Revenues at the world’s top 100 global arms and military services producing companies totaled $632 billion in 2023, a 4.2% increase over the prior year, according to new data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
The largest increases were tied to ongoing conflicts, including a 40% increase in revenues for Russian companies involved in supplying Moscow’s war on Ukraine and record sales for Israeli firms producing weapons used in that nation’s brutal war on Gaza. Revenues for Turkey’s top arms producing companies also rose sharply — by 24% — on the strength of increased domestic defense spending plus exports tied to the war in Ukraine.
The United States remains the world’s dominant arms producing nation, with $318 billion in revenues flowing to American firms in the world’s top 100 for 2023, more than half of the global total. And the five highest revenue earners globally were all based in the United States — Lockheed Martin, Raytheon (now RTX), Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics.
China ranked second to the United States in arms industry revenues, with nine firms accounting for 16% of the revenue received by companies in the global top 100. Two of the fastest growing countries in terms of revenue growth for top companies were also in Asia, South Korea (plus 39%) and Japan (plus 35%). South Korea’s increase was tied to major export deals with Poland and Australia, while Japan’s was driven by its largest military buildup since World War II.
SIPRI’s analysis takes a “just the facts” approach, tracking sales numbers and correlating them with increases in domestic and export spending tied to specific events. It does not address the dire humanitarian circumstances that underlie the growing revenues of top arms companies, most notably Israel’s unconscionable attacks on Gaza, which have killed over 40,000 people directly and many more through indirect causes, including over 62,000 who have died from starvation. The companies and countries fueling this mass slaughter — including U.S. firms that have supplied a substantial share of the bombs, missiles, and aircraft used in Gaza — should be held to account for their actions, even as they halt the supply of weapons and services that the Israeli government is using to commit ongoing war crimes.
Another major impact of the revenue surge for top arms makers is the diversion of funding and talent from addressing urgent global problems, from climate change to poverty to outbreaks of disease. And the more companies and countries become dependent on the profits of war, the harder it will be to shift funding towards other urgent priorities. The continuing militarization of the global economy has a double cost — lives lost in conflict and devastating problems left unsolved. The situation needs to be treated as far more than a grim parade of statistics about who benefits from a world at war. It should be treated as an urgent call to action for a change in global priorities.
William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. His work focuses on the arms industry and U.S. military budget.
Top image credit: Andrew Angelov via shutterstock.com
Top photo credit: Ukrainian T-64BM tank crews conduct the Defensive Operations lane during the Strong Europe Tank Challenge (SETC) at the 7th Army Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, May 10, 2017. (7th Army Training Command/Flickr)
The Russia-Ukraine war, more than any other external challenge faced by the Trump administration, has proven to be an intractable conflict that defies straightforward solutions.
One of the main sticking points that has made a ceasefire and settlement so painful to negotiate is the stark misalignment between Russian and Ukrainian postwar security concerns.
Ukraine seeks ironclad guarantees against future Russian aggression. These can come in two general forms: outside assurances, with the most conspicuous one being the Article V protections that come with NATO membership, or the “steel porcupine” strategy whereby Ukraine builds up its own robust domestic deterrent with assistance from Western states.
Both approaches are saddled by what is known in international relations theory as the security dilemma. That is, measures taken by Ukraine to dramatically bolster its defenses as part of a war termination framework will be perceived as threatening and therefore deemed unacceptable by Moscow. This perception problem cannot be solved merely by insisting that Moscow’s concerns are unfounded, especially in the context of record low trust between Russia and the West, nor can these concerns be overridden.
Russia has the leverage, conferred by its outsized latent power, long-term battlefield advantages, and escalation dominance, to reject any settlement that it views as incompatible with its core security interests. Ukraine, for its part, cannot accept a settlement that leaves it vulnerable to a future Russian attack. Squaring this circle requires not just persistent outside mediation but creative thinking about the kinds of guarantees that can be provided without feeding into escalatory spirals with Russia.
The solution is a group of Western weapons stockpiles that would be stored outside Ukrainian territory by host countries and temporarily released to Ukraine’s armed forces in the event of future Russian aggression. These weapons, which would include but are not limited to Patriot batteries, ATACMS, HIMARS, Storm Shadow missiles, Leopard 2 and Abrams tanks, and F-16 fighter jets, would be sourced from American arms purchased by European countries as well as European donors.
To stimulate investments into the off-site stockpiles, the U.S. would agree that a portion of the spending toward these banks will be deductible from the 5% defense spending target for NATO member states.
Purchasers do not necessarily have to be hosts; for example, Sweden can procure U.S. HIMARS missiles meant for a stockpile located in Romania. Other potential host countries include Poland, Germany, Czechia, and the Baltic states. These weapons banks would be maintained by the host countries and governed by a special commission within the EU. A sufficient number of Ukrainian servicemembers, after factoring in all relevant sustainment and rotation requirements, would be trained and available at all times to use these weapons without direct Western operation. The commission would undertake logistical responsibilities of ensuring that the stockpiles are modernized and maintained.
A future Russian invasion would trigger a short consultation period after which, if the aggression does not cease, the off-stockpiles would be unlocked and their contents surged to the Ukrainian military. These weapons would be leased to Ukraine for the duration of hostilities and returned to the host countries after the fighting ends.
These stockpiles would be spread across Europe to minimize risks for any single host country. Russia would be provided with general information about the kinds of systems that are in these stockpiles, but not with full inventorized lists, and independent verification mechanisms will be established to ensure that none of the stored weapons will be leaked to Ukraine in peacetime. As part of the agreement, Moscow will acknowledge that any attack or verified act of sabotage carried out against any off-site stockpile puts Russia in a state of war with the host country and falls squarely under NATO’s Article 5 collective defense provisions.
Countries and locations in closer proximity to Ukraine would be prioritized for most off-site stockpiles, minimizing Russia’s window to inflict damage on Ukraine prior while the deliveries are in transit. Ukraine would re-orient its force posture to emphasize fortifications, mines, drone swarms, and other defensive tools to blunt Russian advances while it waits for stockpile weapons to arrive.
This model offers a range of benefits to all the stakeholders involved.
Kyiv has long lamented the gradual, "drip, drip, drip" style in which Western aid has been transferred since 2022. The off-site stockpile model guarantees a critical mass of high-impact weapons ready to be delivered nearly immediately and all at once, with the infrastructure and sustainment needed to support them already in place. This positions Ukraine to decisively counter a future Russian assault and seize the initiative in the conflict’s opening stages, minimizing the likelihood of another protracted attrition war that plays to Russia’s inherent strengths.
Because these weapons would not be stationed on Ukrainian soil, the quantities that can be allocated to the offsite stockpiles are substantially higher than what Russia would accept as part of an Istanbul 2022-style domestic deterrent agreement.
Kyiv would, reasonably, require assurances that the weapons banks will not be held hostage to national politics or bilateral issues between Ukraine and the host countries. The decision to unlock the stockpiles would be governed by a ratified agreement between the EU and Ukraine. Unlike the Budapest Memorandum, this agreement would be binding and its execution not subject to the discretion of national parliaments or heads of state. Host countries found to be in breach of the agreement would be subjected to EU-level sanctions which will remain in place until they re-enter compliance.
Current Western defense-industrial production rates mean it would take some time for the banks to be filled, but it must be recognized that these same resource limitations already apply to weapons Ukraine is currently waiting to receive from its Western partners. It is preferable from Ukraine’s perspective to wait for the stockpiles to accrue in peacetime, as part of a ceasefire building into a larger U.S.-led settlement between Russia and the West, than to continue receiving a small fraction of what Kyiv needs to sustain the war effort in the midst of relentless and intensifying Russian attrition warfare.
The risks implicit in informing the Russians about the contents of the stockpile are minor for the reason that Russian intelligence already commands a good grasp of what the West has and is willing to send Ukraine. The provision of every new kind of weapon system has been accompanied by lengthy public debates in the West, so the train has well left the station when it comes to maintaining the element of surprise. The alternative “steel porcupine” strategy, too, does not support any real strategic ambiguity, as Russia has sufficient intelligence capabilities to keep abreast of Ukraine’s domestic buildup and future procurement plans.
The Kremlin has long maintained that it will not accept any threats to Russia from Ukrainian territory. These stockpiles do not increase Ukrainian or Western offensive power against Russia precisely because they will not be on Ukrainian soil, and they can only pose a threat if Russia commits future acts of aggression against Ukraine. They are, in that sense, a purely defensive tool.
This model is not, in itself, enough to affect war termination in Ukraine, nor is it viable without a larger framework deal that re-establishes rules of the game between Russia and the West. A panoply of other issues, including delimitation, non-bloc status and EU membership, sanctions, and ceasefire monitoring, will have to be negotiated.
But the off-site stockpile proposal is the best way to provide Ukraine with substantial guarantees without feeding into the security dilemma that has played a major role in stymying diplomatic efforts to achieve a durable peace.
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Top image credit: U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack meets with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun at the presidential palace in Baabda, Lebanon, in this handout image released on July 7, 2025. Lebanese Presidency Press Office/Handout via REUTERS
Recent remarks by a senior U.S. diplomat suggest that Washington may be open to a more conciliatory approach to Hezbollah, the predominantly Shiite Lebanese movement that has been regarded by Washington as a terrorist proxy of Iran since it was blamed for the bombings of the U.S. Marine barracks and the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983.
During a visit to Beirut last week in which he pressed for Hezbollah’s disarmament, Tom Barrack, a successful real estate investor and personal friend of President Donald Trump who serves as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Türkiye and U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, described Hezbollah as a “political party … [that] also has an armed wing.”
“Hezbollah needs to see that there is a future for them, and that this path is not meant to be only against them, and that there is an intersection between peace and prosperity for them as well,” he added.
The remarks stirred criticism, notably from pro-Israel forces in Washington, who saw in them a deviation from the longstanding official U.S. position that the Shiite group is a terrorist organization in its entirety.
Barrack, who was recently chosen to replace the more hawkish Morgan Ortagus as U.S. envoy to Lebanon, visited Beirut to receive the official Lebanese government response to an American proposal to disarm Hezbollah. While the proposal’s details remain under wraps, it essentially called for the group to hand over its heavy weapons in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese territories, pursuant to the U.S.-mediated ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon at the end of last November. According to various reports, a four-month timetable was set for implementation of the proposal.
Barrack struck an unusually upbeat tone on the response he received from the Lebanese side, noting that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had already gathered much of Hezbollah’s arsenal in southern Lebanon. “I’m unbelievably satisfied with the response,” he declared, adding that what “the (Lebanese) government gave us was something spectacular in a very short period of time.”
The Lebanese government’s response has also not yet been made public, but Barrack’s emphasis after his meetings with top government officials on resolving the issue of Hezbollah’s arms through national dialogue involving the group itself without imposing time frames suggested his endorsement of the official Lebanese position.
Lebanon’s president Joseph Aoun has long maintained that disarming Hezbollah must take place through dialogue and that a more forceful approach risks plunging the country into civil war.
A Hezbollah official told RS that the Lebanese response set certain preconditions before any dialogue about disarmament could take place.
“The state officials emphasized that three steps must first be taken which are ending Israeli violations [of the November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel], Israel’s withdrawal from all Lebanese occupied territories, and a return of Lebanese prisoners taken and held by Israel,” he said.
Barrack’s remarks stand in stark contrast to those made by Ortagus, who had described Hezbollah as a “cancer” that must be eliminated.
Unsurprisingly, Barrack’s upbeat tone provoked thinly veiled complaints from pro-Israel circles back in Washington. In an article entitled “Now Is Not the Time to Ease Up on Hezbollah – or Beirut,” David Schenker of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy criticized his failure to set a specific deadline for Hezbollah’s disarmament. And, referring to Barrack’s characterization of Hezbollah “as a political party with a militant aspect to it,” Schenker also accused Barrack of being “inexplicably conciliatory” towards the group.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain of the Foundation of the Defense of Democracies (FDD), a Washington-based think tank generally aligned with Israel’s right-wing Likud party, complained that the U.S. envoy “reversed three decades of US policy by no longer labelling Hezbollah a terrorist organisation.”
These complaints may have moved the State Department spokesperson, Tammy Bruce, whose boss, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has long cultivated political support from pro-Israel donors, to reaffirm Washington’s position that Hezbollah in its entirety is a terrorist organization. “Hezbollah is a designated terrorist organization, and we do not distinguish between its political or armed wings,” she said.
Nonetheless, Barrack reiterated the distinction to a group of journalists in New York, even going so far, when asked whether the U.S. could eventually take Hezbollah off its terrorism list, as to acknowledge that possibility.
“I’m not running away from the answer but I can’t answer it,” said Barrack in response to a question about whether such a measure could be taken, adding that it would require Hezbollah to eventually agree to hand over its heavy weapons — which pose a threat to Israel — to the Lebanese military.
Despite the controversy surrounding Barrack’s statements, a policy that deprioritizes animosity with Hezbollah would ultimately serve U.S. interests. While it was badly battered militarily during last fall’s war with Israel, the results of Lebanon’s municipal elections held in May demonstrated that Hezbollah — and its Shiite ally Amal — retain overwhelming support in the Shiite community, Lebanon’s largest religious denomination.
Indeed, opting for a more confrontational approach by pressuring the Lebanese state into disarming Hezbollah by force, as opposed to a dialogue, therefore runs a real risk of plunging the country into sectarian chaos, which would constitute a major policy failure for Washington.
“The United States has no positive interest in unending chaos in Lebanon,” explained former CIA veteran Middle East analyst and Quincy Institute non-resident fellow Paul Pillar in remarks to RS.
“Such instability is just a demonstration of the U.S.’s inability to bring peace to the region and as such is a stain on the reputation of the United States.”
A less confrontational stance towards Hezbollah makes even more sense given the recent conciliatory rhetoric of the group itself towards the U.S. In a speech in May, the group’s secretary-general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, made a clear distinction between the United States and Israel, asserting that President Trump has an “opportunity to invest in Lebanon and the region” if he frees himself from “Israel’s grip.”
The realization of Barrack’s outlined vision is of course far from guaranteed.
For starters, the ban imposed this week by the Lebanese Central Bank on the Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Qard Al-Hassan financial institution will raise the group's suspicions regarding Washington’s true intentions, not least given that this step was hailed by Barrack himself.
Israel also continues its near daily attacks on Lebanon that have even escalated in recent days, with an airstrike on the Bekaa valley leading to the deaths of 12 people. The persistence of these attacks undermines efforts to launch the government’s dialogue with the Lebanese Shiite movement regarding its weapons arsenal. Hezbollah has vowed that such attacks — in addition to Israel’s occupation of Lebanese territory since last fall’s war — need to end before it would take part in such a dialogue.
Another, less prominent issue relates to Syria and its Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led government which Hezbollah and the wider Lebanese Shiite community perceive as a major and potentially existential threat.
This owes primarily to the Salafi-Jihadi anti-Shiite roots of HTS, and the sectarian massacres committed by HTS-affiliated forces in post-Assad Syria. The spiritual leader of Syria’s Druze community in Suwayda province recently accused government-affiliated forces of conducting indiscriminate attacks in the province. Against the backdrop of the developments in Suwayda, Israel conducted a massive air campaign in both the province itself and the capital Damascus. According to press reports, targets in Damascus included the Defense Ministry and Presidential Palace, with Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu stating that the purpose of the operations was to protect the Druze minority.
Some of Barrack’s recent statements have also fuelled concerns about a new era of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon.
In an interview with The National, an Emirati media outlet, after his Beirut visit, the U.S. envoy warned that Lebanon runs the risk of becoming “Bilad Al Sham” once again if it does not move to address the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament.
Bilad Al Sham refers to the region once known as “Greater Syria” of which Lebanon was once part. While he later stated that his remarks were not meant as a threat to Lebanon, Barrack’s warning elevated Hezbollah’s already existing fears that Syria could regain an outsized role in Lebanon.
“These statements and the fact that Barrack was assigned the Lebanon file along with Syria raise suspicions that Washington intends to impose Syrian trusteeship over Lebanon akin to that which previously existed (during the Assad dynasty),” said the Hezbollah official.
This adds another dimension to the broader debate regarding Hezbollah’s arms and Washington’s Lebanon policy more broadly. If indeed U.S. officials are considering giving Syria major influence in Lebanon under an HTS-led government, this would likely not only undermine efforts to reach a disarmament agreement with Hezbollah, but could also potentially ignite sectarian violence of catastrophic proportions.
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Top photo credit: Druze stand on both sides of the border between Israel and Syria, amid the ongoing conflict in the Druze areas in Syria, in Majdal Shams, near the ceasefire line between the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and Syria, July 16, 2025. REUTERS/Ayal Margolin ISRAEL OUT.
Israel framed the attack as a warning to protect Syria’s Druze minority and warned that further “painful blows” would follow unless Syrian troops and allied militias withdraw from the south. Why would Israel bomb an important government building in Damascus purportedly on behalf of the Druze?
The Druze, a religious minority that is ethnically Arab, number about one million worldwide, roughly 700,000 of which live in Syria’s Suwayda governorate. Some 150,000 Druze hold Israeli citizenship and serve in the IDF, while another 20,000 Druze in the Israeli‑occupied Golan largely retain Syrian identity.
Parts of these constituencies have pressed Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to act but Israel has its own motivations, including the preservation of a Druze-dominated buffer zone in the south of Syria to insulate it from the new Syrian government which it views with great suspicion. Al-Sharaa’s government has adopted a congenial attitude towards Israel and expressed that it does not seek conflict. But the prevailing perspective in Israel is that al-Sharaa is attempting to consolidate power, and once he does, he may return to his jihadist roots.
This is one reason that immediately following the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel bombed much of Syria’s conventional military capacity. Another reason for the strike is that Israel likens itself as the protector of the Druze, both because there are Druze Israelis, and also because it supports Israel’s image as a multicultural society within a Jewish state.
A ceasefire announced late on July 15 collapsed within hours as artillery fire resumed. Druze cleric Sheikh Yousef Jarbou and Syria’s Interior Ministry announced a fresh truce midday on the 16th that allows government checkpoints to remain, although whether hard-line Druze factions will accept it remains unclear. The Druze faction led by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri released a statement that reaffirmed the community’s right to self-defense.
Simultaneously, Israel is redeploying forces: a military spokesman said units now operating in Gaza are being shifted to the Golan frontier and additional battalions are on standby for “several days of fighting” along the Syrian border.
This escalation threatens Washington’s nascent normalization track with Syria’s interim president, and former jihadist Ahmed al‑Sharaa. President Trump publicly courted Sharaa in Riyadh in May, providing sanctions relief and a future place in the Abraham Accords, a plan now in doubt after Israel’s strike on Damascus.
U.S. Special Envoy for Syria and Ambassador to Türkiye Thomas Barrack has been meeting regularly with Ahmad al-Sharaa and urging Syria’s minority groups to accept the authority of the central government in Damascus. With Israel signaling more action, the risk of a broader Israel‑Syria confrontation is rising fast, however, Washington appears to be working toward de-escalation in the background.
The Trump administration clearly wants the new government in Damascus to succeed as evidenced by its removal of all sanctions and strong statements of support for Syrian unification under Damascus. The fact Washington’s closest partner in the Middle East is now bombing Syria is not conducive to Washington’s aims there and it is likely scrambling to ensure things don’t go from bad to worse. Whether this strike in Damascus will shake the al-Sharaa government into withdrawing from Suwayda remains to be seen.
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