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Israel can still drag the US into war with Iran

Israel can still drag the US into war with Iran

The tit-for-tat has ended for now, but Benjamin Netanyahu has many incentives to continue goading Tehran

Middle East

The Biden administration is breathing a sigh of relief that it has so far avoided a wider regional war between Israel and Iran. But that self-congratulation should be tempered with realization that it was a close call and that the incentives for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his hawkish governing coalition to provoke one are still present.

The Biden administration’s rhetorical outrage at Iran’s forewarned and well-choreographed symbolic missile and drone attacks on Israeli territory conflicts was absurd, as was its crowing that Israel, with U.S. and allied help, had already “won” by knocking down almost all the sequenced projectiles. American policy has long been so “in the bag” for its Israeli ally, no matter what its behavior, that such silly kabuki has been normalized.

Despite the U.S. declaration of victory, designed to dissuade Israel from a strong escalatory response to the Iranian strike, the Israeli leader came close to ordering a much larger “retaliatory” strike than the limited one the Israelis executed, according to the New York Times.

Although Hamas started the Gaza conflict with its heinous terrorist attack on Israel, Israel’s purposefully reckless attack on Iran’s embassy compound in Syria on April 1, 2024 — which killed seven Iranian military personnel, including three top Iranian generals — threatened to widen and escalate the conflict into a direct Israel-Iran war that easily could have dragged in the United States.

Internationally, overseas embassies are regarded as being the soil of the home country; thus, Israel’s attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria was the same as an attack on Iran itself. As a result, Iran retaliated with the symbolic missile and drone attack against Israeli territory.

Netanyahu and his hawkish governing coalition have blatantly rejected a two-state solution that would go a long way toward diminishing conflict in the region and enhancing Israel’s long-term security. Even before this pugnacious government took office, Israel has long desired to push the United States into a war with its Iranian rival to ensure Israeli regional dominance by severely diminishing Iran’s military capabilities.

This hidden agenda was clearly demonstrated by the Israeli government’s virulent opposition to the U.S.-led nuclear deal with Iran, which would have blocked pathways for Iran to build a nuclear weapon. One would have thought that Israel would have been wildly excited about an agreement that would have severely restrained Iran’s program. Yet, Israel knew that a reduction of tensions between Iran and the United States that the agreement, if it had been fully carried out, would have put any severely debilitating U.S. military attack on Iran’s conventional military capabilities and nuclear program in the deep freeze.

Fortunately, for the hawks in Israel, when President Donald Trump became president, he unilaterally terminated the nuclear deal, again raising the possibility that the United States might do the dirty work of militarily taking on Israel’s archrival.

Given that Netanyahu has foolishly worn a partisan preference for Trump and the Republicans on his sleeve, dragging President Biden, despite appearances, into war with Iran has been difficult.

Yet now may be Netanyahu’s golden opportunity. An even wider war, which includes direct U.S. military conflict with Iran, would help an unpopular, indicted prime minister who may need to stay in power to keep himself out of jail and divert attention from his wildly disproportionate military response and potential bog in Gaza.

America’s alliances and partnerships with other countries are only of value if they advance what should be the end goal — enhancing U.S. security. One issue — in addition to the free rider problem in which the dominant power (always the United States) bears the greater cost burden — is that smaller countries like Israel can have an incentive to be more aggressive with their neighbors when under the protective umbrella of the larger power.

Although intense U.S. and allied pressure on Israel to limit its “retaliatory” strike on Iran has, for the moment, prevented a wider regional war, Netanyahu’s political survival may depend on such escalation, especially if he needs to take the Israeli public’s attention away from the likely quagmire that poorly planned Gaza aftermath will likely bring forth — similar to the continuing counterinsurgency slog after an initial “win” by the United States in Iraq.

Netanyahu has already seen his low poll numbers go up during his dust-up with Iran after his reckless attack on the Iranian embassy. So why not a massive first strike on the Iranian-supported Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border to get the escalation ball rolling? New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof reported that one of his “scarier discussions with an Israeli official recently was his advocacy of a first strike on Hezbollah, and a poll found that 53 percent of Israeli Jews favor such an attack on Hezbollah.”

A lesson of history learned by the American founding generation that was forgotten by U.S. policymakers in their rush to acquire a Pax Americana after World War II: permanent and entangling alliances can commit a country to needless and costly faraway wars — especially a country like the United States that has the intrinsic security advantage of being far away from the world’s centers of conflict. The great powers of Europe also forgot the downside of alliances when those pacts dragged them into a cataclysmic war that none of them wanted: World War I.

To avoid being enmeshed in a wider war in the Middle East, Biden should threaten to cut off or reduce the billions of dollars in annual U.S. military aid to Israel if it does not stop its overheated actions in Gaza and its blatant attempts to widen the war to include Iran. Instead, the United States is in the process of vastly increasing the amount of that aid, further rewarding Israel for its irresponsible behavior.


Protesters hold a banner calling on U.S President Joe Biden not to trust Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a demonstration. REUTERS

Middle East
POGO The Bunker
Top image credit: Project on Government Oversight

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Military Industrial Complex

The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.


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Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

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Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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Top image credit: People line up to buy bread, after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria December 23, 2024. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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