These are the three social evils Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. warned would destroy America from within: Militarism, materialism, and racism. Decades later, they help explain the divisions in our country that led to the January 6 attack by protesters on the U.S. Capitol. Of the three, however, the role our recent wars have played in exacerbating these conditions is often the most overlooked.
Video produced by Khody Akhavi.
shutterstock/Lightspring
Last month the Justice Department published a press release announcing that seven Chinese nationals have been charged with “conspiracy to commit computer intrusions and conspiracy to commit wire fraud.”
This announcement came on the heels of warnings from Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Director Jen Easterly and National Cyber Director Harry Coker that Chinese hackers are making a strategic shift to target critical infrastructure, are likely able to launch cyberattacks that could cripple that infrastructure, and are increasingly exploiting Americans’ private information.
It’s apparent then that a conflict between China and the United States would include disruptive, dangerous cyberwarfare. Indeed, as U.S.-China military-to-military communications restart, cyber needs to become a key part of these conversations to develop bilateral crisis management mechanisms.
Unfortunately, cyber crisis management is still in its infancy. The United States and China have engaged in multiple bilateral and multilateral dialogues on cyber-related issues in the past. For example, the 2015 summit between President Obama and Xi Jinping created a series of agreements — tacit and explicit — on cyber espionage, the joint investigation of cybercrimes, and a process that eventually produced the U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues.
However, direct U.S.-China official dialogues have not led to substantial cooperation. President Biden warned Xi during a recent call against China using cyberattacks to target sensitive infrastructure, but no solutions nor potential dialogues appear to have been brought up.
There is no dearth of unofficial dialogues, and some have proposed discrete steps that would enhance U.S.-China cyber relations and crisis management mechanisms, such as coming to mutual definitions of cyber terms, strengthening bilateral communications, and promoting restraint in cyber usage. Unfortunately, despite the many attempts at facilitating U.S.-China cyber dialogues and improved relations, no concrete standards or guidelines on cyber usage in a potential conflict have been adopted, nor have U.S.-China cyber relations appeared to improve.
Both Washington and Beijing are familiar with the potential harm cyber can do when expertly implemented. Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm known to be created and implemented by the United States and Israel, damaged the centrifuges Iran used for its nuclear-enrichment program. China’s cyberespionage campaigns to steal sensitive technologies and designs from American businesses have led to strategic vulnerabilities — like with the theft of designs for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s self-diagnostic system in 2009.
Concerns about cyber espionage have been a defining feature of U.S.-China technology and business relations since the early 2000s, extending into the rhetoric to ban TikTok. Cyber exploits could cut off power grids, like in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016, cripple wastewater treatment facilities, or render sources of vital information useless — as witnessed in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.
If a conflict were to break out between the United States and China, wherever and however it might, the reality is that cyber will be a key weapon in a well-rounded arsenal of traditional and emerging weaponry. Fortunately, there may be some space for negotiation. A RAND study — built upon “insights from interviews with leading Chinese and American cyberspace policy experts across [their] governments, militaries, think tanks, and academic communities” — found that China may be more likely to come to a bilateral agreement wherein both the United States and China agree not to cyberattack each other and limit the targeting of critical infrastructure.
There is also some precedent which would suggest that the Chinese government thinks that cyberattacking critical infrastructure should be off-the-table. In 2015, China participated in the drafting of and signed a note by the Secretary General as a member of a United Nations group of governmental experts, in which the participants recommended that states not target critical infrastructure with cyber. Further emblematic of this willingness to find common ground on cyberthreats is China’s 2015 agreement with Russia to not cyberattack one another. However, the RAND study also found that trust was one of the main impediments to creating such an agreement with the U.S. Neither the U.S. nor Chinese interviewees knew if they could fully trust the other side to adhere to any agreements against this kind of cyberespionage and exploitation.
Thus, any agreement like the China-Russia cyber “non-aggression pact” would need to foster transparency and trust between the relevant Chinese and U.S. parties. The agreement would need to be paired with bilateral channels designed to communicate information on cyber events, both mundane and arising from a crisis. Transparent forums between the U.S. and Chinese military, with a focus on cyber elements, is an absolutely vital step to navigate crises effectively and promote a restraint-based foreign policy and defense strategy, especially given the pervasive nature of cyber threats.
Luckily, in recent months, Washington and Beijing have re-established military-to-military communications, expressed continued interest in establishing dialogues on the use of artificial intelligence (AI), and have otherwise collaborated in the United Nations on a resolution establishing principles for AI development. While it is not cyber-specific, AI and cyber are conjoined issues. It shows that there may be space for U.S.-China collaboration on emerging technologies, which could lead to more robust dialogues and crisis management mechanisms. These could be vital trust-building exercises that lead to further cooperation on issues related to cybersecurity.
Ultimately, there is a path forward for the United States and China to come to an understanding on cyberwarfare in at least some domains. To this end, both sides need to create new bilateral forums to discuss and advance crisis management coordination on these issues of common concern about cyberwarfare.
Ursula von der Leyen (CDU, l), President of the European Commission, stands at the lectern in the European Parliament building. Josep Borrell, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, sits in the background. The EU Parliament is debating the attack on Israel and preparations for the EU summit at the end of October. REUTERS
The EU has condemned Iran’s April 14 drone and missile attack against Israel conducted in response to Israel’s lethal bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria on April 1. However, while the condemnation is unanimous, EU officials and individual member states have different positions on the issue.
Those differences broadly reflect the pre-existing divisions on the Middle East since the war in Gaza started last October. Even though the EU is united in its calls for restraint and de-escalation, these divisions are limiting the diplomatic role Europe could play in actually bringing those objectives closer to reality.
The main fault-line is between the moderates who see the Gaza war’s root causes and in turn push for an immediate ceasefire, and the hawks who prioritize Israel’s nearly unqualified right using any means necessary to defend itself above any other consideration. These attitudes have conditioned responses to the conflict between Israel and Iran.
Hours after the Iranian attack, the EU high representative for foreign policy Josep Borrell issued a brief condemnatory statement on behalf of 27 member states. In a separate interview, Borrell, a key member of the moderate camp, evaded the question of whether the EU would support Israel if Tel Aviv were to retaliate against Tehran. Instead, he emphasized the need for de-escalation and warned against sleepwalking into a regional war.
He also said there are those who’d wish such an escalation to occur because would divert attention from the war and humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, in what could be interpreted as a snipe at Israel’s beleaguered Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.
Among the EU member states, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, a notable moderate, made sure to condemn, alongside the Iranian attack, “all forms of violence that threaten the safety and well-being of innocent civilians,” in a likely reference to Gaza, and called for conflict resolution through diplomatic channels. In another comment, Sanchez didn’t even mention Iran, limiting his statement to an expression of a “maximum concern” at the regional escalation.
At the other end of the spectrum is Germany which accused Iran of bringing the Middle East to the brink of the abyss through its “dangerous behavior.” The German foreign ministry vowed to “diplomatically secure Israel’s defensive victory” — without explaining what such a victory would entail and how it is supposed to be achieved all the while preventing a further escalation.
Other European heavy-hitters — France and the non-EU United Kingdom — have equally taken strongly pro-Israeli stances. French President Emmanuel Macron called for Iran’s isolation as an alternative to the “conflagration,” including through “convincing the countries of the region that Iran is a danger, imposing more sanctions and pressure against Iran, also on its nuclear activities.”
British Foreign Minister David Cameron, meanwhile, offered a “complete understanding” for Israel’s bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, on the grounds that it housed the IRGC personnel which “have done terrible things all over the world.” Cameron was seemingly oblivious to the fact that it’s a common practice for diplomatic premises to host military or intelligence officers, some of whom may not be the paragons of respect for human rights and adherence to international law.
It seems that on the EU level, the hawks are having an upper hand. At its informal discussion on April 16, the bloc’s foreign ministers agreed to pursue new sanctions against Iran concerning, notably, the alleged provision of drones and missiles to Tehran’s allies in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shiite groups in Syria and Iraq. They also agreed to identify and close whatever loopholes remain in the implementation of the existing sanctions on the supply of the components used for the production of unmanned aerial vehicles in Iran. These new measures are expected to be imposed on Iran at the formal foreign ministers meeting on April 22.
Yet the hawks’ victory does not seem to be complete: contrary to a push from some member states and support from Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission and formally Borrell’s boss, there is still no agreement on the terrorist designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Borrell reiterated his position that such a listing would require a court decision from an EU member state that would have established the IRGC’s involvement in terrorist activity on the EU soil. Presently, there is no such judicial ruling. The real reason, however, seems to be political: reluctance to further deteriorate the already seriously strained relations with Iran over a mostly symbolic designation.
The EU is right in calling Iran to the task — a strike on a sovereign state, in the circumstances it took place, is a flagrant violation of the international law and cannot be accepted as a new normal. Yet the unambiguity of the condemnation of Iran’s actions and the alacrity with which the direction of the new sanctions has been agreed stands in a sharp contrast with Europe’s inability to bring the tiniest of consequences to bear on Israel, six months after its destructive war in Gaza.
Equally of note, France and Britain, together with the United States, blocked a statement in the U.N. Security Council condemning Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria — a statement that, according to some experts, could have prevented an Iranian retaliation.
Taking a tough stance on Iran, while justified on its own terms in light of Tehran’s actions, seems to be a price Europe is willing to pay in order to convince Israel to exercise restraint in its own retaliation plans. However, de-escalation imperative requires that attempts to reassure Israel of Europe’s support be balanced by an outreach to Tehran.
If Europe were to follow Macron’s and other hawks’ calls for Iran’s isolation, it would risk losing whatever leverage it still retains there. And Europe would need that leverage if it were to try to convince Tehran not to unleash an even stronger response to Israel’s hypothetical retaliation.
Refugees from Sudan wait to be transported to the transit camp in the town of Renk near the border after crossing the border into South Sudan, April 4, 2024 via Reuters
On the morning of April 15, 2023 in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan,the country’s de facto national army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) took up arms against one another. Through temporary ceasefires and multiple attempts by foreign countries and international bodies to mediate an end to the war, the fighting persists.
Over the past year, the civil war has created one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises. Thousands have been killed and over eight million have been displaced. With over 6.5 million people internally displaced, Sudan is home to the highest number of internally displaced people in the world. Relentless fighting has forced many to leave Sudan entirely, with 1.5 million having fled to neighboring states as refugees.
The regionalization of this conflict is risking further destabilizing the wider Horn of Africa and Gulf regions, with regional powers now becoming involved. The UAE has reportedly provided military weapons to the RSF while Egypt has reportedly supported the SAF. A recent report suggests Iran is providing drones to SAF forces, which has helped them regain lost territory in and around Khartoum.
As more players become implicated in the military outcome of the war and as the humanitarian crisis deepens, the war is becoming increasingly complex and layered. Yet, at its most basic level, this conflict is of a genre as old as war itself. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who heads the SAF, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (commonly called “Hemedti”), who leads the paramilitary RSF, are vying for power. Each is hoping to be the sole leader of Sudan.
Though now rivals engaged in a vicious war, Al-Burhan and Hemedti were once allied military leaders. In 2019, the two worked jointly to overthrow the country’s long-time dictator, Omar al-Bashir, who had led the country since 1989. Following the successful coup, street protests erupted calling for a rapid transition of power to a civilian-led government. On June 3, 2019, the SAF and RSF responded violently, killing over 100 people in Khartoum. During the massacre, over 70 men and women were raped by RSF personnel.
Following international pressure, in August 2019 the military leaders agreed to allow for the formation of a transitional military-civilian government — the Transitional Sovereign Council — with elections scheduled to be held in 2023. But in October 2021, just over two years after the formation of the transitional government, the two military leaders again worked together to overthrow the government and regained full control over Sudan.
As the two sought to establish a governing structure in the months after this second coup, differences emerged between the two leaders’ visions for the future of Sudan’s government.
Al-Burhan sought to allow many of the political elites formerly allied with al-Bashir to reenter government. Hemedti, a Darfuri Arab, opposed such a plan, concerned that reinstating the old political guard would eventually return Sudan to a governing structure too similar to that which they overthrew, and erode his standing in the face of political elites who look down on those, like him, who are from Darfur.
Another essential point of disagreement was in the plan to unify the two armed forces into a single national force. Al-Burhan, whose SAF serves as the de facto military of the country, demanded that Hemedti’s RSF force integrate into the SAF within two years. Hemedti, however, wanted the integration period to be spread out over a decade, giving his paramilitary more autonomy in case conflict resumed.
Following months of rising tensions, Hemedti deployed RSF forces to strategic locations throughout the country, including Khartoum, in anticipation of armed conflict. In the early hours of April 15, 2023, the RSF attacked SAF bases across the capital, including at the city’s airport, signaling the start of what would turn out to be the region’s most devastating conflict in many years.
Despite having fewer fighters, in the year since the civil war began, the RSF has successfully gained control over much of the capital and large portions of the country’s western provinces in the Darfur region.
As conflict has spread, civilian suffering has reached levels unprecedented even for a region well acquainted with war, displacement, and humanitarian disaster.
The humanitarian toll is hitting children the heaviest. UNICEF estimates that 24 million children are at risk of “generational catastrophe.” Of these, 14 million are in dire need of humanitarian support and 3.7 million are acutely malnourished. With 19 million children out of school, the long-term effects on the mental development of children will continue long after the war has ended.
Despite the massive humanitarian challenges facing the Sudanese people, international humanitarian support has fallen far short of what is needed. OCHA — the U.N.’s humanitarian agency — estimates that out of the $2.5 billion needed to fund a sufficient humanitarian response in 2024, only $155.2 million has been received thus far, amounting to just 6% of the needed support for this calendar year. The U.S. has provided 10% of that humanitarian aid. For 2023, OCHA says that 51% of the total funding needed for humanitarian relief was received.
The humanitarian crisis has been augmented by both armed groups committing widespread and severe human rights abuses across the country. Both forces have summarily killed civilians and ransacked cities, looting and then destroying unwanted property, including homes. The RSF and SAF have also both forcibly enlisted men and boys, threatening to kill them if they refuse to fight.
A U.N. report determined that between May and November of last year, the RSF committed at least 10 attacks against civilians in El-Geneina, the capital of West Darfur province, killing thousands, most of whom were part of the African Masalit ethnic group. The report also reveals that by mid-December, at least 118 people — including 19 children — had suffered from sexual violence, including being raped and gang raped by members of the military and paramilitary forces.
Throughout Darfur, the RSF has demanded that women leave their homes, forcing many to flee west to bordering Chad. The paramilitary also singles out men, and sometimes boys, systematically killing them one-by-one as they try to escape. Attacks specifically perpetrated against the Masalit community have spurred conversations about whether Darfur is again the site of a genocide.
Despite the remarkable levels of devastation and widespread displacement, the international community has been slow to respond. Relative to other conflicts, many far less devastating than the war in Sudan, this war has received limited media attention and has not been prioritized by countries outside the region. Yet, as the crisis worsens and as the effects spread beyond Sudan’s borders, foreign governments have increased their attention over the past few months.
On February 26, over 10 months into the war, the Biden administration announced the appointment of former congressman Tom Perriello as Special Envoy for Sudan. Tasked with leading the U.S. government’s efforts to resolve the conflict, Perriello — who previously served as U.S. envoy to the Great Lakes region during the Obama administration — has traveled on multiple occasions to the region where he has engaged civil society groups and regional governments in a dialogue with the hope of restarting peace negotiations.
As the war enters its second year of heavy fighting, Perriello will find it difficult to tie the conflict’s many threads together and mediate an end to the war. But with a growing chorus of Sudanese civilians and many throughout the region pleading for an end to the conflict, the Biden administration has done well to increase its focus on ending the war through diplomatic engagement — a sign to those in East Africa that the U.S. is committed to rolling up its sleeves and leading the effort to achieve long-term peace in the region.
