Since the Russia-Ukraine war began over 20 months ago, Western media has constructed and dutifully hewn to a series of narratives: Volodymyr Zelensky is a war hero and resistance leader akin to Winston Churchill. Ukrainians are eager to volunteer for the war effort while Russians flee conscription. More money and weapons are all the Ukrainians need to retake the territory Russia has annexed. The West’s interests lie in helping them achieve that grand victory rather than in pushing for a ceasefire and negotiated settlement.
Facts at odds with these narratives — such as that Ukraine has been taking unsustainable losses in combat, that we don’t have enough artillery shells to adequately supply them, that the billions we’ve been sending to Ukraine are falling prey to corruption — have been dismissed as “Putin talking points.” The critics who point them out are attacked as Kremlin apologists.
All of which is why it was so extraordinary to read this week’s cover story in TIME magazine.
Written by Simon Shuster, who previously wrote the article naming Zelensky TIME's“Person of the Year” at the end of 2022, the piece is ostensibly another hagiography of Zelensky as the heroic figure forced to go it alone as times get tough and Western allies start to “abandon” him. But rather than shoring up Zelensky’s standing in the West, it validates many of the criticisms made by those supposed Putin apologists. Only now those criticisms are being voiced by Zelensky’s own aides and advisers inside the presidential palace.
The narrative dam our media has built around the reality in Ukraine is apparently breaking wide open, and the truth is finally spilling out:
Ukraine’s war aims are unrealistic. Kyiv has long maintained that its definition of victory, namely the retaking of all Ukrainian territory including Crimea, is achievable with Western arms and money. Now a disastrous summer counteroffensive, which has resulted in horrific Ukrainian casualties while reclaiming negligible amounts of territory, has Zelensky’s advisers reconsidering whether those aims are realistic. Yet Zelensky’s belief in ultimate victory over Russia has only “hardened into a form that worries some of his advisors,” according to Shuster, who describes Zelensky’s faith as “immovable, verging on the messianic.” One of Zelensky’s closest aides tells Shuster that, “He is delusional. We’re out of options. We’re not winning. But try telling him that.” This of course runs counter to all the propaganda pumped out by Ukraine and repeated by Western media sources. But increasingly it’s only Zelensky who still believes his own press clippings.
Staggering casualties have decimated the Ukrainian army. Ukraine has refused to disclose casualty counts throughout the war, dismissing the increasingly-credible reports of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian casualties as Russian propaganda. But another close aide to Zelensky tells Shuster that casualties are so horrific that “even if the U.S. and its allies come through with all the weapons they have pledged, ‘we don’t have the men to use them.’” Shuster reports that, “In some branches of the military, the shortage of personnel has become even more dire than the deficit in arms and ammunition.” According to the article, the average age of a currently-serving Ukrainian soldier is 43 and getting older all the time. It appears the youth have already been sacrificed.
Conscription policies are draconian. Another fact dismissed as a “Putin talking point” is that Ukrainians have had to resort to ever-more draconian conscription policies to replenish their military’s ranks. Shuster lays out the unpleasant reality: “New recruitment is way down. As conscription efforts have intensified across the country, stories are spreading on social media of draft officers pulling men off trains and buses and sending them to the front. Those with means sometimes bribe their way out of service, often by paying for a medical exemption.” The corruption became so widespread that Zelensky fired the heads of all the regional draft offices in August, but the move backfired as lack of leadership brought new recruitment nearly to a halt.
Morale is collapsing. Even patriots don’t want to die serving as canon fodder for a doomed military strategy. Within the officer ranks, there is growing dissension bordering on mutiny. One close Zelensky aide complained to Shuster that some front-line commanders have begun refusing orders to advance even when they come directly from the office of the president. When Shuster asked a senior military officer about those complaints, the officer said that some officers have no choice but to refuse orders that are simply impossible. He told a story about an order in early October to “retake” the city of Horlivka, a “strategic outpost” in Eastern Ukraine that’s been under Russian control for almost a decade. “The answer came in the form of a question,” writes Shuster. “With what?” With no recruits and no artillery, Zelensky’s dreams of driving the Russians from every inch of Ukrainian territory cannot be achieved. He can only fight futilely to the last Ukrainian, and there is a diminishing number of Ukrainians willing to die in service of that strategy.
Corruption is uncontrollable. It has long been a “Putin talking point” that Ukraine’s government was shot through with corruption. And yet Zelensky has been getting an earful about exactly that from its U.S. and NATO allies, who don’t want to see their billions of dollars in aid disappear into the pockets of corrupt officials. Zelensky has taken some actions, like the sacking of his Minister of Defense Oleksiy Reznikov for corrupt procurement practices. But to really root out corruption, Zelensky will have to fire most of his government. A top presidential adviser admitted as much to Shuster once his audio recorder had been shut off: “People are stealing like there is no tomorrow.”
“Nobody believes in our victory like I do,” Zelensky told TIMEin what became the pull quote for this cover story. He may have to read Shuster’s piece to see just how right he is, as he seems surrounded by aides who no longer believe in Ukraine’s war strategy or Zelensky’s leadership of it.
Zelensky no doubt intended the quote as a Churchillian “never surrender” exhortation to courage and resolve in the face of Ukraine’s “darkest hour” rather than as an admission of delusional optimism. Yet his dogmatic insistence on total victory and refusal to consider peace negotiations belie a loss of touch with reality that ought to worry both his countrymen and allies.
To be sure, Zelensky is not alone in his refusal to face reality. The Biden administration has proposed another $61 billion for Ukraine’s war effort without explaining how this will produce a different result than the $100+ billion already appropriated. Undoubtedly Zelensky’s optimism was fueled by Biden’s repeated promises of total support for "as long as it takes." But it’s becoming increasingly clear that the U.S. is in no position to deliver on that promise indefinitely. It has too many other global commitments, including to Israel, which compete for limited resources.
Alone among his team, Zelensky seems not to understand how circumstances have changed. Shuster and TIME try their best to portray him as the last stalwart of the Ukrainian cause, but the fact that his own inner circle is the source of the torrent of revelations and complaints suggests that his immovability owes not to Churchillian resolve but rather to an impervious bunker mentality.
David Oliver Sacks is Founder and General Partner of Craft Ventures and cohost of the All-In Podcast.
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskiy during a joint press conference with Prime Minister of Denmark Mette Frederiksen in Kyiv, Ukraine September 06, 2023 (paparazzza/shutterstock)
UPDATE 6/3 8:50a.m. EST: Polls have closed in South Korea, with exit polling indicating that liberal Lee Jae-mying will win by a wide margin.
South Koreans will be heading to voting stations on Tuesday to elect their next president in the wake of Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment and removal from office in April.
According to the public opinion trends over the past weeks, Lee Jae-myung, the candidate from the liberal Minjoo Party, is heavily favored to win. In South Korea’s polarized two-party structure, both mainstream liberal and conservative parties have managed to build highly committed support bases that would allow each party to secure at least 30% in most elections. Consequently, the decisions of the remaining swing voters have become decisive for electoral success.
On that note, recent polls have shown the moderate-nonpartisan base’s clear preference for Lee Jae-myung over his main rival Kim Moon-soo of the conservative People Power Party. This trend is reminiscent of last year’s parliamentary election in which the swing voters tilted strongly toward the Minjoo Party, eventually handing them a landslide victory.
In shaping the favorable momentum for Lee Jae-myung and the Minjoo Party, the South Korean public’s widespread desire to punish Yoon for his December coup attempt has been seemingly decisive. Many swing voters likely find it hard to support the People Power Party, which remained supportive of Yoon throughout the impeachment saga.
However, the people’s choice of Lee and the Minjoo Party in this election would not mean continued support for them. After the election, although there would be more demand for investigations into the martial law plot and punishments for those involved, many citizens will begin to shift their attention to other important domestic and foreign policy issues.
As a government that also holds a supermajority in the parliament, the new government would face high public expectations for problem-solving.
Indeed, the South Korean public is preoccupied with an array of challenges. Among them, how the new government can manage potential differences and disagreements in the U.S.-South Korea alliance and maintain strong, mutually beneficial ties with Washington.
South Koreans are deeply worried about the Trump administration’s sweeping tariff increases and the ripple negative impacts it would have on their economy. A heavily export-dependent economy, South Korea is vulnerable to external pressures and has indeed felt the ramifications of U.S. tariffs targeting its key industries, including automobiles. Given this situation, whether the new government can successfully negotiate a smart deal with Washington will be considered extremely important.
The issue of alliance cost-sharing for U.S. Forces Korea is another big concern for South Koreans. During his first term, President Trump threatened to withdraw from South Korea if Seoul did not increase its cost-sharing contribution dramatically. While Washington and Seoul then managed to agree on a reasonable deal, Trump had indicated on multiple occasions that getting South Korea to pay a lot more remains his goal.
Last year, as a presidential candidate, Trump vowed to demand $10 billion from South Korea for stationing U.S. forces there — about nine times what the Biden administration and Seoul agreed in October 2024. Many South Koreans would presumably support paying more to maintain the current conditions, as over 90% of them believe the U.S. alliance is necessary for their security. But they would not find $10 billion or anywhere near it acceptable, and would hope the new government would find a middle ground with Washington.
When it comes to security cooperation, whether Seoul and Washington can align their objectives and priorities regarding North Korea and China is the elephant in the room. Most South Koreans perceive North Korea as the biggest security challenge and would want the U.S.-South Korea alliance’s military and diplomatic focus to remain on North Korea.
Nevertheless, it is uncertain if the Trump administration feels the same way. Several key Trump officials, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, have signaled they would seek a restructuring of U.S. forces in Asia, including those in South Korea, to focus more on deterring China, particularly with a Taiwan contingency in mind.
This issue of “strategic flexibility” — allowing U.S. forces in South Korea to operate beyond the Korean Peninsula — could emerge as a source of tension in the alliance, as Seoul would be predominantly worried about dealing with North Korea and would also want to avoid a hostile relationship with Beijing.
From trade to regional security, there are difficult and sensitive issues for Seoul and Washington to address and to seek compromise, at least a mutual understanding to agree to disagree. It remains to be seen how Lee Jae-myung intends to approach these complex alliance questions. But no doubt, he will be given a very tough assignment starting day 1.
keep readingShow less
Top photo credit: NORFOLK, Va. (Apr. 15, 2008) Navy Capt. Patricia Cole, director of the Tailored Maritime Operations Center (T-MOC) at the Naval Network Warfare Command, inspects fellow officers during a command-wide bi-annual uniform inspection. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Corey Lewis File# 080415-N-2147L-001
On April 30, new Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Stuart Scheller, a former Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel, announced his intent to push for military reform, echoing the frustrations that led to his 2021 court-martial for publicly criticizing the Afghanistan withdrawal.
His call for accountability resonates with my decades-long work as an advocate for transforming the broken U.S. military personnel and leadership systems and addressing the deep-rooted issues in military culture. These would include bloated bureaucracies, careerism, a lack of ethical leadership, and fossilized military doctrine — all which Scheller’s remarks brought into sharp focus.
I see Scheller’s appointment as a unique opportunity for change, but there is a lot of work to do.
A broken system
The U.S. military’s personnel system fosters a leadership culture that often serves the military-industrial complex’s interests over national security.
The “up or out” promotion model incentivizes officers to prioritize career advancement over mission success, rewarding those who avoid controversy and align with the status quo. This dynamic aligns with defense contractors’ desires for perpetual overseas operations, as prolonged conflicts drive demand for weapons, logistics, and services.
For example, the Pentagon’s reliance on costly, high-tech systems — like the $10 billion Littoral Combat Ship program, plagued by design flaws — reflects a preference for feeding contractor profits over delivering practical warfighting tools.
Similarly, the 20-year Afghanistan campaign, costing $2 trillion, enriched defense firms while strategic missteps prolonged the conflict, exposing troops to unnecessary risks. This culture not only fuels endless wars but also sidelines innovative leaders who challenge wasteful or escalatory policies, leaving servicemembers to bear the human cost.
A reformed military would prioritize mission success and troop safety over bureaucratic inertia and contractor interests. By fostering ethical, merit-based leadership and streamlining operations, the system could avoid reckless engagements and ensure servicemembers are deployed only when necessary.
My reform strategies — tested at West Point, Fort Benning, and with allies like Ukraine — offer a path forward, emphasizing four pillars: ethics, merit, transparency, and efficiency.
Ethics: Fostering moral courage
Adopting Mission Command, a decentralized leadership philosophy, empowers junior leaders to make decisions aligned with clear objectives, fostering moral courage over blind obedience.
Unlike the current zero-defects culture, which punished Scheller’s principled dissent, Mission Command would encourage leaders to prioritize duty and troop welfare, reducing reckless deployments driven by careerist or contractor pressures. For instance, ethical leaders could have questioned the prolonged Afghanistan presence, sparing lives lost in later years.
The U.S. Army War College study by Dr. Leonard Wong and Dr. Stephen J. Gerras, titled "Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession", published in 2015, examines systemic dishonesty within the U.S. Army. The study argues that the overwhelming number of administrative and training requirements imposed on officers makes it impossible to fully comply, leading to routine misrepresentation or "ethical fading."
Merit: Rewarding competence
Replacing the “up or out” system, emplaced in 1917 by the Navy, then by DoD in 1947, with a flatter, merit-based structure would promote leaders based on real-world skills — adaptability, critical thinking, and tactical innovation — rather than time served or connections. This would retain talent and ensure leaders prioritize mission success over appeasing defense contractors or chasing promotions.
Competent leaders who move up though this process are less likely to endorse unnecessary operations that endanger troops.
Transparency: Building trust
Opaque promotion and assignment processes breed distrust, as soldiers see favoritism at play. Clear, open criteria for advancement, tied to mission-relevant metrics, would rebuild confidence. Transparent assessments of force effectiveness could expose strategic errors — like those in Iraq or Afghanistan — before they escalate, preventing servicemembers from being sent into poorly planned conflicts fueled by external interests.
The 2001 Commandant of the Marine Corps Trust Study emphasized building trust through decentralized decision-making, mission command, and strong leadership ethics. If implemented in the DoD today, it could enhance operational efficiency by empowering lower-level commanders to make rapid, informed decisions, fostering agility in complex battlefields. It would strengthen unit cohesion and morale by prioritizing trust-centric leadership, aligning with modern warfare's demand for adaptability.
Additionally, it could improve public trust in the military by reinforcing ethical standards and transparency, addressing recent declines in confidence (e.g., 45% public trust in 2021 per Reagan Institute Foundation). This approach could also bolster recruitment and retention by cultivating a culture of accountability and professionalism.
Trimming ranks and headquarters
The most recent study addressing negative officer and headquarters bloat in the Department of Defense is the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report titled General and Flag Officers in the U.S. Armed Forces: Background and Considerations for Congress [R44389], updated on March 8, 2024.
This report highlights the increase in senior officer billets (3- and 4-star ranks) relative to total force size, noting that in 2023, there were 169 such billets compared to 155 during the Vietnam era, despite a significantly smaller force.
It cites concerns from the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) about the risk of creating a "military force of bureaucrats rather than warriors" and references historical warnings, such as General John Sheehan's 1998 statement about the dangers of an overly bureaucratic military staff. The report also discusses inefficiencies, such as excessive staff layers (up to 30 in some cases), which hinder decision-making and operational effectiveness.
Additionally, a 2023 article from the Epoch Times titled Top-Heavy, Bloated Command Structure Hurts US Military Effectiveness, Costs Billions (published September 26, 2023) draws on similar themes, referencing a 2017 Joint Force Quarterly study on "rank creep." It notes that the current 900 admirals and generals (including 41 four-stars) command a much smaller force than during World War II, leading to inefficiencies and higher costs without enhancing mission success.
The bloated officer corps and sprawling headquarters divert resources from combat units, slowing decisions and insulating leaders from frontline realities. Reducing general officer positions and headquarters staff, as suggested in the April 30, 2025, DoD memo, would empower frontline leaders and focus resources on troop readiness. A leaner structure would deter unnecessary overseas commitments, ensuring service members are deployed only for clear, achievable objectives.
The opportunity
The military’s failures stem from a personnel system that fuels careerism, indulges the military-industrial complex, and endangers troops. Historical missteps in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan underscore the cost of this dysfunction.
With a new DoD leadership and public support for reform, the April 30, 2025, memo’s call to cut waste and prioritize effectiveness aligns with this blueprint. By dismantling the industrial-age personnel system, the Pentagon can create a military that values ethics, rewards merit, ensures transparency, and eliminates bloat — reducing the impulse to engage in endless wars and protecting servicemembers from needless harm.
keep readingShow less
Top image credit: TIRANA, ALBANIA - MAY 16: France's President Emmanuel Macron, Britain's Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Germany's Chancellor Friedrich Merz speak during a Ukraine security meeting at the 6th European Political Community summit on May 16, 2025 at Skanderbeg Square in Tirana, Albania. Leon Neal/Pool via REUTERS
In a dangerous echo of past miscalculations, the E3 — France, Germany, and the United Kingdom — are once again escalating tensions with Iran, this time by threatening to trigger the reinstatement of U.N. Security Council sanctions (the so-called “snapback”) if U.S.-Iran nuclear talks collapse.
The E3 sees such a step as deploying leverage to force concessions from Iran on its nuclear program. However, it risks derailing diplomacy entirely and plunging the Middle East into deeper crisis.
Leading this charge is France, reprising its role as the E3’s most hawkish voice, reminiscent of its hard line in the JCPOA negotiations in 2015. At a closed-door U.N. Security Council meeting on proliferation at the end of April, French Foreign Minister Jean Noël Barrot exemplified this combative turn, saying that if the U.S. – Iran talks do not bear fruit, France and its European partners “will not hesitate for a second to reimpose all the sanctions that were lifted 10 years ago.”
Weeks later, after Iranian dissident director Jafar Panahi received a Cannes Film Festival award, Barrot hailed the accolade as a symbol of “resistance to the Iranian regime’s oppression.” While there is nothing wrong with praising the victory of an Iranian director, the politicized framing and the timing — amid delicate nuclear talks — was diplomatically inept, needlessly antagonizing Tehran.
Such rhetoric aligns with France’s and other European countries’ broader patterns of conflating Iran’s domestic policies with its nuclear obligations, an approach that only hardens Tehran’s stance. Little surprise, then, that Barrot’s remarks were received poorly in Tehran, with the French envoy summoned to the ministry of foreign affairs, and Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi lashing out at France’s perceived hypocrisy on human rights.
But France is not alone. Britain’s influential and outspoken ambassador to the U.S., Peter Mandelson, appeared to side with those in Washington who demand an end to any domestic uranium enrichment in Iran — the thickest of Iran’s red lines and the main bone of contention in the ongoing talks with the U.S. These suggestions were met with an immediate reaction from Tehran, with Araghchi warning about an end to any negotiations with E3 if “zero enrichment” was indeed to become the official European position.
In a remarkable about-face, the E3, which in early 2000s spearheaded the process that eventually led to the JCPOA, are now increasingly aligning with the Washington hawks, who, like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, opposed the JCPOA from the outset. In fact, there seems to be two competing tracks in motion right now: one is the Trump-Witkoff track that appears to be a genuine effort to strike a deal with Tehran, to the extent of President Trump openly admitting that he warned Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu against any steps that might derail a deal. And the other track is led by Rubio and the E3 privileging coercion over diplomacy. Since the U.S. can no longer invoke the snapback as it’s not a part of the JCPOA, Rubio is encouraging the E3 to do just that.
In that context, Barrot’s assertion that “there is no military solution to Iran’s nuclear program, but the path of diplomacy is narrow,” sounds disingenuous. It aligns with the views expressed by the former Biden top Middle East official Brett McGurk who pushed for “deadlines” for diplomatic negotiations, backed up by perennial “credible military threat.”
Yet history shows that pressure only causes Tehran to dig in, not fold. Objectively, there is also no reason for that: yes, Iran’s enrichment levels reached 60% which is far beyond the 3.67% permissible under JCPOA. But Tehran also consistently signaled that it is open to negotiate “everything” provided that its domestic enrichment rights are respected. That leaves ample space to negotiate the technical details, such as the caps on the enrichment, sunset provisions, the fate of the stockpiles of the enriched uranium, and verification.
During the Tehran Dialogue Forum, which I attended last week, many ideas in that regard were floating around. One informal — not coming from an official source — suggested a temporary suspension of enrichment as a confidence-building measure, with the stockpiles exported to Russia once the enrichment is renewed. The idea of a regional enrichment consortium — provided Iran’s enrichment rights are safeguarded — is gaining ground
Iranian officials also privately hinted at the possibility of pausing some of their advanced centrifuges. And while Tehran opposes perpetual restrictions on certain aspects of its nuclear program in principle, negotiating a renewal of sunset provisions for another 5 or 10 years should not be impossible. It would allow Trump to claim a superior deal over the one negotiated by Obama. As far as verification is concerned, Iran has signaled, in an important shift, that it is open to admitting American inspectors to its nuclear sites within the IAEA inspections.
These dynamics show that there is a space for diplomacy. The hawks’ and E3 insistence on artificial deadlines is unjustified — complex issues between two longtime adversaries cannot be resolved in a few meetings in Muscat and Rome. Building trust requires time. But what seems to matter to the E3 the most is not the resolution of the nuclear stand-off but using its leverage as an end in itself. “Use it or lose it” seems to be the new mantra in Paris, London and Berlin.
What explains that course is the E3’s apparent desire to punish Iran for issues unrelated to the nuclear file, such as its military ties with Russia or domestic human rights abuses.
These concerns are valid. Europe sees Russia’s war in Ukraine as an existential threat. Seen through this lens, Europeans hold a dim view of Iran. Amplifying the negative perceptions are issues related to alleged activities of Iranian intelligence services on the European soil and arrests of European citizens in Iran on apparently spurious grounds, which the EU sees as hostage-taking.
However grave and legitimate these grievances, merging them with nuclear diplomacy is a recipe for failure. The JCPOA was never intended to address all problems with Iran; it was a narrowly crafted nonproliferation agreement. Holding the nuclear deal hostage to extraneous demands guarantees its collapse — and with it, any hope of containing Iran’s nuclear program or its other policies the E3/EU finds objectionable, such as military ties with Russia.
Tehran has warned of “severe consequences” if the E3 invokes the snapback. Top among these could be withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a scenario that would eliminate international oversight of Iran’s program. The current moderate government would be weakened — and it already faces criticisms from hardliners for supposedly being too quick to frontload Iran’s concessions, such as a readiness to temporarily go back to the JCPOA-levels of enrichment. In a déjà vu following the demise of the JCPOA at the tail end of the pragmatic Rouhani presidency (2017-2021), hardliners could reassert themselves again, ironically exacerbating every policy the E3 dislikes — accelerated enrichment, deepened ties with Russia, and tightening the screws domestically.
This is why the E3’s threat of snapback is not just irrational — it is self-defeating. Europe, already grappling with the Ukraine war, can ill afford another avoidable crisis. If the E3 can’t help with the U.S.–Iran talks, it should, at least, refrain from actively undermining them.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.