Word is that Israel is getting a bit nervous as one after the other, Iran hawks are being shuffled out of key foreign policy and national security positions in the White House.
Meanwhile, "America First" realists continue to be in ascent.
According to news in the last 24 hours, Eric Trager, who was heading the Middle East and North Africa portfolios for the National Security Council, has been removed from his position. Trager, who is the former Esther K. Wagner Fellow at the pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is considered an Iran hawk and was appointed to the post by Mike Waltz.
Morgan Ortagus, considered one of the "strongest pro-Israel supporters in the administration," was also shuffled out of her role as the Lebanon envoy under Steve Witkoff. Her removal from the position, which had been hinted in recent days, "stunned officials in Jerusalem, where she is viewed as closely aligned with Israel interests," according to YNet News. Her Lebanon trip this week was reportedly canceled and she would have no further role on Witkoff's team.
News of the "purge" began last week when it was also announced that a number of NSC officials were being let go by acting national security adviser Marco Rubio in a broader effort to drastically slim down what the administration sees as a bloated and inefficient agency. Most of the targets were not identified at the time, but we now know they included dual U.S.-Israeli citizen Merav Ceren, who was working the Iran and Israel desk and had previously worked with the Israel government.
Observers point out that all of these changes are coming amid stepped-up Trump Middle East policy, where he is at once trying to get a nuclear deal hammered out with Iran, withdraw troops from a new Syria, and make deals with partners in the Gulf. His frustration with Benjamin Netanyahu over Gaza and his insistence on a military approach to Iran has spilled over into the press in recent weeks. His firing of Waltz in early May was reportedly in part because Waltz had been talking about war plans with Netanyahu behind Trump's back.
“Trump’s foreign policy team is undergoing a course correction in keeping with his own pivot,” Marwa Maziad, a professor of Israeli politics at the University of Maryland, told Middle East Eye.
Meanwhile, the realists seem to be gaining more traction in the Trump orbit. Justin Overbaugh, nominee for Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, is expected to be confirmed by the Senate after little resistance from key committees in Congress. A retired Army colonel with service in both the Iran and Afghanistan wars, Overbaugh is a former Defense Priorities fellow.
Top photo credit: An Abrams M1A2 Main Battle Tank is loaded onto a trailer headed to Vaziani TrainingArea May 5, 2016, in preparation for Noble Partner 16. (Photo by Spc. Ryan Tatum, 1st Armor Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division)
With the stroke of a pen, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has gutted the Pentagon’s weapon testing office.
His order is intended to “eliminate any non-statutory or redundant functions” by reducing the office to 30 civilian employees and 15 assigned military personnel. The order also terminates contractor support for the testing office.
The ostensible reason for the change is to save $300 million at a time when billions are being added to the defense budget.
But any potential savings in the short term will eventually be drastically eclipsed by the money wasted fielding faulty weapons. In fact, this move will end up endangering troops by sending them into combat with gear that has not been properly vetted.
The real problem with this move is simple: reducing the size of the testing office reduces its oversight capacity. The office of Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) maintains an oversight list of all the programs it monitors. The testing office currently has 272 programs in its portfolio including the latest model of the M1A1 Abrams, the B-21 bomber, and the Ford-class aircraft carrier. It will soon also include programs like the F-47, the Navy’s anticipated F/A-xx, plus whatever new systems Silicon Valley creates.
To put this into perspective consider this: to adequately monitor a program like the F-35, the testing office has a civilian action officer covering a slate of related programs. That individual can’t attend all the meetings or review the reams of data generated during the testing events. For support and analysis, DOT&E contracts other civilians with specific expertise. DOT&E works with federally funded research and development centers like the Institute for Defense Analysis, MITRE, Applied Research Associates, and Virginia Tech to provide the manpower to monitor testing events, attend planning meetings, analyze data, and write reports.
With reduced capacity, the testing office will, by necessity, have to rely more on the analysis provided by the military services and the defense industry. Neither are the intended neutral arbiters Congress needs to properly oversee the performance of the Pentagon’s new weapons.
Congress created the testing office in 1983 over the furious objections from both the defense industry and Pentagon leadership. At the time, a bipartisan core of lawmakers believed they were not being told the full truth about the performance of new weapons. They also had plenty of evidence that tests were being compromised. A constant flow of news articles detailing failed weapon tests appeared on the pages of the Washington Post and the New York Times about programs like the Sergeant York air defense gun and the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle.
The saga of the latter has been immortalized in the book and film The Pentagon Wars.
The individual military services each have their own operational test agencies. The Air Force Operational Test & Evaluation Center, the Navy’s Operational Test & Evaluation Force, Marine Corps Test and Evaluation Activity office, and the Army Test and Evaluation Command conduct the operational test events. The role of DOT&E with its supporting personnel is to help design the tests, ensure they are conducted properly, and then independently analyze and report the results of them.
The entire purpose of operational testing is to determine whether a new weapon is both combat effective and suitable for use with the troops. It’s not good enough for a weapon to work in a controlled laboratory environment. It has to work in the hands of the troops who will operate it and in the conditions in which they fight.
An expert marksman testing a new rifle might be able to hit the bullseye every time on an indoor range. Such a result might lead some people to believe the rifle is effective. But if a soldier takes the same rifle into the field and it immediately jams due to the humidity swells the ammunition by a few microns, the weapon is neither effective or suitable.
It’s better to discover problems like that before the weapon goes into full production and certainly better than when the soldier is in a firefight.
The question of whose interests are really being served must be asked. The best interest of the men and women serving in the ranks is to make sure their weapons and equipment have been thoroughly evaluated before being placed in their hands. The American taxpayers have an interest to see that their hard-earned money isn’t buying weapons that don’t work.
Service leaders have a professional interest to see their pet projects move rapidly through the process. Many of them also have a financial interest because upon their retirement from the military, they take lucrative positions in the defense industry. The industry executives have an interest in making sure the government buys their wares. A testing report showing that a new weapon isn’t performing well threatens the future of a marquee product, hence the animosity towards the testing office.
But ultimately, the military won’t benefit from hollowing out the testing office. While the move may save a few dollars in the short term, the troops will end up paying the price when they end up fighting not only the enemy, but their own faulty gear.
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Top image credit: President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi attends the 34th Arab League summit, in Baghdad, Iraq, May 17, 2025. Hadi Mizban/Pool via REUTERS
As the scorching summer season approaches, Egypt finds itself once again in the throes of an uncomfortable ritual: the annual scramble for natural gas.
Recent reports paint a concerning picture of what's to come, industrial gas supplies to vital sectors like petrochemicals and fertilizers have been drastically cut, some by as much as 50 percent. The proximate cause? Routine maintenance at Israel’s Leviathan mega-field, leading to a significant drop in imports.
But this is merely the latest symptom of a deeper, more chronic ailment. Egypt, once lauded as a rising energy hub, has fallen into a perilous trap of dependence, its national security and foreign policy options increasingly constrained by an awkward reliance on Israeli gas.
For years, the Egyptian government assured its populace and the world of an impending energy bonanza. The discovery of the gargantuan Zohr gas field in 2015, hailed as the largest in the Mediterranean, was presented as the dawn of a new era. By 2018, when Zohr began production, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi declared that Egypt had "scored a goal," promising self-sufficiency and even the transformation into a regional gas exporter. The vision was that Egypt, once an importer, would leverage its strategic location and liquefaction plants to become a vital conduit for Eastern Mediterranean gas flowing to Europe.
Billions were poured into new power stations, further solidifying the nation's reliance on gas for electricity generation, which today accounts for a staggering 60 percent of its total consumption.
However, the dream of abundant domestic gas has, like so many ambitious projects in the region, begun to wither. Just three years after its peak, Zohr’s output alarmingly declined. Experts now suggest Zohr’s recoverable reserves may be far less than initially estimated. Furthermore, as Egyptian energy expert Khaled Fouad notes, the political leadership's "impatience" to accelerate production for quick economic returns — especially to capitalize on European demand amid the Russia-Ukraine war — led to technical problems and damage to the wells.
Compounding this internal mismanagement is Egypt’s chronic foreign currency crunch, and the multi-billion dollars in arrears it owes to international oil and gas companies.
These financial troubles have, in turn, curtailed crucial investments in new exploration and the maintenance of existing fields, effectively strangling domestic production. Consequently, by 2023, Egypt had dramatically reverted to being a net natural gas importer, a precipitous swing of over $10 billion from its brief surplus just a year prior. And in 2024, Israeli gas accounted for a dominant 72 percent of Egypt's total gas imports. This growing dependence has, perhaps inevitably, transformed a commercial transaction into a formidable tool of leverage.
The true vulnerability of this arrangement was laid bare following the outbreak of the war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023. Israel, citing "security concerns," abruptly forced Chevron, the field’s operator, to shut down production at its Tamar field, causing imports to Egypt to plummet. This marked the first of several disruptions, with another significant cut occurring in May of this year. While officially attributed to maintenance, Egyptian analysts widely interpret these interruptions, coinciding with heightened political tensions due to the Gaza war, as a form of political "blackmail."
This energy dependence has profoundly constrained Egypt's national security and foreign policy calculus, particularly concerning the Gaza conflict. For Cairo, the war next door poses an existential threat due to persistent calls from figures like U.S. President Donald Trump and far-right elements in the Israeli government, for the displacement of Gaza’s population into Egypt's Sinai Peninsula.
This prospect, a "red line" for Egypt, is fiercely resisted by Cairo, which views Israel's active push of Gaza's inhabitants towards the Egyptian border as a calculated attempt to extinguish the possibility of a future Palestinian state. In addition to the political fallout for Cairo if realized, such a move would displace upwards of a million Gazans, including Hamas militants, onto Egyptian soil, which would in turn transform Sinai back into a volatile conflict zone.
The region was only recently stabilized after a costly, over decade-long campaign against extremist militants, a campaign in which Hamas, for a period, even provided clandestine aid to some of these groups. The potential for renewed instability could far exceed its previous peak.
In addition to exacerbating security challenges, a mass displacement will also dramatically spike Egypt's domestic energy demands, already strained by the sudden influx of over 1.2 million Sudanese refugees into Egypt since the outbreak of war in Sudan in April 2023, according to Egyptian government estimates.
Furthermore, Egypt's economic and energy vulnerability limits its room for maneuver. The absence of a new Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv, a symbolic gesture of protest against Israel's Gaza offensive, masks the deeper, uncomfortable truth that Cairo’s ability to exert meaningful influence in the ongoing tragedy is severely hampered by its reliance on Israeli energy.
Confronted by these immense pressures, Egypt cannot afford to provoke a direct confrontation that could jeopardize its national security, energy supplies, or critical foreign aid, which has historically been disbursed by the U.S. in direct support of the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Instead, Cairo is relying on a combination of military posturing, diplomatic initiatives, and regional alliances to push back against Israeli actions — while being careful not to cross a line that would trigger severe retaliation or broader destabilization.
Faced with this awkward and increasingly untenable predicament, Egypt is now scrambling for alternatives, embarking on a multi-pronged outreach strategy that underscores the desperation of its energy crunch. Capitalizing on its thawing of relations with Turkey, President el-Sisi’s visit to Ankara in September 2024, followed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's reciprocal trip to Cairo in December of the same year, cemented the rapprochement with agreements on energy cooperation, among other areas of shared interest.
Crucially, Egypt has inked a deal for the long-term lease of a Turkish Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) from Höegh Evi Ltd., signaling a sustained reliance on LNG imports for at least a decade. In parallel, Cairo is in advanced talks with Qatar, a global gas giant, for long-term supply contracts.
While these external maneuvers are underway, Egypt is simultaneously intensifying domestic exploration efforts. Minister of Petroleum Karim Badawi recently announced the drilling of 75 wells and 40 new discoveries in the past year, estimated to hold significant, albeit relatively modest, reserves.
However, substantial discoveries take years — typically three to five, especially for offshore fields — to develop and connect to the grid. Renewable energy, championed by Egypt with ambitious targets to meet 42 percent of its electricity demands from green sources by 2035, offers a crucial long-term pathway. But, the upfront investment is immense, and the immediate impact on bridging the current energy deficit is negligible. All these efforts, while necessary, are long-term fixes, offering little respite for the immediate summers to come.
The reliance on Israeli gas, initially framed as an economic boon, has proven to be a strategic liability, eroding Egypt's foreign policy autonomy and tethering its domestic stability to external forces. Achieving true energy self-sufficiency or, at the very least, a diversified and resilient energy mix, will require years of sustained investment, prudent resource management, and a strategic vision that prioritizes national security over short-term economic expediency.
Until then, Egypt remains caught in the current, its fate disproportionately swayed by the flow, or interruption, of gas from its neighbor across the Sinai.
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Top image credit: Karol Nawrocki holds a rally March 2025. KSikorski / Shutterstock.com
In a nail-biter finish to a bitter campaign, a polarized Polish electorate over the weekend chose the Euro-skeptic, populist right candidate, Karol Nawrocki over Rafal Trzaskowski, the liberal mayor of Warsaw.
This contest, with close parallels to the recent one in Romania, produced an unanticipated triumph for Nawrocki, who, like George Simian, his Romanian counterpart, aligned himself with the MAGA agenda of President Trump. At a CPAC meetingheld in Poland in the lead-up to Poland’s runoff, Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s endorsement of Nawrocki was applauded by populist nationalist leaders from across Europe.
The official results showed Nawrocki with 50.89% and Trzaskowski with 49.11%. Turnout of 71.63% was higher than in any presidential contest since Lech Walesa won the office in 1990.
Trouble with Europe and Ukraine
Trzaskowski was the candidate of Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s pro-EU, pro-Ukraine Civic Coalition (KO), and his victory would have lifted the limits posed on Tusk’s domestic policy agenda by the veto power of outgoing President Andrej Duda, who, like Nawrocki, comes from the nationalist Law and Justice Party (PiS). Tusk’s government has become unpopular in part because it has underperformed on the promises it made to liberal voters in its impressive ouster of PiS after eight years in power in 2023.
Trzaskowski’s campaign unearthed several scandals about Nawrocki’s former involvement in brawls between rival soccer teams, his career as a boxer with alleged underworld contacts, and his allegedly having swindled a pensioner in the sale of an apartment. None of these scandals seems to have discouraged his supporters. He went into the campaign as a virtual unknown, having been the head of the Institute of National Remembrance and director of the WWII museum in Gdansk.
Since returning to power in 2023, Tusk has restored Poland’s position in the European Union, unlocking EU funding that had been withheld because of the clash between PiS in power from 2015 to 2023. There is a prospect of renewed friction with President Nawrocki obstructing Tusk’s pro-EU policies.
The potential resumption of the conflict with Brussels over PiS-era judicial appointments could affect Poland’s enhanced stature and clout within the EU on matters of foreign and security policy. Since Tusk’s election, the so-called Weimar Group of France, Germany and Poland has become a sort of foreign and security policy caucus among EU member states, and, with the UK, this group has spearheaded the Europeans’ drive to stay the course in military support for Ukraine, even as the U.S. under Trump has pressed for negotiations to begin in earnest to end the war.
Nawrocki pledged during the runoff campaign to oppose NATO membership for Ukraine and is certainly very cool on the idea of Ukraine’s EU accession, in part because of the impact on Poland’s farmers. While he is no friend of Russia, Nawrocki, a conservative historian, shares with much of the PiS rank and file some grievances against Ukraine for the treatment of the Polish minority in western Ukraine during WWII. Nawrocki shares with other nationalist-populist politicians in Europe the opposition to admitting asylum seekers and migrants, a position that even Tusk has had to accommodate. But unlike Poland’s liberals, Nawrocki’s voters are unhappy with the obligation to support large numbers of Ukrainian refugees.
Nawrocki owes his victory in part to the voters who supported the right-wing libertarian-nationalist candidate from the Konfederacja party, Slavomir Mentzen, who finished a strong third behind Trzaskowski and Nawrocki in the first round. The lion’s share of Mentzen’s voters supported Nawrocki in the runoff.
What lies ahead?
So long as Tusk remains prime minister, the European Commission is unlikely to move abruptly into open hostility with Poland, in part because the actual performance of Nawrocki in office remains to be seen. The Polish president’s powers are not comparable to the those of the other two nationalist populist leaders in Central Europe, Viktor Orban and Robert Fico.
Unlike Orban or Fico, Nawrocki will back harsher EU sanctions on Russia and will support boosting Poland’s already high defense spending to meet a perceived Russian threat. Like Tusk, however, Nawrocki opposes deploying Polish troops in any capacity in post-war Ukraine. Nawrocki is likely, however, to be even more determined than Duda was to veto legislation to roll back the PiS-era judicial reforms or to relax restrictions on abortion.
It is possible that Nawrocki will try to produce a legislative deadlock that forces early elections by splitting the multiparty majority led by Tusk. New elections are set for 2027 but could come earlier if the governing coalition were dissolved. Nawrocki is much more combative and ideological than Duda has been and can be expected to press his advantage to bring PiS back to power as soon as is feasible.
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