews are important but the world does not stop spinning as they occur nor do the opportunity costs. Regional diplomacy to push the Taliban toward a ceasefire and Kabul toward an interim government appears to be underway. The Biden administration should participate in such initiatives. But it should not use U.S. troops as a source of coercive leverage in diplomatic efforts because ultimately that runs counter to the goals of diplomacy. Now is the time to bring U.S. troops home before it is too late.
Adam Weinstein is Deputy Director of the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute, whose current research focuses on security and rule of law in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
Then-Vice President Joe Biden during a tour of the largest military training facility in Afghanistan in 2011. (Photo by Chief Petty Officer Brian Brannon/public domain)|Afghan national army Chief of Staff Gen. Sher Mohammad Karimi meets Vice President Joe Biden during a tour of the largest military training facility in Afghanistan in 2011. (
Top photo credit: Bonn, Western Germany. February 04, 2025. Friedrich Merz, chancellor candidate (CDU), speaks to voters at a CDU election campaign tour stop at congress center WCCB. (Shutterstock/Ryan Nash Photography)
The German election set for February 23 has been coasting toward a predictable outcome since the collapse of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s three-party coalition in December.
Friedrich Merz, the center-right leader of the opposition Christian Democrat CDU-CSU, remains comfortably ahead of his nearest rival, the populist nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD). In order to become chancellor, Merz will have to form a coalition with either the center-left SPD or the Greens, or possibly both.
This outcome risks producing a new iteration of the unpopular, fractious three-party coalition led by Olaf Scholz.
The major novelty of the race is the unprecedented level of support (about 20%) for AfD. Three mass killings in the last three months — in Magdeburg’s Christmas market, in Aschaffenburg and most recently in Munich — have cast a long shadow over the election campaign. All three perpetrators were of Middle Eastern origin and, in two of the three cases, had applied unsuccessfully for asylum.
These events have boosted the fortunes of the AfD in its second-place position behind the CDU-CSU. The CDU-CSU lead over AfD was 15% as recently as mid-November; it may now be as low as 8 percentage points. The first televised debate of the campaign, held February 9, featured only Merz and Scholz, whose SPD is now polling at about 16%.
As the margin between CDU-CSU and AfD narrowed, Merz sponsored a resolution in the Bundestag calling for tougher measures against irregular migration and prompt deportation of failed asylum seekers. On January 29, this resolution passed with support from the AfD. Merz, in the minds of his many critics, had broken the “firewall” taboo — the pledge of all mainstream parties not to cooperate with the AfD. His move was met by very large protest marches in Berlin and other cities. Merz now insists that CDU-CSU will never violate its pledge not to cooperate with AfD.
Over the course of the campaign, neither Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD) nor the Greens led by Economy Minister Robert Habeck has gained much momentum, as both bear responsibility for the weak economy. Three smaller parties remain near the 5% threshold for winning seats. They are the antiwar populist left party (BSW) led by Sahra Wagenknecht, Die Linke (the Left) headed by Gregor Gysi, and the business-friendly Free Democrats under Christian Lindner.
Shock therapy for Europe
Last week’s diplomatic blitz by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth at the Ukraine Defense Contact group, followed by Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, brought a shocking new focus on the viability of staying the course on Ukraine and on U.S. commitments to European security, raising the stakes in Germany’s election.
Vance’s critique of Germany’s “firewall” was taken as an attempt to boost support for the AfD. Both Scholz and SPD Defense Minister Pistorius reacted viscerally in Munich, while Foreign Minister Baerbock contended that the U.S. could yet be persuaded to revise its positions on a Ukraine settlement, in particular on territorial concessions to Russia and NATO membership for Ukraine.
Conference organizers had revoked invitations to both AfD and BSW because their delegations had walked out of the speech by Ukraine president Zelensky at last year’s event. Vance pointedly made time to meet with Alice Weidel while in Munich. For good measure, Presidential envoy Keith Kellogg made clear at Munich that Europeans would not participate in the initial phase of U.S. Russia talks on a settlement. The opening of talks by the Americans and Russia in Riyadh on February 17 followed with what, for Europe, was dizzying and disorienting speed.
A German diplomat told Politico that Europe had received repeated wake up calls (about the imperative to increase military capabilities) but had “kept hitting the snooze button.” It is hard to understand how European analysts could have failed to prepare any contingency for the kind of dramatic reorientation of American policy on Ukraine that had been forecast clearly before and during Trump’s election campaign.
Merz has recently come over toward the SPD’s position on relaxing the so-called debt brake that has stood in the way of any substantial rise in defense spending in Germany. This may be a small indication that the wake-up call has at last been heard.
The final televised debate of the campaign on Feb. 16, included all four of the leading candidates — Merz, Scholz, Robert Habeck (Greens) and AfD’s Alice Weidel. Merz restated his support for sending German long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine, and Scholz continued to oppose this. Neither man noted that this long-rehearsed question will be moot if the U.S. succeeds in its attempt to reach a ceasefire or otherwise make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
Merz told Weidel that her “neutral” position on the Ukraine war would, in his mind, disqualify AfD from ever being in government. Scholz harshly mocked AfD’s proposals for reviving the economy. Nevertheless, this debate, planned long before Vance’s challenge about the firewall, implicitly conferred a degree of respectability to the AfD’s standing in the race.
While clearly angry at Vance’s remarks, Scholz nevertheless has restated Germany’s abiding imperative to avoid any breach between the U.S. and NATO’s European members. Germany — traditionally more reliant on American defensive guarantees than nuclear armed Britain or France — seems likely to reconcile itself to a proposed negotiated settlement so long as the outcome for Ukraine can be depicted as representing a foundation for its national survival and recovery.
Germany will accept burden shifting toward Europe in NATO, in the interest of averting any open breach between the U.S. and Europe. In keeping with the German center-right’s Atlanticist tradition, Merz has been comparatively circumspect about the implications of the abrupt Washington policy shift on Ukraine. The antiwar AfD and the BSW have both welcomed the pursuit of negotiations.
Getting real vs. magical thinking
Although the Paris summit convened on Feb 16 by Macron produced no consensus among Europeans on next steps, the focus given to whether and when to deploy peacekeepers indicates that the US has managed to shift the conversation toward accepting the fait accompli of the U.S. about-turn on Ukraine-Russia.
On balance, despite the intense anxiety around the fate of Ukraine and reaction to the shift in American policy, Germany’s election is unlikely to bring any unsettling surprise.
A perpetual fever dream of the National Security Establishment is to speed up the process of buying new weapons. Few should be surprised by this considering that it can take years, and sometimes decades, to field a new piece of hardware.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is expected to shortly issue new acquisition guidance meant to deliver new tech to the troops “at the speed of relevance,” to steal a common Pentagon refrain. Before the new administration’s reformers begin implementing solutions, they need to understand the true nature of the problem.
The current acquisition process is far from perfect and does need to be streamlined, but the process itself is not the primary reason new weapon programs blow through their budgets and fall years behind schedule.
Acquisition programs struggle mainly because they are poorly conceived. The fundamental mindset within the national security establishment is that more technology is always better, but this causes the majority of delays and cost growth. Service leaders and their allies in the defense industry work to pack as many features as possible into every weapon and then wonder why they can’t get all the components to work together properly.
An emblematic example is the F-35’s Distributed Aperture System notably represented by the program’s $400,000 helmet. Fighter pilots need to be able to see what is happening in the sky around them. History has shown that the pilot who spots the enemy first is typically the one who wins.
The best fighters throughout history like the F-86 and the F-16 were designed to improve the pilot’s visibility by having them sit high in the fuselage with a clear bubble canopy. Pilots of those aircraft could use the greatest ocular device yet discovered… the human eyeball.
Such an organic solution apparently would not suffice for the F-35, so designers had to devise something more befitting of the 21st century. Enter the Distributed Aperture System. It uses a series of cameras mounted in the skin of the jet which projects images into the pilot’s helmet visor. Program boosters called the system “magical” and used it as a major selling point for the F-35.
The Government Accountability Office offered a different assessment. In a 2023 report, their analysts singled out the Distributed Aperture System as a primary degrader of the F-35’s full mission capable rate. A reasonable person would be justified to believe that F-35 pilots at least find the system useful.
As it turns out, that is not the case. When asked about the DAS by a documentary crew, an F-35 pilot said that if he needs to see what is beneath him, he simply rolls the jet on its side and looks with his own eyes because he can see “with much higher clarity.”
The term of art for adding needless complexity to weapon programs is “gold plating.” Defense industry leaders engage in the practice for both financial and political reasons. They get to charge the government for the extra costs to research and develop the technologies.
Additionally, each new gadget becomes a subcontract to be awarded to a supplier. These suppliers are scattered all over the country. The member of Congress representing the district containing one of these suppliers suddenly has a vested political interest in the program’s survival. The same goes for the state’s two senators.
Sticking with the F-35 example, Lockheed Martin now claims suppliers for that program in all 50 states according to a helpful interactive map created by the contractor.
Once all of these components are built, they have to be assembled into a F-35. Bolting everything together can be problematic, but system integration at the software level is the real trouble in the information age. The Pentagon’s top testing official recently reported that software development in the F-35 program has stagnated as developers discover flaws faster than they can create fixes.
Any acquisition reform proposal coming from the new administration that does not address the gold plating tendency will fail to produce the desired results. Simply streamlining the weapon buying process without fundamentally changing design practices will only deliver warfighters more acquisition failures at a slightly faster pace.
Accountable acquisition reform begins with a shift in thinking. Weapons are only tools people use in combat. As anyone who has reached for a screwdriver knows, the best tools are the simplest ones that can perform the intended function. In the event that U.S. warfighters employ weapons in combat – which the United States must proactively prevent at all costs – they must be effective. Any additional features make the tool more expensive and are just as likely to distract from the task.
Simplicity is a key in weapon design. Simple weapons have shorter development cycles and cost less. Secretary Hegseth can save money and deliver capabilities to the troops faster merely by changing the way people think about weapon design.
The war in Ukraine has served as a reminder to the general public that both Russia and the U.S. have massive nuclear weapons arsenals and that they continue to pose an existential threat to human civilization, and perhaps even to our very survival on the planet.
But do we actually know why? As a nuclear scientist and weapons expert I think it would be helpful to briefly contemplate, as a survival enhancing exercise, the effects of a single nuclear detonation on Washington, Kyiv or Moscow.
Keep in mind that a single Russian Sarmat or SS-18 intercontinental missile carries ten 800-kiloton bombs, and the Russian intercontinental missile arsenal can launch about 400 of those bombs within minutes of a launch command. Let’s focus here on the effects of a single 800-kiloton nuclear detonation at a height of about one mile above an American city.
The detonation of this nuclear weapon would release the near explosive equivalent of a million tons of TNT within a 100 millionths of a second and within a volume of roughly a cubic foot. Because so much energy is released so quickly and in such a small volume, the temperature inside the explosion will reach roughly 100 million degrees celsius, about five times that of the center of the sun.
Within a millionths of a second, the explosive energy heats the surrounding air to a million degrees, creating a “fireball” of superheated air with an inner pressure of tens of millions of pounds per square inch. This fireball initially expands at about one million miles per hour, and within a second becomes a bubble of hot air of about one mile in diameter.
As this superheated air-bubble expands to its maximum diameter, its edges push against the surrounding air, producing a compressed blast wave of enormous power and extent.
The light and heat from the fireball are so intense at this point that a detonation over Detroit or Kiev at night, out of line-of-sight due to the earth’s curvature, could still be seen as a flash of light low in the sky from Washington DC or Moscow, respectively. It will be bright enough at 50 miles to cause retinal burns if individuals happen to be looking towards the detonation.
At a range of nearly eight miles, the fireball will appear almost 100 times brighter than a noon hour desert sun, and will ignite clothing, curtains, grass, and light vegetation.
At five miles, it will appear more than 200 times brighter than a noon hour desert sun, and would cause warping of metal surfaces, explosive combustion of the paint off walls, and ignitions of essentially all combustible materials in the fireballs’s line-of-sight. Brittle concrete and granite surfaces would be so rapidly heated that they would explode into dust. Black smoke from partially combusted materials will fill the air, making it impossible to even read street signs from ground level.
At ranges yet nearer to the detonation, heating effects will be so intense, that human flesh would burn explosively into carbon, and asphalt on the streets would melt and, in some cases, vaporize.
At that point, the resulting fires over an area of between 100 and 150 square miles on Earth would efficiently heat large volumes of air near and above the ground. The energy released by this mass fire would be 15 to 50 times greater than the energy produced by the nuclear detonation. The rising hot air would reach wind speeds of 300 miles per hour and be so intense they would knock airplanes above the fire zone from the sky.
This “chimney effect” would pull cool air from outside the fire zone towards the center of the fire at speeds of hundreds of miles per hour. These superheated ground-winds of more than hurricane force would further intensify the fire.
At the edge of the fire zone, the winds would be powerful enough to uproot trees of several feet in diameter and suck people from outside the fire into it, fill city streets with flames and firebrands, break in doors and windows, and cause the fire to jump, sometimes hundreds of feet, swallowing anything not already violently combusting.
This ferocious “hurricane of fire” would also be accompanied by the release of large amounts of potentially lethal toxic smoke and combustion gases, creating an environment of extreme heat, high winds, and toxic agents in target areas.
These combined effects will produce a lethal ground-environment for three to six hours while the fire burns most intensely.
Those who tried to escape through the streets would have been incinerated by the boiling hot hurricane-force winds filled with firebrands and flames. Those able to find shelter in the lower-level sub-basements of massive buildings would likely suffocate from fire-generated gases or be cooked alive as their shelters heated to oven-like conditions.
After the fire burns out, the street pavement would be so hot that even tracked vehicles would not be able to pass over it for days. Buried, unburned material from collapsed buildings throughout the fire zone could burst into flames when exposed to air — even months after the firestorm had ended.
As the nuclear debris cloud rises, it will drag with it the radioactive isotopes produced during the detonation of the nuclear weapon. One hour after the detonation, the radioactive isotopes will be about 10,000 times more radioactive than the radiation released in the Chernobyl accident, which occurred in 1986. Since these radioactive isotopes are mostly “short-lived,” within one day the activity levels will drop to several hundred times that of the Chernobyl release.
Some very small fraction of these radioactive materials would be falling to the ground within the hours following the nuclear attack, and since the activity of these materials is so high, they will produce radiation on the ground near and downwind of the target area that will be lethal within hours to exposed individuals.
Facing these realities, can anyone know how to define the meaning of winning a nuclear war?
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