U.S. officials are scrambling to determine how two leaked, highly U.S. classified documents conveying potential Israeli plans to attack Iran got on the Telegram app. According to the New York Times, the documents were prepared “in recent days” by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which analyzes information and images collected by U.S. spy satellites.
There are several theories regarding these leaked reports.
The first theory reads that the Iranians hacked the U.S. intelligence services and leaked the document as part of their psy-ops against Israel. Given previous Iranian hacks, it is not outside the realm of possibilities that they have the capacity to hack the United States.
Iranians also have a clear motivation, though it also suggests that they may not have the capacity to defend against the planned Israeli attack — even with the forewarning that the hack provides — and instead opted to leak it to forestall Israel’s plans.
Two, an actor within the U.S. government may have leaked it, but the investigation of the U.S. government itself appears to have concluded otherwise. They have moved on to investigating outside actors.
Three, the Biden administration may have orchestrated the leak itself in order to delay the Israeli attack. Biden clearly lacks the courage to say no to Israel, so instead, he sneaks out intelligence with the aim of delaying Israel’s plans at least until after the U.S. elections, at which point he may find the semblance of a spine.
Four, the Israelis may have leaked this themselves with the aim of diverting Iran’s attention by getting them to look for an attack in all the wrong places.
Five, finally, since the U.S. investigation is looking at outside actors, the question is if a close American ally — a Five Eyes state (FVEY) or a NATO ally with access to FVEY intelligence — leaked it. If so, it would suggest that close U.S. allies are so frustrated with Biden’s refusal to stop Netanyahu from starting the largest war in the Middle East since World War II that they are taking matters into their own hands to sabotage Netanyahu’s escalation plan.
A Western diplomat recently told me that the only way to stop the war is to have the players who forced President Biden off the Democratic ticket in July repeat their feat by forcing Biden to stop Netanyahu.
All of this while Washington continues to nurture the mythology that its “leadership” is what holds the world together.
Top Photo: Lars Klingbeil (l-r, SPD), Federal Minister of Finance, Vice-Chancellor and SPD Federal Chairman, and Bärbel Bas (SPD), Federal Minister of Labor and Social Affairs and SPD Party Chairwoman, bid farewell to the members of the previous Federal Cabinet Olaf Scholz (SPD), former Federal Chancellor, Nancy Faeser, Saskia Esken, SPD Federal Chairwoman, Karl Lauterbach, Svenja Schulze and Hubertus Heil at the SPD Federal Party Conference. At the party conference, the SPD intends to elect a new executive committee and initiate a program process. Kay Nietfeld/dpa via Reuters Connect
Surfacing a long-dormant intra-party conflict, the Friedenskreise (peace circles) within the Social Democratic Party of Germany has published a “Manifesto on Securing Peace in Europe” in a stark challenge to the rearmament line taken by the SPD leaders governing in coalition with the conservative CDU-CSU under Chancellor Friedrich Merz.
Although the Manifesto clearly does not have broad support in the SPD, the party’s leader, Deputy Chancellor and Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil, won only 64% support from the June 28-29 party conference for his performance so far, a much weaker endorsement than anticipated. The views of the party’s peace camp may be part of the explanation.
Why it matters
The release of the Manifesto poses a challenge to the party’s leadership that could weaken the governing coalition. Polls indicate that Germany’s Social Democratic Party commands only about 15% of public support. It remains, however, indispensable to the parliamentary majority government headed by Friedrich Merz and the CDU-CSU parties (Christian Democratic Union of Germany and Christian Social Union in Bavaria). The new leadership of SPD wants to turn the page on the Olaf Scholz era and sees its role in the Merz government as an opportunity to rebuild its electoral fortunes after its miserable 16% showing in the February elections.
To date, accommodation of CDU-CSU on a range of issues has not helped SPD’s standing with voters.
Unfortunately for Merz, his own hold on power requires the SPD not to lose much more ground. After the resounding defeat of SPD Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the much younger Klingbeil rose to party leadership and, as Deputy Chancellor and Finance Minister, supports Merz’s stance on Ukraine and the defense buildup. Important backing comes from the SPD Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.
A heretofore timid and cowed minority of SPD politicians hold onto the preference, deeply embedded in the strategic culture of post-World War II Germany, for conciliation over confrontation in resolving international crises. Unease about the prevailing stance on Ukraine may be part of the weak voter support for the SPD. Merz has played up the idea of a Russian threat to NATO as early as 2029 if Ukraine is defeated, and has built considerable public support for rearmament based on these forecasts.
The unyielding stance on the war in Ukraine draws together the parliamentary majority held by CDU-CSU and SPD, as well as the Greens, while the parliamentary opposition consists of the AfD and the Linke (left) party, both of which question continued support for Ukraine absent any diplomatic initiative. The German policy on Ukraine appears to hinge on the hope that a prolonged conflict will ultimately compel Russia to retreat from its war aims and accept a compromise acceptable to Ukraine’s leadership.
This stance, framed in moralistic and principled terms equating compromise with dishonorable appeasement, is highly resistant to any revision. The insistence on staying the course seems to be rooted also in optimism that a successor to President Trump will return the U.S. to its former role as guarantor of European security and reliable foe of Russian ambitions.
The Manifesto
The Manifesto marks a revival of the traditional foreign policy course set by Willy Brandt beginning in the late 1960s, credited in the minds of many SPD members and other Germans with producing the peaceful dissolution of the USSR and the reunification of Germany.
The two leaders of the peace camp who produced the Manifesto are Rolf Mützenich, leader of the party’s Bundestag faction until February, and Ralf Stegner, a member of the SPD Executive Committee until recently. The 100 signatories of the Manifesto include a former party chairman, several former ministers, and historian Peter Brandt, son of the former Chancellor.
The release of the Manifesto marks a departure for these signatories, most of whom supported Scholz’s Zeitenwende of 2022, which boosted aid to Ukraine and defense outlays more generally.
The authors charge that the party and the coalition are seeking peace and security by preparing for war rather than, as the authors advocate, pursuing the same aims along with, rather than against, Russia. They concede that Germany should build up its defense readiness (Verteidungsfähigkeit), but they invoke the Helsinki Final Act concept of collective security, which they say produced valuable arms control agreements and enabled the reunification of Germany.
They also call for de-escalation and mutual confidence building to accompany a carefully calibrated rearmament framed solely in a defensive mode and for supporting German and European industrial development.
The signers also endorse a European diplomatic strategy to end the war in Ukraine and oppose the stationing of U.S. medium-range missiles in Germany.
Reception of this action by SPD mainstream has been cold. The SPD defense minister, Boris Pistorius, by far the most popular SPD politician, accused the signatories of failing to face reality and exploiting the public’s desire for peace.
The disappointing showing for Klingbeil at the party conference may reflect misgivings within the party about his unreserved support for what many see as excessive bellicosity and fear-mongering on the part of Merz. The timing of the peace faction’s Manifesto release suggests they hoped to open a breach in the party ranks.
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Top photo credit: The Tucker Carlson show screengrab (TCN)
Over the Independence Day holiday, Tucker Carlson announced that he had conducted an interview with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.
Dan Crenshaw immediately attacked him. “Nothing screams July 4th like platforming the leader of a terror state that labels us ‘The Great Satan,” the hawkish Republican congressman shared on X. Fellow rightwing hawks and frequent Carlson critics, Senator Ted Cruz and radio host Mark Levin, piled on, admonishing Carlson for daring to do this.
But why wouldn’t an American political pundit or stateside journalist of any kind do this?
That this is “wrong” would have been news to the New York Times when they interviewed the leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in 1979. The MacNeil/Lehrer report also interviewed Khomeini. A number of mainstream American outlets interviewed him. These particular interviews were on the eve of the U.S. hostage crisis that began in early November of 1979. CBS News’ Mike Wallace interviewed Khomeini two weeks after the hostage crisis began. Time magazine also interviewed him during the crisis and declared Khomeini 1980’s "Man of the Year."
That label was not an endorsement of Khomeini. Time called Adolf Hitler “Man of the Year” in 1938. Like with Khomeini, that was not an endorsement of the German dictator. It was recognition of his impact on the world stage at that time. This is why American journalists also interviewed Hitler.
Journalism 101 requires covering and talking to the major players in any given conflict.
During the Obama administration, controversial Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was interviewed by the American press on a regular basis. American reporters had interviewed al-Qaeda terrorist leader and eventual 9/11 mastermind Osama Bin Laden. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was interviewed by CBS News maven Dan Rather one month before the 2003 U.S. invasion. Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was interviewed a number of times throughout many American administrations.
Outside the Middle East, entertainment host Ed Sullivan interviewed Cuba’s Fidel Castro on his popular nighttime variety series in 1959. ABC News’ Barbara Walters interviewed him in 1977. The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour interviewed Castro in 1985. In fact, Cigar Aficionado interviewed the brutal dictator in 1994, in which publisher Marvin Shanken’s first question was “How important are cigars to Cuba?”
That interview might actually sound like “platforming” someone who probably shouldn’t be. That said, the magazine republished the interview in the summer of last year to celebrate its 30th anniversary.
Last June, Carlson interviewed Russian President Vladimir Putin, which was also controversial. Less controversial were the times Barbara Walters interviewed Putin, NBC News interviewed him, CBS News interviewed him, the New York Times interviewed him, and all the American outlets who interviewed different Russian presidents going back to the earliest days of the Cold War.
Why would so many American journalists “platform” so many adversaries of the United States?
Because even framing the question that way is ridiculous. Carlson’s explanation for why he recently interviewed Iran’s president is similar to what any journalist of any generation might say to critics who could question their decision to interview international bad actors.
“We know we’ll be criticized for doing this interview,” Carlson explained in a short video clip to address any such questions, prior to releasing his actual interview. “Why did we do it anyway? Well, we did it because we were just at war with Iran 10 days ago, and maybe again.”
That part is important. It’s as if hawkish figures, like Crenshaw, Cruz, and Levin, who seek war, find it treasonous to let Americans hear all the sides involved. Wars in which American sons and daughters potentially could be asked to risk their lives for.
It’s easier to get to war if fewer questions are asked and only one side can exclusively control the narrative.
Carlson continued, “And so, our view, which has remained consistent over time, is that American citizens have the constitutional right and the God-given right to all the information they can gather about matters that affect them.”
One could imagine Barbara Walters giving a similar answer if challenged for interviewing Castro or Putin. Different words, perhaps, but the same, simple journalistic reasoning.
In the interview, Carlson asks Pezeshkian, among other things, about his country’s seriousness in continuing nuclear negotiations and also why his countrymen chant slogans like ‘Death to America’ and call the U.S. ‘The Great Satan,’ and the Iranian president gives his answers.
Is he serious? Is he lying? Is this a man that can be believed?
That’s not the point. He’s a politician. The same questions might also apply to any American politician. The point is that Americans hear him. “The purpose of the interview was to add to the corpus of knowledge from which Americans can derive their own opinion,” Carlson said. “Learn everything you can, and then you decide.”
Tucker Carlson interviewing Iran’s president isn’t a scandal. It’s basic journalism. More scandalous is how many journalists today no longer feel the need to do it.
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Top photo credit: Donald Trump (White House photo) and Vladimir Putin (Office of the Russian Federation President)
To a considerable degree, President Donald Trump won the presidency in 2024 because voters embraced his message of keeping America out of protracted conflicts and his promise to end the war in Ukraine.
The administration has made substantial operational headway, particularly in reopening stable channels for dialogue with Russia, but it has proven difficult to arrive at a framework for a negotiated settlement that enjoys buy-in from all the stakeholders — Ukraine, Russia, and Europe.
A sharp diversion of American resources and attention to the Middle-East threatens to make the goal of facilitating a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine more evasive still.
The Israel-Iran war stimulated an effusion of speculation, most of it unfounded, around Russia’s supposed interests in aiding its “ally” Iran. In point of fact, there is no tangible sense in which Russia is militarily allied to Iran. One has merely to read the text of the Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed in January 2025, to discover that the parties’ only concrete security obligation toward one another if either one comes under attack is to “not provide any military or other assistance to the aggressor which would contribute to the continued aggression.”
Moscow's relationship with Tehran, though it is more than simply friendly and does reach quite far in the fields of economic and political cooperation, is part of a larger portfolio of Middle-Eastern interests that includes maintaining constructive relations with Israel and the Arab states. The idea that Russia had the slightest intention of allowing itself to be drawn into a military confrontation with Israel over Iran was based purely on the ideological framing, popular among certain subsets of the transatlantic foreign policy community but with little connection to reality, that Moscow is duty-bound to support Tehran by dint of shared autocratic affiliation.
No less wrongheaded is the notion that U.S. strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities sent a “message” to Russia about American resolve, as it’s unclear what that message was supposed to be.
When it comes to potential aggression against NATO countries, there is no indication that the Kremlin doubted or wanted to test the deterrent credibility of American commitment to the alliance’s Article 5 collective defense provisions prior to the American bombing runs. On the issue of Ukraine, the U.S. has repeatedly demonstrated even under a previous administration which was vastly more invested in Kyiv’s victory that it will not fight Russia over Ukraine. It is neither credible nor advisable, considering White House officials’ consistent skepticism of the idea that core U.S. interests are on the line in Ukraine and their desire to deescalate tensions with Russia, to maintain any degree of strategic ambiguity on the prospect of entering direct hostilities with Russia.
Moreover,, the Iranian strikes were conducted in the context of American and Israeli escalation dominance, which made it possible for the U.S. to seize the diplomatic initiative and steer the conflict to its termination with a ceasefire between Israel and Iran after twelve days.
No such conditions exist between Russia and Ukraine, where it is Moscow that maintains the battlefield initiative and holds the capacity to intensify or de-escalate the war as it sees fit.
Yet the linkage between Russia and Iran is significant in other ways. One can easily see how Kremlin officials would fall upon the belief that the White House knew about Israel’s decision to attack Iran and used previous rounds of nuclear talks with Tehran to lull Iranian leadership into a false sense of security. This perception, if left unaddressed, can run a red pen through the work the administration has done to build bilateral trust with Russia and present itself as a good faith negotiator.
The best way to dispel this lingering sense of unease is to make an effort to reengage Iran in substantive negotiations. To the extent that Russia shares and is in a position to contribute to the U.S. goal of achieving a peaceful framework for an Iran without nuclear weapons, the administration should consider taking Putin up on his offer to support the Iran talks.
Russia is already deeply engaged in the region, reportedly including through secret negotiations with Israel over Iran and Syria. Leveraging the Moscow-Tehran-Jerusalem triangle as a vector for reviving the Iran nuclear talks not only advances American interests in the Middle-East but, insofar it establishes larger U.S.-Russia linkages, can generate positive diplomatic momentum toward a negotiated settlement over Ukraine.
The Iran-Israel war has also accentuated the hard limits of U.S. ability to sustain, whether directly or indirectly, multiple high-intensity conflicts.
Previously apportioned U.S. aid packages to Ukraine were slated to run their course by the end of summer. The Pentagon’s reported decision to terminate them prematurely evinces the stark tradeoffs, all too often lost on neoconservative observers, that the U.S. faces in funding foreign war efforts across the world while maintaining its own domestic stockpiles and defense posture.
As Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, keenly understands, there is not a bottomless reserve of interceptors and other munitions to sustain an attrition war that Ukraine is slowly losing in a theatre that is not vital to core U.S. security interests. Yet resource constraints, though no doubt real and deeply felt by this administration, are only one piece of this puzzle.
Administration officials repeatedly warned that the U.S. would “walk away” unless progress is made toward a negotiated settlement between Russia and Ukraine. It was always the case that the likeliest, most readily available path to walking away runs not through explosive proclamations of the kind that followed the disastrous February Oval Office confrontation between President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, but rather through a slow, deliberate, and initially subtle diversion of resources and attention away from Ukraine that becomes more pronounced as its cumulative effects compound over time.
The U.S. effort to help Ukraine since 2022, with all its multifarious security, diplomatic, and economic prongs, is the most ambitious aid program ever to be undertaken by a non-belligerent on behalf of a third country to which it has no formal commitments. Observers presciently warned that the all hands on deck strategy taken by the Biden administration was unsustainable given the challenges faced by the U.S. in other parts of the world, but anything less than singleminded focus on Ukraine was always bound to lead to the unraveling of the West’s maximum-pressure program against Russia and, with it, Kyiv’s ability to prosecute the war.
The aid decision is yet the latest reminder, as if any more were needed, that time is not on Ukraine’s side. Ukrainian and European efforts to get the White House to recommit to the Biden-era “as long as it takes” approach to this war will only expedite the administration’s divestment from it.
Still, American engagement in the peace process remains critical for both Ukraine and broader challenges surrounding European security. Kyiv and its European partners need, now more than ever, to repair to a viable set of initial war termination proposals that can secure U.S. buy-in and serve as a point of departure for getting U.S.-brokered peace talks between Russia and Ukraine back on track.
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