New Gallup polling indicates that, for the first time, a minority of Americans — only 46% — are sympathetic toward Israelis. The percentage is the lowest recorded in Gallup’s 25 years of tracking the issue via its annual World Affairs Survey.
While the polling shows that Americans are more sympathetic toward Israelis over Palestinians overall (46% vs. 33%), U.S. adults are reporting they are more sympathetic toward Palestinians, up 6% from last year.
Americans’ views are largely split by political affiliation, according to Gallup. Republicans remain broadly supportive of Israelis, with 75% sympathizing with them over the Palestinians. Democrats, meanwhile, now side with Palestinians over Israelis by an almost 3-to-1 ratio (59% vs. 21%).
And a majority of Americans support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, though Democrats (76%) and Independents (53%) support the idea more than Republicans do (41%).
Americans’ increased Palestinian sympathies follow an extended Israeli war on the Gaza strip, that has killed more than 48,000 Palestinians and wounded 110,000 others, though bodies are still being recovered from the rubble.
Previous polling suggests Americans’ changing attitudes toward the Israel-Palestine issue can impact election results. Indeed, a mid-January YouGov pollbacked by the Institute for Middle East Understanding (IMEU) Policy Project indicated the Biden administration's Gaza policy was a top reason 2020 Biden voters stayed home in 2024, costing then Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris critical votes.
Top photo credit: Iraqi Shi'ite Muslims hold a cutout of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as they attend a protest against Israeli strikes on Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, June 16, 2025. REUTERS/Ahmed Saad
As Israeli jets and Iranian rockets streak across the Middle Eastern skies, Iraq finds itself caught squarely in the crossfire.
With regional titans clashing above its head, Iraq’s fragile and hard-won stability, painstakingly rebuilt over decades of conflict, now hangs precariously in the balance. Washington’s own tacit acknowledgement of Iraq’s vulnerable position was laid bare by its decision to partially evacuate embassy personnel in Iraq and allow military dependents to leave the region.
This withdrawal, prompted by intelligence indicating Israeli preparations for long-range strikes, highlighted that Iraq’s airspace would be an unwitting corridor for Israeli and Iranian operations.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani is now caught in a complicated bind, attempting to uphold Iraq’s security partnership with the United States while simultaneously facing intense domestic pressure from powerful, Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) factions. These groups, emboldened by the Israel-Iran clash, have intensified their calls for American troop withdrawal and threaten renewed attacks against U.S. personnel, viewing them as legitimate targets and enablers of Israeli aggression.
The PMF, a powerful array of predominantly Shiite militias formalized in 2016 and nominally reporting to the prime minister as commander-in-chief of the armed forces after their pivotal role in fighting ISIS, have since presented a difficult challenge to Iraqi state sovereignty. For years, these groups, especially the hardline elements among them known as the “muqawama” or resistance factions, have demonstrated a capacity to act in opposition to Baghdad’s formal policy.
This was seen recently in their threats to arrest Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa ahead of the Arab League summit in Baghdad last month, citing an outstanding Iraqi arrest warrant for his past terrorist activities on Iraqi soil. This directly undermined the Iraqi prime minister’s attempts at rapprochement with Damascus. Moreover, one of the PMF’s hardline factions, Kata'ib Hezbollah, has been implicated in the abduction of Elizabeth Tsurkov, an Israeli-Russian academic whose release remains under negotiation, despite concerted efforts by Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein and Prime Minister al-Sudani.
The deep-seated hostility of these PMF factions toward American forces was significantly intensified by the 2020 U.S. killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani and PMF commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis — a strike the U.S. justified as necessary to prevent imminent attacks that Soleimani was allegedly planning against American diplomats and military personnel in Iraq and the region. This animosity escalated further following the outbreak of violence between Israel and Hamas in October 2023.
As a result, Iraq — a country uniquely navigating alliances with both the U.S. and Iran, hosting some 2,500 American troops while also having Iran-backed militias integrated into its security forces — has since witnessed a sharp escalation in both rhetoric and repeated attacks against U.S. assets and personnel. This belligerence has only amplified following Israel’s recent strikes on Iran.
“If America dares to intervene in the war, we will directly target its interests and military bases spread across the region without hesitation,” warned Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, secretary-general of Kata’ib Hezbollah. Other PMF leaders have echoed this stance, with Akram Al-Kaabi, head of Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba, asserting that the assault on Iran was “in cooperation with the American occupier” and demanding the U.S. “must be removed from Iraq.”
The Iraqi government’s ability to restrain these groups, given their power and influence within the political system, remains limited and may prove increasingly difficult in the face of a prolonged war between Israel and Iran.
This internal challenge is compounded by Iraq’s vulnerability to airspace violations. Despite recent multi-billion dollar investments aimed at modernizing its air defense systems, including plans to acquire advanced capabilities from South Korea and France and bolster early warning systems, these improvements remain incomplete.
Iraq’s current air defenses are therefore not robust enough to intercept high-speed or long-range threats, such as Israeli jets or Iranian ballistic missiles traversing its skies. Indeed, this vulnerability has manifested already, U.S. air defense systems near the American Consulate in Erbil reportedly shot down a suspected Iranian drone on June 15.
The Iraqi government’s only recourse is through diplomatic channels. Prime Minister al-Sudani himself conveyed Iraq’s “categorical rejection of the use of its territory or airspace to carry out or facilitate any acts of aggression against neighboring countries” to Steven Fagin, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Iraq, and Major General Kevin Leahy, commander of the International Coalition to Combat ISIS, according to a press release from his office.
Baghdad has also formally filed a complaint to the United Nations Security Council and directly urged the U.S. to prevent Israeli overflights. However, Iraq’s leverage remains minimal.
The 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement — designed to solidify long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relations between the U.S. and Iraq — explicitly precludes the use of Iraqi territory for "attacks against other countries." But in practice, U.S. strategic interests, especially amid the current conflict, evidently override Baghdad’s theoretical control. This places the U.S. in a dilemma: not preventing Israeli overflights for attacks on Iran implicitly undermines Iraq's airspace sovereignty and risks further escalation with Tehran, yet forcefully attempting to stop them could directly entangle Washington in the conflict.
Iran, keenly aware of Iraq’s impotence, has intensified its diplomatic pressure on Baghdad. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi openly declared that Iraq “is unable to preserve and control the sovereignty of its territory in the face of aggression,” demanding Baghdad “bear its responsibility in preventing the use of its airspace for aggression against neighboring countries.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated this stance, urging Iraq to prevent its airspace from being “misused” against Iran.
Beyond the awkwardness of being an involuntary conduit for Israeli strikes, Iraq also needs stability in Iran for its energy needs. With roughly one-third of Iraq's electricity generated by Iranian natural gas, any sustained disruption to these supplies — already threatened by damage to Iran's energy infrastructure from recent strikes — risks triggering widespread blackouts and social unrest, further weakening Baghdad's position.
Adding to Iraq's woes, President Donald Trump’s confusing signals are of no help.
While praising Israel’s strikes as “excellent” and warning Iran of “more to come,” evidently hoping to extract concessions from nuclear talks that now appear on the verge of collapse, he simultaneously claimed advanced knowledge of Israeli plans, leaving the precise nature of U.S. support deliberately ambiguous. Simultaneously, Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted on U.S. non-involvement, instead emphasizing that the priority was protecting American forces, distancing Washington from direct responsibility.
However, the U.S.'s role in helping intercept Iranian rockets during Iranian counter-attacks, and the U.S. decision to reduce its diplomatic footprint in Iraq just prior to Israel launching its attacks, have been widely interpreted, particularly by Iran and its allies in Iraq, as clear indicators of Washington's complicity.
The greatest risk is that if al-Sudani fails to restrain PMF factions and U.S. troops face sustained attacks, their focus would inevitably shift from fighting ISIS to self-defense or withdrawal. This would severely diminish their ability to support Iraqi and Kurdish forces on counterterrorism, creating a dangerous vacuum for ISIS to regroup and expand.
Internally fragile and geographically exposed, Iraq risks becoming both a battleground and casualty in the Israel-Iran conflict. A prolonged showdown poses an existential threat to its security and imperils its nascent recovery.
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This file photo shows Bush delivering a speech to crew aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, as the carrier steamed toward San Diego, California on May 1, 2003. via REUTERS
By now you’ve likely seen the viral video of an Iranian television reporter fleeing off-screen as Israel bombed the TV station where she was recording live. As the Quincy Institute’s Adam Weinstein quickly pointed out, Israel's attack on the broadcasting facility is directly out of the regime change playbook, “meant to shake public confidence in the Iranian government's ability to protect itself” and by implication, Iran’s citizenry.
Indeed, in the United States there is a steady drumbeat of media figures and legislators who have been loudly championing Israel’s apparent desire to overthrow the regime of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
If you haven't seen the barrage of tweets, cable news appearances, or hawkish op-eds calling for the U.S. to join Israel in its war on Iran, look no further than John Bolton’s recent Wall Street Journal piece, headlined “Iran's Ayatollahs Are Weaker Than Ever.” Bolton hammers on about how this is the moment for “overthrowing the Ayatollahs,” affirming in no uncertain terms that “America's declared objective should be just that.” In other words, and to no one's surprise, Bolton is back onhis B.S. — pushing for regime change in Iran.
But here's the thing: regime change operations don't work, and there's a long history of failed American interventions to prove it.
Take, for example, the dozens of covert regime change operations the United States undertook during the Cold War. Over 60% of these failed in their goal to replace the targeted country’s political leadership, though in many of these attempts countless lives were lost and diminished as a result of American efforts. Even the so-called “successful” regime change operations were ineffective, given that in about half of these cases the U.S.-installed government was eventually overthrown, often violently.
Regime change operations also have had the effect of keeping the United States bogged down in irresponsible conflicts that have little connection to the American national interest. U.S. behavior during the Vietnam War provides a case in point. The United States first got involved with supporting the government of Ngô Đình Diệm, the president of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), in the mid-1950s. By late 1963, it was clear that Diệm and his administration were profoundly unpopular, and U.S. officials greenlighted a regime change operation that “succeeded” in assassinating and replacing Diệm, but ultimately did little to stabilize South Vietnam or increase support for the government.
In fact, the operation kept the United States committed to a South Vietnamese state that was doomed to collapse. Ironically, of course, the United States’ primary strategic goal in southeast Asia was to — you guessed it — force regime change in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) — a goal Americans were never able to accomplish.
Tragically, the disastrous experience in Vietnam did little to cure America’s addiction to regime change. Throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, U.S. forces attempted to force regime changes in a diversity of countries, from Iraq to Portugal, from Liberia to Angola, and from Haiti to Serbia.
Predictably, the Global War on Terror was riddled with regime change operations that — surprise — ended up undermining U.S. interests and one of the stated reasons for American involvement in the first place: bringing democracy to the broader Middle East. Disbanding the Ba'ath Party in Iraq led to insurgency and ISIS; assisting in the removal of Muammar Gaddafi created a power vacuum that resulted in Libya descending into a devastating civil war; and the 20-year war in Afghanistan, which began with the removal of the Taliban, ended with the group’s return.
Direct U.S. participation in Israel’s war against Iran wouldn't even be America's first rodeo with regime change in that country. Back in 1953, the CIA, in coordination with the United Kingdom’s MI6, orchestrated a coup against Iran's democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, installing the Shah in his place. And what did that result in? The 1979 Islamic Revolution — driven partly by fury over decades of American interference in Iran — gave us the very theocratic government Bolton and many others are now obsessed with toppling. In other words, the regime we’re being told we need to overthrow only seized power because of our last attempt to enact regime change in Iran.
And yet, if you’ve watched even a minute of the latest 24-hour news cycle, you’ve likely heard the phrase “regime change” dozens of times. But why should the United States pursue regime change in Iran? The threat of the country obtaining nuclear weapons? Not to dismiss a legitimate concern, but fear-mongering headlines about Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been gracing the front pages of major newspapers for the entirety of millennials’ lifetimes.
And weren’t we just participating in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program that, by all accounts, were going smoothly — that is, until Israel's targeted attacks took out key Iranian officials, including Ali Shamkhani, one of Iran's top negotiators?
Even if we ignore the fact that Israel is very clearly calling the shots when it comes to a war with Iran, it's worth highlighting just how devastating pursuing a regime change in the country could be. The combined population of Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003 was just 50 million; Iran's current population is approximately 88 million. The combined size of Iraq and Afghanistan is 421,000 square miles; Iran is a whopping 636,000 square miles. In this context, regime change would likely result in nothing more than death and deracination for the people of Iran; even if the United States desired to transform Iran into a liberal capitalist democracy, it is very difficult to imagine how this could be accomplished.
It almost goes without saying: Americans must resist being dragged into yet another disastrous military adventure in service of a strategy that doesn’t work, and never will.
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Top photo credit: August 2024 -- Led by the United Kingdom and involving trainers from 12 other countries, Operation Interflex gives Ukrainian recruits a five-week crash course in everything from infantry tactics to combat first aid, preparing them to defend their homeland. . (NATO/Flickr)
The war in Ukraine has raged for over three years. As ceasefire talks loom, major European NATO members including Germany, UK, France and Denmark are planning to protect any future armistice by sending their troops as peacekeepers in a “Coalition of the Willing.”
Their goal is to deter the Russians from restarting the war. Unfortunately, deterrence comes from combat capability. Without it there is no deterrence at all. That capability is in question. NATO equipment and doctrine was developed for the Cold War and tested in the mountains of Afghanistan. It has not been tested in conventional war and needs to absorb lessons from the Ukraine war to offer a military option to the European elites, independent of the United States.
Many Western military specialists do not appreciate the evolution in warfare. They believe that NATO’s “combined arms” doctrine will break the Russian Army. Unfortunately, emerging technology increased defensive firepower to the point where it defeats the protection capability of the attacker. The combination of artillery and drones destroys any attacking force before it can penetrate in depth. So far NATO leadership does not seem to have adopted its doctrine, equipment, or professional training to the new environment.
NATO doctrine evolved from the U.S. “Air Land Battle” developed to stop massed Soviet tanks from breaking through Germany’s Fulda Gap in the 1980s. Frontline units affected no more than 15km, maximum range for artillery at the time. Reconnaissance assets were mainly scouts or manned aircraft and neither could establish persistent observation of enemy rear for long.
War in Ukraine upended this environment. Proliferation of drones enabled both sides to establish persistent observation 30 –100 km in depth. Strike systems like short-range first-person view (FPV) drones can range 30 km beyond the front, and fixed-wing drones such as “Lancets” can reach 70 km. Artillery range grew from 15km to 50km and in some cases 70km.
The extended ranges of weapons mean it’s easier to mass fire (fire from two or more weapons directed at a single target or area). In the 1980s, an attacking battalion could only be engaged by strike systems of an opposing battalion, today it can be hit by full fires of the three to five enemy battalions in the opposing line.
The “safe” areas in the friendly rear have disappeared. Getting to the front is a journey of 50-70 km under constant enemy observation and strikes. Any large formation moving through this zone is likely to get destroyed before reaching the front. For example, during the Zaporozhye counteroffensive, large portions of mechanized Ukrainian forces were destroyed without even breaching Russian outer minefields.
Most pundits assume that Ukraine failed to follow NATO doctrine. This is false. Ukraine tried NATO doctrine, but abandoned it after it failed on the battlefield. For example, it lacked a realistic concept for dealing with enemy minefields and fortifications. German instructors told incredulous Ukrainian soldiers, “just drive around the minefields.”
This advice proved suicidal in the face of Russian/Soviet sappers, who’s reputation for massive, complex minefields reach back to WWII.
The overall pitfalls in the NATO doctrine, is that it assumes massive overmatch in equipment, munitions and airpower, provided by an overwhelming industrial base. Without those advantages NATO doctrine fails to deliver results.
There is also lack of professionalism among NATO officers, stemming from over 20 years of “War on Terror” that atrophied professional education in realms of conventional warfare. The loss of institutional knowledge has deeply affected Western militaries and is exacerbated by hubris gained from victories over weaker powers.
The New York Times article, “Secret History of the War In Ukraine,” describes the consequences of the NATO mind set. Falling back on their War on Terror experience, U.S. advisers focused on long range fires but completely neglected cavalry (heavy mechanized scouts).
Russian defense belts are preceded by “security zones,” an area about 10 km deep, which is held by dispersed heavy mechanized scouts, tasked with keeping enemy scouts away from the main defense belt and disrupting the attacker’s main body. In battles of Kherson and Zaporozhye, the Russian outpost line routinely broke up Ukrainian attacks with heavy losses, before those attacks reached the main defense belts.
Observing the latest NATO exercise in the Baltic, French soldiers still clear trenches, in large, clustered groups, using small arms. The only drone visible belongs to the reporter taking PR shots. Meanwhile in Ukraine, the Russian army uses drones at every level, from providing instant updates to assault troops to dropping grenades into strong points ahead of them. To preserve the lives of soldiers, grenades and large explosives are used to clear bunkers and corners instead of sending men.
The French appear to do none of these tactics. The outcome of the clash between these two forces is not hard to predict.
A similar picture appears to be in the air, where both sides are flying low, employing standoff munitions, lobbed from safety provided by friendly air defense. Glide bombs are the weapons of choice for both Russians and Ukrainians, reducing exposure time and reducing aircraft losses to single digits.
Will NATO adopt this practice? Unlikely. NATO military experts still talk about gaining air superiority and penetrating airspace beyond the front, flying into the very heart of Russian air defenses. Without the massive U.S. Air Force, Europeans would quickly run out of aircraft. This problem is exacerbated by low readiness rates, for example only 30% of German aircraft can actually fly.
The equipment is another sore point. Europe has donated so much that it's almost out. In an artillery centric war, many NATO members ( UK, Denmark) have none. Western arms makers have focused on performance over mass, resulting in few boutique solutions which rapidly wear out in prolonged combat. The war in Ukraine churns through equipment at a rate that the West can't replace. For example, production of donated M777 artillery, billed as game changer, cannot keep up with losses and by now are mostly destroyed.
This leaves introducing a draft, which is always an unpopular measure, but the migrant crisis risks exacerbating the situation. New citizens are unlikely to fight in Ukraine, without massive unrest. Excluding them will result in equally massive unrest from the European indigenous population. Either way, the draft threatens tearing European societies apart.
Instead of taking time to learn the lessons from Ukraine and improve its combat capability, NATO appears to assume that Russians don’t know how to fight. In the meantime both European training and equipment readiness rates are abysmal.
Here lies the ultimate puzzle. Given the inadequacy of NATO’s European forces to fight a sustained war, one must wonder, what are the European leaders hoping for? Do they delude themselves into thinking Russia is losing and they can defeat it in war, like some in the U.S.? Are they bluffing, or do they assume that the mere sight of Western forces will cause Russians to capitulate?
Why are they willing to run the real risk of a military defeat with all its negative political and economic consequences? Europe must address these questions before a catastrophic mistake is made.
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