The recent Trump, Vance, and Zelensky office blow-up was ugly. And yet, the moment revealed hard truths about the war in Ukraine: namely, the need to end it.
For years, the Biden administration repeatedly pushed for military aid to Ukraine to continue the fighting. But its efforts have ultimately kept peace out of reach.
Indeed, the Trump administration’s continued push for negotiations comes as the conflict, a functional stalemate between Russia and Ukraine, has resulted in a quarter-million deaths, left another 800,000 wounded, and caused $1 trillion in economic damages. And the Ukrainian government, meanwhile, is running out of troops who can fight.
“Battle lines haven't meaningfully moved since 2022, and declining support in the U.S. for continued war funding only adds to the greater sense of urgency this war needs to end for the sake of Ukraine, for its post-war security, for its prosperity, for its very future,” says Senior Video Producer, Khody Akhavi, in a new video produced for the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
“A negotiated settlement or compromise actually affords Ukraine the best opportunity to actually preserve its independence, a viable path towards reconstruction and eventual membership to the EU. That might not be the sort of end that Ukrainians had sought to this war, but it's very clear where the other path leads.”
Learn more by watching Khody Akhavi’s latest video:
According to new analysis by the Climate and Community Institute (CCI), recent increases in Pentagon spending alone will produce an additional 26 megatons (Mt) of planet-heating gases — on a par with the annual carbon equivalent (CO2e) emissions generated by 68 gas power plants or the entire country of Croatia.
With the Pentagon’s 2026 budget set to surge to $1 trillion (a 17% or $150 billion increase from 2023), its total greenhouse emissions will also increase to a staggering 178 Mt of CO2e. This will make the U.S. military and its industrial apparatus the 38th largest emitter in the world if it were its own nation. It will also result in an estimated $47 billion in economic damages globally, including impacts on agriculture, human health, and property from extreme weather, according to the EPA’s social cost of carbon calculator.
Yet the Pentagon’s true climate impact will almost certainly be much worse than estimated by the CCI, as the calculation does not include emissions generated from separate supplementary U.S. military funding, such as for arms transfers to Israel and Ukraine in recent years. It also does not include the emissions from armed conflict, which are considerable when it happens.
And the CCI study only covers U.S. military spending. Military spending in European NATO countries is also surging. At the Hague Summit in June, the 32 NATO member states pledged to increase their military and security spending from 2% to 5% of GDP by 2035. As a result, NATO military spending in Europe and Canada could increase from around $500 million today to $1.1 trillion in 2035, when the combined defense budgets of the other 31 allies will essentially equal the Pentagon’s. Every dollar or euro of this military spending in preparation for NATO to fight hypothetical wars with China, Russia or anyone else has a climate and opportunity cost.
Meanwhile, U.S. military leaders want to spend more justified largely on threat inflation. During a recent meeting of military industrial leaders in Wiesbaden, Germany, for example, NATO’s recently appointed Supreme Allied Commander, U.S. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, restated the flawed case for increased military spending. He called on member states to prepare for the possibility that Russia and China could launch wars in Europe and the Pacific simultaneously, with 2027 being a potential, though highly speculative, flashpoint year.
Grynkewich, who is also head of the U.S. European Command, argued that the situation meant that allies have little time to prepare. “We’re going to need every bit of kit and equipment and munitions that we can in order to beat that,” he said.
His remarks were made during a U.S. Army Europe and Africa-hosted LandEuro symposium, designed to encourage military and industry leaders to find ways to significantly increase weapons production, especially in Europe. As always during such events, the two-day program served as an opportunity for companies to showcase various weapons systems at the symposium’s so-called “Warriors Corner.”
Grynkewich also repeated a key argument used by NATO leaders to justify increased military spending: the growing cooperation among adversaries.
“Each of these threats that are out there cannot be viewed, in my estimation, as discrete challenges. We’ve got to think about how all of them are aligning,” he said.
However, evidence of such an orientation among the so-called “Axis of Upheaval” (China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia) is patchy at best and primarily bilateral rather than as a fully-formed four-way alliance. This cooperation is also driven by shared frustrations with the U.S.-led international order and a desire to counter Western dominance. Donald Trump’s systematic demolition of that “rules based international order,” illegal military attacks on Iran and constant anti-China rhetoric further shape this cooperation and risk it becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
At the same symposium, U.S. Army Europe and Africa Commander Gen. Christopher Donahue said that the U.S. Army and NATO have launched a new military initiative called the “Eastern Flank Deterrence Line,” which aims to enhance NATO’s ground-based military capabilities and promote military-industrial interoperability across the alliance. Donahue also warned that NATO forces could capture Russia's heavily fortified Kaliningrad region “in a timeframe that is unheard of” if necessary. Therein lies another disconnect. On the one hand NATO pleads a poverty of resources, and on the other brags about already having the capability to stop Russia’s “mass and momentum problem" and to attack and take Russian territory.
It should also be remembered that the United States currently operates over 870 overseas military bases and installations — two and a half times more than the rest of the world combined — and that NATO members already collectively account for 55% of global military spending.
The main disconnect at Wiesbaden, however, was the failure to consider the link between military spending and climate emissions. There was no “Green Corner” to remind NATO generals that the climate crisis is an existential threat, meaning it poses a danger to the fundamental existence of humanity and the planet. This blinkered approach comes right from the top.
In March this year, Trump’s Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, wrote on X: “The @DeptofDefense does not do climate change crap. We do training and warfighting.” This training and warfighting will have catastrophic climate consequences, including further water scarcity, sea-level rise, and desertification in vulnerable regions. In turn, this will inevitably lead to political instability and further forced migration.
NATO’s contribution to the climate crisis cannot be ignored. The alliance and its member states must be transparent about the scale of their emissions and must make serious commitments to reduce their carbon footprint.
Instead of ramping up tensions with adversaries, the top NATO generals should be calling for political leaders to invest in diplomatic and non-military solutions to today’s political crises. Then, as the authors of the CCI analysis argue, these increases in U.S. military spending could be redirected towards demilitarized climate resilience measures, such as public transit, renewable energy or green new social housing — a true investment in human security.
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Top image credit: Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev via Madina Nurmanova / Shutterstock.com
Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan — two longstanding foes in the South Caucasus who fought bloody wars in the 1990s and again in 2020 — was imminent.
He credited his administration’s diplomatic efforts: “Armenia and Azerbaijan. We worked magic there and it’s pretty close — if not, it’s already done,” he declared during a dinner with Republican senators.
His remarks referenced a U.S. proposal to lease a 43-kilometer road through Armenia’s southern Syunik province to an American private company for 100 years, as revealed by U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack. The plan is depicted as a creative fix for the deadlock over Baku’s demands for the so-called Zangezur corridor — a land route that runs through Armenian territory to connect with Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave and Turkey. Under U.S. management, the logic goes, all sides could use the road, moving beyond the “tribal viewpoints” that fuel the conflict.
Yet, reactions in both Armenia and Azerbaijan have so far been tepid — despite the fact that both nations currently seek to reduce Russia’s influence in the region, which should, in theory, make them more receptive to U.S. involvement.
The core sticking point remains sovereignty. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stressed that Armenia must retain control over the route. At the same time, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, speaking in Khankendi/Stepanakert (the former capital of the now-dissolved Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, with its indigenous Armenian population violently expelled from the region in 2023, insisted on unilateral access to Nakhichevan and Turkey, dismissing any foreign presence. “There will be no operators, no leases, no rentals on our territory,” he asserted — an implicit rebuke to Washington.
Given Aliyev’s past claims that Syunik is “ancient Azerbaijani land” and his threats to seize it by force, Armenia rightly sees his demands as a precursor to annexation.
Still, Aliyev praised Trump’s “vision and efforts to promote peace” after Trump shared a clip of his speech on Truth Social — in what appeared to be an attempt to flatter the U.S. president.
Complicating matters further, the proposed corridor would cut through Armenian territory bordering Iran. Tehran has fiercely opposed any extraterritorial arrangement, fearing it would sever its link with Armenia, boost Turkish-Azerbaijani influence at its own expense, and leave its trade routes Russia and Europe vulnerable to Baku’s whims. Iran even conducted military drills near Azerbaijan’s border in 2022 as a warning.
Adding to Tehran’s unease is Azerbaijan’s military cooperation with Israel, along with suspicions that Israeli drones entered Iran via Azerbaijani airspace during their 12-day war last month — a claim that Baku vehemently denies. Iran also suspects Baku and Tel Aviv of stoking separatist sentiments among its Azeri population. Notably, Brenda Shaffer from the Washington-based neoconservative Foundation for Defense of Democracies (a vocal advocate for Azerbaijani irredentism with close ties to Baku’s government) framed Armenia-Azerbaijan peace almost solely as a means to isolate Iran and create a “NATO corridor” from Turkey to Central Asia.
Given U.S. support for Israeli strikes on Iran and its own attacks on Iranian nuclear sites, an American-run corridor near its border would only heighten Tehran’s fears of encirclement. Despite its weakened state, Iran retains enough leverage to sabotage a deal it deems a threat to its core national interests.
Aliyev, meanwhile, appeared to placate Tehran by accusing, albeit without evidence, the EU’s Armenia border mission of spying on Iran in an apparent attempt to deflect Tehran’s scrutiny over Baku’s ties with Israel. Still, his rhetoric aligned with Iran’s opposition to extraregional meddling, meaning the U.S. and EU, just as Armenia pivots toward the West.
Russia, like Iran, views the U.S. proposal as an attempt to push it out of the South Caucasus — a perception Yerevan seems to be doing its best to encourage. Yet Moscow still holds considerable leverage: it guards Armenia’s border with Iran, retains a military base in Armenia, and dominates broad sectors of its economy and infrastructure, even as Yerevan’s pro-Western pivot so far is heavier on rhetoric than on tangible actions. How would Russian border troops coexist with an American-run corridor? Would Washington deploy forces to protect it, risking a clash with Russian forces in Armenia? And does the U.S. even have the staying power and political will to enforce such a deal in a region of only marginal strategic importance to its interests?
While a U.S.-brokered peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is welcome in principle, the current proposal ignores too many regional complexities. At best, it’s a rough draft that requires intensive negotiation with all the regional players, including Iran and Russia. At worst, it’s another headline-grabbing stunt in Trump’s elusive quest for a Nobel Peace Prize.
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Top photo credit: Volodymyr Zelensky (Shutterstock/Pararazza) and Vladimir Putin (Shutterstock/miss.cabul)
President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has said that a further round of talks between Ukraine and Russia could start as early as this week, and indicated that “everything had to be done to get a ceasefire.” Yet it is far from clear that a ceasefire will be possible. And it’s likely that the war will continue into 2026.
In June, Zelensky was pressing the European Union to go further in its sanctions against Russia, including calling for a $30 per barrel cap on Russian oil shipments. Washington effectively vetoed a lowering of the oil price cap at the recent G7 Summit in Canada. However, on July 18 the European Union agreed its 18th round of Russian sanctions since war began, overcoming a blocking move by Slovakia in the process.
This imposes a cap on Russian oil shipments at 15% below market value ($47.60 at the time the package was agreed) and places further restrictions on Russia’s energy sector. But, there is scepticism that this will dent Russian revenues without the U.S. mirroring the measures, as the prior $60 per barrel G7 cap made no noticeable difference. Zelensky hailed the package as “essential and timely.”
Despite the overtures towards peace talks, economic sanctions against Russia continue to be the preferred approach for both Zelensky and for the EU. And the clock is ticking for the focus to shift back to President Trump’s proposed secondary sanctions. Having given Russia 50 days to agree a peace deal with Ukraine or face tariffs of 100% against its major trading partners, Trump has effectively set a deadline of September 2.
Between now and then, the August holiday period will kick in during which diplomats across the Western world, much of the Russian government and, even in times of war, some of the Ukrainian government will be downshifting. Of course, wars don’t stop when holidays start. But the idea that either side will have the energy or motivation to deliver a sudden and remarkable breakthrough ceasefire deal that navigates both sides’ concerns in August is, to put it mildly, ambitious.
In any case, and as I have said before, I see little to no prospect that yet another round of sanctions will influence President Putin without genuinely substantive progress towards peace between both sides.
It’s clear that a peace deal or, at the very least a meaningful ceasefire with a clearly articulated peace process, will only be possible when the presidents of Ukraine and Russia meet, which Zelensky has pressed for.
But there is a significant element of theater here. To recap on what happened at the May peace talks in Istanbul, President Putin first proposed them, following pressure from President Trump and the EU to agree to an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine. Zelensky then challenged Putin to meet in person in Istanbul. It was obvious to anyone who has studied Russia’s obsession with form over substance that Putin was never going to agree to a meeting without even the skeleton of a pre-prepared bilateral paper on the table to discuss.
And so, predictably, the Kremlin named a delegation led by the official who also led Russia’s delegation to the ill-fated Istanbul peace talks in March and April 2022. At the eleventh hour, Zelensky was himself pressured to name a Ukrainian delegation “out of respect” for President Trump and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the talks commenced a day later than planned. President Trump then said that no peace deal would be agreed until he met with Putin.
This time around, the Russian side has already quashed the idea of a bilateral meeting between Putin and Zelensky for the same reasons provided in May. "There is a lot of work to be done before we can talk about the possibility of some top-level meetings," said Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s long-time press spokesman.
For its part, the Ukrainian side has set three goals for Wednesday's talks: the further return of Ukrainian prisoners of war, on which there have been several encouraging exchanges since May, the return of Ukrainian children, an issue on which both sides have engaged unofficially throughout the war. The third goal is engineering a meeting between Zelensky and Putin.
Yet, this limited agenda will not be enough to satisfy the Kremlin that Ukraine is ready to negotiate and make progress towards an agreement on Russia’s so-called underlying concerns, the key concern being Ukraine’s NATO aspiration. Without the negotiations seriously getting into this and other such substantive issues as the disposition of forces and territory when the fighting stops, don’t expect a leader-level meeting any time soon.
And of course, the threat of so-called secondary sanctions as soon as September 2 means that the pressure on Russia to deliver is higher now than at the Istanbul talks in May. From Zelensky’s perspective, no peace deal in Istanbul means secondary sanctions against Russia.
This dynamic of Europe and the U.S. threatening Russia with sanctions unless progress towards peace is made, while no expectations are placed on Ukraine to make concessions, has been locked in since March of 2015. It simply will not work.
Calling on Putin to meet in Istanbul is therefore, like it was in May, an act of political theater by Zelensky. He needs to keep his Western sponsors on side and for the flow of money and arms into Ukraine to continue. He also wants to polish his image as a putative global statesman.
Meanwhile, at the most recent Contact Group of Support for Ukraine meeting, then Ukrainian Prime Minister Denis Shmyhal requested an additional $6 billion to cover this year’s deficit in defense procurement. He also urged “partners to allocate funds for Ukraine in their budget proposals for 2026, right now.”
Anyone who believes that Zelensky is really committed to accelerating moves towards peace in Ukraine may, I fear, be overly optimistic. I am increasingly convinced that war will continue into next year.
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