Opposition parties so far not throwing Hezbollah under the bus

US Plans to marginalize Hezbollah

According to the Wall Street Journal, the Biden administration is devising a plan to bypass Hezbollah in the election of a new Lebanese president after almost two years of a presidential vacuum.

Meanwhile, the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar has claimed that Washington’s ambassador to Beirut, Lisa Johnson, has called on Lebanese political factions to prepare for a post-Hezbollah era.

“Hezbollah has become very weak after the strikes that were directed at it, targeting its leaders and killing its Secretary-General (Nasrallah), and therefore, it can no longer impose what it wants, and there is a new political phase that the country will witness soon in which the party has no place,” Johnson is quoted as telling party leaders.

U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller appeared to confirm that Washington is pursuing the goal of marginalizing Hezbollah politically.

“What we want to see come out of this situation, ultimately, is Lebanon able to break the grip that Hezbollah has had on the country—more than a grip, break the stranglehold that Hezbollah has had on the country and remove [the] Hezbollah veto over a president,” Miller told reporters earlier this month.

The Lebanese political landscape

Hezbollah and allied groups, like the Shiite “Amal” party, support the candidacy of Suleiman Franjieh, leader of the Christian “Marada” movement known for his strong ties to Hezbollah. Washington’s preferred candidate meanwhile is believed to be the Lebanese army chief, Gen. Joseph Aoun.

The major Lebanese political factions in the country break down primarily along sectarian lines.

Hezbollah and Amal, both of which represent the Shiite community, while the most prominent Sunni party is the “Future” movement led by former premier Saad Hariri. Other Christian parties “include the “Lebanese Forces,” and the “Free Patriotic Movement.” The Progressive Socialist Party is the most popular Druze faction.

Any attempt to diminish the status of Hezbollah would require the cooperation of more than one of these factions. But aside from Lebanese Forces Christian party leader and staunch Hezbollah rival Samir Geagea, there appears to be little enthusiasm for the Biden administrations plans thus far.

This was reflected in a meeting organized by Geagea under the title “In Defense of Lebanon” in which he unveiled a new roadmap that includes the election of a president who would be committed to the implementation of international resolutions, including UNSCR 1559, which, among other provisions, calls for the disarmament of the movement.

Leading figures from the traditional anti-Hezbollah camp were notably absent from this meeting, including Hariri who continues to reside in the United Arab Emirates after announcing his withdrawal from politics in early 2022. Senior officials from Hariri’s Future Movement, like former premier Fouad Siniora, also did not attend Geagea’s meeting.

This should not come as much of a surprise, however, given the tangible shifts in the Sunni-Shiite sectarian dynamics in Lebanon as a result of the Gaza war. That the Shiite Hezbollah decided to carry out cross-border operations against Israel in support of the people in Gaza and the Palestinian Hamas movement—both of which are predominantly Sunni—has earned it the support of most Lebanese Sunnis. Some of the country’s Sunni groups have even joined Hezbollah in conducting attacks against Israel. The Lebanese al-Jamaa al-Islamiya, which is a local offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, has coordinated with Hezbollah in carrying out cross-border operations.

This situation contrasts sharply with that which existed when Hezbollah dispatched fighters to support the Syrian government against an armed rebellion that was launched by predominantly Sunni groups more than a decade ago. As a result, many Lebanese Sunnis came to see Hezbollah as complicit in Sunni persecution in Syria.

But Hezbollah’s support for the Sunnis in Gaza, along with the unprecedented ferocity of the Israeli offensive against the coastal enclave has changed that perception. It now appears that prominent Lebanese Sunni politicians and factions feel they can ill afford to be seen as taking sides against Hezbollah.

Of no less significance is the Biden administration’s full-fledged support for Israel in its war efforts. With the administration throwing its full weight—whether reluctantly or not—behind the Israeli military campaign, Lebanese Sunni political elite do not want their names tied to any U.S.-led initiative to reshape Lebanese politics, least of all one which seeks to marginalize the group that has maintained steadfast support for Gaza.

The Free Patriotic Movement, which is the second largest Christian party in parliament behind the Lebanese Forces, has criticized Hezbollah’s decision to launch attacks on Israel in support of Gaza. But it has also emphasized that the election of a president must be accomplished through reaching a local Lebanese consensus and not as a result of external pressures.

Jubran Bassil, the leader of the movement has also stated that Israel’s military operations were aimed at the entire country and not just Hezbollah.

Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze community, also boycotted the meeting organized by Geagea. Instead, he is taking part in trilateral talks that also include the caretaker prime minister, Najib Miqati, and the speaker of the parliament and Hezbollah’s staunch Shiite ally, Nabih Berri, who also represents Hezbollah in those talks. The three have stressed the importance of electing a president acceptable to all parties.

The Druze leader, who once spearheaded a campaign against Hezbollah, has even gone as far as declaring his openness to supporting Franjieh, Hezbollah’s preferred candidate for the presidency.

Importantly, Jumblatt, who has strongly criticized the Western stance in the current conflict while coming out strongly in support of Hezbollah, is known as Lebanon’s political kingmaker representing a crucial non-aligned bloc in parliament. Given that Lebanon’s president is elected by the parliament, the votes of this bloc will likely be crucial in electing a new president.

The Israeli hand

There are other reasons that make enlisting in an anti-Hezbollah initiative an undesirable option for the majority of Lebanon’s political elite more broadly.

Chief among these is that U.S. objectives appear to align very closely with the narrative coming out of Israel. “Free your country [from Hezbollah] so that this war can end,” declared Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in remarks addressed to the Lebanese people after the assassination of Nasrallah.

With Israel designated as an enemy by the Lebanese state and the escalation of its bombing of the country, including central Beirut, few would want to be associated with any effort that can be so clearly linked with Israeli objectives.

Meanwhile, Israel’s conduct of its war against Hezbollah, including the killing of Lebanese Army soldiers, serves only to reinforce the notion of Israel as an enemy of the Lebanese state. With the Lebanese military remaining the only major institution respected by all parties in the country, such attacks contradict the notion that Israel is only at war with Hezbollah.

For that matter, they also undermine U.S. interests, given that Lebanon’s armed forces are one of Washington’s closest allies in the region.