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Jenin

Gaza in the rearview, Israelis turn tanks and guns onto West Bank

The Trump administration lifted sanctions on extremist settlers this week, raising questions about his policies to come

Analysis | Middle East

Most attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the past 15 months has focused on the Gaza Strip, given the devastating Israeli assault that has reduced most of that territory to rubble.

But the larger occupied Palestinian territory — the West Bank, along with what Israel has defined as East Jerusalem — never ceased to be on the front line of the conflict. During those same 15 months, more than 800 Palestinians in the West Bank have been killed by either the Israeli military or Jewish settlers, according to data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

The Israeli violence against West Bank Palestinians has increased since the start of the recent ceasefire in Gaza. The latest in a series of raids by the Israeli military has centered on the city of Jenin and was described by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as “extensive and significant.” The Palestinian Health ministry reported that eight people were killed and at least 35 injured in just the first few hours of the operation.

Meanwhile, violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinian villagers and their property has risen sharply. In the year following October 2023, the U.N. office recorded more than 1,400 incidents of such violence in the West Bank.

The latest escalation of Israeli violence in the West Bank is connected to the Gaza ceasefire in multiple ways. Netanyahu has been walking a political tightrope in agreeing to the ceasefire while placating right-wing elements in his coalition who want a continued war. Stepping up military operations in the West Bank is one way to keep those elements satisfied while they await a resumption of the destruction in the Gaza Strip.

Increased military action in the West Bank also helps Netanyahu to divert attention from the failure to achieve his declared objective of destroying Hamas.

The availability of military resources is another connection. The Israeli military has been stretched by more than a year of intense operations against Gaza, not to mention Israeli offensives during the past year in Lebanon and Syria. The pause in Gaza enables some of those resources to be redeployed to the West Bank. It is worth remembering that Israeli vulnerability to Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, was possibly related to an earlier redeployment of some security forces from southern Israel to the West Bank.

The West Bank always has been—certainly from the Israeli government’s point of view—more important than the Gaza Strip. Gaza has been the open-air prison where much of the Palestinian population could be confined, but the West Bank is a central and prized part of Israeli expansionism. More than 600,000 Jewish Israeli settlers are now living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, embodying both the expansionism itself and an Israeli determination to make establishment of a Palestinian state unfeasible.

During his first term, Trump reversed decades of U.S. policy by stating that Israeli settlements in the West Bank did not violate international law. With his appointments as well as his rhetoric, Trump has indicated that his second administration will be at least as deferential to the Israeli government on these matters as his first one was.

One of his earliest post-election nominations was former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee to be ambassador to Israel. Huckabee, a Baptist minister and self-declared Zionist, has said that “there’s really no such thing as a Palestinian.” He has repeatedly stated that the West Bank — a descriptor he avoids in favor of the biblical “Judea and Samaria” — belongs to Israel and that “the title deed was given by God to Abraham and to his heirs.”

Trump’s nominee to be ambassador to the United Nations, New York Representative Elise Stefanik, refused to say at her confirmation hearing whether the Palestinian people have a right to self-determination. Stefanik said she agrees with the view that “Israel has a biblical right to the entire West Bank.”

As with many of Trump’s early provocative actions, there is little or no sign of pushback from members of his own party in Congress. Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas, now chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, last month introduced legislation requiring official U.S. documents to refer to “Judea and Samaria” instead of the West Bank, with Cotton saying that “the Jewish people’s legal and historic rights to Judea and Samaria goes [sic] back thousands of years.”

Trump has most directly promoted violence in the West Bank by removing — as one of his Day One rescissions of dozens of Biden administration actions — sanctions on Israeli settlers who have committed violence against Palestinian residents of the West Bank. Possibly for Trump, this was just another reflexive action to undo whatever his Democratic predecessor did, as well as to do anything that he or his followers could bill as “pro-Israel.” But the practical effect is to give a green light to perpetrators of lethal actions, ranging from shootings to arson, that have ruined lives and livelihoods. In most cases the only offense of the victims has been to live in the land where they and their families have lived for centuries.

All these U.S. and Israeli policies are a recipe for increasing the never-ending violence by both sides in the West Bank. Neither military raids nor settler intimidation will lead the Palestinian residents of the territory to roll over and accept their treatment. Resentment from subjugation and apartheid will be amplified by anger over death and destruction.

As with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, even sustained, large-scale military operations by Israel will not kill the will to resist. Hamas itself has called for a “popular mobilization” in the West Bank to oppose the Israeli military escalation there as well as to resist the violence by settlers. Also as in the Gaza Strip, the will to resist will mean recruitment of more fighters to replace the ones Israel manages to kill.

The ill consequences of the violence include still more suffering beyond what the residents of the West Bank have already endured. The violence also is an additional destabilizing factor in the wider region — especially in next-door Jordan, with its large Palestinian-origin population.

For the United States, the ill consequences include resentment and anger—which can take various forms, including anti-American terrorism—stemming from close association with inhumane Israeli treatment of the Palestinians. The United States already is paying a price in this regard from being associated with the carnage in Gaza. The price will rise the more that the West Bank is swept into the same unseemly picture.


Top image credit: Palestinians walk next to heavy machinery and an armored vehicle on a damaged street as they leave Jenin camp during an Israeli raid, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, January 22, 2025. REUTERS/Raneen Sawafta
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Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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