Ties between Silicon Valley and the military industrial complex are not new. But the alliance of tech billionaires and venture capital titans working together to turn the Pentagon into a money spigot to fund far-future military gear is a novel conspiracy.
Their uniquely deranged rhetoric hits all the high notes: the revolutionizing power of unbridled capitalism, tech as a panacea for all social ills, the absolute necessity of U.S. military hegemony, and (as prime mover) our precarious position on the cusp of the Chinese century.
Like all conspiracies against decency, common sense, and restraint, this one has lots of speaker tours and expos. Here are some of the craziest things I remember hearing as I wandered around the recent Artificial Intelligence Expo for National Competitiveness in Washington, D.C., and my attempts at translation:
“The Pentagon can now lend money directly to companies — that’s a great deal for American taxpayers.”
Translation: You thought the previous six audits we failed were bad, wait until we have a loan portfolio to manage.
“Pentagon contracting needs a fundamental redesign — we can’t just tweak it anymore.”
Translation: We’ve been slowly eating away at DOD’s annoying oversight and regulatory units over the last 50 years but if you could just finally get rid of those people we’d appreciate it.
“Microsoft is part of the industrial base — but if we are to bring the full enterprise suite into classified government work this will require massive amounts of investment capital.”
Translation: The best things in life are free but operating any of our products is going to be like so expensive.
“A decade ago Silicon Valley didn’t agree with the DOD mission — they’ve done a complete 180.”
Translation: Retaliating against all those tech worker sit-ins and union organizing was really effective.
“The [pro-Palestine] peace activists are war activists — we are the peace activists!”
Translation: I couldn’t translate this one because I blacked out and hit my head on the Palantir-sponsored mocktail bar.
“China isn’t this compartmentalized.”
Translation: Watch as American corporate executives discover the benefits of central planning!
“Edge computing is the future.”
Translation: If you want to have 800 military installations all over the world you’ll need a lot of distributed computing sites, we’d like to introduce you to our new product line: “forward operating servers.”
“In terms of AI-driven weapons accuracy, there’s too much superfluous data that isn’t necessary for targeting.”
Translation: At least this is what the Israelis are telling us.
“Too much data used for AI targeting comes from open source intelligence.”
Translation: Give us direct unhindered access to all your classified databases forever until we’re all dead.
“Are we close to having ‘Google-fired missiles’?”
Translation: Google executives’ search for ad revenue destroyed your primary product so have you considered pivoting from building browsers to blowing stuff up?
“Quantum computing can overcome the military’s GPS denial issue in Ukraine.”
Translation: If you buy our really expensive autonomous systems that can’t function without GPS right now we promise they’ll work in 5 years, or maybe 10 — okay definitely no more than 20 years.
“We need to eliminate dis-synergy.”
Translation: Creating meaningless corporate neologisms makes me sound innovative and disruptive.
“The Replicator drone initiative can put thousands of attritable systems in place in 18-24 months, but what they need is to break down barriers so they can do this over and over and over again.”
Translation: Save 10% on weaponized drones when you sign up for our subscribe and save option!
“Watch as I remote pilot this new drone that uses automated sensors to avoid obstacles. It can even run on a cell phone hotspot in the middle of Riyadh!”
Translation: This demo worked great when [please wait….system loading] I was in the middle of the desert [please wait….system loading] but apparently the high speed internet here at [please wait….system loading] the convention center in Washington DC [please wait…]. Oh well, never mind.
“Lockheed Martin is building an AI factory.”
Translation: Our excellent staff of quality control agents are literally strapped to their cubicles with their eyelids pinned open to issue recalls for any product that is definitely being built by an AI and not some guy in a robotic exoskeleton playing Operation! using a closed circuit TV.
“These partnerships aren’t just about building a defense industrial base, they’re about building an American industrial base.”
Translation: About half of the supply chain parts are coming from China but it will still feel very American because you’ll be paying for it.
“The venture capital sector enables DOD to leverage tens of billions of dollars of VC money, which generates more money to invest in defense tech.”
Translation: We, the super rich, are the only thing standing between you and Red Dawn. I’ll soon be rendering your fat to make human candles for my apocalypse bunker but for now let’s make some great memories.
“But, if VCs keep losing on defense tech when firms and investors washout, that leveraging I just mentioned won’t happen.”
Translation: Remember when we all soiled our collective pants and you bailed out our investment accounts in Silicon Valley Bank even though they technically weren’t FDIC insured? Yeah we’d like to scale that up to infinity.
“Government needs to focus on capitalizing underlying industries (semiconductors, biochem) because VC can’t do that — it takes too much capital and the timeline is too long.”
Translation: Can the taxpayer front the money for the really big expensive hardware stuff so VCs can just invest in the more short-term profitable stuff? I single-handedly employ an entire firm of asset managers to oversee my Belgian Malinois’s stock portfolio so if you don’t do this you’re destroying American jobs.
“VCs focus on the really hard things (quantum computing, advanced materials) because they only want the big wins.”
Translation: None of this stuff will ever perform the operations we’re talking about but that’s okay because we create enough hype around it and get in early enough that we can cash out before that becomes a problem — for us. It’s still a big problem for you because you listened to us and now you’re broke.
Shana Marshall is a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute and associate director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
Worldwide spending on nuclear weapons rose by $10.8 billion between 2022 and 2023 with 80% of the increase coming from the United States, according to a new report released on Monday by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN).
The $10.8 billion increase brings annual global spending on nuclear weapons up to $91.4 billion. From 2019 to 2023, $387 billion has been spent on nuclear weapons.
“By comparison, the World Food Programme Executive Director stated in 2021 that to end world hunger, countries could spend $40 billion per year through 2030, which is a total of $360 billion over nine years,” said the report, “Surge: 2023 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending.” ICAN notes that sum is $27 billion less than what the U.S., China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan spent on their nuclear arsenals in just five years.
ICAN points to weapons companies as profiting off the surge in spending on nukes, noting that the top 20 companies working on nuclear weapons earned more than $31 billion from their nuke related work in 2023. And “[t]here are at least $335 billion in outstanding nuclear weapons contracts to these companies, some of which continue for more than a decade,” said the report.
Honeywell International, Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin, and General Dynamics topped the list of companies profiting from nuclear weapons expenditures.
That flood of public funds to private contractors was coupled by significant spending by these companies on efforts to shape the debate around government spending. The companies spent $118 million lobbying governments in the U.S. and France in 2023 and donated more than $6 million to think tanks researching and writing about nuclear weapons.
Lockheed Martin contributed to the most think tanks, including: Atlantic Council, Brookings Institution, Chatham House, Center for a New American Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Hudson Institute, and Observer Research Foundation.
The increased spending on nuclear weapons hasn’t corresponded to an increase in the absolute number of nuclear warheads, a number that has continued to decline since the end of the Cold War, but the number of nuclear weapons deployed for use with missiles and aircraft has gone up.
“While the global total of nuclear warheads continues to fall as cold war-era weapons are gradually dismantled, regrettably we continue to see year-on-year increases in the number of operational nuclear warheads,’ said Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Director Dan Smith, in a press release citing data from SIPRI’s own report on nuclear weapons, also released on Monday. “This trend seems likely to continue and probably accelerate in the coming years and is extremely concerning.”
SIPRI points to tensions over the Ukraine and Gaza wars weakening nuclear diplomacy. Last year, Russia suspended its participation in the last remaining treaty limiting Russia and U.S. strategic nuclear forces and the U.S. suspended sharing its own nuclear weapons data with Russia as required by the treaty.
SIPRI also cites Russia’s repeated threats of using nuclear weapons and the Israel-Hamas war, which upended an informal agreement between the U.S. and Iran to de-escalate tensions. That conflict has also undermined efforts to engage Israel — which has never acknowledged its nuclear weapons program — in the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, which has contributed to an overall weakening of nuclear diplomacy.
While nuclear weapons contractors are enjoying new contracts of billions of dollars in public funds, the overall outlook for constraining the use of nuclear weapons is looking much worse.
“We have not seen nuclear weapons playing such a prominent role in international relations since the cold war,” said Wilfred Wan, Director of SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme at the release of the new report. “It is hard to believe that barely two years have passed since the leaders of the five largest nuclear-armed states jointly reaffirmed that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’”
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Pennsylvania National Guard Soldiers bound for Africa mission, Dec. 2023. (photo by Pennsylvania National Guard )
Pennsylvania National Guard Soldiers bound for Africa mission, Dec. 2023. (photo by Pennsylvania National Guard )
Ronald Reagan vowed to get rid of Selective Service during his 1979 presidential campaign, saying that the military draft “rests on the assumption that your kids belong to the state.”
“That assumption isn’t a new one,” he said. “The Nazis thought it was a great idea.”
Selective Service, in which men aged 18-26 are mandated to register voluntarily, survived Reagan and remains in place to this day. Failure to register is considered a felony. According to Matt Welch at Reason, there have only been 14 convictions under this law and none since 1986, though some 100,000 men per year don't register and risk penalties like getting student loans, working a government job, or obtaining a driver's license, depending on where they reside.
Now, nearly 50 years after America’s last war of conscription in Vietnam, lawmakers are supporting legislation that sounds like they’re preparing for another full draft.
The 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that passed the House on Friday contained a measure that would register men automatically with Selective Service. Whereas for a half century young men were supposed to fill out the proper paperwork on their own time, now all men would automatically be in the Selective Service database when they turn 18.
Maybe congressional members will vote next to send these boys to Ukraine or Gaza? Not likely, since Congress has largely ceded warmaking authority to the Executive over the last 20 years. Are you comfortable with President Joe Biden or possibly Donald Trump making those life-and-death decisions about your son or male relative?
While it is a felony not to register currently, there is still a shred of the voluntary left. Automatically registering young men for what is essentially a draftee list rips the last veil away. And though there is no active conscription for war today, this would make it a lot easier for Uncle Sam to start it.
Denunciations over the amendment came quick. “Why and Where will we be sending our kids to war?” pleaded former Democratic Congressman and current House candidate Dennis Kucinich. “Does anyone hear the drums of war and see the erosion of our individual liberty?” he added.
“I will veto any legislation to reinstitute the draft,” vowed independent presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. To date, Biden or Trump haven’t commented.
The House effort was spearheaded by Democratic Congresswoman Chrissy Houlahan of Pennsylvania. Automatic registration was included in the House Armed Services Committee’s version of the NDAA that passed in May, advancing through the committee in a 57 to 1 vote.
According to Defense News, Houlahan said during a debate in May, "By using available federal databases, the [Selective Service] agency will be able to register all of the individuals required and thus help ensure that any future military draft is fair and equitable."
"This will also allow us to rededicate resources — basically that means money — towards reading readiness and towards mobilization … rather than towards education and advertising campaigns driven to register people."
Supporters believe automatic registration will cut down on bureaucratic red tape. It’s curious that members of Congress actually concerned about red tape in Washington would start by making it easier to reinstitute the draft.
Maybe forcing men off to foreign lands for unclear reasons where so many will not come back deserves deeper thought, deliberation, and yes, perhaps mountains of bureaucracy and red tape standing between human beings and war? Houlahan has raised the specter, so let's dust it off and take a look.
Of the 58,220 U.S. military members killed in Vietnam, 17,671 of them were draftees. That’s 30 percent. They had no choice in the matter.
When 2020 Democratic presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg was calling for mandatory national service five years ago, Cato’s Doug Bandow noted that “the military doesn’t want conscripts or short‐termers. The armed services learned during the Vietnam War that those who don’t want to be there tend to develop discipline problems…”
The Heritage Foundation’s James Jay Carafano said about the political practicality of another draft, “The lesson of Vietnam, and previous wars, is that drafts require political consensus. However, such consensus cannot be presumed before a conflict.”
Is there any semblance of a national consensus on America’s fueling of the Russia-Ukraine conflict?
Military drafts have existed in every American war through Vietnam when the last draftees were deployed in 1972. Both Bandow and Carafano cite that war and potential lessons learned for a good reason.
The year before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, Brookings’ Bruce Chapman observed, “We eliminated the draft three decades ago in part because the armed services found that they needed relatively fewer recruits to serve longer than conscription provided. As the numbers that were needed shrank, the unfairness of the draft became ever more apparent-and offensive.”
“The government took advantage of its free supply of almost unlimited manpower by underpaying its servicemen, thereby losing many recruits who might have chosen a military career,” Chapman added, noting that conscripts can actually devalue the military in the eyes of men who otherwise might have made a career in it.
It’s safe to say that Rep. Houlahan has unlikely considered the many reasons a restoration of the military draft would be an awful idea.
It could be that she and other members of Congress who support the automatic Selective Service can't fathom why moving in this direction is bad on its face, and that's exactly why these people shouldn’t have any kind of power over the lives of America’s young boys and men. Especially this power.
Their lives should matter more than office efficiency.
Why did Europe go to war in 1914? How did the Cold War end? Will the U.S. and China go to war over Taiwan? Imagine a grand chessboard stretching across the globe, where great powers with vast resources strategize and maneuver their pieces.
In this high-stakes game of survival, each move reflects a nation's pursuit of security, wealth, prestige and influence. Every nation must navigate the wide and intricate web of alliances and trade, rivalries, and war. The great powers must vigilantly track all the pieces on the board and anticipate many moves ahead.
Every move — a trade agreement, military deployment, or diplomatic negotiation — can have far-reaching and unintended consequences. It can either strengthen bonds of cooperation or push nations closer to conflict.
Dale Copeland, professor of international relations at the University of Virginia, has authored two magisterial books on great power hostilities, which can serve as essential guides to this most dangerous and complex game. His 2014 Opus Magnum “Economic Interdependence and War” offers in-depth analyses of all the great power wars from the Napoleonic Wars to the end of the Cold War. His latest book, “A World Safe for Commerce” takes a comprehensive examination of U.S. foreign policy from the Revolution to China’s rise.
Both books present an impressive variety of evidence in favor of Copeland’s unique theoretical perspective, which he calls “dynamic realism.”
According to Copeland, dynamic realism synthesizes the greatest strengths of offensive and defensive realism by recognizing “how states grapple with the tension presented by needing to reduce simultaneously the risk of spirals of misunderstanding and the risk of not doing enough to build the nation’s power sphere.”
Copeland concurs with offensive realists that “rational security-maximizing states may need to expand to hedge against future threats.” But he just as strongly agrees with defensive realists that “if this expansionism ends up creating those future threats, then it may be self-defeating.” States constantly need to assess “the likelihood of the other being nasty rather than nice.”
Copeland’s second key distinction from other schools of realism is his emphasis on the significance of economic relations. He argues that the complex economies of great powers are deeply dependent on vital foreign markets, trade routes and raw materials. Their leaders view access to critical strategic commercial networks as a security necessity. If they anticipate positive trade relations with another nation will continue, they strengthen ties of peaceful cooperation.
However, if they fear losing access to crucial markets, they adopt hardline policies that often lead to war. “This tension between needing to expand one’s economic sphere of influence and wanting to avoid an escalatory spiral that might restrict access to vital markets is baked into the DNA of modern great power politics,” he says.
“Economic Interdependence and War” convincingly demonstrates that dynamic realism surpasses all other theories of international relations in explanatory power. Copeland shows that “in thirty of the forty case periods, economic interdependence played a moderate to strong causal role.” Trade expectations often mattered when we least expected it. Japan tried hard to make peace with the U.S. until 1941, when the U.S. embargo pushed its leaders into a desperate attempt to secure the nation’s survival through conquest and war.
Pessimistic trade expectations also exacerbated German fears of encirclement, which partially explain both world wars.
Copeland explores how regime type, interest groups and psychology shape great power dynamics, despite his conviction that domestic factors rarely serve as the primary cause of war. Ideological divides sparked the French revolutionary wars and intensified the Cold War. Nationalism drove the German and Italian wars of unification.
Copeland discusses statistical studies indicating that democracies are less likely to engage in conflict with one another only if both are developed nations. He suggests that developed nations are better positioned to cultivate strong trade ties. This perspective overlooks a crucial explanation highlighted by Jack Levy and William Thompson in their fact-filled book “The Arc of War” — developed states increase both the costs of war and the benefits of trade for every other nation.
As a result, developed nations are highly motivated to avoid conflict with each other. Although highly developed democracies and autocracies have frequently waged asymmetric wars against weaker opponents, the absence of war between them since 1945 offers hope that a stable peace among major powers is achievable.
“A World Safe for Commerce” is an engaging history of U.S. foreign policy that uncovers how the motives of American leaders were frequently less benign than most Americans think: “Even if they cloak their policies in the warm and fuzzy language of liberalism and freedom, and occasionally find themselves trapped by it, they are careful calculators of national security through the lens of commercial power.”
Copeland recounts that Britain’s harsh mercantilist restrictions pushed the American revolutionaries into their war for independence. The ideology of liberty only gained momentum when the first shots were fired. The Wars of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War and numerous interventions in Latin America and Asia were all fought to safeguard and expand the U.S. sphere of economic interests.
The U.S. came close to war with Britain in 1916, but ultimately declared war on Germany when it became the greater threat to U.S. trade with Europe and Latin America. The massive expansion of U.S. power during World War II was primarily driven by the imperative to ensure access to global markets in order to counter the threat of Axis dominance over Eurasia.
The U.S. economic containment policy against the Soviet Union initiated the Cold War, while the lifting of U.S. sanctions played a crucial role in facilitating Gorbachev's efforts to bring about its end. Trade expectations and classic geopolitics also explain the wars in Korea and Vietnam.
Copeland outlines why China’s Belt and Road Initiative and military buildup could be interpreted as either aggressive moves or the predictable actions of a rising power seeking security and resources. He emphasizes the need for the U.S. to better understand the forces driving China’s behavior to craft “a balanced policy that both signals resolve and avoids creating spirals of hostility.” He argues that an all-out economic containment strategy and interference in China’s domestic policies could push China toward military conflict over disputed regions like Taiwan and the South China Sea.
In his view maintaining open trade and diplomacy can build trust and reduce fears of economic decline. He advises the U.S. to project military strength in East Asia to deter Chinese expansion, while reassuring China that economic engagement will continue as long as it avoids aggression.
The vivid historical case studies in both volumes are packed with surprising insights into the root causes of the largest wars in modern history, challenging the conventional wisdom. Copeland’s pioneering work serves as a dire warning that any “downward spiral in commercial and political relations” can lead us straight to catastrophe.
Indeed, wise leaders must play a grand chess game for peace.