DAMASCUS, SYRIA — The Old City of Damascus is teeming with life. On any given night, one can find thousands of Syrians strolling through streets lined with endless shops. People stream in and out of restaurants situated in ornate Ottoman-era courtyards, where diners hang out around elegant, black-and-white stone fountains until the early hours of the morning.
But a short walk east reveals a ghost town. The neighborhood of Jobar, a former rebel stronghold with a prewar population of 300,000, has been reduced to a maze of crumbling apartment buildings and mangled cars. “When I was [in Syria] in January, I was shocked at the level of destruction,” said Robert Ford, who served as U.S. ambassador to Syria from 2011 to 2014 and has visited the country several times in recent years. “It looked like films I'd seen of cities in World War Two.”
Streets full of destroyed buildings, believed to be littered with unexploded ordnance, stretch for miles in the Jobar neighborhood of Damascus. (Connor Echols/Responsible Statecraft)
In places like Jobar, the task facing Syria’s new government stands in stark relief, written on the destroyed remnants of once bustling streets. And these visible scars are just one indication of the profound damage that years of war and sanctions have wrought on Syria’s economy.
Rolling blackouts attest to the sorry state of the country’s electrical grid. Syrian banks, after years of toiling in isolation, are now struggling to return their practices to international standards in order to plug themselves into the global financial system. With gas stations in disrepair, most drivers now rely on roadside stops where workers dispense fuel from thin plastic water jugs. Supply chains for most industries will have to be rebuilt from scratch.
Nine months after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria is working hard to overcome these challenges. Syrians of all stripes have thrown their support behind the effort to reconstruct cities ravaged by war and natural disasters, with some contributing millions of dollars and others chipping in with sweat and tears. Many of the 14 million people who fled during the conflict have returned to visit, and some have even made the decision to move back home for good.
But looming over all of this enthusiasm is the threat of a new economic disaster — one driven not by local dynamics but by Western sanctions. President Donald Trump, despite having waived or suspended many U.S. sanctions on Syria, has so far failed to persuade Congress to permanently remove crippling measures first put in place to pressure the Assad regime. Lawmakers, particularly in the House, have instead pushed to add new conditions for the removal of sanctions, sowing doubt about the Syrian economy’s future and slowing the flow of the estimated $400 billion in investment needed to rebuild a country in which 90% of people now live in poverty.
To better understand the impact of sanctions — and assess the possibility of removing them — RS visited a range of cities in Syria and spoke with people on the ground there, in addition to experts on sanctions and congressional staffers. The picture that emerged is bleak.
Sanctions represent a key barrier to the program of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who has focused on technocratic policies following the fall of the Assad regime. “He is genuine when he says the priority has to be reconstruction,” said Ford, who has spoken with Sharaa several times since he took power. Back in 2023, when Ford first met Sharaa, the future president was particularly concerned about job creation in Idlib, the city that his militant group had held since 2017.
Sharaa’s logic was that, “if young people don't have jobs, they migrate towards the most extreme Islamist movements,” Ford recalled.
Experts on Syria’s economy share Sharaa’s concerns. As Syria continues its fragile transition to a post-Assad system, they argue that the continued imposition of sanctions will threaten more than just Syrians’ pocketbooks. “If the country remains economically isolated, institutionally hollow, and unable to meet humanitarian needs, it risks descending into state failure and triggering new migration waves, drug trafficking, terrorism, and chaos that various regional and domestic actors could quickly exploit,” a recent report from Karam Shaar Advisory, a consulting firm focused on Syria, said.
One Syrian man put it more bluntly. “The sanctions aren’t against the government,” he said. “They’re against the people.”
The long arm of sanctions
Syria is no stranger to sanctions. Back in 1979, the U.S. designated the Syrian government as a state sponsor of terrorism, largely as a result of its support for Palestinian armed groups. U.S.-Syrian relations experienced a series of ebbs and flows in the ensuing decades, but the designation stuck.
President Clinton met multiple times with President Hafez al-Assad in the 1990s as the U.S. sought normalization between Syria and Israel. In the early days of the war on terror, Syria even lent the U.S. a hand by alerting Washington of a planned al-Qaeda attack on an American base in Bahrain. But that cooperation unraveled following Syria’s opposition to the 2003 Iraq War, which led the U.S. to impose new sanctions on the Assad regime.
Eight years later, the government’s brutal crackdown on Arab Spring protestors erased any possibility for a cooling of tensions between the U.S. and Syria.
Both the Obama and Trump administrations used executive orders to impose additional sanctions on Syria as the country descended into a brutal civil war. Then, in 2019, Congress made the fateful decision to impose a package of restrictions known as the Caesar sanctions in response to atrocities committed by the Assad regime. These unusually harsh measures, which included secondary sanctions against foreign entities doing business in most sectors of the Syrian economy, left the country in near complete economic isolation.
“Sanctions were having an impact on a 360 degree level,” recalled Vittorio Maresca di Serracapriola, an expert in sanctions on Syria and an economic analyst at Karam Shaar Advisory.
Once a luxury resort, the Safir hotel in Maaloula, Syria, was all but destroyed in fighting during the civil war. The property's Kuwaiti owners have yet to begin reconstruction. (Connor Echols/Responsible Statecraft)
When President Bashar al-Assad finally fled in December 2024, many hoped that the sanctions would go with him. President Trump fed these hopes in May when he promised an end to the measures, which he followed up in June with a sweeping executive order that suspended or waived the vast majority of sanctions.
But Congress has had other plans. In the House, some lawmakers have pushed for the full elimination of the Caesar sanctions, but others have advocated instead for imposing additional conditions. The pro-sanctions camp remains skeptical of Sharaa, a one-time al-Qaeda fighter who claims to have moderated his views. And so far, these skeptics are winning. A bill that would maintain the Caesar sanctions for at least two more years, sponsored by Rep. Mike Lawler (R-N.Y.), advanced out of the House Financial Services Committee in July.
Efforts to secure a clean repeal, meanwhile, have yet to even get a committee markup.
Debate in the Senate has been more complex. Senate Democrats, led by Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), have argued in favor of a straight repeal. “The financial services industry has made clear that, absent a clean repeal, it is very unlikely that they will be able to extend financing to any kind of major projects in Syria,” a Democratic congressional aide told RS, adding that this would kill any hopes for a full reconstruction.
Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), for his part, initially pushed to maintain the sanctions with strict conditions for their removal. But, after negotiations with Democrats including Shaheen and Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Graham signed onto a compromise proposal. The new version would provide immediate sanctions relief and simply require the president to regularly update Congress on Syria’s compliance with various requirements related to fighting terrorism and ensuring accountability for atrocities. This proposal is likely to be included in a “manager’s package” of amendments to the annual defense policy bill, meaning that its chances of passing the Senate are high, according to the Democratic staffer.
Van Hollen praised the compromise proposal in a statement to RS. “Failure to lift the sanctions would be a big missed opportunity and would hamstring vital reconstruction efforts,” he said. “That being said, given the past history of members of this interim government, it’s critical that we also have an insurance policy to safeguard our interests.”
It remains unclear whether this compromise will be enough to persuade Western banks to take the risk of investing in a new Syria. After all, even with a clean withdrawal of sanctions, Syria’s problems go far deeper than kitchen table issues. Clashes continue between the central government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, and soldiers affiliated with Sharaa’s government have been accused of committing massacres against both Alawite and Druze Syrians in recent months.
Meanwhile, efforts to secure some form of transitional justice and move toward a more democratic system of government have been halting at best, and terror groups like ISIS have tried to take advantage of the transition to reconstitute their forces. But Sharaa’s bet is that these problems can only be dealt with properly if the country’s economy is placed on a clear path to recovery.
Palmyra, which once had a population of at least 70,000 people, is among the most destroyed cities in Syria. A small portion of the pre-war population has begun to return. (Connor Echols/Responsible Statecraft)
In September, Sharaa brought this argument to the United Nations, where he became the first Syrian president to address the General Assembly in more than 50 years. “Syria is reclaiming its rightful place among the nations of the world,” he said. “We call now for the complete lifting of sanctions, so that they no longer shackle the Syrian people.”
Trump appears to agree with Sharaa about the need for sanctions relief, which, as Ford noted, will be necessary in order to secure any form of long-term investment. But without support from Congress, the administration can only do so much to calm the nerves of investors. So it is that the Caesar sanctions, first designed to bring the Assad regime to heel, are now poised to cripple its successor.
“We could do everything possible to help the Syrians and it could still not work out,” the Democratic aide said. “But I think if we don't do everything possible, like removing these shackles off the economy, that it definitely won't work out.”
Top image credit: August 18, 2025, Washington, District Of Columbia, USA: Top European leaders in the Oval Office, Monday, August 18, 2025. (Credit Image: Daniel Torok/White House/ZUMA Press Wire)
Last month, Lithuania’s former foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis pithily diagnosedEurope as being stuck in a perpetual geopolitical Groundhog Day. Landsbergis is quite correct, though for reasons that would leave him unsmiling.
Europe’s problem is not its hesitance to confront Russia, one quality it enjoys in ample abundance, but its insistence on prioritizing short-term measures over a realistic strategy for ending the war in Ukraine.
This lack of a strategic vision has resulted in an “act first, think later” mentality, incentivized on the level of the European bureaucracy and the domestic politics of the EU’s biggest players. Nowhere is this better observed than on the perennial question of the several hundred billion euros’ worth of Russian assets held by Euroclear in Belgium.
European leaders have embarked on a renewed push to seize these assets, frozen at the start of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, in a bid to find funding sources for Ukraine’s war effort.
The latest scheme along these lines seeks to provide Ukraine with a zero-interest €140 billion “reparation loan” from the frozen Russian assets. This loan will only be repaid if Russia agrees to provide sizable reparations to Ukraine.
There is little to say on the mechanics of this plan that has not already been raised by the Belgian government, which is being strong-armed by EU leadership, Germany, and several other European states into shouldering nearly all the risks without being provided any clear benefits.
"There's no free money. There are always consequences," said Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever. "I explained to my colleagues yesterday that I want their signature saying: 'If we take Putin's money, we use it, we're all going to be responsible if it goes wrong.’"
And things will indeed go wrong in that there is no plan for forcing repayment on Russia, which means the full risks and costs will functionally be assumed by European member states.
This plan’s only major innovation over prior schemes is its supposed workaround on the thorny issue of legality. Greenlighting outright seizure of Russia’s sovereign assets will undermine the credibility of European financial institutions and exercise a chilling effect on non-Western investors at a time when European countries are facing significant long-term macroeconomic pressures.
Proponents claim that the plan, because it is a loan subject to conditional Ukrainian repayment, technically does not dispute Russia’s sovereign claim over its assets. This bureaucratic workaround will be of ill solace to international investors. The complex machinery of global financial institutions runs on predictability and widespread agreement on a set of predetermined rules of the game about market relations and the property rights that underpin them.
If the EU bestows itself the ex nihilo right to commandeer someone else’s assets, something not established in international law or recognized by anyone else as a legitimate practice, it will be seen and treated as an expropriation in all but name with the full consequences to Europe’s reputation that this entails.
If the goal is to secure from Russia something that can reasonably be called Ukraine reparations, this can be accomplished in a much easier and safer way. There is a widespread recognition in Moscow that Russia is unlikely to get its European assets back. The real question is the terms on which the Kremlin will lose its money, and here, regardless of what some European leaders say, Russia’s legal ownership over these assets does give it leverage in determining their fate.
As my colleagues George Beebe and Anatol Lieven previously suggested, the West should open a negotiating cluster as part of the Ukraine peace talks to utilize the frozen assets toward a postwar international reconstruction fund for Ukraine. Depending on how talks progress, the West can offer to allocate part of the money to support people and territories that end up on Russia’s side of the postwar delimitation line.
An overseeing U.N. committee can ensure that funds used in this way go exclusively toward humanitarian, non-military projects.
The precise apportionment for Russian-controlled territories is itself subject to negotiations and will depend on what the rest of the peace deal looks like, but the West can and should argue that the lion’s share will go to Ukraine in exchange for Moscow’s agreement to unfreeze assets held by Western companies in Russia. This deal negates any concerns about financial blowback against Europe, as Russia would have to relinquish its sovereign claim over the frozen assets in order for them to be utilized toward the international reconstruction fund.
Linking these assets to a broader war termination framework rather than seizing them now strengthens the West’s negotiating position in determining the contours of a peace deal. It generates additional financial incentives, especially if coupled with a roadmap to sanctions relief, for Moscow to come to the negotiating table.
It’s not difficult to see why Europeans have revived asset seizure schemes after a string of failed initiatives along similar lines. Drying funds for Kyiv and gradual American disengagement from the war have stirred European leaders, whose goal is to sustain Ukraine’s war effort for as long as possible, to contemplate steps previously thought impossible or too risky.
It falls on the White House to convey to our allies that achieving a lasting settlement is in Western interests precisely because it frees Europe from the burdens of indefinitely financing this war, and to work on a continuous basis to secure European and Ukrainian consensus on a viable war termination framework.
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Chris Pratt (Joe Seer/Shutterstock); Israel flag (Shutterstock); Stephen Curry (Reuters)
A newly created firm called Show Faith by Works is carrying out a $3.2 million outreach and digital targeting campaign to Christian churches in the western United States on behalf of the Israeli government. The firm’s goal, as described in its filing under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, is to increase “positive associations with the Nation of Israel, while linking the Palestinian population with extremist factors.”
Show Faith by Works will carry out the campaign through December for its work, which includes targeting churchgoers with pro-Israel ads “geofencing” major churches, hiring celebrity spokespeople, and visiting churches and colleges with a mobile trailer called the “10/7 Experience” on behalf of the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
In one slide of the proposed plan, the firm listed a number of potential “Christian Celebrity Spokespeople” for Israel, including actors Jon Voight and Chris Pratt, former NFL player Tim Tebow, NBA player Steph Curry, and a number of megachurch pastors. According to the document, the athletes and celebrities would be expected to “deliver pro-israel (sic) Messaging.”
In response to a question whether Jon Voight has been offered to work as a spokesperson for Israel, Siri Garber, a public relations executive who represents the actor, explained in an email that she was unaware of any offer.
“Not that I know of but it’s about time they start trying to combat the Pro Pali prooganda (sic) machine. They should choose some w[h]o are a[pp]ealing (sic) to the Gen Alphas and Millenials etc as that is where all the misinformation lies,” wrote Garber in the email. In response to a follow-up question about whether Voight would consider such a request, Garber responded “No idea.”
Chad Schnitger, who is leading the contract for Show Faith by Works, told RS in an email that as of now, none of the celebrities mentioned in slide deck had been contacted. “This was an early planning document with a variety of options that were discussed but nothing set in stone,” he said.
“We’re very proud of the way the project has grown since these early planning sessions and we’re eager to show it to the world once we get more details and materials in place,” he added.
Schnitger’s firm also proposed a “10/7 Experience” mobile trailer that would tour Christian colleges, churches, and events highlighting the atrocities of October 7, 2023. The trailer will feature a “wall-length mounted TV with updated information, pro-Israel media” and footage of the “IDF explaining the difficulty of fighting bad guys in hostile territory with civilians.”
Show Faith by Work’s goal is to reach some 3.8 million churchgoers. Of those, the firm estimates getting around 5-10% to “agree to our programs or attend our events or sign a pledge card.”
As part of this outreach, Show Faith by Works will be launching targeted pro-Israel ads to churchgoers in what it promised to be the “Largest Geofencing and targeted Christian Digital Campaign ever.” Geofencing uses location-based marketing to send notifications and advertisements. For instance, users that have enabled location services on their phone may see an AT&T ad if they are walking near an AT&T store.
Show Faith by Works pledged to “geofence the actual boundaries of every Major church in California, Arizona, Nevada and Colorado and all Christian Colleges during worship times.” The firm said it will then “Track attendees and continue to target with ads” on behalf of Israel.
All of this is part of a campaign to “combat low American Evangelic Christian approval of the Nation of Israel’ and “counter new and evolving pro-Palestinian messaging as the global narrative shifts.”
A Pew Research poll from July found that 72% of white evangelical Protestants have a favorable opinion of Israel. Some polling has suggested that younger evangelicals have shifted more dramatically, including a Barna Group poll from 2021 — two years before the October 7 attack by Hamas — which found that support for Israel among evangelical Christians aged 18-29 had dropped from 75% to 34%.
The firm’s work is being overseen by Eran Shayovich, Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel who is spearheading “project 545,” a campaign to amplify Israel’s strategic communication and public diplomacy efforts. Shayovich is also the point of contact for Brad Parscale, Trump’s former campaign manager, who is leading efforts to deploy new websites and digital content to train ChatGPT on behalf of Israel.
The FARA contract revealed that Show Faith by Works will also be coordinating its work with an Israeli consulate. While it does not specify which Israeli consulate it is working with, the firm is conducting this outreach in California, Nevada, Arizona, and Colorado, all states that are covered by the Israeli Consulate of Los Angeles.
The firm’s talking points include two sets of messages, one labeled “Pro-Israel” and the other labeled “Anti-Palestinian State.” The bulleted talking points include messaging on how “[P]alestinian and Iranian goals are not land-focused, but genocidal” and how “Palestinians elect Hamas’s leadership.” (Note: The last election in the Gaza Strip was in 2006 and only a fraction of Gaza’s current population ever cast a ballot for Hamas).
Show Faith by Works’ pitch deck also offered to sponsor “Pro-Israel messages on Christian Social Media influencers followed by young Christians.” As part of this work, the firm promises to “counter current Pro-Palestinian propaganda with response videos.” Sponsoring the influencers themselves would likely require the influencers to register under FARA and acknowledge the Israeli sponsorship on their social media posts, according to foreign lobbying experts. A proposed organization chart showed that the social media influencers would also report to the “Specialist Hollywood Purchasing coordinator.”
This aspect of Show Faith’s work is similar to Bridges Partners, a firm that Israel hired last week to coordinate a cohort of 14-18 social media influencers distributing content on behalf of Israel in exchange for around $7,000 per post.
Show Faith by Works, like Bridges Partners and many otherfirms working for the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is channeling its business through Havas Media Network, an international media company working for Israel.
Schnitger, who is being paid $150,000 for the six-month contract, told RS that the firm has made some changes since crafting the initial pitch deck for the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “We think it’s very important that the Christian church is educated about these issues. Everything we do is vetted through teams of Christian pastors. We can’t wait to show it to you in a few months,” he said.
When asked what changes had been made, Schnitger did not respond.
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Top photo credit: President Donald Trump walks out with Steve Witkoff after taking part in bilateral meetings at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, Tuesday, September 23, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)
In Deir al-Balah, a mother told me her son now counts the seconds between blasts. Policy, to her, isn’t a debate; it’s whether trucks arrive and the night is quiet. Donald Trump’s 20-point plan promises ceasefire, hostages home, Israeli withdrawal, and reconstruction. It sounds complete. It isn’t.
Without enforceable mechanics, maps, timelines, phased verification, and real local ownership; it risks being a short-lived show, not a durable peace.
On paper, the plan strings together familiar parts: a ceasefire tied to hostage releases, withdrawal linked to disarmament, and a multinational stabilization effort to guard rebuilding. Used well, those tools can buy civilians time to breathe: a tranche-based exchange that releases hostages as pauses begin and expands aid corridors with each verified step; and a properly mandated, regionally backed stabilization presence that keeps fighters away from families, protects convoys, and secures reconstruction sites so hospitals, schools, and water systems can function. Modest instruments, not magic, but correctly sequenced, they save lives.
The design breaks down where hard agreements usually do. First, it effectively treats disarmament as surrender, demanding that an armed actor relinquish leverage before credible political guarantees and security protections exist. Durable settlements don’t start with a leap of faith over a void.
Second, the withdrawal language is vague. If a “pullback” arrives bundled with continuing perimeter control, airspace, crossings, or security carve-outs, residents will experience it as occupation under a new brand. Independent analysis notes the text lacks concrete timelines and operational granularity past the opening phase.
Third, enforcement leans on statements rather than machinery. Without mapped guarantor responsibilities, triggerable penalties, and pre-positioned logistics, promises turn into press releases. Reporting on the Palestinian Authority’s potential role underscores how preconditions and sequencing could stall implementation.
There’s a deeper political absence, too. This deal does not deliver what Palestinians actually hope for: self-determination and a say in their future. After high-profile recognitions of Palestinian statehood, offering a Gaza-only fix that sidelines political rights makes those gestures look symbolic rather than substantive. Having Israeli institutions effectively able to veto consequential steps feels like Oslo all over again: process without power-balancing.
That is how interim arrangements harden into permanent limbo — deference to political will instead of instruments, asymmetric leverage left intact, and verification without consequences. Analyses of the current proposal also point to how leaders can convert hesitation into de facto veto power.
If Trump is serious about peace, Jerusalem and the West Bank must be inside the plan, not promised to some later round. Facts on the ground are moving the other way. The UN Security Council has said settlements lack legal validity and violate international law. The UN humanitarian office has documented widespread settler violence and access restrictions that corrode daily life and any negotiated horizon.
I don’t say this as a spectator. For three decades, and, crucially, from 1994 to 2012, I worked across Israel and the Palestinian territories, running dialogues, designing confidence measures, and trying to push fragile agreements into daily reality. I arrived at Oslo believing its interim architecture could be saved. Hard experience taught me why it often wasn’t: interimism without enforcement calcifies; asymmetry invites spoilers; and externally driven programs that sideline local voices manufacture the very grievances violence feeds on. Those are not laments; they’re operating instructions.
So what would a plan that acts like peace look like? Start with measured, verifiable sequencing. Convert the hostage-for-ceasefire idea into a tranche ladder with objective indicators.
Tranche 0: a 72-hour humanitarian pause and release of the most vulnerable hostages, independently verified.
Tranche 1: further releases and sustained relief corridors.
Tranche 2: armor out of GPS-mapped grid squares; municipal functions transferred to neutral civil administrators.
Tranche 3: localized arms-reduction pilots paired with trained community policing.
Tranche 4: broader demobilization tied to political benchmarks. Publish indicators per tranche, names returned, coordinates vacated, tonnage of aid delivered, verified hand-ins, police trained, on a public dashboard so guarantors act on facts, not spin.
Next, replace applause with commitments on paper. Regional states and major donors should sign a concise guarantor treaty with annexes that spell out who does what when breaches occur: logistics deployed within 48 hours, escrowed funds released or frozen, proportionate sanctions, or a rapid-response element under hybrid command.
Add an escalation ladder, a dispute-resolution clause, and a small guarantor secretariat that tracks readiness daily. Tie money to verification outcomes so incentives are immediate and reversible. Established policy work already frames these sequencing and governance choices—use it to draft the legal plumbing.
Then give monitoring real teeth. Stand up a Verification & Rapid Response Authority (VRRA) with three pillars: a Technical Verification Unit (remote sensing, forensics, chain-of-custody); a Civilian Observers Network (local monitors and NGO liaisons); and a Rapid Response Wing (pre-positioned transport, medevac, engineering). When the VRRA issues an evidence packet—geolocated imagery, metadata, documented hand-ins—it should automatically trigger the agreed guarantor response. Monitoring that cannot cause action is theater; people in Gaza do not have time for theater.
Demobilization must not be coerced by a vacuum. It should be gradual, conditional, and reversible — and paired with a transitional political compact that guarantees participation, association, and a mapped route to representation. Pilot DDR alongside livelihoods, public hiring, micro-grants, reconstruction jobs—and community-led policing reforms so neighborhoods feel safer, not abandoned. Field reporting shows that sequencing PA governance and security responsibilities will make or break feasibility; treat that as a design constraint, not a footnote.
Reconstruction must rebuild institutions, not patronage. Create a Donor Compact & Reconstruction Authority (DCRA) with pooled escrow and a multistakeholder board, Gaza municipalities, West Bank civil society, donors, independent auditors, and a VRRA liaison. Use digitized public procurement, local-first contracting, community sign-off on major projects, and payments contingent on VRRA-verified delivery. Coverage of an Arab-backed multibillion-dollar plan illustrates how donor politics can fragment; a compact like DCRA keeps money honest and visible to the people it is meant to serve.
Finally, coherence or collapse: a Gaza-only fix will not hold. Pair Gaza tranches with West Bank protections, temporary settlement constraints tied to compliance, increased international monitoring at checkpoints, and targeted support for communities under strain, because what happens in one arena cascades into the other.
If negotiators want something immediate and practical to insist on, here it is: redraft the plan into a tranche protocol with mapped withdrawals and a public verification dashboard; sign the guarantor treaty and pre-position logistics and escrow, with an explicit escalation ladder; and stand up the VRRA and DCRA with legal charters, independent boards, and automatic triggers so verification leads to action, not statements.
Gaza’s families don’t need grandeur; they need a night without terror, a clinic with light, a school bell that rings. Recognitions of Palestine should mean voice and agency, not just new communiqués. A plan that looks like peace but acts like control will fail them. Put Jerusalem and the West Bank inside the deal. Build the scaffold, measured tranches, mapped withdrawals, independent verification, accountable reconstruction, and you buy time for politics, dignity for civilians, and a future Palestinians can recognize as their own.
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