Mapping the votes of December 12 at the UN General Assembly (where every state has a single, equal vote with no veto powers) reveals massive support across the Global South (but also among many European states and U.S. allies in Asia, Japan and South Korea) for an unconditional ceasefire in Gaza.
This is as clear a diplomatic message as it gets: that Washington, now starkly isolated on the issue, should be using its leverage to end Israel’s relentless bombing campaign in Gaza. The support was even greater than the October 27 resolution which called for a “humanitarian truce” — with, among others, India, Philippines, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Fiji coming over to a ceasefire in the latest vote.
However, the Global South had varying preferences on the amendment introduced by the U.S. condemning Hamas (but not Israel) by name and its “heinous terrorist attacks” on October 7.
Here a divide is apparent between mainly Muslim-majority states — almost all of which voted against the amendment — and other Global South states. Thus a contiguous belt stretching from Mauritania in western Africa to Pakistan opposed the amendment, as did Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia. They were joined by South Africa, Cuba, Bolivia, Uganda, and a few other non-Muslim majority states.
The rest of the Global South — including India, Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Ghana, and Kenya — abstained, did not vote, or supported the U.S. amendment.
Sarang Shidore is Director of the Global South Program at the Quincy Institute, and member of the adjunct faculty at George Washington University. He has published in Foreign Affairs and The New York times, among others. Sarang was previously a senior research scholar at the University of Texas at Austin and senior global analyst at the geopolitical risk firm Stratfor Inc.
Dan M. Ford is a junior research fellow at the Quincy Institute's Global South Program. Previously he served as a research and communications associate at the Global Interagency Security Forum in Washington, D.C.
A group of Democratic lawmakers led by Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) on Tuesday slammed a Republican proposal to pour $150 billion into the military beyond the increases already planned for 2025.
“Republicans are putting the Pentagon before the people,” Markey said during a press conference on Capitol Hill highlighting wasteful Pentagon spending.
The senator stood next to a large list of alternative projects that could be funded by a $150 billion allocation including new hospitals, student loan forgiveness, affordable housing units, and free school lunches.
Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.) took aim at Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency, highlighting the hypocrisy of a military budget increase amid massive cuts to much smaller federal agencies like the U.S. Agency for International Development, the National Institute of Health, and the Department of Education.
“Let’s not be fooled by the hollow claims that Elon is going to go after waste in Pentagon spending,” she said.
Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.) said the $150 billion spending increase proposal was driven by her colleagues’ investments in the military industrial complex, echoing an opinion piece she published in the Detroit Free Press late last month.
Rounding out the slate of speakers were Robert Weissman, co-president of Public Citizen, Gabe Murphy, and Thomas Countryman. Murphy, a policy analyst at the nonpartisan organization Taxpayers for Common Sense, lamented the bloating influence of private companies, noting that “half of our budget goes to defense contractors.”
Meanwhile, Countryman, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs and current Board Chairman at the Arms Control Association, criticized the proposal’s emphasis on nuclear weapons spending as a defense strategy. “What concerns me about this particular agenda request by Republicans is that it will contribute to a nuclear arms race,” he said.
Jordan’s King Abdullah II just met with President Trump, and afterwards during a short press conference, deflected journalists’ questions about Trump’s insistence he accept Palestinian refugees from Gaza.
Abdullah said he would need to wait for other Arab leaders, including Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt, before responding directly. President al-Sisi and other Arab leaders will meet in Cairo on February 27, ostensibly to propose an alternative to Trump’s plan to forcibly remove Palestinians from Gaza, which would be a war crime.
For his part, Trump asserted that Palestinians do not want to be in Gaza, would be happy to leave, and that they would not want to return. Trump did not address questions about how he would handle the fact that many Palestinians will refuse to leave. Sitting beside King Abdullah, who looked uncomfortable, Trump appeared to walk back his intention to force Jordan to accept Palestinians by withholding U.S. assistance to the kingdom, which he is already doing.
Jordan is in a difficult position, given the country’s reliance on U.S. support, which makes up about 10 percent of its national budget. Egypt similarly relies on U.S. assistance. Both countries began to receive significantly more financial support from the U.S. after signing peace treaties with Israel in 1994 and 1979, respectively.
When asked by Fox News’ Brett Beier about how he would convince Jordan and Egypt to take approximately a million Palestinian refugees each, Trump said, “We give them billions and billions of dollars a year.” Trump’s cut to foreign assistance includes the $1.45 billion the U.S. sends to Jordan annually (the only countries to which he did not cut assistance were Israel and Egypt). It is evident that from Trump’s perspective, Jordan owes the U.S., and so should be willing to take in Palestinian refugees.
Trump may not realize that by trying to strongarm King Abdullah into accepting Palestinians, he is not only risking the U.S.-Jordan relationship, but potentially the willingness of other Arab states to partner with America. Trump seems to believe that the U.S. sends military and humanitarian assistance to Jordan and other countries and receives little in return, rather than grasping that U.S. support to other countries has played a key role in maintaining U.S. leadership, and when forced to accept political suicide in order to support Trump’s regional agenda, countries like Jordan will increasingly seek other partners.
Moreover, Trump appears unaware that he is posing an existential threat to Abdullah’s rule and the stability of a major non-NATO ally. Jordan’s population is already approximately half Palestinian, due to previous Israeli expulsions of Palestinians in 1948 and 1967. Jordanians are seething over Israel’s war on Gaza. Ninety-four percent of the population are boycotting American goods as a result of U.S. support for Israel’s war on Gaza. Three attacks on the Israeli border or embassy have already occurred. If hundreds of thousands of new Palestinian refugees were forced into Jordan, the fragile status quo would likely collapse. Abdullah’s government could be overthrown, and given the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in September’s parliamentary election, the government most likely to replace it would not be interested in signing another peace treaty with Israel, or be willing to host U.S. troops.
In addition to the political instability that would result, Jordan simply does not have enough resources to take in additional refugees. Jordan lacks adequate water for its existing population, a scarcity made worse by Jordan’s refugee burden from previous conflicts, including the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the years of Syria’s brutal civil war. Jordan has remained a bastion of relative stability despite regional upheaval, due largely to the U.S. and Europe helping pay for Jordan to host refugees.
Despite this support, Jordan’s debt is already 90 percent of its GDP. Twenty-two percent of Jordan’s population are unemployed. When I visited last fall, interlocutors emphasized the economic distress faced by the majority of the population.
From Abdullah’s perspective, Jordan already does a lot for the U.S. At Washington’s urging, Jordan has maintained a peace treaty with Israel for the past 30 years, despite its deep unpopularity among the Jordanian population. Jordan hosts 15 different U.S. military installations and almost 4,000 American troops.
When I was last in Jordan in October to assess the impact of the war on Gaza, Iran fired missiles over Jordanian territory at Israel. The Jordanian military issued a statement that it had worked with the U.S. military to help shoot down some of the Iranian missiles. One of these even fell and killed a Jordanian. The next day, Jordanians expressed outrage: why was their government helping the U.S. to defend Israel, even at the expense of their own safety?
America’s partners from Saudi Arabia to the U.A.E. to Egypt have been willing to acquiesce to the U.S. vision for the Middle East — a vision that prioritizes the desires of Israel over the existence of Palestinians — because it served their own interests. With U.S. support and weapons, Arab autocrats have consolidated their hold on power. Their collaboration with the U.S. is predicated on the U.S. helping to keep them in power.
When the Obama administration failed to save Mubarak’s regime from the popular uprising that overthrew it in 2011, many Arab autocrats were shocked at what they saw as Obama’s betrayal of a key U.S. partner. If they observe Trump not only failing to support a U.S. partner but actively coercing him into a decision that could lead to his overthrow, rulers from Riyadh to Rabat may reconsider their partnership with the United States.
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Top image credit: Frederic Legrand - COMEO / Shutterstock.com
“My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier,” President Donald Trump promised the American public in his inaugural address on January 20, 2025. About three weeks later, it’s safe to say that no one will remember Trump as a unifier, but he still has a chance to claim the peacemaker title.
Of course, Trump is not talking much like a dove these days. He’s already threatenedseveralU.S. neighbors in service of territorial aggrandizement, musedabout making war on Mexican cartels, and proposed occupying the Gaza strip with U.S. troops after its residents are ejected. But at the same time, he’s still pushing for peace talks in Ukraine, signaling openness to a new nuclear deal with Iran, and has mentioned reopening talks with North Korea.
Ultimately, whether Trump can be a peacemaker will largely come down to the president himself, specifically his ability to keep his administration focused and his willingness to persevere through arduous talks and criticism, rather than giving up and reverting to belligerent posturing. Pessimism seems warranted.
As a president and candidate, Trump’s record at making peace is poor. It’s true he didn’t start any new wars last time he was president, but he came close with Iran and engaged in a tempestuous “fire and fury” exchange with North Korea before engaging in unsuccessful talks. He also didn’t end any wars or bring deployed U.S. forces home, despite gesturing at exiting Syria and drawing down in Europe. As a candidate last year, Trump was critical of the Biden administration for carrying out the withdrawal from Afghanistan he negotiated — his signature peacemaking achievement.
Still, Trump appears serious about striking a peace deal with Russia over Ukraine, even if he couldn’t manage it in a day as he promised. He hasn’t said much about North Korea lately, but past statements about “falling in love” with North Korea’s dictator suggest he views some sort of deal with Pyongyang as unfinished business. More surprisingly, Trump haslatelysaid he’s open to a new nuclear deal and broader détente with Iran. He underlined this by suggesting that he’d turn his administration’s Iran file over to Steve Witkoff, a fellow real estate mogul who seems to value deal-making, and by publicly blocking Iran hawks like former Secretary of State Pompeo and his deputy Brian Hook from this administration.
On Israel and Palestine, Trump says he is pursuing peace, but that is not obvious. Yes, his support for the ceasefire plan the Biden administration structured for Gaza was critical in getting the Israeli government to finally agree. And Trump outwardly shares the Biden’s administration’s faith that an Israeli-Saudi normalization can pacify Israeli-Palestinian relations. But it’s difficult to call this a peace plan, especially after he proposed removing Palestinians from Gaza entirely before redeveloping the area into the “Riviera of the Middle East” — hardly a peaceful overture given that it would require the forcible relocation of two million people.
As with the Abraham Accords his last administration brokered, Trump seems more interested in generating benefits for U.S. clients — Israel and Saudi Arabia now — than achieving anything for Palestinians.
Each of these endeavors — Ukraine, North Korea, Iran and Israel — presents unique political challenges, but they face a common set of domestic obstacles.
One is public opinion. Conventional wisdom in U.S. politics is that making peace is riskier for politicians than starting wars. But while being dovish is rarely a big advantage, peace accords can pay electorally, and generally the public will not punish their pursuit.
Various commentators insist that Trump won the election due to his promise to end wars abroad — or at least that Kamala Harris lost it due to her comparative hawkishness, but there is little evidence for this. Very few voters (four percent in exit polls) said foreign policy was decisive to their choice, and those voters were closely split between the candidates. Voters do seem to have preferred Trump on foreign policy overall, but evidence suggests it was due to an aura of strength and change, not his specific proposals. Indeed Trump’s voters seemtodisagree with his desire to cut a deal with Iran, his views on NATO, and his statement that he might not defend Taiwan, but they did not punish him for any of it.
The election data thus echoes decades of public opinionresearch suggesting foreign policy generally lacks salience and presidents have substantial rope to pursue their preferred policies. So public opinion will not much constrain Trump’s pursuit of peace deals.
The main resistance to Trump’s peace agenda, if it lasts, is likely to come from inside the Beltway, from Congress along with commentators, think tank analysts, and foreign lobbies. Recall that opposition from these quarters to the Iran deal is what brought President Barack Obama’s aide Ben Rhodes to coin the phrase “the Blob,” now a short-hand for the protectors of the U.S. foreign policy status quo.
Trump is not immune to elite criticism — he certainly reacts to negative press — but his political success makes him acutely aware of the limited real or lasting effects of the Beltway debate on his ability to push through his preferred policies. Of course, Obama did get his Iran deal and Trump negotiated exit from Afghanistan under similar attacks.
Congress will have little ability to stop any peace deal Trump signs, which are likely to be structured as executive agreements, not treaties the Senate must approve. Opposition in Congress could still lead to difficulties, if for example Democrats decide to hold up appointments or spending to block or shape a Ukraine deal. For now, at least though, the Republican majority is loyal to Trump and disinclined to assert their powers over foreign policy.
Heavier establishment opposition to peace deals might come from the more traditionally hawkish parts of the Trump administration, starting with national security adviser Mike Waltz, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and even Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (whose inexperience makes him harder to read). But Trump’s second term advisers seem to have been chosen because they are likely to be pliant — unlike John Bolton, Rex Tillerson, and Jim Mattis, who all thwarted Trump in various ways.
If the public, Congress and Trump’s staff are all willing to go along with pushing peace deals, it should be smooth sailing, right? Not quite. Even getting warring sides to the table can take months of talks or more and then negotiations can go on indefinitely. The Korea Armistice talks took two years. The Iran deal took over a year of intense haggling. The exit agreement with the Taliban took about a year and a half to conclude. Even a Ukraine-Russia ceasefire, let alone a true peace deal could take years.
Trump seems ill-suited to tolerate this kind of patient diplomacy. He’s often called a transactionalist, but he’s mostly been a shallow one; more interested in the publicity and spotlight associated with making a deal than its substance. That is not fatal to a peace agenda, but it raises doubts about commitment and endurance. Will Trump stick with peace talks as he did with the Taliban? Or will it be more like the North Korea talks — pomp around merely having talks with little of the staffing and compromise vital to success?
The rash pronouncements of Trump’s first weeks may prove typical. Impulsive ultimatums and radical proposals — like threats to invade Mexico or endorsement of throwing Palestinians out of Gaza — may alienate stakeholders in the U.S. and abroad, shattering coalitions needed to advance his peaceful objectives. At a minimum, the neo-imperialist start to his term raises doubts that he can stay focused on the peaceful legacy he claims to seek.
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