As the war between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and allied militias against the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group continues, the Trump administration is reportedly tapping Massad Boulos as the State Department’s special envoy to the African Great Lakes region.
In this capacity, Boulos will be responsible for leading the American diplomatic effort to bring long-desired stability to the region and to end a conflict that has been raging in the eastern DRC for decades.
Other than serving as an adviser on Middle East policy for President-elect Trump’s team during the transition period between the election and inauguration, Boulos has no U.S. foreign policy experience.
Much of his previous work was in the private sector, where he most recently worked at a small automotive conglomerate for a West African company, called SCOA Nigeria, whose profit was less than $66,000 last year.
Boulos also has familial connections with the first family. The president’s daughter, Tiffany Trump, is married to Massad Boulos’ son, Michael.
In an email to Responsible Statecraft, the State Department would not provide comment on Boulos’ reported appointment.
Since the early days of the most recent incarnation of this conflict in late 2021, two major peace processes have been running in parallel. In one, Kenya brought together many of the 120 disparate armed groups fighting in the eastern Congo, successfully reaching a truce between some of these groups and the Congolese government. However, the most powerful of these groups, the Rwandan-backed M23, was absent from the talks and remains the major threat to the DRC.
In a separate peace track, Angola had been serving as the leading mediator, attempting to set up negotiations between M23 rebels, their backers in Rwanda, and the DRC government. But exhausted and disheartened following numerous failed mediation efforts, Angolan President Joao Lourenco announced in mid-March that he will no longer lead this mediation process.
In an interview with Responsible Statecraft, Onesphore Sematumba, a senior analyst on the DRC and Burundi at the International Crisis Group, said that “peace efforts have been further complicated by the involvement of multiple state actors, each with their own interests.”
Burundi, Rwanda’s southern neighbor, has provided direct support for the DRC and Congo-backed armed groups seeking to attack Rwandan assets. Uganda, which borders Rwanda to the north, has also sent troops to the region. Although Uganda’s involvement is more enigmatic, the United Nations found that Uganda has supported M23 rebels in the eastern Congo.
Mediating an end to such a long and complicated war with numerous state and non-state actors is a difficult task. Just launching negotiations has proven to be a challenge, with each side at times refusing to accept the basic parameters set forth by mediators before negotiations even begin. In December, Rwandan president Paul Kagame refused to attend Angolan-initiated mediation efforts if M23 rebels were not also present, something DRC president Felix Tshisekedi, who discredits M23 as an unserious armed group whose entire financial and military strength rests on Rwanda’s support, refused to allow.
If confirmed as special envoy, Boulos and the American delegation would have the advantage of coming to the table with a relatively fresh voice. Recent news that Trump is considering agreeing to a deal offered by the DRC to grant critical minerals access to the United States in exchange for military support through the provision of military resources and training to the Congolese military risks violating American neutrality, consequently hindering its influence to broker a peace agreement.
Agreeing to such a deal, which the Trump administration is reportedly considering, would immediately collapse American credibility in the eyes of Rwanda, hurting U.S. efforts to bring about a lasting peace deal. According to Sematumba, funnelling more weapons into the arena and tilting the military scales in favor of one side would only intensify the fighting and exacerbate the conflict. The U.S., Sematumba said, “should not come to the region with a plan centered around adding to the violence.”
In a major surprise, Tshisekedi and Kagame united in Doha on March 18 for peace talks hosted by Qatar, opening a third track of peace negotiations.
Although Sematumba is skeptical that any major player, including the U.S. government, will be able mediate an end to such a complicated war anytime soon, he says that any American effort to do so should “consider all the existing peace initiatives,” rather than adding yet another one to an already “incoherent” peace effort.
Attaching itself to Qatar’s negotiating track might be the way to go, seeing it is the only peace initiative so far that has successfully brought together the heads of state of both the DRC and Rwanda to discuss the conflict face-to-face.
U.S.-ties to each country can help contribute to an end to the conflict. Both the DRC and Rwanda have close economic and diplomatic relations with the United States. Both have also benefited from large amounts of U.S. foreign aid over the decades, with the U.S. budgeting $990 million for aid to the DRC and $188 million to Rwanda in 2023, the most recent year with complete data. Although a recent analysis finds that Trump’s policies will cut 65% of aid funding directed towards Rwanda and 34% directed towards the DRC, the U.S. is still a major contributor of aid to the region, and through it has the requisite soft power to influence peace negotiations.
Any successful and lasting peace agreement is likely to require Rwanda to end its support for M23 and remove Rwandan troops currently stationed in DRC territory. The challenge to Boulos will come if Rwanda remains intransigent on that issue.
American sanctions remain a more extreme option. The United States last month sanctioned a senior Rwandan government official as well as a member of the larger rebel group of which M23 is a part. Sanctions were a key part of the United States’ strategy to ending the less severe incarnation of this crisis in 2012, the first time M23 threatened regional security. Donors back then froze $240 million in aid to Rwanda, and President Obama used American diplomatic and economic leverage to successfully pressure Kagame to end his support for the rebellion. This, however, proved to only be a temporary reprieve, with M23 returning more powerful than ever in 2021.
Sematumba expressed doubt that sanctions would lead to a lasting peace, saying that sanctions are “more likely to hurt villagers than the country’s leadership,” and that the numerous sanctions already in place against Rwanda, including by the EU and the UK, have failed to move the needle, and have quite possibly made the conflict worse. Once the EU implemented its sanctions on Rwanda on March 17, M23 pulled out of peace talks just a day before they were scheduled to be held in Angola as a form of protest against the EU’s new sanctions policy.
Although the power of the U.S. dollar and the sizable levels of American foreign aid funnelling into the region give the U.S. some leverage to implement economic sanctions against Rwanda, in 2022, the last year with full data, the U.S. was only Rwanda’s tenth-largest export market and eleventh-largest source of imports. Rwanda, therefore, has plenty of alternative trading partners it could turn to if the U.S. were to implement sanctions.
Despite the complexity of this conflict and the difficulty facing Boulos and his team once they take the helm, using American soft power and leverage can help them mold peace talks and incrementally move the conflict towards a resolution.
