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Confucius says: Get the definition of US-China ‘competition’ right

Here’s what’s missing in the debate about these two Great Powers in friction

Analysis | Asia-Pacific

Sparked by a Foreign Affairs essay proposing a “theory of victory” toward China, many prominent American analysts have joined the debate on whether the United States needs a “theory of victory” in its competition with China.

A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) frames the debate in terms of “end state” vs. “steady state” in U.S.-China policy. The report presents a diversity of views from American observers as well as analysts from select countries in Asia and Europe. Collectively, these views reveal the central parameters of the current debate on U.S.-China competition.

Wide-ranging though it is, this debate is lacking in one crucial aspect: an interrogation of the concept of competition itself. This neglect is problematic because different conceptions of competition tend to shape different strategies of competition.

The Trump administration’s conception of “strategic competition” led to confrontational policies toward China. The Biden administration’s proposal of “managed competition” produced a more stable yet still tense relationship. As strategy is inherently interactive, Washington’s competitive strategy will also affect Chinese perceptions and responses.

For its part, Beijing is averse to using the term “competition” to characterize the relationship. Chinese officials have tried to modify it by adding adjectives such as “positive” or “healthy.” But they have yet to offer a theory — let alone concrete policy proposals — on “positive competition.”

Imagine Confucius, the ancient Chinese philosopher, joining the debate. He would have significantly expanded it by offering a radically different conception of competition. This would be the idea of “exemplary competition” (junzi zhi zheng) — and one that could transform U.S.-China rivalry into a force for mutual growth and global stability.

Consider ancient Chinese archery, which Confucius saw as a model of exemplary competition. Archers pursued excellence not by obstructing their opponents, but by perfecting their own skill and character. They engaged in parallel competition, each aiming at their own target, while adhering to elaborate rituals that fostered mutual respect and self-improvement.

The Confucian concept of “exemplary competition” presents an illuminating contrast to the U.S. approach to great power competition. At the heart of the contrast lie two different intellectual traditions: the individualist tradition that underlies Western — particularly American — thought, and the relational tradition central to Confucian philosophy. The individualist tradition, shaped by Enlightenment ideas and American history, sees individuals and nations as separate entities with their own interests and rights. In this view, competition is about different parties pursuing their own goals, often measuring success by how much they gain compared to others.

The Biden administration’s China strategy reflects this individualist pursuit of relative advantage. It encompasses a broad spectrum of policies designed to maintain American technological and economic preeminence, strengthen alliances to counterbalance Chinese influence, and frame the competition as a clash of value systems. The strategy’s ambitious scope, aiming at achieving superiority across technological, economic, political, military, intelligence, and global governance domains, reveals an underlying preoccupation with maintaining global primacy.

In contrast, the Confucian relational tradition sees people and nations not as isolated entities, but as deeply interconnected. Competition is not about pursuing relative advantage; it is a process of mutual elevation occurring within a web of relationships. The long-term health of the relationship takes precedence over short-term, narrowly self-interested gains. As exemplified in ancient Chinese archery, the goal was not merely to win, but to improve oneself and one’s competitors, thereby strengthening the social fabric.

This concept of exemplary competition casts light on the inadequacies of the current debate on U.S.-China competition. A central divide in the debate is between hawks, who want to equate “winning” with regime change inside China, and moderates, who seek to manage competitive coexistence and avoid inadvertent conflict.

The hawks, represented by former Trump administration national security official Matt Pottinger and former Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), focus solely on maximizing U.S. interests. They assume that a U.S. “victory” necessitates China’s defeat. The moderates highlight the risks of unchecked confrontation such an approach would bring about. They emphasize the importance of stabilizing the relationship and cooperating on key issues of mutual concern.

From a Confucian perspective, the framing of this debate is misguided. Confucius would likely urge a fundamentally different conception of “winning” or “success.” Victory in an exemplary competition between the United States and China would involve both nations improving themselves and excelling in their respective strengths while maintaining a peaceful and cooperative relationship. Washington and Beijing would each strive to enhance their own capacities and address their internal challenges, rather than focusing on obstructing or undermining the other.

The goal would not be to “defeat” the other side or force a change in its political system, but to achieve the best possible version of oneself.

This conception of success presents a different set of policy imperatives for both countries. For the United States, it would emphasize reinvigorating democratic institutions, strengthening educational systems, modernizing infrastructure, catalyzing innovation, and addressing systemic social inequalities. For China, the focus would shift toward enhancing democratic governance, confronting environmental challenges, and achieving sustainable development. Both nations would be “winning” by becoming better versions of themselves, not by diminishing the other.

The foreign policy implications of this approach are equally significant. Exemplary competition does not dismiss the genuine differences and tensions between the United States and China; rather, it provides a framework for channeling competitive impulses constructively. It acknowledges the importance of safeguarding legitimate interests and encourages the fostering of enlightened, rather than narrow, self-interest.

Moreover, it would compel Washington and Beijing to assume collaborative leadership in addressing humanity’s most pressing challenges — particularly climate change, pandemics, and artificial intelligence governance.

Although the idea of exemplary competition has distinctive Confucian roots, its relational foundation is not entirely foreign to American thought and practice. The various European-descended subcultures of American society have historically valued family harmony and community cooperation.

Indeed, elements of exemplary competition are discernible in the Biden administration’s China policy, particularly in its emphasis on domestic renewal. These promising developments are nevertheless overshadowed by a threat-based competitive strategy oriented toward zero-sum outcomes.

American analysts have demonstrated a keen awareness of the importance of exemplary competition, albeit without explicitly framing their ideas in these terms. In the CSIS report mentioned earlier, various experts propose innovative approaches centered on domestic renewal.

This common ground, though modest, suggests that exemplary competition between the United States and China remains possible. At a minimum, it indicates that the U.S. policy community should expand its conception of competition.

The same imperative applies to China. Despite being the birthplace of Confucianism, China has not explored the implications of Confucian exemplary competition for contemporary U.S.-China relations. Furthermore, current Chinese foreign policy often fails to meet Confucian standards. As the wellspring of Confucian thought, China bears a particular responsibility to embody exemplary competition in its U.S. policy.


Top photo credit: U.S. President Joe Biden meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 leaders' summit in Bali, Indonesia, November 14, 2022. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque/File Photo
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