Follow us on social

Is Biden too weak or unwilling to stop a 'Sarajevo moment'?

Is Biden too weak or unwilling to stop a 'Sarajevo moment'?

War with Iran could be imminent. The commander-in-chief's obligation is to put our interests first, not Israel's

Analysis | Middle East

The Middle East is on the cusp of a Sarajevo Moment — an increasingly likely major conflict between Israel and Iran.

Their two leaders, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, hold in their hands the choice between war and peace. But another leader has a crucial role: U.S. President Joe Biden. To stop conflict before it escalates uncontrollably, he must demonstrate more authority and less passivity than he has done this past year.

With the expanding exchange of fire between Israel and Iran, the collection of conflicts has moved beyond the Levant (plus Yemen) and has become a direct war between Israel and Iran. If together they don’t deescalate now, the scale of fighting and its strategic impact, both in the region and beyond, could dwarf the fighting and destruction we’ve seen so far.

The United States would surely be sucked in. Indeed, Netanyahu would welcome it — it’s long been part of his strategic game plan; and the Ayatollah may find it unavoidable.

Tragically, debate within Biden’s top team is not about whether Israel should launch major strikes against Iran in response to the latter’s missile attacks Tuesday, but where and how, with President Biden even giving public advice. Means to break the cycle of escalating violence, if any, are not apparent.

For most of last year, the United States has been a combatant-by-proxy, in its virtually open-ended support of Israel’s war efforts on multiple fronts. Israel depends absolutely on U.S. weaponry and other support — plentifully supplied and with very few restrictions on their use — plus a direct U.S. role in intercepting two Iranian missile barrages. While Washington has been a proponent of deescalation in both Gaza and now Lebanon, that has consisted mostly of cajoling belligerents rather than acting to impose a halt to the fighting.

On Iran, the United States and Israel do not fully share interests. Both would welcome regime change. Israel also wants Iran to be disintegrated and has worked over the years to bring it about; by contrast, Biden and his team should by now understand the chaos such a development would release across the region and beyond.

Washington’s most important strategic interest in Iran has been to forestall or prevent its development of nuclear weapons. Yet for years, Netanyahu has undercut U.S. efforts in that regard. In 2015, China, Russia, France, Germany, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States concluded a nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. It effectively rolled back and froze Iran’s nuclear program, and Teheran honored its part of the bargain.

Netanyahu fought this agreement every step of the way, including his direct appeal to a joint session of Congress in 2015 in which he stridently opposed any agreement with Iran that would enable it to retain even a civilian nuclear program.

His efforts paid off. In 2018, President Donald Trump pulled out of the JCPOA. When Biden took office in 2021, he could simply have rejoined the agreement, just as he reversed so many other destructive Trump actions. But he failed to do so. Instead, he engaged in a drawn-out process to negotiate a “better” agreement with Iran. No fair observer judges the negotiations to have been serious, since neither Israel nor its U.S. supporters wanted it done.

Ironically, at last month’s U.N. General Assembly in New York, Iran’s president affirmed his government’s readiness to rejoin the JCPOA; Biden’s team ignored him..

In diplomacy on Gaza, President Biden has long publicly stressed the need for a cease-fire and the release by Hamas of Israeli hostages but has failed to put American power behind that request. Thus, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other top U.S. officials have visited the region multiple times; but Biden has refused to demand that Netanyahu genuinely support an agreement.

Even when Hamas showed some flexibility, Netanyahu imposed new demands. Except for one limited withholding of 2,000-pound bombs, Biden has done nothing to condition or stop arms supplies to Israel, even temporarily, when Israel has thwarted U.S. diplomacy. Nor will Biden premise continuing military support on Israel’s (and Egypt’s) opening borders to a free flow of desperately needed humanitarian relief.

With Biden’s unwillingness to do more than talk about a ceasefire in Gaza, plus his effective acceptance of Israel’s rejection of any progress in Palestinian rights, let alone a two-state solution, Netanyahu saw no obstacle to taking the next step in his long-run strategy: to root out Hezbollah from Lebanon.

Here, Biden has effectively given a green light to Israel’s relentless bombing campaign and ground incursion that have already displaced well over one million Lebanese and killed another 2,000, including Hezbollah militants and civilians.

More important, the danger now is that Biden will not act — he may talk and cajole, but not demand — as Netanyahu turns his military focus to Iran, the front that is far more crucial for the future of the entire Middle East and America’s strategic interests there.

As always, Netanyahu has made astute calculations about U.S. domestic politics. With the presidential election a mere month away, he knows that Biden will do nothing to stop Israel from getting its military business done by November 5 or even by Inauguration Day. Biden will not risk alienating Israel and its formidable lobby here in Washington.

His simply asking Netanyahu not to attack critical sites in Iran that could make inevitable a major war, one that would involve the United States militarily, is most unlikely to avoid escalation. Indeed, it has long been Netanyahu’s dream that the U.S. will take care of Israel’s “Iran problem.”

Americans’ popular support for Israel’s fundamental security has always been rock-solid, although at times — notably the 1956 Suez War and its siege of Beirut in 1982 — Washington has opposed some Israeli offensive military operations. It has also denounced — again mainly with talk rather than serious action — some Israeli policies, such as settling hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews in the West Bank in violation of international law.

As Israel’s most prominent and powerful patron, America now must make clear to Israel that continued U.S. military and diplomatic support will be at risk if Netanyahu and his coterie fail to take fully into account U.S. evaluations of Israel’s security needs. Israel must also accommodate U.S. interests, which include not contributing to the risks of a major conflagration. The U.S. and others can then urge Iran also to hold its fire, lest it risk suffering massively in a terribly destructive war. Tehran may already understand this.

If Biden seeks to avert this Sarajevo Moment, he must now put U.S. interests first, rather than continue deferring to Israel’s perspective and desires. A test of Biden’s presidency in foreign policy is thus on the line. It’s not clear even now he will do what he must, as demanded by his role as commander-in-chief.


A billboard in Tehran depicting Iran's ballistic missiles fired at Israel in April 2024.(saeediex/shutterstock)

Analysis | Middle East
Havana, Cuba
Top Image Credit: Havana, Cuba, 2019. (CLWphoto/Shutterstock)

Trump lifted sanctions on Syria. Now do Cuba.

North America

President Trump’s new National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) on Cuba, announced on June 30, reaffirms the policy of sanctions and hostility he articulated at the start of his first term in office. In fact, the new NSPM is almost identical to the old one.

The policy’s stated purpose is to “improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy” by restricting financial flows to the Cuban government. It reaffirms Trump’s support for the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which explicitly requires regime change — that Cuba become a multiparty democracy with a free market economy (among other conditions) before the U.S. embargo will be lifted.

keep readingShow less
SPD Germany Ukraine
Top Photo: Lars Klingbeil (l-r, SPD), Federal Minister of Finance, Vice-Chancellor and SPD Federal Chairman, and Bärbel Bas (SPD), Federal Minister of Labor and Social Affairs and SPD Party Chairwoman, bid farewell to the members of the previous Federal Cabinet Olaf Scholz (SPD), former Federal Chancellor, Nancy Faeser, Saskia Esken, SPD Federal Chairwoman, Karl Lauterbach, Svenja Schulze and Hubertus Heil at the SPD Federal Party Conference. At the party conference, the SPD intends to elect a new executive committee and initiate a program process. Kay Nietfeld/dpa via Reuters Connect

Does Germany’s ruling coalition have a peace problem?

Europe

Surfacing a long-dormant intra-party conflict, the Friedenskreise (peace circles) within the Social Democratic Party of Germany has published a “Manifesto on Securing Peace in Europe” in a stark challenge to the rearmament line taken by the SPD leaders governing in coalition with the conservative CDU-CSU under Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

Although the Manifesto clearly does not have broad support in the SPD, the party’s leader, Deputy Chancellor and Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil, won only 64% support from the June 28-29 party conference for his performance so far, a much weaker endorsement than anticipated. The views of the party’s peace camp may be part of the explanation.

keep readingShow less
Trump and Putin on phone
Top photo credit: Donald Trump (White House photo) and Vladimir Putin (Office of the Russian Federation President)
US-Russia talks: The rubber finally hits the road

Good, bad and ugly: Impact of US Iran strikes on Russia war talks

Europe

To a considerable degree, President Donald Trump won the presidency in 2024 because voters embraced his message of keeping America out of protracted conflicts and his promise to end the war in Ukraine.

The administration has made substantial operational headway, particularly in reopening stable channels for dialogue with Russia, but it has proven difficult to arrive at a framework for a negotiated settlement that enjoys buy-in from all the stakeholders — Ukraine, Russia, and Europe.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.