No, you heard it right. Last week in a Fox News appearance, South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham said outright that the war in Ukraine is “about money.”
Namely, Graham told Fox News host Sean Hannity that the U.S. stands to financially gain from Ukraine’s vast agricultural sector and “two to seven trillion dollars’ worth” of rare earth minerals alike in a prospective wartime deal with the war-torn, albeit resource-wealthy, nation.
“This war is about money. People don’t talk much about it. But you know, the richest country in all of Europe for rare earth minerals is Ukraine. Two to seven trillion dollars’ worth of minerals that are rare earth minerals, very relevant to the 21st century,” Graham declared. “Ukraine’s ready to do a deal with us, not the Russians. So it’s in our interest to make sure that Russia doesn’t take over the place.”
“[Ukraine] is the bread basket of…the developing world,” Graham mused. “Fifty percent of all the food going to Africa comes from Ukraine.”
Graham also emphasized that the incoming Trump administration is uniquely positioned to cash out on such resources. “Donald Trump is going to do a deal to get our money back, to enrich ourselves with rare earth minerals. A good deal for Ukraine and us,” Graham said. “And he’s going to bring peace.”
Trump has suggested repeatedly that he wants to bring all sides to the table to talk in order to end the war. Graham has been consistently on the other side of the debate where he has wanted Ukraine to keep fighting at all costs.
Yet Graham insists that Ukraine will benefit from the prospective “deal” he describes. His own history of hawkish comments, where he previously said that “with American weapons and money, Ukraine will fight Russia to the last Ukrainian,” suggests Ukrainians' best interests and meaningful peace both rank low amongst his priorities.
Notably, this isn’t the first time Graham has suggested that the U.S. could benefit from access to Ukraine’s natural resources. “[Ukrainians are] sitting on a trillion dollars’ worth of minerals that could be good to our economy,” Graham said in a video clip from September, where he was standing next to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
Meanwhile, war fatalities continue to mount, with the Wall Street Journal reporting in September that over a million people have died or been wounded in the Russia-Ukraine war since its inception. To hawks like Graham, such fatalities seem to be an acceptable price to pay in an apparent bid for Ukraine’s natural resources.
Stavroula Pabst is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft.
Top image credit: U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) attends a news briefing amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine March 18, 2024. REUTERS/Gleb Garanich
On the same night President Donald Trump ordered U.S. airstrikes against Iran, POLITICO reported, “MAGA largely falls in line on Trump’s Iran strikes.”
The report cited “Charlie Kirk, a conservative activist and critic of GOP war hawks,” who posted on X, “Iran gave President Trump no choice.” It noted that former Republican Congressman Matt Gaetz, a longtime Trump supporter, “said on X that the president’s strike didn’t necessarily portend a larger conflict.” Gaetz said. “Trump the Peacemaker!”
Republican Senator and Trump supporter Tim Sheehy (R-Mont), was quoted as saying that ordering the strikes was the “right decision.”
The first U.S. airstrikes on Iran on Saturday happened at 6:40 p.m. Eastern time. The timestamp on the POLITICO story was 9:48 p.m., a mere three hours after the first bombs were dropped.
In fact, MAGA did not largely “fall in line” with Trump’s airstrikes. The real picture is more complicated, and less categorical than the mainstream media has allowed.
Some have come out loud and clear against the strikes from the first. You don’t get more MAGA than devout Trump loyalist, Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, whose first X post addressing the strikes on Saturday night read, “Every time America is on the verge of greatness, we get involved in another foreign war. There would not be bombs falling on the people of Israel if Netanyahu had not dropped bombs on the people of Iran first. Israel is a nuclear armed nation.”
“This is not our fight,” Greene said. “Peace is the answer.”
On Sunday, Greene followed up with a lengthy anti-war post that asked why the U.S. was fighting abroad instead of dealing with America’s border problems. Greene wrote, “Neocon warmongers beat their drums of war and act like Billy badasses going to war in countries most Americans have never seen and can’t find on a map.”
Other major voices — including non-MAGA conservatives and libertarians — have challenged the legality of the strikes, like Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.). Others, once the ceasefire was put into place overnight Monday, have chosen not to dwell on Saturday’s bombing operations or their efficacy, but have focused on the risk of regime change, U.S. ground action, or being lured into a long war by Israel.
Tucker Carlson, Trump supporter and arguably the most high profile conservative pundit today, reflected this strategy on Monday. He had been out front and center against a possible war with Iran. In his first appearance on Emily Jashinsky’s new show, he did not indicate that his views had changed.
“I don’t want to relive Iraq,” Carlson told Jashinsky in the interview, referring to the dynamics that led to the protracted Iraq war. He said he was grateful that Trump “took this in for a landing” and appeared in no mood to continue strikes or engage in the regime change that neocon voices were demanding.
“I know the people who did it,” he said, referring to the Iraq War architects. “I’ve lived among them, and defended it. I’m not doing that again,” he said. “We came very close to doing that again because of Mark Levin, Laura Loomer and the rest of these morons.”
Former Trump senior adviser Steve Bannon is not criticizing the strikes outright but has supported the president declaring the war over and making sure the ceasefire works. In repeated episodes of his “War Room” podcast, Bannon has warned against getting sucked into a regime change war and has turned his ire on Israel’s role in encouraging Trump’s involvement, saying, “my issue isn’t whether Iran has a nuke. My issue is that (Prime Minister Benjamin) Netanyahu, for his own political dilemma, created a false sense of urgency.”
He called neocon voices like radio host Mark Levin, "town criers for Netanyahu."
For his part Gaetz has shifted his focus to Israel, too, suggesting “Israel doesn’t want peace” but only “regime change.”
Meanwhile, Christian conservative Matt Walsh of the Daily Waite has been a blunt non-interventionist, writing Tuesday that “I want the U.S. to back out of (the Middle East) completely and focus on its own problems. Call that simplistic or ‘isolationist’ if you want. I don't care,” he said.
“Our country is in a state of existential crisis on multiple fronts internally. We don't have the time, resources, manpower, will, or ability to fix problems for other countries right now. We need to focus on ourselves and let them handle their own disputes.”
“America first,” Walsh added.
Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., who was not supportive of prospective strikes before Saturday, told Bannon that “the president getting a cease fire is a big deal,” he said, noting he hoped this would be the first step in extricating the U.S. from the region. “We need to have less presence in the Middle East. This is not a sustainable posture for us.”
Joe Rogan, the most popular podcaster in the world, who many might consider MAGA or at least MAGA adjacent, said during an interview with Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), “I think the whole MAGA thing right now is very divided, particularly because one of the things they voted for was no war.”
“Well now it seems like we’re in a war,” he added. “And it’s quick. We’re six months in and that’s already popped off.”
Rogan is half right. You can find those who identify as MAGA who outright support the strikes — some early polls appear to bear that out — but there is still a collective resistance to war, especially a long, regime change war that resembles anything like the 20 years of protracted conflict that loomed over the youth of America's youngest generations.
Arguably the truly great divide now is between these aforementioned conservatives — MAGA and those who MAGA support — encouraging Trump’s instincts for restraint, and the neoconservatives who are likely upset that Trump didn’t go further militarily, or better yet, that he had forced Israel into a ceasefire with Iran on Monday.
The Wall Street Journal editorial board certainly wasn’t happy, suggesting Trump was treating Israel and Iran equally, and giving Iran a “reprieve.”
“I hate this word ceasefire, the president hated it a few days ago too,” exclaimed Levin, calling it a “life line” and saying the Iranians should have been “forced to sign a surrender document” instead. “Does this mean the regime survives? I guess so.”
The epitaph for MAGA restraint is not only premature, it is inaccurate. Some would even suggest that meetings that Trump had before the strikes Saturday, particularly with Bannon, had reminded him that his base had certain expectations and would not support an Iraq 2.0. They hope, at least at this moment, that the U.S. has avoided that fate and that it is important to keep pushing Trump in the right direction.
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Top image credit: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com
Eighty years ago, on June 26, 1945, the United Nations Charter was signed in San Francisco. But you wouldn’t know it if you listened to European governments today.
After two devastating global military conflicts, the Charter explicitly aimed to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” And it did so by famously outlawing the use of force in Article 2(4). The only exceptions were to be actions taken in self-defense against an actual or imminent attack and missions authorized by the U.N. Security Council to restore collective security.
And yet, after the United States bombed Iran’s nuclear program last weekend, the leaders of the E3 countries (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) released a joint statement that made no reference to international law, let alone the U.N. Charter whose 80th anniversary was just days away. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s post on X mentioned the risks of a nuclear Iran and the need for regional stability ahead of respect for international law, almost as if the latter were an afterthought.
When Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, European leaders most certainly did not underline the need to preserve stability on the European continent above all else. Russia’s illegal invasion of its neighbor was seen as an attack on Europe itself and on everything that it stood for. A herculean effort was undertaken to punish Moscow and provide Kyiv with military assistance, financial support, and a path toward joining the West. EU leaders have even endorsed the establishment of a special tribunal to try Russia for the crime of aggression.
Due to pressure from the Trump administration, European decisionmakers have finally come around to the idea of a ceasefire in Ukraine. But after three years of war and hundreds of thousands of dead, they are still not prepared for a veritable and unavoidable compromise. Ukraine’s right to join NATO is still defended in many circles as a matter of principle, even though the administration ruling it out has rendered the entire discussion a moot point. Sanctions cannot be lifted while Russian troops remain on Ukrainian soil, even partially as a means of advancing a delicate peace process.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we were told, left the world a binary choice: either fight to preserve the “rules-based international order” or enter a dangerous new reality defined by the “law of the jungle.”
To be fair, the “rules-based order” was always a deliberately opaque term, designed to allow a subset of states to dictate the terms of legitimate interstate behavior. But while the U.S. under Joe Bidenconceived of this order as a bloc with both proponents and opponents, the Europeans seemed to view it more earnestly as a neutral description of the post-World War II global system based on multilateralism, international law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
Unfortunately, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed — and deepened — Europe’s dependence on the United States for its security. This came after the EU’s worsening ties with Russia in the years prior to the war had already illustrated the tension between Brussels’ desire to “speak the language of power” while remaining a normative actor. As a matter of principle, no third country could exercise a veto over the EU and Ukraine pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation — but what if such cooperation exacerbated security tensions on the continent and was, therefore, of dubious strategic utility?
Three years ago, Brussels elites were patting themselves on the back over the resurgence of transatlantic unity and the EU’s newfound status as a “geopolitical actor.” Unbeknownst to them, they were actually laying the groundwork for the world to roll their eyes at any European reference to the “rules-based international order.” That European leaders continue to fall in line with the U.S. despite the major (and crudely manifested) rift that has opened up between them under Trump speaks volumes.
Going forward, appeals to international norms in the case of Ukraine will carry far less water. It has become clear as day that European governments refuse to compromise on Ukraine not to uphold universal principles, but rather because of their perceived security (and status-related) interests and fears. Ironically, this will come at the expense of Europe’s ability to get much of the rest of the world on board for its strategy of isolating Russia and increasing pressure on Vladimir Putin to compromise.
Twenty months of Israeli violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza have not prompted a significant break in relations between Jerusalem and European capitals. In that case, at least one could argue that Hamas was systematically violating the laws of war as well. But Israel’s attack on Iran was a clear-cut violation of international law — a preventive rather than pre-emptive war, aimed at averting an unfavorable security situation in the future rather than thwarting an imminent threat. In that sense, it was not entirely dissimilar from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which ostensibly aimed to halt Kyiv’s deepening ties with NATO.
All too often, we hear that the existence of a rules-based international order is the sine qua non of a European Union that itself is a rules-based organization composed of 27 equal member states. Yet Europe’s evident double standard in responding to the events of the past three years has laid bare its contradictory aspirations and the rudderlessness of its foreign policy.
With the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Russia’s more recent assault on Ukraine, the great powers have set a precedent that rising middle powers appear all too happy to emulate. To help reverse this trend, European governments will need to condemn violations of international law more consistently. They should also consider rallying a global coalition behind an effort to forge new and tighter international norms to regulate the use of force — a campaign that would also offer an opportunity to reset relations with Global South states that have been alienated by Europe’s response to the war in Ukraine.
Moreover, in recent years, countries such as Azerbaijan and Israel have succeeded in demonstrating that conflicts that high-minded internationalists insisted only had a political solution may have a military solution after all. It is imperative that Europe lead by example in sending a message to the world that diplomacy, rather than military coercion, represents the best way to achieve one’s political goals.
If Europe were more open to a genuine compromise peace with Russia — one that compartmentalizes disagreements but reaffirms key international norms — this would affirm quite powerfully that negotiations, rather than territorial gains, offer the most reliable means of guaranteeing one’s core security interests. Successful negotiations would also help to avert a decades-long cold war that risks going hot — and dealing the final blow to the world that the U.N. Charter envisioned in the process.
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Top image credit: Tehran Iran - November 4, 2022, a line of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps troops crossing the street (saeediex / Shutterstock.com)
In a startling turn of events in the Israel-Iran war, six hours after Iran attacked the Al Udeid Air Base— the largest U.S. combat airfield outside of the U.S., and home of the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters — President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire in the 12-day war, quickly taking effect over the subsequent 18 hours. Defying predictions that the Iranian response to the U.S. attack on three nuclear facilities could start an escalatory cycle, the ceasefire appears to be holding. For now.
While the bombing may have ceased, calls for regime change have not. President Trump has backtracked on his comments, but other influential voices have not. John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, said Tuesday that regime change must still happen, “…because this is about the regime itself… Until the regime itself is gone, there is no foundation for peace and security in the Middle East.” These sentiments are echoed by many others to include, as expected, Reza Pahlavi, exiled son of the deposed shah.
Yet for many Iranians, regime change would represent a profound betrayal of their long-held democratic aspirations through peaceful protests. It also raises several uncomfortable but necessary questions: What person or what organizations are ready to govern the day after, and is there a viable roadmap for what comes next?
The answer, according to leading Iran scholars and analysts, is bleak.
“Absolutely no one,” says Hamid Dabashi, professor of Iranian Studies at Columbia University.
“The monarchists and the Mojahedin are positively despised by the overwhelming majority of the Iranian population with no grassroots support,” he adds. “Despite a significant opposition to the ruling regime, it is still widely and passionately popular among many others.”
The vacuum left by the regime’s collapse would not be filled by democratic forces, but likely by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the military organization dedicated to regime control and survival, or violent power struggles.
And yet, external promoters of regime change — from exiled elites to Western think tanks — continue to push a fantasy of democratization-by-collapse. They fail to answer the most basic questions: Who forms the interim authority? What coalition can command legitimacy across Iran’s deeply diverse and fractured society? How is order maintained in the days and weeks following the fall of the current regime?
Without consensus on even the basic norms of democratic governance, the opposition remains paralyzed and ill-prepared to step in if the regime collapses.
As foreign intervention again becomes a tool of Western policy, more Iranians are invoking the legacy of Mohammad Mosaddegh, the democratically elected prime minister overthrown in a CIA- and MI6-backed coup in 1953. That act of foreign interference cleared the path for decades of autocratic rule, first by the Pahlavi monarchy and eventually by the Islamic Republic itself. If the lesson of Mosaddegh means anything today, it is that externally engineered regime change often backfires and ends in more repression.
Beyond the leadership vacuum lies an even more volatile threat: the fragmentation of the Iranian state. Iran is a multi-ethnic society, and the sudden collapse of central authority could trigger a surge in secessionist movements among the Kurds, Balochis and Azeris. These groups have legitimate historical grievances, but they also risk becoming pawns in a larger geopolitical struggle.
“This is quite serious,” warns Dabashi. “These groups have legitimate grievances against the central government that have been put to illegitimate ends by Israel financing and arming them. They will remain legitimate only so far as they demand and exact their rights within the Iranian polity — the instant they raise the Israeli flag, get weapons from them, and side with the invaders of their own homeland they become illegitimate bandits.”
Neighboring countries will not stand idly by. Turkey, Syria and Iraq are likely to resist any Kurdish independence efforts, while Pakistan will fiercely oppose Baloch separatism. Azerbaijan’s meddling in Iran’s Azeri-populated regions could provoke confrontation. In the wake of its victory against Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Baku’s irrendenstist rhetoric has sparked fury across Iran. On November 10, 2022, a private Azerbaijani TV channel sent a message to Iranian Azerbaijanis: “Your path is the path of justice. In this path, we stand by your side. We are with you until the end.” Images of the Khudafarin Bridge connecting the Azerbaijan border with Iran through the Araz River were shown in the background.
These dynamics raise the specter of regional war fueled by proxy militias, with Iran as the battlefield.
As noted earlier, the one force poised to fill the void is the IRGC. With a nationwide infrastructure and command over both military and economic assets, the IRGC may emerge as the de facto ruling power.
“IRGC at its core is a guerrilla operation,” Dabashi says. “One consequence of this Israeli invasion might in fact be a military coup in Iran by the IRGC rather than a democratic government.”
Thomas Warrick, former senior adviser in the U.S. State Department, concurs.
“The most likely ‘winner’ if the present government collapses would be a military dictatorship (‘election by coup’) by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which is the best-armed, and far away the richest actor in Iranian politics,” says Warrick, who also served as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy. “They would likely install a figurehead religious leader to give their rule the mantle of legitimacy. But the level of internal repression would likely increase. This is not the only possible outcome, but it is the most probable unless outside forces intervene — which is unlikely at the moment.”
That scenario would amount not to liberation, but to a change in autocrats, from clerics in robes to generals in fatigues, propping up a new Ayatollah not only dependent on the IRGC for his security but also for his position.
And the international community must be prepared for any such possibilities. There is no historical precedent, Dabashi warns, for violent regime collapse in Iran or the broader Middle East leading directly to democratization.
“You cannot bomb, destroy and slaughter people to democracy,” he says.
Nor can Iran count on popular mobilization for change. The Arab Spring uprisings in 2010 and 2011 were characterized by protests and armed rebellions, and led to the overthrow of regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Yet the 2009 Iranian Green movement prompted by allegations of election fraud against reformist Mir-Hossein Mousavi was quashed by Iranian security forces. Subsequent movements such as the 2019 Bloody November movement protesting the rise in fuel prices and the recent (and ongoing) Mahsa Amani protests have been met with more heavy-handed crackdowns and large-scale killings, to include executions, by authorities.
Iran is fertile ground for popular mobilization as a means of regime change. Yet, while the regime is unpopular, high inflation wreaks havoc among families and cultural warfare divides the theocracy and the people, such mobilization still faces a multi-layer security apparatus dedicated to regime perpetuation and political repression. Until there are visible signs of fractures in the Basij, the Iranian Army and/or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the current regime is unlikely to change.
Still, many Iranians long for change. As Massoumeh Torfeh, an Iran specialist at the London School of Economics, notes, “Regime change is a deeply misguided idea. It may be what 80 percent of Iranians desire, but without a credible opposition or a unifying leadership figure, there is no viable alternative on the horizon” — at least before the passing of the Supreme Leader, 86-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
What is needed now is a reassessment of U.S. and Israeli policies toward Iran. Bombing campaigns and regime decapitation strategies have failed time and again in the region, from Iraq to Libya to Syria. Each time, they created new vacuums filled not by representative institutions, but by violence, warlordism and foreign interference. The lessons from these misadventures are clear: the plan for the day after is far more important than the war plans themselves.
In both the U.S. and Israel, recent comments from the Israeli defense minister and President Trump seem to indicate a willingness for regime change (even while positions seem to change daily) but they have offered absolutely no evidence that their teams have made serious efforts to develop plans to address “the day after.” This is not George Santayana’s “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Or an oft stated definition of insanity as “doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result.” This is worse. Those senior government officials and influential voices who still call for regime change when an opportunity for a return to diplomacy exists are committing egregious professional malpractice.
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