When it comes to the reported draft framework agreement between the US and Russia, and its place in the Ukraine peace process, a quote by Winston Churchill (on the British victory at El Alamein) may be appropriate: “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”
This is because at long last, this document engages with the concrete, detailed issues that will have to be resolved if peace is to be achieved.
The plan has apparently been worked out between US envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev (reporting indicates Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the president's son-in-law Jared Kushner were involved, too) but a great deal about it is highly unclear. The Trump administration reportedly believes that a deal is imminent, but the Russian government has been at pains to stress that no agreement has yet been reached, so we do not know if Moscow will try to exact further concessions.
Moreover, the details of several key points have not been revealed, and above all, it may be impossible to get the Ukrainian government to agree to essential elements, unless the Trump administration is prepared to bring extremely heavy pressure to bear on both Ukraine and America’s European allies.
It has already been reported that President Zelensky has rejected the plan and is working with European governments to propose an alternative.
Among the most difficult points for Ukraine will be the reported draft agreement that Ukraine should withdraw from the approximately 14% of the Donbas that it still holds, and that it has sacrificed tens of thousands of lives to retain. But with the key Ukrainian town of Pokrovsk seemingly close to falling, the Trump administration apparently believes that the rest of the Donbas is sooner or later bound to fall too, and there is no point in losing more Ukrainian lives in a vain attempt to keep it.
The draft agreement also reportedly softens the blow for Ukraine by stating that the area handed over will be demilitarized and controlled by neutral peacekeepers. In the other two provinces claimed (but only partially occupied) by Russia, Zaporizhia and Kherson, the ceasefire line will run along the existing front line. In a huge concession to Russia, the Trump administration is reportedly willing to recognize Russian legal sovereignty over the Donbas and Crimea (which would also imply the lifting of many U.S. sanctions on Russia) though it does not expect Ukraine to do so.
The draft agreement apparently excludes long-range missiles for Ukraine and would impose limits on the size of the Ukrainian armed forces, though we do not know how great these limits will be. The Ukrainian government agreed to the principle of arms limitations at the Istanbul talks in March 2022, but has since categorically rejected the idea.
The draft agreement also reportedly includes unspecified U.S. security guarantees to Ukraine, and a formal Russian acknowledgment (already stated by President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov) of Ukraine’s right to join the European Union, in return for the exclusion of NATO membership for Ukraine. It has not been revealed however whether this would require a change to the Ukrainian constitution to restore the previous commitment to neutrality, something that could be hard to pass through the Ukrainian parliament. This is also true of another key element of the reported plan — the establishment of Russian as a second official language in Ukraine.
Predictably, the leaked plan has drawn immediate denunciation from both Ukrainian and Western sources, with it being described as a demand for Ukraine’s “capitulation.” This is mistaken. As the Quincy Institute has long pointed out, an agreement that leaves three quarters of Ukraine independent and with a path to EU membership would in fact be a Ukrainian victory, albeit a qualified one.
This should be obvious if you look at the Russian government’s goal at the start of the war of turning the whole of Ukraine into a client state, or alternatively of seizing the whole of eastern and southern Ukraine. It would also be a Ukrainian victory in terms of the 500-year-long history of Russian, Polish and Turkish rule over Ukraine. And by way of additional evidence, you would only have to listen to the howls of protest that an agreement along these lines will evoke from Russian hardliners, who still dream of achieving Russian maximalist aims.
When it comes to the Western security guarantees to Ukraine promised (but not specified) in the draft agreement, it is crucial to recognize that in international affairs and in history there is no such thing as an absolute guarantee, let alone a permanent one. There are however a whole set of commitments that can be included in order to deter future Russian aggression: The peace agreement should be ratified by the UN Security Council and endorsed by the BRICS; Western economic sanctions should be not ended but suspended, with a snap-back clause stating that they will automatically resume if Russia resumes aggression; designated long-range missiles and other arms can be stockpiled with an assurance that they will be provided to Ukraine if Russia restarts the war.
Above all, Ukraine should retain the complete and guaranteed right to receive and develop the defensive weapons that throughout this war have played a key part in slowing the Russian advance to a crawl and inflicting immense casualties on the Russian army. Because in the end, the greatest deterrent by far against Russia starting a new war is how badly its armed forces have suffered and performed in this war.
If Russia can achieve its basic stated goals in Ukraine, would any future Russian government really want to go through this again?
Certain Western officials, politicians, and commentators believe, and have stated openly, that keeping the Ukraine War going is “money well spent” because it weakens Russia without sacrificing U.S. lives. But apart from the deep immorality of sacrificing Ukrainian lives for this goal, the longer the war goes on the greater the risk that Ukraine will suffer a far greater defeat, Russia a far greater victory, and the US a far greater humiliation.
Given the growing evidence of Ukrainian military weakness, simple prudence would dictate the search for an early peace on reasonable terms.
