U.S. officials are scrambling to determine how two leaked, highly U.S. classified documents conveying potential Israeli plans to attack Iran got on the Telegram app. According to the New York Times, the documents were prepared “in recent days” by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which analyzes information and images collected by U.S. spy satellites.
There are several theories regarding these leaked reports.
The first theory reads that the Iranians hacked the U.S. intelligence services and leaked the document as part of their psy-ops against Israel. Given previous Iranian hacks, it is not outside the realm of possibilities that they have the capacity to hack the United States.
Iranians also have a clear motivation, though it also suggests that they may not have the capacity to defend against the planned Israeli attack — even with the forewarning that the hack provides — and instead opted to leak it to forestall Israel’s plans.
Two, an actor within the U.S. government may have leaked it, but the investigation of the U.S. government itself appears to have concluded otherwise. They have moved on to investigating outside actors.
Three, the Biden administration may have orchestrated the leak itself in order to delay the Israeli attack. Biden clearly lacks the courage to say no to Israel, so instead, he sneaks out intelligence with the aim of delaying Israel’s plans at least until after the U.S. elections, at which point he may find the semblance of a spine.
Four, the Israelis may have leaked this themselves with the aim of diverting Iran’s attention by getting them to look for an attack in all the wrong places.
Five, finally, since the U.S. investigation is looking at outside actors, the question is if a close American ally — a Five Eyes state (FVEY) or a NATO ally with access to FVEY intelligence — leaked it. If so, it would suggest that close U.S. allies are so frustrated with Biden’s refusal to stop Netanyahu from starting the largest war in the Middle East since World War II that they are taking matters into their own hands to sabotage Netanyahu’s escalation plan.
A Western diplomat recently told me that the only way to stop the war is to have the players who forced President Biden off the Democratic ticket in July repeat their feat by forcing Biden to stop Netanyahu.
All of this while Washington continues to nurture the mythology that its “leadership” is what holds the world together.
Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recently unveiled his “victory plan,” which is meant to give Western leaders a strategy for how Ukraine can defeat Russia and defend against Moscow moving forward.
While U.S. officials were reportedly “unimpressed” with the proposal when Zelenskyy presented it to the Biden administration last month, the Ukrainian president presented details publicly for the first time on Thursday at an EU summit in Brussels. At the top of Zelenskyy’s plan is an unconditional invitation to join NATO.
“It is important for us that we are strengthened, and the first step should be an invitation,” Zelenskyy said. Zelenskyy’s plan also calls for Western assistance to strengthen Ukrainian defenses, including the allowance for Ukraine to use Western-supplied long-range missiles deep into Russian territory. The missile-use request is not new, and the United States and United Kingdom have been previously reluctant to provide this permission.
Zelenskyy is also asking the EU and the U.S. to protect Ukraine’s natural resources and to position Ukrainian troops in Europe, with the goal of replacing the presence of some U.S. troops on the continent, which have been there since the end of World War II.
Zelenskyy didn’t offer much by way of pathways to peace or ceasefire and even said the plan could go into place without Russian cooperation at all. And it has so far had a lukewarm reception from Western leadership. “We are not at the point right now where the alliance is talking about issuing an invitation in the short term,” said U.S. Ambassador to NATO Jullianne Smith, referring to formally inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. She added however that, “as always, we will continue conversations with our friends in Ukraine to talk to them about ways in which they can continue to move closer to this Alliance.” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte did not outright accept the plan either, saying that he would welcome the day that Ukraine joins the alliance, but that “doesn’t mean that I here can say I support the whole plan.”
Meanwhile, President Biden took what’s been billed as a “farewell trip” to Berlin on Thursday to make up, in part, for the Ramstein meeting that was canceled due to last week’s hurricane in Florida. Despite the meeting’s cancellation, Biden still pledged an additional $425 million in defense aid to Kyiv as support for a continued war is shifting both among Western leaders, and members of the Ukrainian military and public.
“Biden’s trip to Germany represents a last-ditch effort to corral flagging trans-Atlantic support for Ukraine,” said Mark Episkopos, Eurasia research fellow at the Quincy Institute. “But there is every indication that European partners will continue slowly peeling away in the absence of a viable strategy, articulated and pursued by the White House, for bringing the war to a close on the best possible terms for Ukraine and the West.”
Other Ukraine war news this week:
Nearly half of the land taken by Ukraine in the Kursk region of Russia has been retaken, according to The Telegraph. Two months ago Ukraine captured the lightly guarded territory just over the border and Putin has vowed to retake all of it.
Reuters is reporting that Zelenskyy has called on his Western allies to further sanction North Korea following reports of Pyongyang’s direct involvement in the war. According to Ukrainian intelligence, the Kremlin is preparing to receive 10,000 soldiers from North Korea, lining up with earlier reports of North Korea assisting Moscow both with soldiers and advisers, as well as with weapons.
Levadne, in the southern Zaporizhzhya region of Ukraine, has been taken by Russian troops. The Associated Pressreports that the city was retaken on Monday, which adds to the increasing number of cities which Russia has taken or retaken in recent months.
State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller was asked about reports that North Korean troops were assisting Russia with its war against Ukraine. Miller said that if the reports were true, “it would also indicate a new level of desperation by Russia, as it continues to suffer significant casualties on the battlefield.”
When asked about a senior Russian official’s claim that the U.S. would face a “head-on collision with a nuclear power” if American weapons are used deep into Russian territory, Miller said, “I think it’s inappropriate for Russia to continue to make these kinds of statements, as we’ve said for some time.”
Asked about Zelensky’s victory plan, Miller said, “I’m not going to get into the various details other than to say that we continue to engage with the government of Ukraine about that plan.”
Miller also said he was confident France and Germany would continue military support for Ukraine when asked about reports that they would scale down.
When asked again about the cooperation between Russia and North Korea, he said that the administration “continues to have great concerns about the growing security relationship between Russia and North Korea.”
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Top photo credit: The Terracotta Army Sculpture in XIAN, CHINA (Shutterstock)
In recent years, discussions about China’s grand strategy have dominated international security journals, think tanks, and policy discussions across the globe. As China continues its meteoric rise, scholars and policymakers have been asking: Is China pursuing a strategy of global primacy, or is it more focused on balancing the international system?
These questions reflect not only concerns about China’s growing power but also its future trajectory. Will China remain an ambitious yet cautious player in world affairs, or will it pursue outright dominance, fundamentally reshaping global governance?
China’s grand strategy is undoubtedly shaped by history, geography, systemic pressures, and its relative power, often quantified as “comprehensive national power” or CNP. To understand whether China is moving toward a strategy of primacy or balancing, we must explore these factors through a classical realist lens that accounts for both systemic constraints and domestic considerations.
The evolving nature of China's strategy can be framed in several key phases: survival (Mao and Deng), rejuvenation (Deng and Jiang), maximization (Hu and Xi), and balance (potentially in the future).
Historical Foundations of China’s Strategy
China’s grand strategy has always been closely tied to its historical circumstances and strategic culture.
Under Mao Zedong, China's strategy was one of survival. Mao's focus was on consolidating internal power, fending off external threats, and establishing China as a sovereign state unimpeded by external forces. Deng Xiaoping, who led China after Mao, moved toward a strategy of rejuvenation, prioritizing economic modernization while maintaining a low profile in global affairs. Deng’s famous dictum to “hide your strength, bide your time” encapsulated this approach.
The strategic environment of the Cold War and China’s relatively weak international position necessitated caution.
However, the end of the Cold War and China’s economic boom shifted the equation. Under Jiang Zemin, and later Hu Jintao, China’s strategy became more assertive, moving from rejuvenation toward maximization. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the modernization of its military, and its increasingly proactive diplomacy signaled this shift. Hu's “Peaceful Rise” narrative tried to balance China’s growing power with reassurances to the international community.
Nevertheless, China’s material capabilities had grown significantly, and its foreign policy became more confident and wide-ranging.
Xi Jinping and the China Dream: A Strategy of Maximization?
Xi Jinping’s era has ushered in an even more ambitious phase of China’s grand strategy. Xi’s articulation of the “China Dream” embodies a vision of national rejuvenation that encompasses not just economic strength but also global leadership. Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), growing military assertiveness in the South China Sea, and his efforts to reform global institutions to better reflect China’s interests signal a strategy of maximization.
This strategy does not suggest outright global hegemony, but it points toward an effort to maximize China’s influence within a multipolar international system. Xi’s China is no longer content with simply rising peacefully; it seeks to actively shape the global order in its favor.
Avery Goldstein, in his 2020 analysis “China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance,” highlights three core elements of Xi’s strategy. China reassures neighbors of its peaceful intentions, seeks to reform global governance structures (e.g., the United Nations, IMF, and World Bank), and resists efforts by other powers — especially the United States — to constrain its rise. This multifaceted approach reflects a delicate balancing act between maximizing China's power and avoiding direct confrontation with established powers, particularly the U.S.
Balancing: A New Strategy?
While Xi’s strategy seems focused on maximization, there is growing speculation that China may eventually shift toward a more explicit strategy of balancing. In international relations theory, balancing refers to efforts by a state to prevent any one power from becoming dominant, either by building up its own power (internal balancing) or by aligning with other states (external balancing).
China’s current strategy, though ambitious, does not appear to seek global hegemony in the way that the United States did after World War II. Instead, China’s actions may suggest a form of balancing. For instance, China has been careful to forge closer ties with Russia, establish regional economic institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and create a vast network of partnerships through the BRI.
These actions can be seen as a form of offshore balancing, where China strengthens its regional influence while preventing the U.S. from becoming too dominant in the Asia-Pacific.
As China faces headwinds — an aging population, slowing economic growth, environmental challenges, and potential internal political unrest — it may find that a strategy of balancing is more sustainable than one of outright maximization. Indeed, there is evidence that China’s grand strategy has always adapted to the state of its economy and external environment.
As China’s rise peaks and the limitations of its domestic growth model become clearer, its strategy will likely shift once again, this time toward balancing the competing pressures of maintaining economic growth, preserving political stability, and navigating an increasingly hostile international environment.
Is China’s Grand Strategy in Flux?
At present, China’s grand strategy appears to be in a period of strategic flux. On one hand, Xi’s China has become more assertive, seeking to maximize its influence in various spheres. On the other hand, China is acutely aware of the systemic pressures it faces, especially the strategic competition with the United States. This competition could push China toward a more defensive or balancing strategy in the future.
Elbridge Colby’s notion of the “best strategy” may offer insights into China’s next steps. Colby, a prominent advocate of realist balancing within U.S. strategy circles, argues that states must often choose strategies that best align with their material capabilities and the geopolitical environment. Applying this framework to China, one could argue that Beijing’s best strategy in the coming decades might be one of offshore balancing with Chinese characteristics — a strategy that seeks to maintain a stable regional environment while avoiding overextension and direct confrontation with the U.S.
As China faces both internal and external challenges, it may indeed settle into a strategy of balancing, recognizing that it has peaked and must now manage its power carefully. Some scholars, such as Joshua Shifrinson, have suggested that China’s grand strategy has always been more about balancing than achieving outright primacy, especially given the constraints posed by U.S. dominance and China’s economic vulnerabilities.
A Future of Balance
The debate over China’s grand strategy remains open, with competing visions of its future direction. While Xi’s strategy appears focused on maximization, systemic pressures, economic realities, and domestic challenges may force a shift toward balancing in the near future. Whether this is a de facto strategy or a deliberate shift will depend on how China navigates its ongoing rise and the international community’s response to it.
As China continues to rise, debates akin to those that took place in the U.S. in the 1940s may emerge within China’s strategic circles. Just as the U.S. grappled with the question of whether to pursue primacy or balance after World War II, China’s leaders may soon face a similar dilemma. For now, the signs point toward an evolving grand strategy — one that may well transition into a new phase of balancing as China reaches the limits of its rise.
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Top image credit: Sahra Wagenknecht, top candidate of Germany's Buendnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), Katja Wolf, candidate and co-leader of BSW Thuringia, and Steffen Quasebarth, candidate of BSW, attend an election campaign rally for the Thuringia state elections in Eisenach, Germany, August 19, 2024. REUTERS/Karina Hessland
A prolonged war in Ukraine may impede what is necessary for the European Union to build — over some years to come — a conventional deterrent capable of coping with a much harsher and more volatile threat environment.
Achieving greater European strategic autonomy will be difficult so long as the conflict in Ukraine rages for a number of reasons —including domestic political polarization, weak economies, and constrained public finances.
Popular opinion appears to be shifting. As the war approaches its third year, rising shares of populations across Europe have voted for parties opposed to the war and calling for a negotiated settlement. A July 24 update to European public opinion on the war in Ukraine found that most respondents either anticipated or favored a negotiated settlement to end the war.
Political turbulence
Parties of the populist-nationalist right (Alternative für Deutschland in Germany and Rassemblement National in France) and the populist-nationalist left (Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance in Germany and La France Insoumise in France) owe their electoral success in part to their opposition to support for Ukraine as well as to voters’ unhappiness with the sluggish economies of the Eurozone.
Economics Minister Robert Habeck’s (Greens) recent forecast for the German economy in 2024 is a 0.2% contraction, rather than the tepid growth of 0.3% previously forecast.
Reflecting the popular mood in their regions. leaders in Saxony and Brandenburg, Michael Kretschmer (CDU) and Dietmar Woidke (SPD), joined by Mario Voigt, CDU leader in Thuringia, published a call on October 4 for Germany to lead an effort toward a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine war. A peace demonstration in Berlin on October 3, German Unity Day, was led by Sahra Wagenknecht, but also attracted some participation from the SPD’s pro-peace faction.
A just-published Quincy Brief “The Risks to Germany and Europe of a Prolonged War in Ukraine” makes the case that an open-ended commitment to arm and finance Ukraine risks exacerbating the already daunting challenge to Europe’s own defense modernization, given fiscal constraints and high public debt in many EU countries.
Moreover, Thomas Graham, distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former senior diplomat, has advanced the case that European strategic autonomy is necessary and desirable from the standpoint of U.S. interests, and that one of the preconditions for early progress toward this aim is the stabilization of Ukraine.
He further argued that a settlement in Ukraine could, in time, open the way to stabilizing diplomatic measures such as arms control between the U.S.-Europe and Russia, including a revamped Conventional Forces in Europe framework.
The inconclusive war and mounting danger of uncontrolled escalation account, in part, for the turbulent politics across Europe affecting, among others, France and Germany, the traditional engines of European integration. The disabling of the Franco-German tandem weakens the EU’s potential to mount a coherent foreign and security policy, and the economic constraints are very real.
Economic turbulence
The recently published report on the EU economy by Mario Draghi, former chairman of the European Central Bank and Italian prime minister, is a detailed diagnosis and set of recommendations for unlocking growth potential in Europe. The report finds that the most glaring and significant indication of Europe’s sluggish growth and loss of competitiveness is a large gap in growth in Europe’s labor productivity compared to that of the U.S. since the year 2000.
Draghi attributes much of this productivity gap to Europe’s having “missed out on the digital revolution led by the internet and the productivity gains it brought.” To achieve the report’s primary aims — digitizing and decarbonizing the economy and increasing its defense capability — investment as a share of Europe’s GDP would have to rise by 5 percentage points to levels not seen since the 1960s and 1970s.
In defense industrial matters, the report cites the problem of fragmentation and duplication of effort among Europe’s member countries, and calls for Europe-wide coordination and integration of defense investments. By comparison to the United States, European defense spending has a wholly inadequate emphasis on technological innovation and R&D.
Since his appointment in 2019, the main protagonist for European ambitions to reshape defense industrial investment has been Thierry Breton, Commissioner for the Internal Market, a former French Minister of Economy and corporate CEO. A high-visibility turf battle between Breton and Commission president Ursula von der Leyen resulted in the latter’s angry resignation on September 16.
The critically important defense dossier is now the responsibility of Europe’s first Defense Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister and member of the European Parliament. He will face the challenge of finding resources to match the EU’s ambition to play a leading role in defense industrial modernization and will likely favor allowing U.S. and UK firms to compete in EU weapons and equipment procurement, something Breton would have resisted.
Both Kubilius and the new Commissioner for EU foreign policy, former Estonian prime minister Kaja Kallas, will likely insist on tying Europe’s defense industrial investment to meeting Ukraine’s needs in a prolonged war, rather than shifting the emphasis to Europe’s own territorial defense.
Breton has deplored what he sees as France’s having sacrificed its own influence relative to that of Germany within the Commission. The potential of the Franco-German tandem seems to be at a very low ebb, and no other group of members shows the potential to overcome the divisions within the European Union.
Draghi’s compelling diagnosis and recommendations seem unlikely to bring decisive and coordinated action to restore Europe’s competitiveness. While it would not instantly resolve the besetting problems of Europe, an early settlement of the Ukraine crisis is surely one of the crucial preconditions for progress toward European strategic autonomy.
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