A new Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll finds that 63% of Americans support continued aid to Ukraine in its war against the Russian invasion, while 53% overall say it’s been “worth the cost.” Some 45% say it has not been worth the cost.
The new numbers represent a slight dip — 65% supported aid in November last year (down from 72% in July 2022). The biggest decline is coming from Republicans — no surprise there. According to the poll, 50% of Americans who identify as Republican support continued arms aid to Ukraine, a drop of 18 points since July last year, and a full 30 points from the beginning of the war in February 2022.
Meanwhile, Democratic support has remained steady at 77%, down just two points from July 2022.
On the issue of whether the support is “worth the cost,” the numbers are partisan mirror opposites. For Republicans, 38% say U.S. weapons support has been worth it, while 61% say no. For Democrats, 69% say yes, 29% say no.
Interestingly, strong majorities still say NATO (and consequently, U.S. troops) should get directly involved if a NATO country is attacked. According to the poll, roughly 64% say they would favor sending U.S. troops to fight if Russia attacked a NATO ally like Germany; while 57% said they would support the same if Russia attacked allies like Latvia or Lithuania.
As an alliance, by the way, NATO still enjoys a healthy support from both parties, with 77% saying the U.S. should maintain its support and commitment, only down from 81% last July.
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft and Senior Advisor at the Quincy Institute.
Ukraine, Kiev - October 12, 2022 3 soldiers of the foreign legion in Ukraine pay homage to one of their killed in action. A small flag with the name of the dead soldier is planted in the main square. (Jose Hernandez Camera 51/Shutterstock)
Ukraine, Kiev - October 12, 2022 3 soldiers of the foreign legion in Ukraine pay homage to one of their killed in action. A small flag with the name of the dead soldier is planted in the main square. (Jose Hernandez Camera 51/Shutterstock)
On NBC’s Meet the Press Sunday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken struck back at claims that U.S. officials let Israel dodge American laws regarding weapons transfers.
“We don’t have double standards,” Blinken said. “We treat Israel, one of our closest allies and partners, just as we would treat any other country, including in assessing something like international humanitarian law and its compliance with that law.”
Luckily for observers, Blinken has left a substantial public record against which one can test this claim. His own department’s statements and actions undercut this supposed impartiality. Indeed, all available evidence indicates that U.S. officials hold Israel to a lower standard than just about any other country.
Take the State Department’s long-awaited report on Israel’s compliance with international law in Gaza, which came out late last week. The administration found that Israel had likely used U.S. weapons to commit war crimes but said there wasn’t enough evidence to draw clear conclusions about specific incidents. The upshot is that, from the Biden administration’s perspective, there is no legal reason to cut off U.S. arms transfers to Israel at this time.
In Blinken’s telling, any more forceful conclusions would have been impossible given the “incredibly complex military environment” in Gaza. “It’s very, very difficult in the heat of war to make a definitive assessment about any individual incident,” he said Sunday.
But that “very, very difficult” operating environment didn’t stop the State Department from drawing strong conclusions about Hamas’ actions in the very same report. In a three-page defense of Israel’s campaign — a feature not present in similar reports on other states — U.S. officials found with great clarity that Hamas uses human shields, intentionally targets civilians, and “consistently violates” the laws of war.
Observers are left to conclude that the U.S. has somehow attained more definitive inside information about Hamas than Israel, one of America’s closest military partners. This is in part why an independent panel of legal experts and former officials said the report was “at best incomplete, and at worst intentionally misleading in defense of acts and behaviors that likely violate international humanitarian law.”
“Once again, the Biden Administration has stared the facts in the face — and then pulled the curtains shut,” the panel, which includes two former senior officials at the State Department, wrote in a statement.
Notably, Blinken’s ‘fog-of-war’ standard only appears to apply to Israel. “In other contexts, the U.S. does not find it difficult at all to assess violations of international law,” Sarah Yager, the Washington director at Human Rights Watch, told reporters Monday.
Yager pointed to the case of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, about which it took Blinken less than a month to announce that “war crimes had been committed by Putin’s forces.” “Based on information currently available, the U.S. government assesses that members of Russia’s forces have committed war crimes in Ukraine,” he said.
Indeed, Blinken has even accused Russia of ongoing war crimes in Ukraine, suggesting that he’s capable of making such determinations on the fly. “Russian forces and officials have committed – and continue to commit – war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine,” he said in early 2023.
The standard also doesn’t seem to apply to the warring factions in Sudan. Seven months after the start of a brutal civil war in that country, Blinken declared that both sides “have committed war crimes” in the latest conflict, a conclusion he based on the State Department’s “careful analysis of the law and available facts.”
In the cases of Sudan and Russia, the State Department leaned heavily on reports from NGOs and human rights advocates, who conducted key investigations of alleged crimes. As it happens, those very same organizations haverepeatedlyfound that Israel isviolating international law in its campaign in Gaza, but Blinken has apparently chosen to ignore their conclusions.
“What the [report] says is that it's very difficult in these circumstances where security partners are engaged in armed conflict for the United States to assess violations of international law,” Yager said. “We know it's difficult because we did that work, and we presented the evidence to the U.S. government.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin made a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons against Western states during a commemoration of Russia’s World War II victory in Moscow Thursday.
“Russia will do everything to prevent a global clash,” Putin said. “But at the same time, we will not allow anyone to threaten us.”
“Our strategic forces are always in a state of combat readiness,” the Russian leader added, referencing his country’s most powerful nuclear weapons. The comments came just days after Russia announced it would conduct military exercises to prepare for the use of “tactical” nuclear weapons, which are designed for attacks on soldiers rather than population centers.
The announcement set off alarm bells in Washington, which has sought to carefully avoid any escalation to a direct NATO-Russia war. The State Department called the move “reckless” but soothed some nerves by saying the U.S. did not anticipate any short-term use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
Putin’s latest moves are nonetheless part of a notable increase in Russian belligerence toward the West this past week, which Moscow claims is a response to Western efforts to rush weapons to Ukraine.
The situation increasingly resembles an escalation spiral, an international relations term for when two sides inch closer to direct war through gradual moves aimed at deterring the other party. As the war has dragged on, hawkish elements in the West and Russia have each succeeded in pressing their leaders to take steps that were once viewed as likely to result in further escalation.
Fearing a potential Ukrainian defeat, western Europe and the U.S. have increasingly signaled that the proverbial gloves are off. Britain recently declared that it had no issue with Ukraine using British weapons to strike Russian territory. “Just as Russia is striking inside Ukraine, you can quite understand why Ukraine feels the need to make sure it's defending itself,” British Foreign Minister David Cameron said last week.
And Cameron is right in a narrow, moral sense. But the practical wisdom of that greenlight is unclear given Russia’s predictable response, which was to threaten retaliation against U.K. military targets if any British weapons did indeed strike Russian territory.
Even if Britain had no intention of being dragged into the war, Russia’s threat took British views out of the picture entirely. It is now up to Ukraine — a country facing long odds in a desperate, defensive war — to decide whether it can stomach the risk of further escalation.
The U.S. is more attuned to the risks inherent to Britain’s approach. While Washington did quietly give Kyiv long-range missiles, the Biden administration also made clear that the weapons could only be used against targets inside of Ukrainian territory, a restriction aimed at threading the needle between Russia’s red lines and Ukraine’s needs.
French President Emmanuel Macron has been less careful. Macron responded to Ukraine’s battlefield struggles by suggesting that France could send its own troops into the fight, raising the specter of direct war between two nuclear-armed states.
In this case, Russia shot back at Macron by promising to attack any French troops that show up at the frontline. “If the French appear in the conflict zone, they will inevitably become targets for the Russian armed forces,” said a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry Wednesday.
From Russia’s perspective, all of these recent moves are likely about restoring deterrence. But that doesn’t make them any less terrifying to us in the West. And Russia feels the same when we respond to that fear with our own efforts to restore deterrence.
This should all serve as a reminder that the potential of a broader Russia-NATO war never went away. We’ve simply gotten used to living in a time of great danger. In practice, the chance of a cataclysmic mistake is growing more and more likely by the day.
In other diplomatic news:
— Following a meeting with Macron Monday, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for an international truce during the Olympic Games this summer, according to Politico. Macron thanked Xi for signing onto his idea of an Olympic truce and hinted that the pause could provide an opening to push for peace talks in Ukraine. “Maybe this could be an opportunity to work toward a sustainable resolution [of conflicts] in the full respect of international law,” the French leader said. Xi will have a chance to pitch the idea to Putin directly later this month when the Russian leader is scheduled to visit China.
— The only way to end the Ukraine war is through a temporary truce followed by peace talks, Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto said Monday, according to Reuters. Crosetto brushed off the idea that Putin hasn’t actually shown a desire to negotiate, saying “that is a good reason for us to try harder.” “We mustn’t give up any possible path of diplomacy, however narrow,” he argued, adding that Western sanctions and weapons had failed to deliver a decisive battlefield victory.
— Britain moved to expel Russia’s defense attache in London over allegations that the officer was using his military post for spying, according to AP News. The announcement came alongside new restrictions on diplomatic visas for future Russian envoys. Russia promised to respond “in kind.”
— Russian authorities arrested an American soldier in Vladivostok on charges of theft in early May, according to the New York Times. While U.S. officials have not formally designated the soldier as wrongfully detained, the arrest led to speculation that Russia is seeking further bargaining chips for prisoner swaps with the United States.
U.S. State Department news:
In a Wednesday press conference, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller strongly discouraged Americans from traveling to Russia given the risk of wrongful arrest. “Russia has detained Americans for not legitimate law enforcement reasons but because it wants to hold them essentially as hostage,” Miller said. “Americans should not, for any reason, travel to Russia.
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Chinese President Xi Jinping and French President Emmanuel Macron review the troops before Xi Jinping's departure, as he visits France, at the Tarbes airport, France, May 7, 2024. Aurelien Morissard/Pool via REUTERS
When Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in France this week, the world’s conflicts were top of mind. Press reports tended to fixate on whether French President Emmanuel Macron could press Xi to distance himself from Russia. But ultimately, the leaders’ focus drifted farther south.
In a wide-ranging joint statement, Xi and Macron “expressed their opposition to an Israeli offensive on Rafah,” called for an “immediate and sustainable ceasefire,” railed against the possibility of regional escalation, and even endorsed the idea of a worldwide truce to coincide with this summer’s Olympic Games in Paris.
The statement reflected a remarkable shift in China’s diplomatic approach to the world — or, perhaps more precisely, a remarkable shift in how powerful states now treat Beijing. After decades of playing a secondary role in world politics, China is now getting used to the great power treatment, making itself visible wherever diplomacy is happening.
Examples abound: Last year, China sent shockwaves through Washington when it oversaw the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, a major step in reducing tensions between two of the most hostile powers in the Middle East. And, as the war in Ukraine drags on, China has dispatched a special envoy to push for negotiations, securing high-level meetings with officials on both sides of the conflict.
Beijing has even taken on a larger role in that most sensitive of issues: the Israel-Palestine conflict. China hosted Fatah and Hamas — the leading Palestinian factions — for reconciliation talks last week, and observers expect that this mediation role could continue in the coming months and years.
From Washington, this can all look a bit frightening. After three decades of unipolarity, many U.S. policymakers still cling to the idea that America and its allies are the sole guarantors of international peace. A rising China, in the minds of many, must mean a falling U.S.
But experts say that a deep breath is in order. Despite these latest moves, Beijing still has a ways to go before it surpasses Washington in its ability to shape geopolitics. As China grows into its new role, there are no shortage of opportunities for cooperation on issues that matter deeply to each country, especially in places where the U.S. is no longer seen as a credible go-between.
There may even be openings to influence Beijing’s approach to the world in ways that gel better with U.S. interests.
China’s growing role in diplomacy is thus not a threat but an opportunity. The question remains: Will the U.S. seize it?
Three cheers for stability
Above all, China and the U.S. share one essential goal in the Middle East: stability. Students of contemporary politics will note that neither side has done a particularly good job of securing that goal in recent years. But limited cooperation could help provide a path forward for the region.
China has long professed support for the liberation of Palestine through a two-state solution, a goal that it sees as crucial to solving the problems that plague the Middle East. In the early days of the war between Israel and Hamas, Chinese officials walked a tightrope by maintaining trade ties with Israel while refusing to condemn Hamas. But it carefully avoided any direct involvement in the conflict.
Now, China appears to be taking a more active role, expanding its criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza in what many experts view as an attempt to curry favor with the Global South through a topic in which the U.S. has taken a distinctly unpopular stance.
The Beijing talks, however, signal more room for cooperation. Hamas and Fatah have for years failed to bridge the rupture created by their brief civil war that lasted between 2006 and 2007. After convening in Beijing last month, the groups thanked China for its efforts “to help strengthen Palestinian internal unity and reached an agreement on ideas for future dialogue,” according to China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian.
The direct impact of China bringing the factions to the negotiating table should not be overstated, according to Dawn Murphy, a professor at the U.S. National War College. When Beijing mediates, it prefers to act as more of a convener than a direct party to the talks, Murphy told RS. Think Qatar, but a lot bigger.
“The way in which [China] sees itself as contributing is by bringing the parties together, providing a platform for discussion and serving as a more neutral actor that has legitimacy in the eyes of all of the actors involved,” Murphy said.
In this sense, China is very much unlike the U.S. Washington has long made clear that it supports Fatah over Hamas, which much of the West views as a terrorist group. But Beijing’s stubborn neutrality gives it the legitimacy to host credible talks that could promote reconciliation and help pave the way for a two-state solution in the longer term.
China’s commitment to neutrality is a reflection of its broader diplomatic strategy of maintaining balanced relations without getting directly involved in its partners’ domestic politics. China is very averse to risking its own credibility, preferring to avoid siding with any particular state in a conflict, as Murphy noted.
China and countries in the Middle East have significant economic relations that have only deepened over time through partnerships in energy, security and technology. Beijing is the biggest purchaser of Saudi Arabian oil and is also one of Israel’s primary trading partners. It is also willing to engage with the Middle East in ways the U.S. won’t: China sells military technology to Saudi Arabia that the U.S. heavily restricts, and provides heavily-sanctioned Iran with much-needed capital and trade partnerships, according to veteran journalist James Dorsey.
Dorsey, who has written a book about China’s role in the Middle East, notes that these partnerships help ensure that states in the region won't act against Chinese interests. Most Middle Eastern states have stayed out of the Taiwan issue and have not condemned the ongoing human rights abuses occurring in China’s Xinjiang region. “That’s one Chinese objective, and they’ve been very successful in that,” Dorsey told RS.
But that doesn’t mean that China is all-powerful. For all of Beijing’s rhetoric, it has not been able to alter the course of the current conflict wracking Gaza, Dorsey noted. When you look at negotiation processes for a ceasefire today between Israel and Hamas, as well as discussions about what the post-war world will look like, “China is not in the room.”
Murphy says it’s in the U.S. interest to not dismiss China’s desire to resolve these conflicts, citing the Iran-Saudi normalization deal that China helped broker. While negotiations were well underway before China got involved, the outcome of the talks was one that all parties, including the U.S., benefited from.
China is in a unique position to seek further detente in the region, Murphy says. Because it has positive relations with every country in the Middle East, as well as legitimacy in the eyes of their rulers, Beijing could theoretically facilitate negotiations between most of the region’s states.
Indeed, the Biden administration has acknowledged this in limited ways, as Ali Wyne of the International Crisis Group told RS. “Growing instability in the Middle East benefits neither the United States nor China, so U.S. and Chinese efforts in the region need not be zero-sum,” Wyne said. “[I]n recent months, the Biden administration has stated that it would welcome China's help in preventing the conflict between Israel and Hamas from metastasizing into a regional conflagration.”
Dorsey, for his part, warns that China’s facilitation has not yielded concrete results thus far. China has also failed to show a willingness to take risks by taking more tangible action, Christopher Chivvis of the Carnegie Endowment told RS.
“China has demonstrated that its willingness to make sacrifices to try to bring peace and stability to the region is pretty limited,” Chivvis said. For example, China doesn't encourage restraint from Iran despite the leverage its relationship with the country provides.
If China could match its actions more with its rhetoric, it would serve both Beijing and Washington, Chivvis said. “It would be in China's interest to try to demonstrate that it's willing to actually pay some costs in order to deal with some of the global challenges that are out there,” he argued.
The Ukraine problem
In Europe, China has had less room to maneuver. Despite its efforts to push for peace negotiations, Beijing has faced strong criticism from the West in recent months for allegedly supplying tech that supports Russia's military invasion in Ukraine.
As Chivvis told RS, China has tried to walk a fine line between its close ties with Russia and its need to maintain access to European markets and capital. Close trade ties with Europe allow China’s domestic economy to grow at a pace that promotes stability at home, Chivvis noted.
This careful balance has been hard to maintain amid China’s indirect support for Russia’s war. Relations with Europe have been further strained as Chinese goods flood EU markets and price out European producers.
But some steps in the right direction are being taken. This week, during Xi’s multi-stop visit to Europe, he and Macron surprised observers when they agreed to back a worldwide truce during this year’s Olympics — a pause that could serve as a jumping off point for peace talks in Ukraine.
“French officials hope Xi's endorsement is a sign that he could use his influence to persuade Russia to reach a truce when President Vladimir Putin travels to China later this month,” Reuters reported. The French also said Xi made clear that “Beijing did not intend to supply weapons to Moscow and that it was ready to look into the issue of dual-use materials that enabled Russia's war effort.”
As China’s military and economic partnerships grow, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have provided China with an opening to increase its diplomatic efforts, according to Wyne of ICG. Nonetheless, Beijing “does not presently seem positioned to make breakthroughs.” Chivvis agrees, saying that significant cooperation between the U.S and China is a long way off given the contentious state of relations between the two powers.
But there's no denying one obvious truth: It would be far easier to solve the Ukraine war with China's help than without it. It’s now up to the U.S. to decide whether it’s willing to face that fact.