Follow us on social

google cta
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Benjamin Netanyahu

Is Turkey's big break with Israel for real?

Depends on who you ask, but there is a history here that may be difficult to escape

Middle East
google cta
google cta

In recent months, media reports have suggested that long-standing Israel-Turkey relations have reached a “breaking point,” particularly as Israel intensifies its attacks on Gaza and Lebanon. These claims exploded following President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s declaration last Wednesday that Ankara has “currently severed all relations with Israel.”

That assertion, however, was complicated by the response from Israel’s foreign ministry, which stated it was “not aware of a change in the status of relations with Turkey,” despite the trade embargo imposed by Ankara last May.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the longstanding and generally cordial Israel-Turkey relationship is fractured, primarily due to the policies of the current Israeli government. A protracted war in Gaza, a second war in Lebanon, the expansion of settlement activities on the West Bank, and the intractability of the Palestinian issue have led to the present impasse. Yet, the long history of engagement and mutual interests suggests that their relationship will likely withstand the current challenges.

A long history

One of the most notable historical links between Turkey and the Jewish community dates back to the Ottoman Empire, which provided refuge to Jews fleeing persecution in Europe from the late 15th century onward. Jewish Ottomans enjoyed privileges, such as holding key positions in state institutions and engaging freely in business activities. Today, Turkey’s Jewish community, concentrated primarily in Istanbul, traces its roots to this era. The term “Mousavi,” a term derived from the biblical Moses and used instead of “Jew,” reflects an effort to avoid the negative connotations imposed by European prejudice.

Following World War II and the establishment of the state of Israel, the Mousavi community in Turkey continued to thrive – in stark contrast to Jews in Arab countries, most of whom were expelled or forced to flee their homelands. To this day, the Mousavi community remains largely silent during periods of heightened tensions between Israel and Turkey, avoiding public involvement in conflicts such as those in Gaza and the West Bank and prioritizing its security and sustainability within Turkey.

This legacy helped to influence Ankara’s post-World War II approach to the numerous Arab-Israeli conflicts. While Turkey repeatedly faced criticism from Arab states for recognizing Israel in 1948, Ankara has usually maintained a balanced position, in large part due to pressure from its American and European NATO allies.

Domestic considerations

Over the decades, Israel-Turkey relations have suffered frequent ups and downs, but shared interests have consistently brought the two sides back together. Of late, however, the bilateral relationship has deteriorated to historic lows for a number of reasons, primarily, however, as a result of changes in the ideologies of the two countries’ ruling parties.

Ultra-conservative coalitions in Israel have hardened policies on Palestinians and other minorities, fueled by their claims to the “promised land” and aspirations for a “Greater Israel,” the realization of which would impact Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, as well as the West Bank.

At the same time, since the AK Party’s rise to power in Turkey in 2002, Erdogan has pursued a foreign policy guided by “justice and Islamic values.” Rights for Palestinians have become an important driver, illustrated most dramatically perhaps by Erdogan’s confrontation with then-Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in 2009. Tensions peaked with the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, when Israeli forces killed 10 Turkish activists aboard a humanitarian aid ship bound for Gaza. Turkey demanded compensation and condemned Israel’s actions, further deepening the rift.

Yet there are a number of key issues that, so far, have prevented a complete break, notably the geoeconomic dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean. Recent developments in energy politics have driven some reconciliation efforts and are likely to remain relevant if and when the Palestinian question is resolved. Shared interests in energy cooperation had prompted dialogue between Erdogan and Israeli leaders, including President Isaac Herzog and Netanyahu. Meetings, notably one in New York on September 20, 2023, signaled progress toward full normalization.

The October 7 attacks by Hamas three weeks later and subsequent Israeli military operations, however, reignited tensions, with Turkey condemning civilian casualties inflicted by Israel’s offensive and eventually filing a case with the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide.

Prospects for rapprochement

Turkey’s approach to Palestinian issues is often perceived as a strategic factor for Israel, particularly due to Ankara’s engagement with and political support for various groups, including Hamas. However, its policy has fluctuated over the years, shaped by broader regional dynamics and Turkey’s shifting diplomatic priorities.

While Ankara has sought to reassert its leading role in promoting Palestinian aspirations — particularly through strong rhetoric and international legal actions after October 7 — its actual sway over groups like Hamas and Hezbollah remains subject to debate and varies depending on specific circumstances.

The recent allegation that Turkey has offered to host Hamas political offices is perceived by both Israel and the United States as a major setback to improving relations. Turkish officials reject the accusation, suggesting that permitting some Hamas members to “occasionally visit” Turkey does not equate to providing an institutional base for the group. Historically Turkey has taken in members of various opposition groups (as far back as the post-Russian Revolution period) but has been clear about prohibiting operational activities within its borders.

Israel has sought to counter Turkey’s regional influence in recent years by strengthening its ties with Greece, the Greek-led government of Cyprus and various Kurdish factions. Recent developments, such as Turkish allegations that the government in Nicosia is allowing U.S. and allied forces to use their ports for supplying Israel, certainly work against better relations.

Quo Vadis?

Nearly universal condemnation of Israeli military actions and few prospects for ceasefires – much less lasting peace – underpin the view that an intransigeant Israeli prime minister is the most disruptive factor in regional peace and stability. That perception is very much shared by Erdogan’s Turkey. There is a sense that only a successor Israeli government may offer an opportunity for serious dialogue.

Turkey-Israel relations is likely to return to a status quo antebellum, but that would require Israel to shift back to centrist policies, reject the expansionist and neo-colonial agenda of Israel’s ultra-orthodox and ethno-nationalist political parties, and clearly embrace a settlement that respects Palestinian aspirations for a viable state of their own.


Top photo credit: President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Shutterstock/ Mustafa Kirazli) and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Salty View/Shutterstock)

\

google cta
Middle East
Israel’s push for Somaliland base raises fears of wider war
Top image credit: Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar and Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi participate in a joint press conference during Saar's visit to Somaliland on January 6, 2026. (Screengrab via X)

Israel’s push for Somaliland base raises fears of wider war

QiOSK

Bloomberg reported Wednesday that Israel is in talks with Somaliland officials to form a strategic security partnership, which might include granting Israel access to a military base or other security installation along the Somaliland coast from which it can launch attacks against Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

With war raging in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa is a particularly important geoeconomic and geopolitical puzzle piece. Its location near the Bab el-Mandeb strait, which connects ships traveling through the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, makes it a strategic location from the perspective of global shipping, 10% to 12% of which travels through the strait annually.

keep readingShow less
Most Iranian Americans want diplomacy with Iran: poll
Iranian-Americans in the age of Trump, the Travel Ban, and the Threat of War

Most Iranian Americans want diplomacy with Iran: poll

QiOSK

Recent data released by the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) suggests that a strong majority of Iranian Americans support diplomacy to resolve tensions between the U.S. and Iran — a finding at odds with the dominant conversation online suggesting that most Iranian Americans are in favor of the Iran war.

The data was collected through a survey of 505 Iranian Americans conducted by Zogby Analytics between Feb. 27 and March 5. Among the most notable results were that a clear majority of Iranian Americans — 61.6% — support diplomacy to move toward de-escalation and a negotiated path forward.

keep readingShow less
Are we on the precipice of World War III?
Top image credit: New Zealand reinforcements on their way to the front lines during World War I. (Archives New Zealand/ CC BY 2.0)

Are we on the precipice of World War III?

Global Crises

Shortly after U.S. and Israeli bombs and missiles began falling in Tehran, Iranian missiles flew in all directions at U.S. bases in Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and others. The people living in these countries were justifiably terrified, which was a likely objective of those Iranian leaders who survived the first assaults. Tehran’s strategy may be to persuade America’s regional allies to reconsider their security alliances.

In 2010, most people shook their heads when a now-infamous map of Afghanistan’s various societal, governmental, and tribal interests went public. The counterinsurgency (COIN) spaghetti chart was terribly complex – and intractable. One PowerPoint slide shows how challenging it can be to understand how a stimulant in one corner can produce a response in a seemingly tangential sector. And this is just a single country.

keep readingShow less
google cta
Want more of our stories on Google?
Click here to make us a Preferred Source.

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.