Several parties to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) have engaged in actions that threaten to undermine the agreement. The Iranians have now undertaken five calculated breaches of their commitments. In response, the European signatories France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (“E3”) temporarily triggered the deal’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM) on 14 January 2020. The loss of trust between the three European states and Iran is very clear — the Europeans have attempted to play a mediating role vis-à-vis the United States, which withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, but in Iran’s view have not done enough to preserve the benefits it was promised under the deal.
Moreover, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have lost their face-saving capacity which will be required to get the Iranians to the table. All of this is happening while the U.S. continues to escalate its sanctions pressure against Tehran, with the ostensible goal of getting the Iranians to the table to negotiate a new deal. From Washington's point of view, two other topics should be discussed in addition to Iran’s nuclear program: its missile programs and its destabilizing external behavior.
Credible new actors
A lot is at stake. New actors and an expanded discussion format are needed to reduce tensions, to account for U.S. concerns, and to maintain the substance of the agreement. In terms of new actors, Austria, Finland, and Switzerland could provide important diplomatic support (“good offices”). None are encumbered by previous association with the JCPOA. On the diplomatic stage, they are recognized as experienced, credible, and honest top-class brokers. These “New 3” are also Europeans.
Switzerland is not a member of the European Union, but it does represent U.S. interests in Iran. Their political advantage compared to Germany, France, and the U.K. is in their lower profile, which could make them seem less threatening to U.S. President Donald Trump — though all three would need to resist any attempts at economic blackmail from the United States.
An important first symbolic step would be for Austria and Switzerland to join the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) that France, Germany, and the U.K. established last year to facilitate trade between Europe and Iran by circumventing U.S. sanctions.
Fresh ideas
The “New 3” are neither there to “fill in” the deficits of the three European members of the JCPOA, nor to carry out a parallel foreign policy agenda. The momentum of new EU Foreign Policy High Representative Josep Borrell needs to be coordinated and enriched with fresh ideas. All agree that they are opposed to increased hostility from Washington. Overall, the European position must be visibly strengthened and expanded. The “New 3” will only be heard if they — with all obvious limits — have a recognizable added value to offer.
The “New 3” could bring a renewed push to deescalate tensions. The ”E3” pulled the ripcord on their decision to invoke the DRM in early February by suspending the mechanism that would most likely have led the dispute to the United Nations Security Council and thus to the reimposition of international sanctions against Iran.
Despite their breaches of the JCPOA’s terms regarding uranium enrichment, the Iranians continue to allow the controls and inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency without restrictions, apparently until just recently. The agreement is currently hanging by this thread. Both sides looked into the abyss and are afraid of the measures they have themselves undertaken. But does this look like conflict management? A coolly calculated procedure by the “E3” cannot be granted. The most urgent role of Austria, Finland, and Switzerland would therefore be as a corrective to the course the "E3" has chosen.
Bern, Helsinki, and Vienna could also act as face-saving relay stations between the JCPOA parties for the purposes of confidence-building. For example, they could be the ones to suggest to the Iranians that their expectations of the Europeans cannot be met structurally under the conditions that have been created by the Trump administration — in other words, that it is impossible for the “E3” to find a way to allow Tehran to continue selling oil despite U.S. sanctions.In addition, Bern, Vienna, and Helsinki could be asked to provide a confidential discussion framework in their capitals for official contacts between the main counterparts. The importance of this function, similar to the role Oman played in the preparatory talks between Iran and the U.S. that led to the JCPOA, cannot be overestimated in the current difficult situation.
A broader scope
There are two avenues for expanding the scope of the discussion format beyond Iran’s nuclear program. First, the JCPOA, with all its unprecedented requirements in the nuclear field, serves as a kind of “nuclear-weapon-free zone” agreement for Iran. At the upcoming Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York, it would be a leap forward if the JCPOA, with the help of the Iranians, became the model for talks on the Middle East-wide nuclear weapons-free zone that has been sought for decades, without results.
Second, the “New 3” could play a pioneering role for an innovative path on Iran’s missile program that encourages discussion in Tehran, in order to compensate for the failure of the “E3” to protect Iran’s benefits under the JCPOA. Iran will sooner or later have to include its missile programs in diplomatic talks simply because of Washington's demands. However, the proposals from Europe on this issue lack an understanding of the historically determined central role of ballistic missiles in Iran's military strategy. Tehran's missile arsenal cannot be seen in isolation from the region's political constellations and military dynamics. This is where the arsenals of Iran's main opponents, Saudi Arabia and Israel, come into play, in addition to the U.S. military presence.
It therefore makes sense to refrain from focusing exclusively on Iran's capacities in this area and to pursue a regional approach that also includes the capacities of these two main opponents and thus increases the number of actors (Iran's ally Syria should also be part of this setting). The discussion format is thus not only thematic, but also expanded to include important regional players. In short, no stone should be left unturned to save the nuclear deal with Iran, including the involvement of more parties and a broader scope for negotiations.
Adj. Prof. em. Dr. Bernd W. Kubbig was Project Director at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and Adjunct Professor (Privatdozent) at Goethe University, Frankfurt/M., Germany. He has directed the Program on Missile Defense International; and since 2006 he has been coordinating the international expert group on the Establishment of a Missile Free Zone in the Middle East, culminating in the Routledge study, "Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East." In 2011, he founded the Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East (APOME) and was the Editor of the Policy Brief series. He has specialized in U.S. foreign and security policy, with a focus on the Middle East, missile defense, and space.
Marc Finaud is a former French diplomat who has been seconded to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) between 2004 and 2013 and now works for this international foundation, where he trains diplomats and military officers in international and human security, and conducts research in those fields. During his 36-year career as a diplomat (from 1977 to 2013), he served in several bilateral postings (in the Soviet Union, Poland, Israel, Australia) as well as in multilateral missions (to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations). He holds Master’s degrees in International Law and Political Science. He was also Senior Resident Fellow (WMD Program) at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) between 2013 and 2015. He is now also a Swiss citizen. List of publications: www.gcsp.ch/marc-finauds-publication
The war in Ukraine has served as a reminder to the general public that both Russia and the U.S. have massive nuclear weapons arsenals and that they continue to pose an existential threat to human civilization, and perhaps even to our very survival on the planet.
But do we actually know why? As a nuclear scientist and weapons expert I think it would be helpful to briefly contemplate, as a survival enhancing exercise, the effects of a single nuclear detonation on Washington, Kyiv or Moscow.
Keep in mind that a single Russian Sarmat or SS-18 intercontinental missile carries ten 800-kiloton bombs, and the Russian intercontinental missile arsenal can launch about 400 of those bombs within minutes of a launch command. Let’s focus here on the effects of a single 800-kiloton nuclear detonation at a height of about one mile above an American city.
The detonation of this nuclear weapon would release the near explosive equivalent of a million tons of TNT within a 100 millionths of a second and within a volume of roughly a cubic foot. Because so much energy is released so quickly and in such a small volume, the temperature inside the explosion will reach roughly 100 million degrees celsius, about five times that of the center of the sun.
Within a millionths of a second, the explosive energy heats the surrounding air to a million degrees, creating a “fireball” of superheated air with an inner pressure of tens of millions of pounds per square inch. This fireball initially expands at about one million miles per hour, and within a second becomes a bubble of hot air of about one mile in diameter.
As this superheated air-bubble expands to its maximum diameter, its edges push against the surrounding air, producing a compressed blast wave of enormous power and extent.
The light and heat from the fireball are so intense at this point that a detonation over Detroit or Kiev at night, out of line-of-sight due to the earth’s curvature, could still be seen as a flash of light low in the sky from Washington DC or Moscow, respectively. It will be bright enough at 50 miles to cause retinal burns if individuals happen to be looking towards the detonation.
At a range of nearly eight miles, the fireball will appear almost 100 times brighter than a noon hour desert sun, and will ignite clothing, curtains, grass, and light vegetation.
At five miles, it will appear more than 200 times brighter than a noon hour desert sun, and would cause warping of metal surfaces, explosive combustion of the paint off walls, and ignitions of essentially all combustible materials in the fireballs’s line-of-sight. Brittle concrete and granite surfaces would be so rapidly heated that they would explode into dust. Black smoke from partially combusted materials will fill the air, making it impossible to even read street signs from ground level.
At ranges yet nearer to the detonation, heating effects will be so intense, that human flesh would burn explosively into carbon, and asphalt on the streets would melt and, in some cases, vaporize.
At that point, the resulting fires over an area of between 100 and 150 square miles on Earth would efficiently heat large volumes of air near and above the ground. The energy released by this mass fire would be 15 to 50 times greater than the energy produced by the nuclear detonation. The rising hot air would reach wind speeds of 300 miles per hour and be so intense they would knock airplanes above the fire zone from the sky.
This “chimney effect” would pull cool air from outside the fire zone towards the center of the fire at speeds of hundreds of miles per hour. These superheated ground-winds of more than hurricane force would further intensify the fire.
At the edge of the fire zone, the winds would be powerful enough to uproot trees of several feet in diameter and suck people from outside the fire into it, fill city streets with flames and firebrands, break in doors and windows, and cause the fire to jump, sometimes hundreds of feet, swallowing anything not already violently combusting.
This ferocious “hurricane of fire” would also be accompanied by the release of large amounts of potentially lethal toxic smoke and combustion gases, creating an environment of extreme heat, high winds, and toxic agents in target areas.
These combined effects will produce a lethal ground-environment for three to six hours while the fire burns most intensely.
Those who tried to escape through the streets would have been incinerated by the boiling hot hurricane-force winds filled with firebrands and flames. Those able to find shelter in the lower-level sub-basements of massive buildings would likely suffocate from fire-generated gases or be cooked alive as their shelters heated to oven-like conditions.
After the fire burns out, the street pavement would be so hot that even tracked vehicles would not be able to pass over it for days. Buried, unburned material from collapsed buildings throughout the fire zone could burst into flames when exposed to air — even months after the firestorm had ended.
As the nuclear debris cloud rises, it will drag with it the radioactive isotopes produced during the detonation of the nuclear weapon. One hour after the detonation, the radioactive isotopes will be about 10,000 times more radioactive than the radiation released in the Chernobyl accident, which occurred in 1986. Since these radioactive isotopes are mostly “short-lived,” within one day the activity levels will drop to several hundred times that of the Chernobyl release.
Some very small fraction of these radioactive materials would be falling to the ground within the hours following the nuclear attack, and since the activity of these materials is so high, they will produce radiation on the ground near and downwind of the target area that will be lethal within hours to exposed individuals.
Facing these realities, can anyone know how to define the meaning of winning a nuclear war?
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Top Photo Credit: David Cohen via Shutterstock. Safed, Israel-May 1,2017 Jewish Home parliament member Bezalel Smotrich and Ilan Shohat, mayor of the Tzfat, attend the Israel Memorial Day, commemorating the deaths of Israeli soldiers killed
According to reports, far-right Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said on Sunday that “the goal for 2025 is to demolish more than the Palestinians build in the West Bank.” This comes as the Israeli government is reportedly building almost 1,000 additional housing units in the Efrat settlement close to Jerusalem.
The additional units built for settlers in Efrat would increase the settlement’s size by 40% and block development in the Palestinian city of Bethlehem. The roughly 100 existing settlements in the West Bank host around 500,000 Israeli settlers and are considered illegal under international law.
Sunday’s comments from Smotrich reflect his longstanding hopes for Israeli absorption of the West Bank and the nixing of a two-state solution. He published a lengthy plan in 2017 in this regard entitled “One Hope.”
“We need to and can go back to the post-1948 days, regarding both Israeli Arabs and the Arabs of Judea and Samaria,” he outlined in the plan, the first phase of which is called “Victory Through Settlement.” This, he explained, ”will be realized via a political-legal act of imposing sovereignty on all Judea and Samaria, and with concurrent acts of settlement: the establishment of cities and towns, the laying down of infrastructure as is customary in ‘little’ Israel and the encouragement of tens and hundreds of thousands of residents to come live in Judea and Samaria. In this way, we will be able to create a clear and irreversible reality on the ground.”
"The Arabs of Judea and Samaria will be able to conduct their daily life in freedom and peace, but not to vote for the Israeli Knesset at the first stage” as a way to “preserve the Jewish majority in decision-making in the state of Israel.” He vehemently denies that this system resembles apartheid.
Israel has been carrying out military operations in the West Bank’s north for months now, displacing upwards of 40,000 Palestinians, according to experts, which exceeds displacement levels in 1967 after the Six-Day War when Israel annexed the West Bank from Jordan. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) reports that the IDF has killed at least 876 people in the West Bank and East Jerusalem since Oct. 7, 2023.
“The purpose of the operations is to prevent terror from places a few kilometers from Jewish communities and to prevent a repeat of Oct.7,” said an IDF spokesperson, but the actions have come at a significant cost to civilians. Ramy Abu Siriye, a local barber who was displaced from Tulkarem in January, lamented, “The soldiers are taking over one area after another, destroying homes, infrastructure, and roads.”
Annelle Sheline, Quincy Institute Middle East fellow, said everyone loses with annexation: Palestinians, Israelis, the greater region. “The Israeli government continues to undermine the long-term security of Israeli citizens, which can only truly be achieved alongside security for Palestinians.”
Further normalization between Israel and its Arab neighbors may also be in jeopardy if the West Bank is de facto annexed, threatening the prospect of a Palestinian state. Earlier in February, when President Trump floated forcing Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip, the Saudi Arabian foreign ministry confirmed that further normalization with Israel wouldn’t happen until the establishment of a Palestinian state and that their position was “firm and unwavering.”
The State Department has not yet commented on Smotrich’s remarks or the new settlements in the West Bank.
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Top image credit: Secretary Marco Rubio meets with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique A. Manalo in Munich, Germany, February 14, 2025. (Official State Department photo by Freddie Everett)
Could a recent meeting on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Philippine counterpart Enrique Manalo be the beginnings of a de-escalation in the troubled waters of the South China Sea?
There are only hints in the air so far. But such a shift by Washington (and a corresponding response by the Philippines and China) would be important to calm the waters and mark a turn away from the U.S. being sucked into what could spiral into a military crisis and, in the worst-case scenario, a direct U.S.-China confrontation. But to be effective, any shift should also be executed responsibly.
The State Department spokesperson’s comments on February 14 about the meeting reiterated familiar points on “bilateral coordination addressing China’s destabilizing actions in the South China Sea” and “reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the United States-Philippines Alliance.” A U.S.readout of an earlier Rubio-Manalo call on January 22 was more expansive, speaking of China’s “dangerous and destabilizing actions” undermining “regional peace and stability” and being “inconsistent with international law.” The readout also reaffirmed Washington’s “ironclad commitments to the Philippines under our Mutual Defense Treaty.”
Intriguingly however, both sets of comments did not repeat the key assertion — first made by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 2021 and subsequentlyreaffirmed multiple times by the Biden administration — of the Mutual Defense Treaty extending to “armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft, including those of its Coast Guard, anywhere in the South China Sea.”
The omission may simply be an oversight. But it is important to keep the overall strategic context in mind. A radical U-turn in the Ukraine theater and various other administration moves have indicated that Trump is not averse to a major reorientation of U.S. grand strategy. It would be highly premature to label the new approach as “Restraint,” but the shift on Europe is telling. A recognition of the hard realities of interests and a move away from self-defeating framings such as “democracy v. autocracy” would also be a good thing for the United States to embrace in East and Southeast Asia.
However, there is much less reason to believe that the Trump team will aim for a grand reset with China. Washington’s push to confront China economically has, if anything, only escalated. Trump has appointed several China hawks in the National Security Council and the State Department, none of whom are expected to counsel a reset.
However, the Pentagon now includes some Restraint-oriented voices. One, Andrew Byers, the new deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia, recently suggested (in a paper on U.S.-China relations co-authored with J. Tedford Tyler) “removing U.S. military forces or weapons systems from the Philippines in exchange for the China Coast Guard executing fewer patrols.”
A recent Quincy Institute brief on the U.S.-Philippines alliance in the South China Sea analyzed the stand-off and recommended several specific policy actions by Washington to initiate a de-escalation, keeping the factors of vital interests, proportionality, and sustainability in mind. These include elimination of one or more U.S. military sites in northern Luzon, a withdrawal of the provocative Typhon missile system from the Philippines, a halt to pulling in U.S. allies jointly and militarily into the South China Sea, and a reversal of moves indicating the United States is pulling the Philippines into the Taiwan theater; all in exchange for corresponding de-escalatory actions by China.
But a de-escalation in the South China Sea as a part of a limited security thaw with China (even as economic and security competition intensifies elsewhere), if it indeed comes to pass, must be done responsibly. The Quincy Institute brief also counseled increased support for strengthening Philippine coast guard, naval and infrastructure capacities and continued strong diplomatic support for its lawful claims in the South China Sea.
It’s one thing to de-escalate incrementally, demanding equivalent Chinese actions at each step, but quite another to summarily abandon a weaker ally that Washington has arguably egged on. In all things, the United States ought to keep regional stability and Manila’s agency in mind while attempting an urgently-needed de-escalation.
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