Ties between Silicon Valley and the military industrial complexare not new. But the alliance of tech billionaires and venture capital titans working together to turn the Pentagon into a money spigot to fund far-future military gear is a novel conspiracy.
Their uniquely deranged rhetoric hits all the high notes: the revolutionizing power of unbridled capitalism, tech as a panacea for all social ills, the absolute necessity of U.S. military hegemony, and (as prime mover) our precarious position on the cusp of the Chinese century.
Like all conspiracies against decency, common sense, and restraint, this one has lots of speaker tours and expos. Here are some of the craziest things I remember hearing as I wandered around the recent Artificial Intelligence Expo for National Competitiveness in Washington, D.C., and my attempts at translation:
“The Pentagon can now lend money directly to companies — that’s a great deal for American taxpayers.”
Translation: You thought the previous six audits we failed were bad, wait until we have a loan portfolio to manage.
“Pentagon contracting needs a fundamental redesign — we can’t just tweak it anymore.”
Translation: We’ve been slowly eating away at DOD’s annoying oversight and regulatory units over the last 50 years but if you could just finally get rid of those people we’d appreciate it.
“Microsoft is part of the industrial base — but if we are to bring the full enterprise suite into classified government work this will require massive amounts of investment capital.”
Translation: The best things in life are free but operating any of our products is going to be like so expensive.
“A decade ago Silicon Valley didn’t agree with the DOD mission — they’ve done a complete 180.”
Translation: Retaliating against all those tech worker sit-ins and union organizing was really effective.
“The [pro-Palestine] peace activists are war activists — we are the peace activists!”
Translation: I couldn’t translate this one because I blacked out and hit my head on the Palantir-sponsored mocktail bar.
“China isn’t this compartmentalized.”
Translation: Watch as American corporate executives discover the benefits of central planning!
“Edge computing is the future.”
Translation: If you want to have 800 military installations all over the world you’ll need a lot of distributed computing sites, we’d like to introduce you to our new product line: “forward operating servers.”
“In terms of AI-driven weapons accuracy, there’s too much superfluous data that isn’t necessary for targeting.”
Translation: At least this is what the Israelis are telling us.
“Too much data used for AI targeting comes from open source intelligence.”
Translation: Give us direct unhindered access to all your classified databases forever until we’re all dead.
“Are we close to having ‘Google-fired missiles’?”
Translation: Google executives’ search for ad revenue destroyed your primary product so have you considered pivoting from building browsers to blowing stuff up?
“Quantum computing can overcome the military’s GPS denial issue in Ukraine.”
Translation: If you buy our really expensive autonomous systems that can’t function without GPS right now we promise they’ll work in 5 years, or maybe 10 — okay definitely no more than 20 years.
“We need to eliminate dis-synergy.”
Translation: Creating meaningless corporate neologisms makes me sound innovative and disruptive.
“The Replicator drone initiative can put thousands of attritable systems in place in 18-24 months, but what they need is to break down barriers so they can do this over and over and over again.”
Translation: Save 10% on weaponized drones when you sign up for our subscribe and save option!
“Watch as I remote pilot this new drone that uses automated sensors to avoid obstacles. It can even run on a cell phone hotspot in the middle of Riyadh!”
Translation: This demo worked great when [please wait….system loading] I was in the middle of the desert [please wait….system loading] but apparently the high speed internet here at [please wait….system loading] the convention center in Washington DC [please wait…]. Oh well, never mind.
“Lockheed Martin is building an AI factory.”
Translation: Our excellent staff of quality control agents are literally strapped to their cubicles with their eyelids pinned open to issue recalls for any product that is definitely being built by an AI and not some guy in a robotic exoskeleton playing Operation! using a closed circuit TV.
“These partnerships aren’t just about building a defense industrial base, they’re about building an American industrial base.”
Translation: About half of the supply chain parts are coming from China but it will still feel very American because you’ll be paying for it.
“The venture capital sector enables DOD to leverage tens of billions of dollars of VC money, which generates more money to invest in defense tech.”
Translation: We, the super rich, are the only thing standing between you and Red Dawn. I’ll soon be rendering your fat to make human candles for my apocalypse bunker but for now let’s make some great memories.
“But, if VCs keep losing on defense tech when firms and investors washout, that leveraging I just mentioned won’t happen.”
Translation: Remember when we all soiled our collective pants and you bailed out our investment accounts in Silicon Valley Bank even though they technically weren’t FDIC insured? Yeah we’d like to scale that up to infinity.
“Government needs to focus on capitalizing underlying industries (semiconductors, biochem) because VC can’t do that — it takes too much capital and the timeline is too long.”
Translation: Can the taxpayer front the money for the really big expensive hardware stuff so VCs can just invest in the more short-term profitable stuff? I single-handedly employ an entire firm of asset managers to oversee my Belgian Malinois’s stock portfolio so if you don’t do this you’re destroying American jobs.
“VCs focus on the really hard things (quantum computing, advanced materials) because they only want the big wins.”
Translation: None of this stuff will ever perform the operations we’re talking about but that’s okay because we create enough hype around it and get in early enough that we can cash out before that becomes a problem — for us. It’s still a big problem for you because you listened to us and now you’re broke.
Shana Marshall is a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute and associate director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
Last week, analysts from three think tanks penned a joint op-ed for Breaking Defense to make the case for mobilizing the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, a pivot from one exceedingly costly approach to nuclear modernization to another.
After Sentinel faced a 37 percent cost overrun in early 2024, the Pentagon was forced to inform Congress of the cost spike, assess the root causes, and either cancel the program or certify it to move forward under a restructured approach. The Pentagon chose to certify it, but not before noting that the restructured program would actually come in 81 percent over budget.
The Pentagon later revealed that a major driver of the program’s cost growth was a faulty assumption that it could refurbish existing missile silos for Minuteman III, the current generation of ICBMs, to accommodate the needs of Sentinel. Now, the Pentagon is planning to build entirely new silos, at a significantly higher cost.
The three analysts from the Hudson Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute — we’ll call them the Three Missileers — essentially argue that the restructured plans for the Sentinel ICBM are so over budget that mounting Sentinel on heavy trucks instead of in fixed silos would now cost less than building new silos for Sentinel. Their case rests on two assumptions. The first is that taking Sentinel on the road will cost less than building new silos, a dubious and unsubstantiated claim. The second and more fundamental assumption is that the United States needs ICBMs to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. It doesn’t.
Regarding cost, the Three Missileers claim that “while a mobile option may have appeared too costly when Sentinel plans were set in 2014, the total cost is likely lower relative to the information we now have about the realistic cost of fixed silos.”
But they offer no evidence to support that conclusion beyond the Sentinel’s cost growth. They also don’t address the potential costs of abandoning or scaling back current contracts for the Sentinel in favor of new ones. Pentagon contracts often include provisions that penalize the government if it backs away from a planned project, and with the vast array of contracts and subcontracts involved in the Sentinel program, those costs could be significant. Without concrete plans in hand, it’s admittedly difficult to estimate the costs of a mobile approach relative to a stationary one. But even if the authors are correct that a mobile option would be cheaper, as they put it, “make no mistake, it will be costly.”
As for the strategic underpinning of their case, ICBMs are simply no longer necessary to ensure an effective and secure nuclear deterrent. As Taxpayers for Common Sense (where I work as a policy analyst) laid out in a report on the Sentinel last year, the combined explosive yield of nuclear warheads deployed on B-52s could reach up to 30 megatons if variable yield bombs are dialed up to their maximum potential. That’s 1,200 times the explosive power of the bomb the U.S. dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945.
Our fleet of ballistic missile submarines likely carries warheads with a combined explosive yield of 200 megatons, roughly 8,000 times the explosive yield of the bomb dropped on Nagasaki. The notion that we need 400 ICBMs on top of all that firepower is absurd. Furthermore, ICBMs used to offer capabilities that our nuclear submarines and bombers didn’t, but no longer. With advances in the range, accuracy, and destructive power of missiles and bombs deployed on the air- and sea-based legs of the nuclear triad, ICBMs don’t belong in silos or on the back of heavy trucks — they belong in a museum.
This isn’t a radical position. As Gen. George Lee Butler, the director of U.S. Strategic Command from June 1992 to February 1994, said in a 2015 interview, “I would have removed land-based missiles from our arsenal a long time ago.”
In fact, the loudest cheerleaders for forging ahead with Sentinel despite its astounding cost growth are folks with a vested interest in the program — lawmakers in states where it’s being developed, and companies who stand to profit from modernizing an obsolete leg of the triad. According to an in-depth analysis of the ICBM lobby, “ICBM contractors have donated $87 million to members of Congress in the last four election cycles alone.” Eleven of those contractors spent $226 million on lobbying over that same period.
As programs to modernize our nation’s nuclear arsenal forge ahead, we also need to modernize our nuclear weapons strategy. That means ditching an exceedingly expensive and outdated approach to nuclear deterrence that views a nuclear triad as the only way to stand up to our adversaries. For those of us without a vested interest, two legs are more than enough to stand on.
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Top photo credit: United States and Israel flags are projected on the walls of the Old city of Jerusalem in celebration after Israel and Hamas agreed to the first phase of U.S. President Donald Trump's plan to end the war in Gaza, October 9, 2025. REUTERS/Sinan Abu Mayzer
Two years into the Gaza conflict and perhaps on the cusp of a successful phased ceasefire, what can we say?
On the basis of media reporting about Yahya Sinwar’s strategic rationale for attacking Israel on October 7, 2023, it seems that he believed Israel was on the brink of civil war and that the impact of a large-scale assault would severely erode its political stability. He believed that Hamas’s erstwhile allies, especially Hizballah and Iran, would open offensives against Israel, which, in combination with Hamas’s invasion, would stretch the nation’s military capabilities to the breaking point.
Years in an Israeli prison evidently led Sinwar to think that he understood Israel and what made it tick. There was something Dunning Kruger-esque about his self-confidence.
In the event, his attack unified a divided Israeli society and focused most of its electorate on the task of wiping out Hamas. Incidentally, we learned that hostage-taking works against the interests of the hostage-taker when it motivates the adversary to prioritize absolute victory even at the expense of the hostages’ lives. This was another factor that he did not anticipate. His misunderstanding, however, might be excused given the previous successes Hamas enjoyed by seizing hostages. But these very successes buttressed the refusal of Israel to add another ransom arrangement to the list.
On the Israeli side, there was an analogous story of self-deception. Reporting has focused on two elements. The first was Israel’s conviction before Oct. 7, 2023 that it had found the route to least cost stability on the Gaza front. The linchpin of this strategy was a tacit agreement with Qatar to pump cash into the Gazan economy and therefore into Hamas’s pockets. The premise was an assessment that Hamas had made its own strategic pivot toward governance and away from armed resistance. This strategy would also keep an opponent of Fatah in play, thus hamstringing the Palestinian Authority and dividing the national movement.
This approach seemed to secure quiet in the decade leading up to October 7. When a strategy seems to be working, there is generally little appetite within governments to consider alternative scenarios and hedging stratagems; if it ain’t broke don’t fix it becomes the guide to policy.
The second element was the “Konzeptzia,” the mindset that discounted both Hamas capability and motivation to challenge Israel on the battlefield. This caused Israeli military and intelligence leaders to downplay the risk of Hamas aggression. It also caused the political leadership to think that diverting troops from Southern Command to the West Bank to deal with Palestinian violence triggered by empowered settlers would be cost free.
In the end game, it was not lack of tactical warning, but rather a refusal to take it seriously because it ran against the grain of the Konzeptzia. Once it dawned on senior officers that the game was afoot, all the obstacles to swift preemption and mitigation described by Richard Betts in his work on surprise attack made disaster a certainty.
We know, too, that Hamas’s allies read the security environment very differently. It was clear from the outset that deterrence, which had been holding up relatively well between Hizballah and Israel since their brief war in 2006 and Israel and Iran since the 2015 JCPOA, was still preferred to armed conflict. Both Hizballah and Iran sought to preserve it. This necessarily meant leaving Hamas to twist in the wind. But the need to do something symbolic in lieu of something that could spin out of control, Hizballah initiated fire on Israeli assets in the northern part of the country. But the dynamic could not be fine tuned.
Before long the territory on both sides of the Blue Line had been savaged by artillery and rocket exchanges and, on the Lebanese side, Israeli airstrikes. The depopulation of Israel’s northern towns brought political pressure on the government that compounded strategic incentives to raise the stakes.
Israel had been preparing for a showdown with Hizballah since 2006, but had refrained from going to war. Hizballah’s measured – in its view — support for Hamas, which had just attacked Israeli civilians with sadistic glee, was enough to tip the balance. Iran settled for tough talk until Israel struck one of its installations in Damascus, killing senior IRGC officers. This led to missile attacks against Israel that coincided with the Gaza fighting but were not really organic to it.
We know now that the Israeli public supported Netanyahu’s focus on “absolute victory.” There were differences of opinion within the body politic and to some extent within the government over the place of hostages in this framework. But most Israelis seemed to accept the urgent priority of destroying Hamas. Indeed most Israelis were willing to accept serious tradeoffs in pursuit of this goal. Some sectors of the economy suffered, reservists were exhausted, casualties were high and Israel became increasingly isolated on the world stage.
We know, however, that diplomatic isolation is not an effective deterrent to the policies that invite it. In this instance, when Israeli society experienced October 7 in ways that many foreigners found difficult to fathom, growing isolation was not only a small price to pay but also an affirmation of right wing claims that Hamas was just the tip of an eternal antisemitic spear. We also know there was actually sufficient ambivalence in Europe and the Middle East regarding Israel’s brutal response to October 7 to ensure that isolation never evolved into punishment.
Even after a consensus regarding genocide crystallized in many capitals, punishment came only in the form of empty gestures toward Palestinian self-determination.
In part this was due to the awkward fact of Hamas’s role as the aggressor, in part to avoid clashes with the Trump administration when it was in its anti-NATO, pro-Russia phase, and in part because condemning Israel might come back to haunt them if they ever faced a similar attack. The fact that only Turkey, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Belize severed diplomatic relations with Israel over the course of the war should be the subject of careful study in the months and years ahead.
If we had not already known, we are now aware of American lack of leverage over Israel. The U.S. has been pleading for a ceasefire for at least a year while proffering arms and money in support of Israeli operations. Until now, Netanyahu has defied these pleas. The proposition that the U.S. has no usable leverage is now being debated by the Washington commentariat. Those who believe that the U.S. could control Israeli actions through threats of retaliation or imposed distance, have pointed to Donald Trump’s bluster as evidence that there was indeed a reservoir of leverage from which a right minded president could draw and that Israel’s leadership would respect. Headlines and editorials reflect the pull of this narrative.
What do we know that might clarify things? First, we know that Israel had largely achieved its explicit and implicit war aims by decimating Hamas, transferring the casualty risks of urban combat to Gazans, using hunger as a tool to use against Hamas, and demonstrating to Palestinians that Israel held the power of life and death over them. The war therefore had reached a point of sharply diminishing returns to scale.
Second, that the terms devised by the White House largely mapped onto conditions that Netanyahu had long insisted upon.
Third, Israeli overreach complicated Netanyahu’s options going forward. The attack on Qatar was pivotal in this respect. If Israel had restrained itself Netanyahu would not have faced the pressure he did from the Gulf and Washington. And there was a former British prime minister, Tony Blair, waiting in the wings with a fully fleshed out day after plan that had been coordinated with Israel, Washington and key Gulf states and geared to Trump’s 20 points.
Lastly, it is crucial to remember that Trump was not operating in a domestic political setting that his predecessors ever experienced. The combination of an utter absence of domestic constraints and an impulsive personality helped produce a good outcome for Israel and perhaps for the Palestinians. Also relevant is the interest of both Netanyahu and the Trump administration to cast Trump’s intervention in such epic terms. For Netanyahu, this provides a degree of political immunity for doing politically tricky things he wanted to do anyway; he can tell his partners on the right that he had no choice —“Trump made me do it."
And Trump, as he has said himself, wants a Nobel peace Prize. Given this context, attributions of a decisive role to Trump in bringing a war that was virtually over to provisional conclusion need to be taken with a grain of salt.
Attitudinal shifts are clearest in younger age cohorts and have therefore not reshaped party politics yet at the national level. But they will and historians will identify the Gaza war as a turning point.
Finally what do we know about how the ceasefire arrangements will play out? Based on the past two years, It is likely that phase one will conclude successfully. The 20 living hostages will be returned and an Israeli military presence in about half of Gaza’s territory will have an international imprimatur. And Israeli attacks against Palestinians will stop, or at least slow down. One thing we know from Israeli operations in Lebanon is that from Israel’s perspective, airstrikes and other operations are compatible with a ceasefire.
What we do not know is whether phase two will eventuate. The provisions are still being discussed at the technical level. And the grandiose bits — Donald Trump as head of a “peace board,” the consolidation of a technocratic government, the deployment of a rapid reaction force largely manned by Arab soldiers — these must remain for the moment in the category of unknown.
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Top photo credit: A man, wearing shirt in the colours of the U.S. flag, and a woman, wearing an Israeli flag across her shoulders, celebrate after U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Hamas agreed on the first phase of a Gaza ceasefire, at the "Hostages square", in Tel Aviv, Israel, October 9, 2025. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
Reports today indicate that both the Israelis and Hamas have agreed on a deal that would call for an immediate cessation of fighting and return of hostages and prisoners on both sides in a first phase.
Both parties are expected to sign the agreement and the Israeli cabinet will vote to approve it afterwards. The deal would supposedly see a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the ground in order for the hostage-prisoner swaps to proceed, but the thornier issues of Hamas disarmament, governance, full Israeli withdrawal and a complete end to the war have been left to hammer out in later phases.
It remains to be seen if this is fully implemented and successful, but if it will secure an ultimate end of the genocide and the release of the hostages, then that is a crucial achievement.
There is a risk that the deal repeats Trump's previous phased agreement that ended up only becoming a prisoner exchange rather than an end to the slaughter. At the time, in March 2025, Israel had already killed some 48,000 Palestinians in Gaza; today, 67,000 and likely many more are dead.
Israel decided to break that first agreement and resumed the war, and as a result, Phase II of the previous agreement was never reached.
Some commentators in Israel are already declaring that there is no intent on the Israeli side to reach Phase II and end the genocide. Rather, this is just a “hostage deal, and a ceasefire while talks continue in good faith.” That is, a tactical pause before Israel restarts the slaughter.
On the positive side, the fact that Trump is making this such a personal success for himself may imply that he will be far less forgiving if Israel sabotages the deal once again. This, it seems, is what the Palestinians and the Arab states are counting on.
Bottom line is that Trump must retain pressure on all parties — particularly Israel — to ensure that the prisoner exchange is followed up with a full end to the war.
The fact that Trump and his team could step in aggressively to get a deal done this week shows that the war could have ended much earlier had the U.S. pressured the Netanyahu government appropriately earlier. The key reason Trump moved forward with pressure on Israel at this point is because of Israel's overreach by bombing Qatar in September.
It made the White House recognize that Israel's recklessness was increasingly becoming an American problem.
Add to this another key factor: Israel was increasingly becoming a political burden for Trump. Israel’s popularity has been tanking among Trump’s America First constituency. The sheer amount of Trump’s time Israel was demanding - from Gaza to Lebanon to Iran - was seen as undermining Trump’s domestic political priorities while dragging the US once again into unnecessary Middle East conflicts.
Trump has himself pointed to this, saying that his voters have turned against Israel. “My people are starting to hate Israel,” Trump told a donor already in July. Major voices in MAGA, such as Tucker Carlson, Steve Bannon, Candace Owens, and, privately before he was assassinated, Charlie Kirk, view blind support for Israel as incompatible with the America First approach.
Israel‘s international isolation also imposed a cost on the US since it is Washington that is constantly tasked to defend Israel and insulate it from international pressure. Trump reportedly told Netanyahu that Israel cannot fight the entire world. The implicit message was that the US can no longer spend its political capital defending a reckless and recalcitrant Israel.
Trump, of course, is eyeing a Nobel Peace Prize. But ceasefires do not warrant such prizes. Much more must be achieved. If Trump keeps up the pressure on Israel, peace can be secured. And so can the coveted peace prize.
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