Following immense pressure from Israel and its most fervent supporters, the Biden administration announced recently that it will keep giving weapons to five Israeli units that had committed “gross violations of human rights,” including a notorious battalion whose soldiers killed an elderly Palestinian-American man in the West Bank in 2022.
The decision drew sharp backlash from legal analysts and former officials, who noted that the State Department’s own experts had found the units in violation of the “Leahy law,” a 1997 statute that is supposed to stop foreign militaries from using U.S. weapons in war crimes.
In a sense, the move was standard. Israel has long been able to dodge U.S. laws surrounding arms transfers, and it even gets a special process for Leahy vetting that leaves more room for political interference, according to a former State Department official.
Indeed, the Biden administration has shown little public interest in holding Israel accountable for alleged war crimes even as Israel begins its assault on Rafah, where more than 1 million Palestinians have sought shelter amid the war. While the White House has reportedly held up a pair of weapons transfers in recent days, it’s carefully avoided giving a reason for the move, leaving open the possibility that the delay was caused by logistical problems.
Tim Rieser brings a unique perspective to these issues. During a long tenure as an aide to former Sen. Patrick Leahy, Rieser drafted the law that Israeli units now stand accused of violating. Today, he’s pushing for real enforcement of U.S. policy on weapons transfers as a senior adviser to Sen. Peter Welch (D-Vt.).
In an email exchange, RS asked Rieser about whether the Leahy law has ever really been applied to Israel and why policymakers should care. The following conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.
RS: You played a major role in the drafting of the Leahy law. From what you understand, is the Biden administration applying the law to Israel as it was originally intended?
Rieser: No, and Sen. Leahy has said the same. In its long history, the Leahy law has never been applied to Israel. Yet the administration insists it’s being applied consistently worldwide. If that were true, there would have been any number of instances when the law was applied to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
A good example, and there are many, was the fatal shooting of journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, after which Secretary Blinken called for a credible, thorough investigation and that those responsible be held accountable. None of that happened, and no action was taken by the United States under the Leahy law. The reality is that the law is applied differently with respect to Israel in multiple ways, with the result that it has never been applied to deny U.S. assistance to any IDF unit. As to why, I think it is due to a lack of political will.
RS: Has the Biden administration followed the intended process for evaluating violations by Israel? Is Israel capable of holding its own units accountable for violations that may occur?
Rieser: Israel, like any country, can hold accountable members of its security forces who commit gross violations of human rights, which are crimes everywhere. It’s a question of political will and, in some countries, judicial capacity. In four IDF cases, the State Department determined that the individuals responsible for gross violations were appropriately punished. But two of those cases involved fatal shootings of unarmed Palestinians for which the shooters served nine and zero months in prison, respectively.
In the fifth case, the Secretary determined the unit committed a gross violation after a Palestinian-American was killed more than two years ago. But instead of applying the Leahy law, the State Department has been discussing remediation of the unit with the Israeli government. Remediation is a key goal of the Leahy law, but U.S. assistance to that unit should have been cut off a long time ago.
RS: Why should policymakers care about applying the law uniformly, particularly when it comes to close U.S. partners?
Rieser: The law doesn’t apply one standard to some countries and a different standard to others. No country is above the law. If a government doesn’t want to comply with the law, they shouldn’t receive U.S. assistance. But beyond that, the U.S. wants partners that respect human rights and abide by the laws of war, not partners that commit crimes with impunity.
RS: What pathways are there to legislate meaningful conditions on military aid to Israel?
Rieser: There are no pathways currently for legislative conditions on U.S. assistance for Israel. That opportunity came and went with the recent passage of the supplemental appropriations bill. The next opportunity would be in the context of the fiscal year 2025 appropriations bill, which will be marked up in the appropriations committee in June or July.
RS: In what ways are Sen. Welch and his like-minded colleagues putting pressure on the administration to change its tack on weapons transfers to Israel? Have you seen any shifts in the administration's thinking on this issue?
Rieser: Sen. Welch has spoken repeatedly about the need for Congress to stop supporting a war strategy that he believes is fundamentally flawed. He was one of only three members to vote in the Senate against the supplemental appropriations bill, specifically because of the additional funding for offensive weapons for Israel.
We have not seen any noticeable shift in the administration’s policy, at least not to the extent of withholding or conditioning U.S. assistance to the IDF, although it’s also clear that the administration is trying hard to reduce civilian casualties and address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
RS: The Biden administration will have to report to Congress Wednesday about whether Israel has abided by U.S. and international law in its war in Gaza. Do you expect that the report will acknowledge widespread allegations of illegal Israeli conduct? What message will it send if the report fails to acknowledge these allegations?
Rieser: I doubt it will go that far. If the report accepts assurances of the Israeli government that it is abiding by international law and not impeding access to humanitarian aid, the message it will send is that, as a practical matter, the National Security Memorandum didn’t mean much, and the administration is still unwilling to hold Israel to a higher standard.- Whistleblower Josh Paul: ‘Political pressure’ helps Israel skirt US arms rules ›
- Bombs, guns, treasure: What Israel wants, the US gives ›
![Following a largely preordained election, Vladimir Putin was sworn in last week for another six-year term as president of Russia. Putin’s victory has, of course, been met with accusations of fraud and political interference, factors that help explain his 87.3% vote share. If this continuation of Putin’s 24-year-long hold on power makes one thing clear, it’s that he and his regime will not be going anywhere for the foreseeable future. But, as his war in Ukraine continues with no clear end in sight, what is less clear is how Washington plans to deal with this reality. Experts say Washington needs to start projecting a long-term strategy toward Russia and its war in Ukraine, wielding its political leverage to apply pressure on Putin and push for more diplomacy aimed at ending the conflict. Only by looking beyond short-term solutions can Washington realistically move the needle in Ukraine. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, the U.S. has focused on getting aid to Ukraine to help it win back all of its pre-2014 territory, a goal complicated by Kyiv’s systemic shortages of munitions and manpower. But that response neglects a more strategic approach to the war, according to Andrew Weiss of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who spoke in a recent panel hosted by Carnegie. “There is a vortex of emergency planning that people have been, unfortunately, sucked into for the better part of two years since the intelligence first arrived in the fall of 2021,” Weiss said. “And so the urgent crowds out the strategic.” Historian Stephen Kotkin, for his part, says preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty is critical. However, the apparent focus on regaining territory, pushed by the U.S., is misguided. “Wars are never about regaining territory. It's about the capacity to fight and the will to fight. And if Russia has the capacity to fight and Ukraine takes back territory, Russia won't stop fighting,” Kotkin said in a podcast on the Wall Street Journal. And it appears Russia does have the capacity. The number of troops and weapons at Russia’s disposal far exceeds Ukraine’s, and Russian leaders spend twice as much on defense as their Ukrainian counterparts. Ukraine will need a continuous supply of aid from the West to continue to match up to Russia. And while aid to Ukraine is important, Kotkin says, so is a clear plan for determining the preferred outcome of the war. The U.S. may be better served by using the significant political leverage it has over Russia to shape a long-term outcome in its favor. George Beebe of the Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft, says that Russia’s primary concerns and interests do not end with Ukraine. Moscow is fundamentally concerned about the NATO alliance and the threat it may pose to Russian internal stability. Negotiations and dialogue about the bounds and limits of NATO and Russia’s powers, therefore, are critical to the broader conflict. This is a process that is not possible without the U.S. and Europe. “That means by definition, we have some leverage,” Beebe says. To this point, Kotkin says the strength of the U.S. and its allies lies in their political influence — where they are much more powerful than Russia — rather than on the battlefield. Leveraging this influence will be a necessary tool in reaching an agreement that is favorable to the West’s interests, “one that protects the United States, protects its allies in Europe, that preserves an independent Ukraine, but also respects Russia's core security interests there.” In Kotkin’s view, this would mean pushing for an armistice that ends the fighting on the ground and preserves Ukrainian sovereignty, meaning not legally acknowledging Russia’s possession of the territory they have taken during the war. Then, negotiations can proceed. Beebe adds that a treaty on how conventional forces can be used in Europe will be important, one that establishes limits on where and how militaries can be deployed. “[Russia] need[s] some understanding with the West about what we're all going to agree to rule out in terms of interference in the other's domestic affairs,” Beebe said. Critical to these objectives is dialogue with Putin, which Beebe says Washington has not done enough to facilitate. U.S. officials have stated publicly that they do not plan to meet with Putin. The U.S. rejected Putin’s most statements of his willingness to negotiate, which he expressed in an interview with Tucker Carlson in February, citing skepticism that Putin has any genuine intentions of ending the war. “Despite Mr. Putin’s words, we have seen no actions to indicate he is interested in ending this war. If he was, he would pull back his forces and stop his ceaseless attacks on Ukraine,” a spokesperson for the White House’s National Security Council said in response. But neither side has been open to serious communication. Biden and Putin haven’t met to engage in meaningful talks about the war since it began, their last meeting taking place before the war began in the summer of 2021 in Geneva. Weiss says the U.S. should make it clear that those lines of communication are open. “Any strategy that involves diplomatic outreach also has to be sort of undergirded by serious resolve and a sense that we're not we're not going anywhere,” Weiss said. An end to the war will be critical to long-term global stability. Russia will remain a significant player on the world stage, Beebe explains, considering it is the world’s largest nuclear power and a leading energy producer. It is therefore ultimately in the U.S. and Europe’s interests to reach a relationship “that combines competitive and cooperative elements, and where we find a way to manage our differences and make sure that they don't spiral into very dangerous military confrontation,” he says. As two major global superpowers, the U.S. and Russia need to find a way to share the world. Only genuine, long-term planning can ensure that Washington will be able to shape that future in its best interests.](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/media-library/following-a-largely-preordained-election-vladimir-putin-was-sworn-in-last-week-for-another-six-year-term-as-president-of-russia.jpg?id=34283894&width=600&height=600&quality=90&coordinates=483%2C0%2C483%2C0)
