On Wednesday, Pentagon Comptroller Mike McCord revealed that the Department of Defense had failed its sixth audit in a row, with no significant improvements over the last year.
“We are working hard to address audit findings as well as recommendations from the Government Accountability Office,” McCord said in a statement. “The Components are making good progress resulting in meaningful benefits, but we must do more.”
In a repeat of last year’s audit, just one in four of the Pentagon’s auditing units received a clean bill of financial health, though auditors claimed they made some progress in accounting for the agency’s $3.8 billion in assets. McCord said that a clean audit likely remains years away, according to Reuters.
The Pentagon remains the only federal agency to have never passed an audit. Its failure to make significant progress has drawn scrutiny from lawmakers, including Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), who called for an independent audit of the department.
“The recent failure of the Pentagon's 6TH audit couldn't make it clearer that we need accountability & transparency,” Paul posted on X. “No institution is above scrutiny, especially the DoD [with] the largest budget of ANY [federal] agency.”
The Republican-led House Oversight Committee also slammed the Pentagon for its financial troubles, arguing in a post on X that the department’s “inability to adequately track assets risks our military readiness and represents a flagrant disregard for taxpayer funds, even as it receives nearly a trillion dollars annually.”
Rep. Barbara Lee (D-Calif.) said the news showed that it’s “time to stop misdirecting hundreds of billions of dollars away from domestic and human needs to pad unnecessary budget lines for endless wars, failed weapons, & the Pentagon’s corporate handouts.”
The news could reinvigorate efforts to impose a 1 percent budget cut on any parts of the military that fail an audit, a policy that would “provide a much greater incentive to get financial books in order,” according to Jennifer Knox of the Union of Concerned Scientists.
“[T]his isn’t just a matter of clean accounting; it’s a matter of security,” Knox argued. “Ensuring that defense dollars are spent effectively and appropriately will improve performance while reducing spending.”
Connor Echols is the managing editor of the Nonzero Newsletter and a former reporter for Responsible Statecraft. Echols received his bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University, where he studied journalism and Middle East and North African Studies.
The American Enterprise Institute has officially entered the competition for which establishment DC think tank can come up with the most tortured argument for increasing America’s already enormous Pentagon budget.
Its angle — presented in a new report written by Elaine McCusker and Fred "Iraq Surge" Kagan — is that a Russian victory in Ukraine will require over $800 billion in additional dollars over five years for the Defense Department, whose budget is already poised to push past $1 trillion per year.
Before addressing the Ukraine conflict directly, it’s worth looking at the security outcomes of high Pentagon spending during this century. As the Costs of War Project at Brown University has found, the full costs of America’s post-9/11 wars exceed $8 trillion. In addition, hundreds of thousands of people have died, millions have been driven from their homes, thousands of U.S. personnel have died in combat, and hundreds of thousands of vets have suffered physical or psychological injuries. And this huge cost in blood and treasure came in conflicts that not only failed to achieve their original objectives but actually left the target nations less stable and helped create conditions that made it easier for terrorist groups like ISIS to form.
Any call for ratcheting up Pentagon spending needs to reckon with this record of abject failure for a military first, “peace through strength” foreign policy. The new AEI report fails to do so.
As for its central thesis — that a Russian victory in Ukraine will require a sharp upsurge in Pentagon spending — neither part of the argument holds up to scrutiny.
Russia’s performance in Ukraine makes it abundantly clear that Moscow’s armed forces are deeply flawed. They are in a stalemate with a much smaller neighboring country that has parlayed superior morale and an infusion of U.S. and European weaponry into a fighting force that can hold its own against Russia’s much larger military. The only prospect for a Russian victory would be a long war of attrition in which Moscow’s advantages in population and arms production “win” the day.
But even a prolonged war is unlikely to result in total military victory for a Russia, and governing whatever portions of Ukraine it might control will be extremely costly, both economically and in terms of personnel. As a result, even if Moscow were to eventually win a Pyrrhic victory in Ukraine, it would be in no position to take on the 31 member NATO alliance. And it is long past time for our European allies to finally build a coherent military force that can defend its territory without a major U.S. supporting role.
The AEI report is wildly out of touch with current realities, which are tilting towards an approach that would pair continued support for Ukraine’s defensive capabilities with the beginnings of diplomatic track, an approach my colleagues at the Quincy Institute have been advocating since early in the conflict.
We are confronted with an almost mystical belief in official Washington that the first answer to any tough security problem is to increase Pentagon spending and spin out scenarios for addressing a potential war, rather than crafting a strategy in which preventing or ending wars takes precedence.
A cold, hard look at the wars of this century definitively shows that a military first foreign policy is a fool’s errand that does far more harm than good. How long will the American public sit still for this misguided, immensely costly conventional wisdom?
It’s long past time to take a fresh look at America’s military spending and strategy. Unfortunately, the new AEI report does little to reckon with the actual challenges we face.
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Top Image Credit: Diplomacy Watch: US empties more weapons stockpiles for Ukraine ahead of Biden exit
The Biden administration is putting together a final Ukraine aid package — about $500 million in weapons assistance — as announced in Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s final meeting with the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which coordinates weapons support to Ukraine.
The capabilities in the announcement include small arms and ammunition, communications equipment, AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M missiles, and F-16 air support.
“We all have a stake in ensuring that autocrats cannot place their imperial ambitions ahead of the bedrock rights of free and sovereign peoples,” Defense Secretary Austin remarked to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group before announcing the aid. “Ukraine is waging a just war of self-defense. And it is one of the great causes of our time.”
The Defense Contact Group was formed by Austin; its future remains unclear as administrations prepare to change hands.
Indeed, incoming President Donald Trump has increasingly critiqued Biden's Ukraine strategy. In a news conference from Mar-a-Lago earlier this week, the president-elect said that the Biden administration’s talk of Ukraine’s possible NATO ascension played a role in Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine.
"A big part of the problem is, Russia — for many, many years, long before Putin — said, 'You could never have NATO involved with Ukraine.' Now, they've said that. That's been, like, written in stone," Trump said.
"And somewhere along the line Biden said, 'No. [Ukraine] should be able to join NATO.' Well, then Russia has somebody right on their doorstep, and I could understand their feelings about that."
Trump’s comments about Russia’s invasion rationale follow other critical remarks regarding war. In particular, Trump recently emphasized there had to be a “deal” on Ukraine, as people are “dying at levels nobody has ever seen.” He had also said in his 2024 Person of the Year Interview With TIME that “the number of people dying [in the Ukraine war is] not sustainable…It’s really an advantage to both sides to get this thing done.”
Trump's pick for Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg, meanwhile, has postponed a trip to Ukraine, originally set for early this month, until sometime after Trump’s inauguration. According to Newsweek, reasons for the postponement have not been made public, and a new trip date has yet to be determined.
— Ukraine launched a second Kursk offensive this week, according to ABC News. "We continue to maintain a buffer zone on Russian territory, actively destroying Russian military potential there," Zelensky said about the offensive. Ukraine also hit a Russian air force oil depot in Engles, in Russia’s Saratov territory, hundreds of miles within the country’s borders on Wednesday, where a state of emergency has been declared in response.
— Russia says it’s captured the Ukrainian town of Kurakhove; Ukrainian forces say the city is still being fought over, according to AFP. Russia also bombed Ukrainian city Zaporizhzhia on Wednesday in an attack injuring 100 and killing 13.
— The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared on X that Ukraine could replace Hungary’s role in NATO or the EU “if Hungary chooses to vacate it in favor of membership in the CIS or CSTO.” The Ukrainian MFA’s tongue-in-cheek statement, showcasing growing tensions between Ukraine and Hungary, was made in an X thread accusing Hungary’s leadership of “manipulative statements” about Ukraine’s recent decision to end gas transits from Russia to Europe. Namely, Hungarian FM Péter Szijjártó had threatened to block Ukrainian EU ascension over the gas transit halt, which he said could hurt Europe’s energy security.
"A country that signs an Association Agreement with the EU or aspires to become an EU member must contribute to the EU's energy security by providing transit routes. Therefore, closing gas or oil routes is unacceptable and contradicts the expectations associated with EU integration,” FM Péter Szijjártó said.
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Top Photo Credit: US Military General David Petraeus in 2007 (Reuters)
In October 1939, just one month after he took over as Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall famously winnowed the ranks of hidebound senior officers to prepare for war. “Most of them have their minds set in outmoded patterns,” Marshall told his leadership team, “and can’t change to meet the new conditions they may face if we become involved in the war that started in Europe.”
Every democracy since a defeated Athens has pruned its senior leaders proven inadequate to the demands of their respective era – often more painful than mere public shame. Ours may be the only era when an entire general and admiralty class — more than 80% of which gain employment in the defense sector after retirement — has been consistently rewarded with lucre and prestige for losing.
With two failed wars and scores of weapons acquisition fiascoes now secured in history’s dustbin, many may fear that virtue itself has been swept from the floor. Mainstream deference to “self-serving delusion” has sustained an unearned and stunting faith in a senior leadership selection system made hollow by long-past assumptions.
Therefore, Secretary of Defense-designate Pete Hegseth’s impassioned plea to focus upon the people who serve and his condemnation of a self-perpetuating, class-creating leadership system may, if we can look past the vitriol of our day, herald our very own Marshall moment to deter war rather than to fight one.
First, most Americans do not realize that the competitive promotion board system for our military, as defined by law, ends after two-star selection. All three and four-star officers are thus political appointees — in every sense. No selection board convenes to nominate them to the Secretary, President, or Congress. So who culls the anointed from the herd? It falls to each uniformed service chief to manage an ever-shrinking, hermetically-sealed talent pool, presenting a goldilocks-like offering of options to the civilian Secretary who will then forward recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The products of those selections, when confirmed by the Senate, will often outlast their civilian masters in duration of service. The long-term stakes of national security couldn't be higher.
The Senate rarely applies intense scrutiny to the lists of future three-star officers before them for confirmation. A clear signal of systemic dysfunction was the outcry across senior military and mainstream media leaders for the holds exercised by Senator Tommy Tuberville of Alabama. Even after a storied history of senior officer failures, most valued in the end was the replication of and deference to an established hierarchy, and certainly not the effectiveness of the hierarchy selection system itself.
Hegseth is also not wrong when he accuses a senior officer class of self-serving political machinations which often disregard warfighting realities. Yes, senior rank structure past and present is required for the legal execution of the necessary battle captaincy of war. But it is the very nature of political competition for promotion at the highest levels where leaders often first stray from their virtuous origins. The philosophical descent from the battlefield to the polis can be morally treacherous for all who tread there, and especially for the battlefield’s gods who soon enough prove all too human.
Officers protected from prosecution even when found guilty of embezzlement are often the same ones who are the most ready to end much more youthful careers, rather than to stand and support them.
Reinforcing the above debilitating dynamic are the press and leaders who believe that an effective uniformed meritocracy still exists. Often the first time many of today’s elite civilian socioeconomic class mixes with the military occurs at the most senior levels. And the latter feel if they had left service earlier or earlier enjoyed their counterparts’ privileges, they too naturally would have risen as leaders of the corporate world. Pursuit of positions in the same industries that supported them in uniform is merely considered their just due.
This mutual reinforcement reaches its apogee when our most senior military leaders believe they are speaking publicly for the good of the nation, in concert with their newly joined class. They may even attempt to lead-turn the electorate by using their institutionally supported platform to trumpet policies that resonate with their own experiences while also pleasing their political masters’ desires, further ensuring their rise and importance.
A picture book of “firsts” thus replaces victories on the battlefield in the minds of power brokers who measure such selections, however fairly won, as an accretion to even greater power themselves.
Yet often lost in this unvirtuous cycle are the newest volunteers from civilian society, who have little ability to predict the political game ahead.
Indeed, our most vulnerable leaders in the junior ranks sustain the greatest damage from such replication of hierarchy and class creation. Here stands Major Hegseth’s greatest potential and longest-reaching contribution. For as he well knows, most of our youthful best just aren’t willing to go through the inane career paths, obsequious mental tortures, and real damage to family required to participate in such replications of hierarchy, while the less talented do so much more willingly.
Yes, the market of talent is working, but with active flows decidedly leaving an open faucet of promise at every career decision point. Seldom is current leadership held accountable for recruiting and retention woes, or for that matter, anything else.
Some argue this is too complicated to unravel, yet there are ready remedies available. Because the Secretary of Defense must approve each permanent retirement at three or four-star rank, he or she has the capability to use this approval as a lever for national-level accomplishment, not just a rubber stamp for uneventful custodianship. Following the example of the reserve components, we must increase permeability of experts and executives flowing in and out of uniform at the highest levels, and make the reserve-civilian model a feature of the selection system, not a bug.
Moreover, we should enforce and extend “cooling off” periods without which senior officers are enticed to profit from the same military requirements they wrote while on active duty. Bring former three- and four-star officers back to testify when the weapons requirements they championed go wrong so we can learn as an institution. Audit the selection process, emphasize learning leaders, and achieve a modern talent management system that can earn the trust of all ranks.
And since they are political appointees in truth, create a repeatable mechanism to ensure potential three and four-star officers are held accountable to clearly stated strategic intent, rather than wandering aimlessly and often selfishly between the Constitution and the President.
Because history is also ruthless in its pursuit of truth, it teaches how the choice of military leadership often determines the progress or failure of democracy itself.
Around the same time that General Marshall was preparing America for war by choosing more agile leadership, a historian and French army officer named Captain Marc Bloch lambasted a lack of virtue and capability amongst his seniors in his remarkable book Strange Defeat, written mere months before his own cold-blooded execution by the Gestapo.
Summarizing the facts he witnessed firsthand without access to archives in the battlefield, Bloch noted of the serial mistakes that led to the fall of France that, “One glaring characteristic, is however, common to all of them. Our leaders, or those who acted for them, were incapable of thinking in terms of a new war. In other words, the German triumph was, essentially, a triumph of intellect – and that is which makes it so peculiarly serious.”
As General Marshall well knew, America is no more inoculated from a triumph of intellect than the French or any other nation in defending itself. Senior selection systems also require both the freedom of introspection that many died to defend – and the trust of all who would serve in the future. There is nothing more strategic or existential than this.
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