It was December 30, just before Iraqi demonstrators stormed the U.S. Embassy compound in Baghdad’s Green Zone to protest U.S. airstrikes against five Iraqi militia bases that killed more than two dozen militia members, that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded of Iraq’s president and prime minister that their government “guarantee the safety and security of U.S. personnel and property.”
“The secretary made clear the United States will protect and defend its people,” State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus said about her boss’s phone calls, stressing that U.S. personnel were “there to support a sovereign and independent Iraq.” That claim appeared doubtful at the time, given that Washington had conducted its airstrikes without consulting Iraqi authorities in advance, despite the fact that the targeted militia is officially part of the Iraqi armed forces.
The same claim appeared altogether risible four days later, when a U.S. Predator drone struck and killed Iranian Major Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, along with the deputy chairman of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (also officially a part of the Iraqi military), Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, as the two men were leaving the Baghdad International Airport. The attack was carried out without prior consultation with — let alone approval by — Iraqi officials.
A “Sovereign and Independent” Iraq?
Pompeo’s assertion that thousands of U.S. troops, diplomats, spies, and contractors currently deployed to Iraq are there to support a “sovereign and independent Iraq” has taken several more hits since then. The Soleimani killing triggered a quick response from the Iraqi parliament, which on January 5 passed a resolution calling for all foreign military forces to leave the country. The wording might have been universal, but the specific target — the United States — was unmistakable.
The practical effect of parliament’s vote was negligible. Not only was the resolution non-binding, but most of Iraq’s Kurdish and Sunni Arab MPs boycotted the vote, leaving the legitimacy of the outcome in question. Questions swirled as to whether Abdul-Mahdi had the authority to order U.S. forces out of the country. Legally the U.S. is deployed in Iraq under a fairly informal invitation from the Iraqi government, and an Iraqi prime minister could rescind that invitation. But Abdul-Mahdi — who tendered his resignation in November amid waves of public protest — is at the moment only an interim prime minister and may lack the power to take such a step.
But even at this point it started to become clear that the Trump administration had no intention of respecting the wishes of the Iraqi government. Pompeo, for example, told CBS news that the administration was “prepared to help the Iraqi people get what it is they deserve and continue our mission there to take down terrorism,” and told Fox News that “we are confident that the Iraqi people want the United States to continue to be there.” It’s unclear how Pompeo came to possess that information, but clearly if what the Iraqi people wanted was for the U.S. military to leave their country then the administration was not prepared to help them get that.
Pompeo’s boss went even farther. Speaking to reporters on January 6, Donald Trump threatened to punish Iraq with “very big sanctions” if Baghdad moved ahead with any effort to expel U.S. forces. Trump directed most of his anger toward the Ayn al-Asad airbase in Iraq’s Anbar province, which the Pentagon rebuilt after the 2003 U.S. invasion, suggesting he might force the Iraqi government to reimburse the U.S. for that expense.
To Withdraw or Not to Withdraw
What happened next was both a revealing glimpse into the dysfunction of the Trump administration and a comedy of errors. With Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi reportedly wavering a bit on his previous support for removing U.S. forces from the country, the Pentagon sent a letter to his government on January 6 announcing a plan to begin redeploying its forces within Iraq “for onward movement…out of Iraq.” Defense Department officials hurriedly told reporters that there were no plans for a U.S. withdrawal and that the letter was merely an unsigned “draft” that was intended merely for internal discussion and had been forwarded on to Baghdad by mistake.
But Abdul-Mahdi poured cold water on that claim, telling Iraqi cabinet ministers the following day that he’d received an “official” copy of the letter and that his office had even sent it back to the Pentagon to ask for clarification because of a translation discrepancy between its English and Arabic language versions. It is unclear whether the Pentagon is in the habit of translating draft letters into Arabic for internal circulation, but as far as the Iraqi government was concerned the letter was legitimate.
Iran’s retaliation for the Soleimani strike, which took the form of a missile attack against two Iraqi military bases housing U.S. forces early in the morning of January 8, briefly shifted attention away from the letter incident. But Abdul-Mahdi revived it in a phone conversation with Pompeo on Thursday evening, asking the secretary to send a team to Iraq in order to “lay down the mechanisms for implementing” a U.S. withdrawal. On Friday, Pompeo’s State Department replied in very blunt terms that the U.S. would simply not oblige:
"America is a force for good in the Middle East. Our military presence in Iraq is to continue the fight against ISIS and as the Secretary has said, we are committed to protecting Americans, Iraqis, and our coalition partners. We have been unambiguous regarding how crucial our D-ISIS mission is in Iraq. At this time, any delegation sent to Iraq would be dedicated to discussing how to best recommit to our strategic partnership—not to discuss troop withdrawal, but our right, appropriate force posture in the Middle East. Today, a NATO delegation is at the State Department to discuss increasing NATO’s role in Iraq, in line with the President’s desire for burden sharing in all of our collective defense efforts. There does, however, need to be a conversation between the U.S. and Iraqi governments not just regarding security, but about our financial, economic, and diplomatic partnership. We want to be a friend and partner to a sovereign, prosperous, and stable Iraq."
If Pompeo’s blunt rejection of the idea that the Iraqi government is entitled to decide whether or not U.S. forces should leave its territory raises new questions about Washington’s commitment to a “sovereign and independent” Iraq, the latest news tends to suggest quite the opposite. Reviving Trump’s sanctions threat, the administration seems to have embarked on a new “maximum pressure” campaign targeted precisely at Iraq, perhaps even at its territorial integrity.
"The Trump administration warned Iraq this week that it risks losing access to a critical government bank account if Baghdad kicks out American forces following the U.S. airstrike that killed a top Iranian general, according to Iraqi officials,” the Wall Street Journal reported Saturday:
"The State Department warned that the U.S. could shut down Iraq’s access to the country’s central bank account held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a move that could jolt Iraq’s already shaky economy, the officials said.
"Iraq, like other countries, maintains government accounts at the New York Fed as an important part of managing the country’s finances, including revenue from oil sales. Loss of access to the accounts could restrict Iraq’s use of that revenue, creating a cash crunch in Iraq’s financial system and constricting a critical lubricant for the economy."
Needless to say, such a “cash crunch” at a time when there is already clearly popular discontent over country’s economic and political dysfunction could further destabilize Iraq, thus opening new opportunities for ISIS to reconstitute itself and wreak havoc across the country – despite Washington’s insistence that its “military presence” in the country is “solely aimed at continuing the fight against ISIS.”
Ironically, those last words were taken from a communique posted by the State Department Saturday morning regarding a two-day trip by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker to two destinations: Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan, where he met with various Kurdish political leaders; and Abu Dhabi, where he met with the UAE minister of state, Anwar Gargash, and Iraqi Parliamentary Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, Iraq’s highest-ranking Sunni politician. Halbousi had been singled out for praise by Pompeo for condemning the siege of the U.S. embassy, although he later also condemned the killing of Soleimani and Muhandis.
Aside from the fact that Schenker avoided Baghdad, as well as the president and prime minister of Iraq, perhaps the most ominous sign of the Trump administration’s intentions came at the end of the communique in which Schenker is reported to have “thanked the Iraqi, Kurdish, and Emirati people for their support and enduring friendship.”
The wording was strange, to say the least. After all, Iraqi Kurds living in Iraq are Iraqis, so why make the distinction between “Iraqi” and “Kurdish” peoples – a rather sensitive issue in Iraq, as well as in Iran, Syria, and Turkey?
After the U.S. invasion in 2003 the possibility of partitioning Iraq was openly discussed, especially in Washington, DC. Was the State Department hinting that the administration intended to move all of its military forces to Iraqi Kurdistan? Signs from Iraqi Kurdish leaders suggest they would be unenthusiastic about such a redeployment unless it came with some strings attached, presumably related to Kurdish independence. Was the administration suggesting that partition is back on the table? Is this what Pompeo was referring to when he insisted that all U.S. personnel in the country are dedicated to supporting a “sovereign and independent Iraq”?
It’s worth recalling in this regard that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was the only world leader – and Israel the only country – to publicly promote the creation of an independent Kurdish state in the run-up to Kurdistan’s 2017 referendum on seceding from Iraq. Nor was this a new Israeli ambition; dating back to the 1960’s, Israel has supported a number of Kurdish insurgencies in the region.
Of course, in the last three years, Trump has increasingly aligned Washington’s Middle East policies with Netanyahu. He’s slashed aid to the Palestinians, moved the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights. He’s withdrawn from and systematically violated the nuclear deal with Iran (JCPOA), declared the IRGC a terrorist organization, assassinated Soleimani, and pursued his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. Do his latest moves to bully and threaten (possibly with support for partition) Iraq constitute a new “maximum pressure” campaign and an even greater alignment with the Israeli Right?
Derek Davison is an analyst covering U.S. foreign policy and international affairs and the writer/editor of the newsletter Foreign Exchanges. His writing has appeared at LobeLog (where he also served as editor), Jacobin, and Foreign Policy in Focus.
Europeans have become increasingly pessimistic about the chances that Ukraine can recover territories that it has lost since the Russian invasion two years ago, according to a new poll of 12 EU member states.
And an aggregate average of 41 percent of respondents in the 12 countries said they would prefer that Europe “push Ukraine towards negotiating a peace with Russia” compared to 31 percent who said Europe “should support Ukraine in taking back the territories occupied by Russia.”
The poll, which was released by the European Council on Foreign Relations Wednesday, was conducted during the first half of January, before the latest advances by Russian forces in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine, notably in their takeover of the town of Avdiivka, which is likely to add to the impression that Kyiv is increasingly on the defensive.
The survey interviewed a total of more than 17,000 adults in the 12 countries, which included Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden.
It found that continued support for Ukraine’s war aims was strongest in Sweden, Portugal, and Poland where pluralities of respondents said Europe should support Kyiv’s efforts to take back its territory. Support was weakest in Austria, Romania, Italy, Greece, and Hungary, where significant pluralities or large majorities in the five countries said Europe should focus on achieving a negotiated settlement. In France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany, opinion was more divided between the two alternatives.
The poll’s results offered a marked contrast to previous polling by ECFR, according to Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, co-authors of a report released with the survey. In June 2022, ECFR found that many Europeans favored a quick resolution to the war, even if that meant Ukraine would have to give up territory. But buoyed by Ukraine’s battlefield successes in regaining territory one year later, a subsequent poll in 2023 found that a plurality of respondents in nine EU countries that were surveyed at the time wanted to support Ukraine’s war aims and believed they were achievable.
“Now, in the aftermath of Ukraine’s disappointing counteroffensive and amid flagging support in Western capitals, some of that optimism seems to have dissipated,” according to the two co-authors.
Indeed, an aggregate average of only ten percent of respondents in the new poll now believe that Ukraine will defeat Russia, while twice as many, or 20 percent, believe that Moscow will prevail. Across all countries, a plurality of respondents (37 percent on average) believes that a compromise settlement between the two countries will be the most likely outcome.
The survey also queried respondents on the impact of a possible victory by former president Donald Trump in November’s U.S. elections on the Ukraine war. An aggregate average of 43 percent of respondents said a new Trump presidency would make a Ukrainian victory “less likely.” Asked what Europe should do if Trump were to end U.S. aid to Ukraine, an aggregate average of 41 percent respondents said they would favor maintaining (21 percent) or increasing (20 percent) aid to Kyiv, while a third of respondents said they would prefer to follow the U.S. in limiting assistance.
Prior to the war in Ukraine, Russian and Ukrainian interests had already been deadlocked in a heated battle.
But this clash wasn’t being waged on the streets of Kyiv, it was being fought on K Street in Washington D.C. The combatants donned suits, not camouflage. Their targets weren’t hardened military units, they were U.S. policymakers in Congress and the executive branch. Their goal wasn’t total victory, it was to win hearts, minds, and, above all, votes for their cause. This was the lobbying battle before the Ukraine war.
As I documented in a Quincy Institute brief, this David vs. Goliath style battle between a small, relatively low-funded, but remarkably zealous Ukrainian lobby had largely been thwarted by a multi-million dollar lobbying and PR campaign by Russian interests. But when Russian President Vladimir Putin made the disastrous decision to invade Ukraine two years ago, this Russian influence advantage in D.C. quickly evaporated. Within a week of the war's onset, U.S. sanctions effectively decimated Russia’s influence in Washington, forcing a number of top lobbying and public relations firms to sever ties with their Russian clients.
Since then the Ukraine lobby has been largely unopposed in its efforts to steer U.S. foreign policies related to the war. The Ukraine lobby has helped pave the way for more than $100 billion in U.S. assistance to Ukraine and meticulously crafted the media narrative to maintain U.S. public support for Ukraine’s war effort.
The Ukraine Lobby Since the War Began
In the two years since the war in Ukraine began, 46 different firms or individuals have been registered under FARA to represent Ukrainian interests. This includes lobbying heavyweights like BGR Government Affairs, Hogan Lovells, and Hill & Knowlton, as well as international public relations firms like Qorvis Communications. In total, these firms have received nearly $10.92 million from Ukrainian clients since 2022, according to FARA data compiled by OpenSecrets.
Just as in the year before the war — when FARA registrants reported conducting 13,541 political activities on behalf of their Ukrainian clients — the Ukraine lobby has been working feverishly since the war began. A Quincy Institute analysis of FARA records found that, since the war began, Ukrainian interests have reported doing more than 12,000 political activities on behalf of Ukrainian interests, primarily contacting Congress, the executive branch, and media outlets.
By far the busiest firm working on behalf of Ukrainian interests has been Yorktown Solutions, which has represented the Federation of Employers of the Oil and Gas Industry of Ukraine, the Civil Movement For a Just Ukraine, and the Primary Trade Union Organization of State Enterprise National Nuclear Energy Generating Company, better known as "Energoatom."
For just one of these clients — the Federation of Employers of the Oil and Gas Industry — Yorktown has reported doing 8,296 political activities since the war began. To put that remarkable workload in perspective, it equates to an average of more than 11 emails, phone calls, and meetings completed every day on behalf of just one client. No other foreign client registered under FARA has had more work done on their behalf in the past two years, according to a Quincy Institute analysis of FARA records.
Since the war began, Yorktown hasn’t hidden the fact that one of the primary objectives behind all this work is to increase U.S. military assistance to Ukraine. “We’ve gone from energy security to security,” Daniel Vajdich, President of Yorktown Solutions, told Politico less than a month after the war began, explaining the firm's shift away from lobbying related to the Nordstream 2 pipeline and towards acquiring U.S. military assistance for Ukraine.
Vajdich added that, “It is 24 hours, even when we’re sleeping the phone is on, and the phone is going off, and there are phone calls from Kyiv, and there are phone calls from others here in Washington both in and out of government … We speak to the administration. We speak to Capitol Hill. We certainly speak to media as well.”
In addition to its Ukrainian clients, Yorktown has also been working feverishly for the Centre for a European Future, reporting more than 4,000 political activities on behalf of the Belgium based non-profit whose objectives revolve heavily around Ukraine and include, “rebuilding Ukraine,” “joining NATO,” and “securing compensation for the war.”
The Pro-Bono Push for Ukraine
At just under $11 million in reported FARA spending by Ukrainian clients since the war began, the Ukraine lobby isn’t funded at the level of perennial influence powerhouses in Washington, like Saudi Arabia, whose lobbying and public relations firms have received more than $70 million from the Kingdom since 2022, according to OpenSecrets.
But, the actual dollar amount of spending on lobbying, public relations and the other influence efforts done on behalf of Ukrainian interests is deceptive, as many individuals, and even some of the most prominent lobbying firms in D.C., have been working for Ukraine pro-bono. In fact, of the 46 different firms and individuals that have been registered under FARA to represent Ukrainian clients, 29 have done the work for free.
Working for Ukraine pro-bono became somewhat trendy in the Washington influence industry shortly after the war began. Many of the firms registered under FARA to represent Ukrainian interests for free, however, appear to have done little work on behalf of Ukrainian interests. Some reported just a handful of contacts with congressional offices on behalf of Ukraine. Another reported a “one day pro bono effort” for a Ukrainian Parliamentary Delegation to the U.S. In one infamous case, a firm registered under FARA claiming to be working pro-bono for the Ukrainian ambassador to the United Nations, only to deregister just days later after the ambassador publicly explained that he was not actually working with the firm.
On the other hand, a number of lobbying and PR firms have done a considerable amount of work for Ukrainian interests at no charge to their clients. A Quincy Institute analysis of FARA records found that Plus Communications tops this list with nearly 3,000 political activities reported in its pro-bono work for the Ukrainian PR Army, a non-profit organization that purports to help, “global media tell the accurate story of this war through the perspectives of Ukrainian experts, authorities, and witnesses.”
Plus Communications’ work involved pitching interviews with prominent Ukrainian officials to seemingly every mainstream U.S. media outlet, including Fox News, The Washington Post, and NPR.
Another major pro-bono endeavor is being run on behalf of the Ministry of Culture and Informational Policy of Ukraine, specifically in relation to the ministry’s “Advantage Ukraine Initiative,” which seeks to attract international investment in Ukrainian industries, with the top choice being the defense industry.
Several firms are registered under FARA to support this pro-bono initiative, including Hill & Knowlton Strategies, Ogilvy Group, and Group M. The latter has reported nearly 300 emails to major media outlets, most of which were in reference to “ad materials” for Advantage Ukraine. The firm’s FARA filings show these ads include slogans like, “Davos is over. The opportunities in Ukraine have just begun,” and “Imagine an investment where you get applauded by shareholders AND the public?”
Group M’s collaborator on the Advantage Ukraine Initiative, Ogilvy Group, is also one of several firms that have been working pro-bono for Ukraine while taking money from firms that are profiting from the Ukraine war. As Eli Clifton and I previously reported for Responsible Statecraft, Hogan Lovells, BGR Government Affairs, Mercury Public Affairs, Navigators Global, and Ogilvy Group have all done pro-bono work for Ukraine interests while also lobbying on behalf of weapons makers that could profit from the war.
The Ukraine Lobby Today
While the size of the Ukraine lobby has decreased since the early months of the war, 18 firms are still registered under FARA to represent Ukrainian interests. Most of them are still doing the work pro-bono, and many of them remain intent on shaping U.S. foreign policy to Ukraine’s favor. More so than at any time since the war began though, they’re having to fend off an American public which increasingly believes the U.S. is providing too much aid to Ukraine. How this tension pans out remains to be seen, but there is little doubt that the Ukraine lobby has all the ammunition it needs to continue winning the lobbying battle in Washington.
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KYIV, UKRAINE - July 12, 2023: Destroyed and burned Russian military tanks and parts of equipment are exhibited at the Mykhailivska square in Kyiv city centre. (Oleksandr Popenko/Shutterstock)
Two years ago on Feb. 24, 2022, the world watched as Russian tanks rolled into the outskirts of Kyiv and missiles struck the capital city.
Contrary to initial predictions, Kyiv never fell, but the country today remains embroiled in conflict. The front line holds in the southeastern region of the country, with contested areas largely focused on the Russian-speaking Donbas and port cities around the Black Sea.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, having recognized the Russian-occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent days before the invasion, has from the beginning declared the war a “special military operation” to “demilitarize and denazify” Ukraine. His goals have alternated, however, between existential — bringing all of Ukraine into the influence of Russia — and strategic — laying claim to only those Russian-speaking areas in the east and south of the country.
It is in the latter that Russia has been much more successful. Yet after two winters of brutal fighting and hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides, as of the end of 2023 Russia only laid claim to 18% of Ukraine’s territory, as compared to 7% on the eve of the war and 27% in the weeks after the invasion.
Meanwhile, the West’s coffers have been opened — and, as some say, drained — to help Ukraine’s government, led by President Volodymyr Zelensky, defend itself against Moscow.
Regardless, Ukraine’s military forces have been wholly depleted as they compete with a much more resourced and populous Russia. While Ukraine’s military campaign was able to take advantage of Russian tactical mistakes in the first year, its much-heralded counteroffensive in 2023 failed to provide the boost needed not only to rid the country of the Russian occupation, but also to put Kyiv in the best position to call for terms.
If anything, as Quincy Institute experts Anatol Lieven and George Beebe point out in their new brief, “there is now little realistic prospect of further Ukrainian territorial gains on the battlefield, and there is a significant risk that Ukraine might exhaust its manpower and munitions and lay itself open to a devastating Russian counterattack.”
The only and best solution, they say, is to drive all sides to the negotiating table before Ukraine is destroyed.
The narrative of the war — how it began, where it is today — is well documented. On the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, RS thought it might be instructive to look at the numbers — weapons, aid, polling, population, and more — that illustrate the cost and the contours of the conflict over 24 months, and counting.
The U.S. Congress has allocated a total of $113 billion in funding related to the war. The vast majority of this money went directly to defending Ukraine ($45.2 billion in military aid) and keeping its government and society functioning ($46 billion in economic and humanitarian aid). Other funds went to rearming allies ($4.7 billion) and expanding U.S. military operations in Europe ($15.2 billion).
After two years of war, that funding has dried up. The Biden administration, which once shipped two or three new weapons packages each month, has not sent Ukraine a major arms shipment since Dec. 27, 2023. As Congress struggles to pass an additional $60 billion in Ukraine-related funding, observers increasingly believe that aid package may have been the last.
The Pentagon has sent at least 3,097,000 rounds of artillery to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion. Most of those (2,000,000) have been 155 mm shells, the standard size used by the U.S. and its NATO allies. For perspective, that’s about 95,000 tons of 155 mm ammunition alone.
Despite ramping up military manufacturing, the U.S. still only produces about 340,000 155 mm shells per year, meaning that Ukraine has been firing rounds at three times the rate of American production.
Washington has also given Kyiv 76 tanks, including 31 Abrams tanks and 45 Soviet-era T-72Bs. Ukraine has received 3,631 American armored vehicles of various types, from infantry fighting vehicles to personnel carriers and medical trucks.
Meanwhile, Ukraine has made use of 39 American-made HIMARS, a mobile rocket launcher that has become famous for its utility in the war. As for smaller arms, the U.S. has sent at least 400,000,000 grenades and bullets in the past 24 months.
The war has killed at least 10,378 civilians and injured an additional 19,632, according to the UN. More than three in four non-combatant casualties occurred in areas held by the Ukrainian government, indicating that Moscow is responsible for the lion’s share of civilian harm.
When it comes to military casualties, good data still remains hard to come by and estimates are sometimes wildly different. Neither Russia nor Ukraine have offered detailed, public indications of the war’s impact on their soldiers.
The U.S. estimated in August that 70,000 Ukrainian soldiers had died and an additional 100,000 to 120,000 had been injured, putting the number of total casualties at over 170,000. Russia, for its part, claimed in November that 383,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed or wounded.
On the other side, the United Kingdom estimates that Russia has suffered at least 320,000 casualties, with 50,000 deaths among Russian soldiers and 20,000 deaths among Wagner Group mercenaries. Washington said in December that Moscow had suffered 315,000 casualties, though American officials did not provide a breakdown of deaths and injuries.
The United Nations estimates that the Ukrainian population (the entire country within internationally recognized borders), which totaled 43.5 million people in 2021, dropped to 39.7 million in 2022 as war swept through the country’s east. This trend continued into 2023, as the population dropped to 36.7 million — the lowest level since Ukraine became independent in 1990.
As of January, 6.3 million Ukrainians have become refugees abroad, with another 3.7 million displaced internally. As the frontlines have settled, Ukraine’s population has slowly started to grow again, reaching 37.9 million in early 2024. Meanwhile, demographer Elena Libanova estimates that only 28 million of those people live within areas currently under Ukrainian government control (outside of Crimea and the Donbas).
Two new polls that came out within the last week illustrate the complexities of Americans’ feelings toward the war in Ukraine and the U.S. role in it.
First, a Pew poll published February 16 found that a large majority of Americans (74%) see the war between Russia and Ukraine as somewhat (30%) or very important (43%) to U.S. interests. And another survey, from the Harris Poll and the Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft, found that Americans broadly support a U.S.-led negotiated end to the conflict.
But the past few months in Washington have been largely focused on U.S. aid to Ukraine, specifically whether Congress will pass President Biden’s request for roughly $60 billion for Kyiv’s fight against Russia.
According to Pew, in March 2022, 74% of Americans said U.S. aid to Ukraine was “just right” or “not enough.” In December 2023, that same survey found that just 47% said the same. The biggest change came from Republicans: 49% said in March, 2022 that U.S. aid was “not enough,” while just 13% said the same in December.
Meanwhile, Gallup found in August 2022 that 74% of Americans said U.S. aid to Ukraine was “about right” (36%) or “not enough” (38%). Those numbers came down slightly in Gallup’s latest track on this question in October, 2023, with 58% saying U.S. aid was about right (33%) or not enough (25%).
There have been several attempts to bring nations together to outline talks to end the war. Russia and Ukraine engaged in five rounds of talks in Belarus and Turkey shortly after the invasion, but the talks collapsed amid allegations of Russian war crimes and Western pressure on Kyiv to keep fighting.
Since then, the belligerents have spoken directly about secondary issues, like Black Sea shipping and prisoner swaps. Ukraine, meanwhile, laid out a “10-point peace plan” that has formed the basis for five international summits, none of which included Russia. These took place in Copenhagen, Denmark, in June 2023; in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in August 2023; in Malta in October, 2023; in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in December 2023; and Davos, Switzerland, in January of this year.
Since the start of the war, Congress has passed four aid packages for Ukraine, totaling $113 billion. While none of the four packages were identical and aid for Ukraine was sometimes bundled with other spending, the trends for support for Kyiv in Congress are similar to those we see in polling, particularly among congressional Republicans.
The 2022 supplemental, which became law in May 2022 and provided Ukraine with $39.34 billion in aid passed the House 368-57 and the Senate by a vote of 86-11. By September 2023, when the House voted on the Ukraine Security Assistance and Oversight Supplemental Appropriations Act, which provided Kyiv with $300 million in security assistance, it passed by a vote of 311-117, with a majority of Republican members opposing the legislation.
On February 12 of this year, the Senate voted 70-29 to pass a national security supplemental, which would provide approximately $60 billion in aid for Kyiv alongside money for Israel and partners in the Indo-Pacific. The bill has not yet been voted on in the House.
Ben Armbruster, Blaise Malley, Connor Echols and Kelley Vlahos contributed reporting. Graphics by Khody Akhavi.