UPDATE 10/28: According to the New York Times Saturday morning, U.S. air defenses shot down a drone new the Al Asad Air Base in western Iraq on Friday, shortly after the U.S. launched retaliatory attacks against Iranian targets in Syria.
There were no injuries or damage on the ground, U.S. officials said on Friday. Pentagon officials also said that rockets were also fired into northern Syria on Friday but landed far from American troops.
The Pentagon announced it conducted F-16 fighter aircraft strikes against Iranian Revolutionary Guard targets in Syria early on Friday.
The targets — military supply depots that an official said were run by the IRGC — were located near Boukamal in the eastern part of the country. The official said the ammo and weapons there were the same used in a string of recent attacks against U.S. troops on bases in Iraq and Syria.
According to the Associated Press: "there had been Iranian-aligned militia and IRGC personnel on the base and no civilians, but the U.S. does not have any information yet on casualties or an assessment of damage. The official would not say how many munitions were launched by the F-16s."
U.S. personnel had come under fire for several days starting Oct. 19 and through last weekend. At least 24 troops sustained minor injuries, including 19 who suffered mild traumatic brain injuries from the blasts. The Biden administration has blamed Iranian backed militias for the attack and it appears now that they believe Iran's elite guards are supplying those fighters. Of course there are concerns that the war in Gaza will spill over into the region and one way it could do that is if U.S. military in Iraq and Syria are triggered into a fight.
In a statement, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III said that the airstrikes were “narrowly tailored strikes in self-defense,” and “do not constitute a shift in our approach to the Israel-Hamas conflict.”
A mourner reacts holding the body of a Palestinian child killed in an Israeli strike, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, at Abu Yousef al-Najjar hospital in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip, May 6, 2024. REUTERS/Mohammed Salem
Following immense pressure from Israel and its most fervent supporters, the Biden administration announced recently that it will keep giving weapons to five Israeli units that had committed “gross violations of human rights,” including a notorious battalion whose soldiers killed an elderly Palestinian-American man in the West Bank in 2022.
The decision drew sharp backlash from legal analysts and former officials, who noted that the State Department’s own experts had found the units in violation of the “Leahy law,” a 1997 statute that is supposed to stop foreign militaries from using U.S. weapons in war crimes.
In a sense, the move was standard. Israel has long been able to dodge U.S. laws surrounding arms transfers, and it even gets a special process for Leahy vetting that leaves more room for political interference, according to a former State Department official.
Indeed, the Biden administration has shown little public interest in holding Israel accountable for alleged war crimes even as Israel begins its assault on Rafah, where more than 1 million Palestinians have sought shelter amid the war. While the White House has reportedly held up a pair of weapons transfers in recent days, it’s carefully avoided giving a reason for the move, leaving open the possibility that the delay was caused by logistical problems.
Tim Rieser brings a unique perspective to these issues. During a long tenure as an aide to former Sen. Patrick Leahy, Rieser drafted the law that Israeli units now stand accused of violating. Today, he’s pushing for real enforcement of U.S. policy on weapons transfers as a senior adviser to Sen. Peter Welch (D-Vt.).
In an email exchange, RS asked Rieser about whether the Leahy law has ever really been applied to Israel and why policymakers should care. The following conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.
RS: You played a major role in the drafting of the Leahy law. From what you understand, is the Biden administration applying the law to Israel as it was originally intended?
Rieser: No, and Sen. Leahy has said the same. In its long history, the Leahy law has never been applied to Israel. Yet the administration insists it’s being applied consistently worldwide. If that were true, there would have been any number of instances when the law was applied to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
A good example, and there are many, was the fatal shooting of journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, after which Secretary Blinken called for a credible, thorough investigation and that those responsible be held accountable. None of that happened, and no action was taken by the United States under the Leahy law. The reality is that the law is applied differently with respect to Israel in multiple ways, with the result that it has never been applied to deny U.S. assistance to any IDF unit. As to why, I think it is due to a lack of political will.
RS: Has the Biden administration followed the intended process for evaluating violations by Israel? Is Israel capable of holding its own units accountable for violations that may occur?
Rieser: Israel, like any country, can hold accountable members of its security forces who commit gross violations of human rights, which are crimes everywhere. It’s a question of political will and, in some countries, judicial capacity. In four IDF cases, the State Department determined that the individuals responsible for gross violations were appropriately punished. But two of those cases involved fatal shootings of unarmed Palestinians for which the shooters served nine and zero months in prison, respectively.
In the fifth case, the Secretary determined the unit committed a gross violation after a Palestinian-American was killed more than two years ago. But instead of applying the Leahy law, the State Department has been discussing remediation of the unit with the Israeli government. Remediation is a key goal of the Leahy law, but U.S. assistance to that unit should have been cut off a long time ago.
RS: Why should policymakers care about applying the law uniformly, particularly when it comes to close U.S. partners?
Rieser: The law doesn’t apply one standard to some countries and a different standard to others. No country is above the law. If a government doesn’t want to comply with the law, they shouldn’t receive U.S. assistance. But beyond that, the U.S. wants partners that respect human rights and abide by the laws of war, not partners that commit crimes with impunity.
RS: What pathways are there to legislate meaningful conditions on military aid to Israel?
Rieser: There are no pathways currently for legislative conditions on U.S. assistance for Israel. That opportunity came and went with the recent passage of the supplemental appropriations bill. The next opportunity would be in the context of the fiscal year 2025 appropriations bill, which will be marked up in the appropriations committee in June or July.
RS: In what ways are Sen. Welch and his like-minded colleagues putting pressure on the administration to change its tack on weapons transfers to Israel? Have you seen any shifts in the administration's thinking on this issue?
Rieser: Sen. Welch has spoken repeatedly about the need for Congress to stop supporting a war strategy that he believes is fundamentally flawed. He was one of only three members to vote in the Senate against the supplemental appropriations bill, specifically because of the additional funding for offensive weapons for Israel.
We have not seen any noticeable shift in the administration’s policy, at least not to the extent of withholding or conditioning U.S. assistance to the IDF, although it’s also clear that the administration is trying hard to reduce civilian casualties and address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
RS: The Biden administration will have to report to Congress Wednesday about whether Israel has abided by U.S. and international law in its war in Gaza. Do you expect that the report will acknowledge widespread allegations of illegal Israeli conduct? What message will it send if the report fails to acknowledge these allegations?
Rieser: I doubt it will go that far. If the report accepts assurances of the Israeli government that it is abiding by international law and not impeding access to humanitarian aid, the message it will send is that, as a practical matter, the National Security Memorandum didn’t mean much, and the administration is still unwilling to hold Israel to a higher standard.
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Palestinians react after Hamas accepted a ceasefire proposal from Egypt and Qatar, in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip, May 6, 2024. REUTERS/Doaa al Baz TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
Israel was supposed to be letting in more aid. But a move to seize the Rafah Crossing on the Gaza side and shut down all aid flowing into the strip indicates otherwise, as the crossing was a key pipeline for humanitarian assistance.
According to an Israeli official, the operation "involved special ground troops and the Israeli air force" and "resulted in the killing of 20 Gazan combatants, as well as the discovery of Hamas infrastructure that included three operational tunnels." The official added that the operation is ongoing.
The seizure of the crossing comes hours after reports that Hamas accepted the latest deal on the table for a ceasefire. There are actually pictures of Palestinians celebrating in the streets. The Washington Post reported that upon the news, Israeli negotiators were headed to Cairo to hammer out details. However, reflecting remarks from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli officials said they would press on with the Rafah attacks, which began Monday with airstrikes, anyway. In addition, they indicated that Hamas was asking for more than the deal the Israelis and U.S. had put on the table.
“Even though Hamas’ proposal is far from Israel’s requirements, Israel will send a delegation of mediators to exhaust the possibility of reaching an agreement under conditions that would be acceptable to Israel,” Netanyahu's office said late Monday.
The Egyptian Foreign Ministry, for its part, said the Israeli military operation in Rafah threatens efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza. “This dangerous escalation threatens the lives of more than a million Palestinians who depend primarily on this crossing, as it is the main lifeline of the Gaza Strip,” it said in a statement Tuesday.
The EU's top foreign diplomat, Josep Borrell, said Israel's much awaited ground invasion of Rafah had begun. “The land offensive against Rafah has started again, despite all the requests of the international community, the U.S., European Union member states, everybody asking Netanyahu not to attack Rafah,” he told reporters in Brussels. “I am afraid that this is going to cause again a lot of casualties, civilian casualties, whatever they say.”
With the closing of the Rafah crossing, in addition to the shutdown of the nearby Karem Abu Salem crossing, the aid issue just got more dire, say UNRWA officials, as tens of thousands of Gazans have been told to evacuate Rafah city and are headed to evacuation zones in the coastal area of al-Mawasi.
The Biden administration’s Ukraine policy, though it lacks a coherent strategy, is at least centered on an explicit guiding principle: Russia must not be allowed to win in Ukraine. This sentiment is widely shared by U.S. allies across the Atlantic. "I have a clear strategic objective,” said French President Emmanuel Macron in a recent interview. “Russia cannot win in Ukraine.”
But, even in this consensus position, there is a major fly in the ointment: there has not been enough serious consideration of what a Russian victory in Ukraine would look like. The discussion has, instead, centered on alarmist predictions that obfuscate more than they reveal about Russian intentions and capabilities. “Who can pretend that Russia will stop there? What security will there be for the other neighboring countries, Moldova, Romania, Poland, Lithuania and the others?” said Macron, echoing the unfounded narrative that Russia’s ultimate goal is to attack NATO states.
While it is true that Russia’s victory in this war broadly contradicts U.S. interests, a closer look at Moscow’s possible endgame scenarios in Ukraine reveals that total victory — even if it were possible — is not in Russia’s interests and is probably no longer expected or desired by the Russian leadership.
Moscow, according to Western officials, can win this war simply by defeating Ukraine’s Armed Forces (AFU) on the battlefield. At first blush, it seems like a reasonable enough interpretation of a belligerent state’s wartime objectives, but this simplistic framing of the conflict quickly falls apart upon further examination.
What would really happen if the AFU’s lines collapsed — a prospect that, though not yet imminent, appears increasingly less distant by the day — and Russian forces found themselves in a position to steamroll Ukraine?
Even if Ukrainian forces are conclusively routed on the frontlines, besieging such Ukrainian strongholds as Kharkiv and Zaporizhia — let alone Kyiv and Odessa — will prove immensely taxing. Months of drawn-out fighting over the much less significant cities of Mariupol and Bakhmut offer a small, yet nonetheless harrowing preview of what these sieges would entail.
Occupying all of Ukraine would be prohibitively expensive for Russia even in the short term, let alone for a prolonged or indefinite period. The West would likely do its best to dial up these costs by funding and coordinating partisan activities all across Ukraine, but especially in the country’s western half. There is, after all, ample historical precedent for such activity in the form of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which resisted Soviet authorities for up to five years following the end of World War II.
Prior to Russia’s invasion, commentators urged Western leaders to turn this conflict into “Putin’s Afghanistan,” with Ukrainian partisans playing the role of 1980s mujahideen fighters. These suggestions were tabled because the Ukrainian government did not, in fact, collapse in the fateful weeks following the invasion, but it remains the case that any Russian attempt to control all of Ukraine would likely precipitate a prolonged insurgency campaign and incur terrible costs as a result.
Ukraine’s collapse likewise amplifies the risks of a direct clash between Russia and the West. The establishment of a de facto boundary between eastern Poland and Russian-occupied western Ukraine would create a dangerous flashpoint that, in the absence of meaningful deconfliction channels, could erupt in a shooting war on NATO’s eastern flank.
Nor would such a war necessarily be inadvertent on the part of the West; a total Ukrainian collapse would likely spark calls among the Baltic states and at least several major European powers for direct Western intervention on the ground, whether in the form of a NATO expeditionary force or a coalition of the willing drawn up from individual NATO members. Macron has openly and repeatedly stated that the West should not rule out an intervention along these lines; though his proposal was soundly rejected by the U.S. and Germany, it can be expected that political pressure to “do something” to stop Russia will build in Europe and the United States if Kyiv’s defeat becomes imminent.
The Kremlin is well aware that it cannot unilaterally achieve its wartime goals no matter how well it does on the battlefield. Indeed, its goals extend well beyond Ukraine, though not quite in the way that Macron and the Biden administration believe. There is no evidence that Moscow has any intention of launching wars of conquest against Poland, the Baltics, or other NATO states, but it is certainly seeking to extract a host of strategic concessions from the U.S. and its allies in areas including prohibitions against eastward NATO expansion and limitations on force deployments along NATO’s eastern flank.
The war that Russia is waging in Ukraine is thus a proxy for the Kremlin’s larger coercive strategy against the West, though it is not at all clear that conquering Ukraine will bring Moscow any closer to getting its desired concessions. The AFU’s collapse would certainly induce a state of panic in Western capitals. Yet it is difficult to see how this panic can be translated into a concrete willingness by the Biden administration and other Western leaders to strike the kind of grand security bargain Moscow seeks.
In fact, considering how politically invested current Western governments are in Ukraine’s war effort, there is a chance that Ukrainian collapse could produce the opposite reaction and render Western leaders even less likely to enter into substantive talks with Moscow.
Simply put, Russia has little to gain and much to lose by “winning” in Ukraine, if winning is defined as occupying the entire country. Instead, Russia’s incentive is to use its growing advantages as a lever for negotiating with the West. The Kremlin, in light of these conditions, has previously hinted at establishing demilitarized buffer zones in Ukraine that are not under Russian control.
Regardless of what happens on the battlefield in coming weeks and months, Moscow has started something it cannot unilaterally finish. This gives the U.S. tremendous inherent leverage in shaping the outlines of war termination — Washington and its allies should use it now to bring an end to this war on the best possible terms for the West as well as Ukraine.