Ukraine’s security services said on Tuesday that they foiled a plot to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Two colonels in the State Guard of Ukraine, which counts the protection of top Ukrainian officials among its duties, were identified as part of a group allegedly working with Russia’s FSB security agency to assassinate President Zelenskyy, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) head Vasyl Malyuk, and military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov.
This marks one of the highest-profile attempts on Zelenskyy’s life since Russia commenced its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It is also the first time that high-ranking officials were part of such a plot, according to Kyiv. It is unprecedented that “such a high-ranking official of the state security department has become [the] enemy’s moles,” SBU spokesman Artem Dehtiarenko told Politico.
News of the alleged plot comes on the heels of months of internal turmoil in Kyiv, including frequentfirings and arrests of top and senior officials over corruption and espionage charges, as well as Zelenskyy’s decision to fire Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces (AFU) and the second most popular public official in the country, Valery Zaluzhny.
These developments, when viewed against the backdrop of Ukraine’s dwindling battlefield prospects, point to a degree of internal Ukrainian vulnerability that should alarm Western policymakers.
The details of this particular assassination attempt are still unclear, and the full extent of Russian involvement has yet to be established. But if — as asserted by Ukraine’s own security agency — Russian operatives were able to enlist the help of at least two high-level Ukrainian officials to organize a sweeping, multi-stage plot to kill three of Ukraine’s senior-most public servants including the President, it suggests a larger phenomenon of extensive Russian intelligence penetration in the Ukrainian bureaucracy and military that will prove difficult to fully diagnose, let alone uproot.
Indeed, this problem will likely grow even more severe as the growing threat of the AFU’s collapse along the front lines creates new incentives for Ukrainian officials at all levels to consider collaborating with Russia. The May assassination plot could thus be an early warning sign of a wider internal dysfunction that, if left unchecked, may eventually snowball into a challenge to Ukraine’s political stability.
These developments are not indicative of a Ukrainian state that is winning or confident in its impending victory, but are instead symptomatic of a harried wartime government riven by internal weaknesses that are being exploited by Russia with increasing effectiveness.
Mark Episkopos is a Eurasia Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He is also an Adjunct Professor of History at Marymount University. Episkopos holds a PhD in history from American University and a masters degree in international affairs from Boston University.
Volodymyr Zelensky speaks at the Munich Security Conference, Feb. 17, 2023. (David Hecker/MSC)
Volodymyr Zelensky speaks at the Munich Security Conference, Feb. 17, 2023. (David Hecker/MSC)
On August 1, the Trump administrationimposed a 50% tariff on Brazilian imports, sending high-volume sectors like coffee, beef, and textile companies scrambling to adjust to their new reality. The tariffs came on the back of a lobbying campaign from an unlikely source — Brazil itself. Whereas other foreign entities are lobbying the U.S. government to reduce their tariffs, allies of ex-president Jair Bolsonaro asked for more.
Eduardo Bolsonaro, financed by ex-president father Jair Bolsonaro, is the main catalyst behind the lobbying efforts. And by not registering his activities, Eduardo Bolsonaro may be running afoul of the U.S. foreign lobbying laws.
For several months, the younger Bolsonaro has been lobbying the White House and the U.S. Congress to carry out a maximum pressure campaign of tariffs and sanctions against his own country over the Brazilian authorities’ prosecution of Jair Bolsonaro. The primary target of Eduardo Bolsonaro’s campaign is Alexandre de Moraes, the Brazilian Supreme Court Justice leading the investigations into the ex-president.
The elder Bolsonaro is accused of attempting a coup in 2022 to remain in office, which allegedly included a plot to poison President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva and assassinate Moraes. Citing a flight risk, Moraes ordered Bolsonaro to wear an ankle monitor, a move the ex-president called a “supreme humiliation." On Monday, the Brazilian Justice went a step further, placing Jair Bolsonaro under house arrest after he violated a court order prohibiting the use of social media.
Nicknamed “Number Three” by his father as if assigning ranks in a battalion, Eduardo Bolsonaro moved to the U.S. in March and quickly became the family’s chief emissary and lobbyist abroad. Alongside Paulo Figueiredo, the grandson of Brazil’s last military dictator, Eduardo Bolsonaro has metwith U.S. lawmakers, including chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Brian Mast (R-Fla.), co-president of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Chris Smith (R-N.J.), and Republican Assistant Whip Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar (R-Fla.). Eduardo Bolsonaro has also bragged about his close relationship with the White House itself.
A week after a meeting on May 14 between Eduardo Bolsonaro’s entourage and Rep. Cory Mills (R-F who asked Secretary of State Marco Rubio during a hearing if he would consider sanctions against Moraes. “That is under review, and there’s a strong possibility that it could happen,” replied Rubio.
Trump seemingly took the call to action seriously, escalating the stakes far beyond targeted sanctions. On July 9, he sent a letter to President Lula announcing the tariffs. “Due in part to Brazil’s insidious attacks on Free Elections, and the fundamental Free Speech Rights of Americans, starting on August 1, 2025, we will charge Brazil a Tariff of 50% on any and all Brazilian products sent into the United States,” Trump declared.
Eduardo Bolsonaro immediately celebrated the 50% tariffs — referring to them as the “Moraes Tariff” — and responded with a video on his YouTube channel taking credit. “Over the past few months, we have maintained intense dialogue with officials from President Trump's administration, always aiming to accurately and document the reality Brazil is experiencing today,” he said. “The letter from the president of the United States only confirms our success in conveying what we have been presenting to Brazil with seriousness and responsibility.”
Days before the tariffs set in, Trump also imposedMagnitsky sanctions on Moraes, freezing any assets the Brazilian Justice has under U.S. jurisdiction and preventing him from using credit cards backed by U.S. financial companies. Once again, Eduardo Bolsonaro celebrated the decision and took credit. “When I exiled myself to the U.S., I made my intention very clear: to sanction Alexandre de Moraes,” he said. “Today, I have the feeling of a mission accomplished.”
Moraes alleges that Eduardo Bolsonaro’s campaign in the U.S. is being bankrolled by his father with the objective of “shaking the country's economy.” Jair Bolsonaro has reportedly sent around $350,000 to his son. “I put money in [Eduardo’s] hands, quite a lot,” Bolsonaro acknowledged in May, around the same time Eduardo Bolsonaro’s lobbying campaign ramped up.
To date, Eduardo Bolsonaro has not registered as a foreign agent under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), the U.S. foreign lobbying law. As an elected official to Brazil’s National Congress, Eduardo Bolsonaro could qualify for an exemption from registering as a foreign agent. However, Josh Rosenstein, a FARA expert and partner at Sandler Reiff, explained to RS that to do so, the State Department needs to recognize his role as an elected official and interpret his actions as within the scope of his duties.
A State Department spokesperson told RS in an email that the agency had not received a notification from Eduardo Bolsonaro or the Brazilian government that his lobbying actions fall under official government activity.
“Absent the form or some similar official notification to the State Department, FARA's regulations are clear that the exemption is unavailable,” explained Rosenstein. The Department of Justice, which, under the Trump administration, has reserved FARA charges only for instances of “traditional espionage,” is unlikely to ask Eduardo Bolsonaro to register as a foreign agent.
Eduardo Bolsonaro's lobbying campaign for sanctions and tariffs succeeded — perhaps too much. His political gambit could backfire, as some would-be allies are already blaming the Bolsonaros for the new tariffs, leaving the family increasingly politically isolated. A new AtlasIntel and Bloomberg poll shows Lula’s approval rating is now at over 50% for the first time since October 2024, having steadily climbed since Trump’s initial tariff threats.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has given the cold shoulder to the actual Brazilian government.
In a recent interview with the New York Times, Lula said that it has been impossible to contact Trump about the tariffs. “I designated my vice president, my agriculture minister, my economy minister, so that each can talk to their counterpart to understand what the possibility for conversation was. So far, it hasn’t been possible…So I hope that civility returns to the Brazil-U.S. relationship.”
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Top photo credit: Armenian Prime Minister Niкol Pashinyan (wikimedia/office of President of Azerbaijan); President Donald Trump (Gage Skidmore/Flickr); President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan (wikimedia/office of President of Azerbaijan)
U.S. President Donald Trump is hoping the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev are primed for peace when they meet Friday at the White House.
The two are expected to sign a framework agreement while Armenia and the U.S. are expected to launch a joint venture offering exclusive U.S. commercial development rights to a 43-kilometer route through Armenia’s southern Syunik region. This land route will run through Armenian territory to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhichevan exclave and Turkey and has been a main sticking point in negotiations.
Whether or not this will lead to a more peaceful, stable, and prosperous South Caucasus remains an open question. The region, flanked by Russia, Turkey, and Iran, has proven difficult for Washington to strategically maneuver in the past.
Over the last several years, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been engaged in a negotiation process to resolve their decades-long conflict. That process reached a crescendo of sorts in March when the two sides announced that they had finally worked out the text of a peace agreement, following Armenia’s acceptance of two previously unresolved articles. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan has demanded several preconditions — including changes to Armenia’s constitution — be met before signing the document.
How we got here
Azerbaijan emerged victorious, confident, and assertive after reigniting hostilities through a six-week war against the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in late 2020. Feeling further emboldened by global developments since then, Baku has frequently pursued a coercive and maximalist agenda toward Armenia.
Complicating matters further, the Armenian government and parts of society have throughout this period become increasingly dissatisfied with Russia, their nominal ally. This crisis in relations was exacerbated as Moscow largely stood idle as Azerbaijan launched subsequent military escalations, both into internationally recognized Armenian territory (some 80 square milesof which is still occupied to this day) and against Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in the expulsion of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from the territory in September 2023.
Russia’s early setbacks in Ukraine and its significantly curtailed trade and energy ties with the EU due to sanctions led Moscow to become increasingly reliant on Azerbaijan and Turkey. This reliance translated into an unwillingness or inability to ward off violent pressure tactics against Armenia or to publicly condemn Azerbaijan’s actions, much to Yerevan’s displeasure.
Armenia’s subsequent Western-leaning pivot, however, has provoked strong reactions from some in Russia. The Armenian (and Azerbaijani) move to effectively sideline Russian involvement in the above-mentioned transit route further unsettled relations.
Nevertheless, while Yerevan and Moscow have engaged in combative rhetorical spats, both have remained cautious about taking any steps that would cross red lines in their relationship. Yerevan remains an official member of the CSTO and the EAEU and has only increased its trade with Russia. Moscow has not taken any significant retaliatory steps against the Armenian economy, which is heavily reliant on Russia. Importantly, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been restrained in his comments about Armenia and Pashinyan.
As Yerevan now seeks to pivot away from and reduce its critical reliance on Russia – particularly in energy and trade – there exist few alternatives but to pursue a policy aimed at unlocking its border with Turkey and thus allowing for direct trade relations with Ankara, which shut its border with Armenia in 1993.
In addition, Armenia hopes that an open border with Turkey will allow it additional opportunities to expand its ties with European and other partners.
Holding this back, however, is Ankara’s condition that its normalization process with Yerevan be linked to the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Baku, in turn, states that the already-finalized agreement will be signed with Yerevan only when its own preconditions are met, chief among them an unhindered transit route to its Nakhichevan exclave. If the deal is sealed, this route would effectively connect Turkey with Azerbaijan and across the Caspian Sea into Central Asia while avoiding passing through Russian and Iranian territory.
Armenia, which has declared its sovereignty and jurisdiction a red line, is now seeking all available means by which to resist continued Azerbaijani pressure. This has resulted in increased Armenian reliance on the U.S., EU and, paradoxically, Turkey for deterrence as Yerevan pursues its “peace agenda.”
Iran-Israel connections
For Iran, which shares a northwestern border with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, any extraterritorial schemes in Armenia’s Syunik region are viewed as a bright red line.
In late July, Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior adviser on international affairs to the Ayatollah, made strongly worded remarks on the subject and America’s potential involvement. “The main goal,” he said, “is to weaken the Resistance Axis, sever Iran’s link with the Caucasus, and impose a land blockade on Iran and Russia in the region’s south.” Velayati added that the “project is not only part of America’s strategy to shift pressures from Ukraine to the Caucasus, but is also supported by NATO and certain pan-Turkist movements.”
Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman, however, recently sounded a more pragmatic tone.
Of particular concern to Iran is Azerbaijan’s deepening relations with Israel.
Significant efforts have been underway in Washington, Tel Aviv, and Baku to bring the Shia-majority country into the Abraham Accords. Donald Trump’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff made a quiet visit to Baku in mid-March to discuss this topic with the country’s leadership. According to a recent Reuters report, the U.S. views Azerbaijan’s conflict with Armenia as a “key sticking point” given Washington’s view that an agreement should be a “precondition” to joining the Accords.
Across the Muslim world, however, Azerbaijan-Israel relations are already some of the most advanced. Having flown relatively under the radar for many years, Baku’s offensive in 2020 exposed the prevalence of Israeli weaponry in Azerbaijan’s arsenal. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute recorded that, between 2016-2020, some 70% of Azerbaijan’s major arms imports came from Israel.
In exchange, Azerbaijan provides between 40-60% of Israel’s oil needs, and Baku is looking to expand its energy cooperation with Tel Aviv. It is also widely believed that Israelis conduct intelligence operations from Azerbaijani territory, particularly near its southern border with Iran. Indeed, following the 12-day war in June, Tehran called on Baku to investigate reports of Israeli drones using Azerbaijani airspace, a claim that Baku strongly denies.
While Iran is weakened and preparing for an anticipated future war, and Russia remains fixated on Ukraine, the U.S. and Turkey appear to see a window of opportunity to strengthen their influence and advance their interests in the South Caucasus.
Nevertheless, two questions remain: Will increased American and Turkish involvement in the region exacerbate or calm broader tensions, and what is the staying power of a U.S. commitment in the South Caucasus under the current administration?
What ongoing developments clearly signal, however, is that a reinvigorated struggle for the Caucasus is only starting to heat up.
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Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin hold a bilateral meeting at the G20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan June 28, 2019. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque
Next week will likely see the first meeting between the U.S. and Russian presidents, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, since the former’s election to a second term — an encounter the Kremlin has already confirmed.
Details are scarce, including on the summit’s date and place -- Putin hinted that it could be in the United Arab Emirates when he was hosting the UAE President Mohammed Bin Zayed in Moscow.
The Trump-Putin agenda centers on ending the war in Ukraine, although broader issues — global stability, nuclear arms control, the situation in the Middle East, Iran, trade, and sanctions — will likely also be discussed.
The agreement on the meeting came about after the U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s talks with Putin in Moscow which Trump hailed as “a great progress.”
This tone marks a noticeable shift from the more hawkish language Trump had adopted toward Putin in recent weeks, suggesting Witkoff’s diplomacy may have stalled what many feared would be a rapid escalation of U.S.– Russia tensions after Trump set August 8 as the deadline for Moscow to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine passed.
Why the sudden shift? One possible explanation could be that Putin, facing the threat of devastating secondary sanctions on buyers of Russian oil (including China, India, and Brazil), blinked under pressure. But his behavior since Trump’s ultimatum suggests otherwise — these days Putin seems less invested in courting U.S. presidents by making far-reaching concessions, knowing policy can shift dramatically with each administration.
Moreover, after enduring three years of punishing sanctions, Moscow likely calculates that the West has few remaining tools to meaningfully change Russia's strategic calculus in what it views as an existential conflict.
Alternatively, it may be Trump who’s preparing to make concessions, perhaps more substantial than previously considered. This would explain why Moscow deemed the “new U.S. proposals” acceptable following Witkoff's visit.
Trump's apparent reversal likely stems from the failure of his tariff threats against India and China. Both nationsrejected the proposed 100% tariffs on Russian oil purchases as infringements on their sovereign trade rights. While the sanctions would cause short-term economic pain, neither country is willing to compromise on this fundamental principle.
Moreover, China retains powerful leverage — it could retaliate, as it did earlier this year, by restricting exports of rare earth metals that are vital to U.S. industry and defense sectors.
Geopolitically, Trump's simultaneous pressure on both China and India risks driving them closer together. After several decades of carefully courting India — especially under Prime Minister Modi most recently — as a counterbalance to China, Washington risks a major strategic setback if the two Asian giants find common cause in resisting the U.S. The consequences are already visible: Modi plans his first visit to China in seven years amid growing U.S. tensions.
Even more significantly, both Beijing and Delhi now appear to be moving toward Moscow — witness Putin's high-level reception of Modi's national security adviser the day after the U.S. tariff announcement. Completing this geopolitical realignment, Brazil's President Lula has proposed that BRICS nations discuss a common position against the U.S. tariff measures.
Faced with this dilemma, engaging Moscow may offer Trump an escape from his self-inflicted predicament: enforcing his tariff threats would trigger damaging economic consequences and geopolitical realignments, including India's drift from Washington and BRICS consolidation, while backing down on either tariffs or the Ukraine ultimatum to Putin would severely undermine his credibility.
To secure Putin's genuine cooperation — rather than mere stalling tactics —Trump would need to address Russia's key war demands: formal recognition of its territorial gains, guarantees of Ukrainian neutrality (excluding NATO membership), and the reduction of Ukraine's military to levels Moscow considers non-threatening.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio's recent statement highlighting “territorial issues” as central to peace talks suggests Washington may be willing to negotiate this point with Moscow. Russia insists on maintaining control over four Donbas oblasts plus Crimea, with formal recognition of their annexation. While the U.S. has previously only conceded on Crimea, leaving Donbas's status unresolved, Rubio notably avoided specifying what territorial compromises might now be considered.
Naturally, Ukraine — with European support — continues to reject these demands. However, Washington may seek to pressure Kyiv by capitalizing on its deteriorating battlefield position and Zelensky's political vulnerabilities, particularly his mishandling of the anti-corruption agency's abolition and subsequent reinstatement under Western pressure.
One potential compromise could involve a land swap: Russia withdrawing from currently occupied territories in exchange for formal control over the remaining unoccupied portions of the four Donbas oblasts. In return, Moscow would need to abandon its selective approach and implement a comprehensive, immediate ceasefire.
Should such an arrangement prove feasible, it could pave the way for broader peace talks. A more modest summit outcome might be a basic, straightforward ceasefire — already accepted by Ukraine but thus far rejected by Russia. While this would halt active fighting and save lives, it would likely result in an unstable frozen conflict along existing front lines, with all the volatility such situations typically entail.
The summit could alternatively produce no Ukraine agreement, forcing both sides to focus on other sources of their strained bilateral ties — arms control renewals, Middle East tensions, or Iran's nuclear program. Yet, without progress on ending the war, such outcomes would fall far short of success.
The meeting itself remains fragile. A high-casualty attack in Ukraine or disputes over format -— like Trump's reported, but then withdrawn, demand for Zelensky's participation, which Putin conditionally opposes — could scuttle talks before they begin.
Failure would carry grave consequences: renewed battlefield escalation, heightened Russia-West tensions, and shattered hopes for millions of Ukrainians. After three brutal years of war, with 70% of Ukrainians now favoring immediate negotiations (per recent Gallup data), a collapsed summit would compound the tragedy.
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