Follow us on social

Israel, a behind-the-scenes powerbroker in Sudan

Israel, a behind-the-scenes powerbroker in Sudan

Of the many foreign powers influencing this bloody conflict, Tel Aviv could help claw it back — if it wanted to.

Analysis | Africa

Israel is a behind-the-scenes powerbroker in Sudan.

It’s long been clear that the road to peace in Sudan runs through Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — America’s three closest Arab allies. But last month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reminded Sudanese that he has a stake in their country too.

Speaking at the UN General Assembly in September, Netanyahu caused a stir among Sudanese when he held up two maps, ‘The Curse’ and ‘The Blessing.’ The first had Israel’s sworn enemies — Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and the Houthis in Yemen—marked in black. The second had its friends in green — among them Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Sudan.

Shortly after that, Israeli journalist Jonathan Lis wrote that Israel was floating a possible deal to end the fighting in Gaza, in which senior Hamas leaders would go into exile in Sudan. Hamas denied it — Yahya Sinwar would rather die in Gaza than flee to safety. Thee Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, denied it too. But the fact that Sudan is on Israel’s radar serves brings into focus how Sudan’s war is entangled in the Middle East’s higher-profile conflicts.

In 2020, as part of a deal in which the Trump Administration removed Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, Sudan agreed to join the Abraham Accords. General Abdel Fattah al Burhan, head of Sudan’s sovereignty council and de facto head of state, met with Netanyahu in Kampala, Uganda. The breakthrough meeting was hosted by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, but it was brokered by UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed, known as MBZ. Sudan then froze Hamas assets in Sudan.

In the last days of the Trump administration, al-Burhan signed the declarative section of the Abraham Accord, in the presence of then U.S. Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin. Plans for a formal signing with Israel moved slowly, with a timetable reportedly agreed only in February 2023, when Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen visited Khartoum.

Al-Burhan’s deputy at the time, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemedti" also had close ties with Israel. He developed close relations with the UAE, renting out his Rapid Support Force (RSF) units to fight as mercenaries in Yemen, whereby he also established strong links with Israel’s Mossad.

When war broke out in Sudan in April 2023, pitting the two generals against each other, Israel was in contact with both men. The Foreign Ministry leaned towards al-Burhan and the SAF, Mossad towards the RSF.

Israel’s Arab friends also backed different sides in the war. Egypt supports the SAF, in line with its tradition of backing Khartoum’s military establishment. The UAE provides extensive support to the RSF, even while the private Bank of Khartoum, which is majority owned by UAE financiers, is the main financial conduit for SAF. Saudi Arabia leans towards SAF, worried by the UAE’s destabilizing role in the Red Sea, which it considers its own backyard.

During 18 months of fighting, a succession of mediation initiatives by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt and African leaders have come to nothing. One reason for this is that each time al-Burhan agrees to meet Hemedti, or to send a delegation to do so, the leader of Sudan’s powerful Islamists, Ali Karti, vetoes the move. Washington has put Karti under sanctions for “actively obstructing efforts to reach a ceasefire.” Karti now lives in Doha.

The Sudanese Islamists have longstanding ties to Hamas, which was a member of the Khartoum-based Popular Arab and Islamic Congress from the early 1990s, where it established offices, businesses, and training camps. Hamas sourced weapons from Sudan, provoking Israeli airstrikes. Active cooperation cooled in 2014, under pressure from Saudi Arabia.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, despite their long-standing aversion to the Muslim Brothers, have come to believe that the Sudanese Islamists can be managed and no longer pose a threat beyond their own borders. (Egypt’s recent tripartite pact with Eritrea and Somalia also embraces the Damul Jadid group, a branch of the Muslim Brothers in Somalia.) Cairo and Riyadh have been ready to see money and weapons flow to SAF from Qatar, Turkey and even Iran. But Abu Dhabi remains hostile to Islamists, so far unpersuaded by Egypt’s argument that if it can live with the Muslim Brothers next door, the Emirates should be able to do so too.

It's long been clear that a deal in Arab capitals is a prerequisite for ending the fighting in Sudan. The question is how to get there. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has no visible interest in engaging at the high level that is needed. Initially, he put State Department Africa bureau officials in charge of the file, who are ignored by the Arab powerbrokers. While the current special envoy, Tom Perrellio, in theory reports to Blinken, in practice he doesn’t have the top-level backing needed.

When MBZ met with President Joe Biden last month, and affirmed a ”dynamic strategic partnership, the Joint Statement included boilerplate words on Sudan’s war and humanitarian crisis.

Israel could change the equation. Even preliminary exploration of a plan to relocate Hamas to Sudan would need Israel to chart a path to a deal between al-Burhan and Hemedti. In turn, that will need a change in the military and financial equation—a credible show of force by SAF and its Egyptian backers, along with Emirati leverage on the RSF.

Whatever interests Abu Dhabi may have in Sudan, its stakes with Israel are far higher, and it has both carrots and sticks to pressure Hemedti.

The Hamas-to-Sudan story may be a straw in the wind. Even if it becomes a real prospect, Netanyahu or Hamas’s new leaders could pull out at any moment. Sudan’s generals are no pawns: they are experts at manipulating foreign patrons. But the chatter reaffirms how the fate of Sudan lies in the realpolitik of the Middle East, in the hands of states that see Sudan and its people as tokens in their power games.


Top photo credit: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Office of the President of the Russian Federation/Wikimedia Commons) and General Abdel Fattah al Burhan (Reuters)
Analysis | Africa
Francois Bayrou Emmanuel Macron
Top image credit: France's Prime Minister Francois Bayrou arrives to hear France's President Emmanuel Macron deliver a speech to army leaders at l'Hotel de Brienne in Paris on July 13, 2025, on the eve of the annual Bastille Day Parade in the French capital. LUDOVIC MARIN/Pool via REUTERS

Europe facing revolts, promising more guns with no money

Europe

If you wanted to create a classic recipe for political crisis, you could well choose a mixture of a stagnant economy, a huge and growing public debt, a perceived need radically to increase military spending, an immigration crisis, a deeply unpopular president, a government without a majority in parliament, and growing radical parties on the right and left.

In other words, France today. And France’s crisis is only one part of the growing crisis of Western Europe as a whole, with serious implications for the future of transatlantic relations.

keep readingShow less
Starmer Macron Merz
Top image credit: France's President Emmanuel Macron, Britain's Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Germany's Chancellor Friedrich Merz arrive at Kyiv railway station on May 10, 2025, ahead of a gathering of European leaders in the Ukrainian capital. LUDOVIC MARIN/Pool via REUTERS

Europe's snapback gamble risks killing diplomacy with Iran

Middle East

Europe appears set to move from threats to action. According to reports, the E3 — Britain, France, and Germany — will likely trigger the United Nations “snapback” process this week. Created under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), this mechanism allows any participant to restore pre-2015 U.N. sanctions if Iran is judged to be in violation of its commitments.

The mechanism contains a twist that makes it so potent. Normally, the Security Council operates on the assumption that sanctions need affirmative consensus to pass. But under snapback, the logic is reversed. Once invoked, a 30-day clock begins. Sanctions automatically return unless the Security Council votes to keep them suspended, meaning any permanent member can force their reimposition with a single veto.

keep readingShow less
Vladimir Putin
Top photo credit: President of Russia Vladimir Putin, during the World Cup Champion Trophy Award Ceremony in 2018 (shutterstock/A.RICARDO)

Why Putin is winning

Europe

After a furious week of diplomacy in Alaska and Washington D.C., U.S. President Donald Trump signaled on Friday that he would be pausing his intensive push to end war in Ukraine. His frustration was obvious. “I’m not happy about anything about that war. Nothing. Not happy at all,” he told reporters in the Oval Office.

To be sure, Trump’s high-profile engagements fell short of his own promises. But almost two weeks after Trump met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska and European leaders in Washington, it is clear that there were real winners and losers from Trump’s back-to-back summits, and while neither meeting resolved the conflict, they offered important insights into where things may be headed in the months ahead.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.