Hegseth goes to 'spear point' Guam to prep for war with China

The Guam headlines from the recent visit of the U.S. secretary of defense are only part of Secretary Hegseth’s maiden visit to the Pacific. It is Guam’s place in the larger picture - where the island fits into U.S. strategy - that helps us understand how the “tip of the spear” is being positioned. Perhaps overlooked, the arrangement of the “Guam piece” gives us a better sense not only of Guam’s importance to the United States, but also of how the U.S. sees the larger geopolitical competition taking shape.

Before he landed on Guam, the secretary of defense circulated a secret memo that prioritized U.S. readiness for a potential conflict with China over Taiwan. At the same time, it was reported that U.S. intelligence assessed that Guam would be “a major target of Chinese missile strikes” if China launched an invasion of Taiwan.

To put the U.S. secretary of defense’s recent regional visit in context, we need to look at the big picture, and then refocus on Guam and the region. We must not only consider what was said and done during his trip, but also what was not said, to help us understand (1) the signaling on Guam that informs the unfolding U.S. strategy in the region and (2) the increasing risk to Guam’s security.

The big picture

The Trump administration’s Asia-Pacific policy is still unfolding and may not be completely clear for some time. The secretary of defense’s claim was that the trip was to "reestablish deterrence." The “secret memo” provides context for this claim, but several elements are likely driving policy. First, containing China is of considerable focus, both militarily and economically. It is also clear that as it advances a strategy, the Trump administration will be using all elements of national power - diplomacy, information, military and economic - in this effort.

Secretary Hegseth’s visit helped set the stage for elements of this strategy. It is a well-studied assumption that without South Korea and Japan, the U.S. would struggle - and possibly lose - in a military conflict with China. In this context, it is not surprising that his visit to Japan was heralded as “reinforcing readiness, interoperability and shared resolve across the Indo-Pacific.” But beyond the well-trodden U.S. Department of Defense phraseology, the new U.S. secretary of defense was bringing the agenda of a new president to the region.

Those countries on the “frontlines of any contingency we might face in the western Pacific” are being asked to do more to advance U.S. strategy. It is no secret that the Trump administration wants regional governments to increase military spending. A fundamental element is to “rebalance burden sharing with allies and partners.” But there is more. Requests for expanded basing, pre-conflict permission for increased access, assurances of logistics and overflight use of sovereign territory in a China conflict are likely in the discussion. The Korean Ministry of Defense even preemptively denied that Washington had requested clarity on Korea’s role and commitment in a potential military conflict involving China. In the U.S. president’s words, the U.S. has treaty commitments to defend these frontline countries, but they are not committed to defending the U.S.

The Trump administration’s pressure campaign on regional allies to support U.S. warfighting contingency planning is itself a tell. The U.S. is pushing for greater commitment and clarity because today they do not have it. This tepid allied commitment makes for a weak American war plan in the event of conflict with China. But decisions about war go to the heart of a nation’s sovereignty. Even America’s closest allies in the region are unlikely to grant permission for a unilateral U.S. decision to bring their country into conflict. After all, these countries are on what the U.S. secretary of defense calls the “frontlines.”

Over the coming months, we are likely to see the Trump administration - and possibly President Trump himself - continue to push for greater commitments. A potent mix of economic levers and military strategy is already in play. In his first phone call with South Korea’s acting president (ostensibly over the issue of unilateral U.S. tariffs), President Trump linked increased payments for U.S. military presence in South Korea with the “possibility of a great DEAL.” (Emphasis in original.)

Short of capitulating to highly leveraged U.S. demands, countries will try other levels of appeasement. For example, while Secretary Hegseth was in the Philippines, it was announced that the U.S. would have another “leave-behind” missile system that could target Chinese ships. Within days of the visit, the Philippines’ request to buy F-16 fighters and related equipment - valued up to $5.6 billion - was approved by the Trump administration. Shortly after the defense secretary’s visit to Japan, the Japanese government (over the objections of Okinawa’s government) approved the year-round stationing of surveillance drones in Okinawa. Previously, these ISR assets rotated every six months from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. These are, however, relatively small steps in relation to the commitments the U.S. is seeking.

Regional allies of the U.S. are clear about the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and opposition to a change in the status quo by force. Authorizing the U.S. to unilaterally manage a de facto commitment to war with China on their behalf is a different matter. It remains to be seen how far sovereign governments in the region will bend to Trump’s view of containing China.

On cue - and as a reminder that the adversary always has a say - the People’s Republic of China put on an unusual show of military force during Mr. Hegseth’s visit to the region. A large air and naval presence encircling Taiwan, live-fire activity in the straits cutting through the first island chain and bomber incursions into the South China Sea were held over a six-day period. This activity was as much a message to the U.S. and its allies as it was to Taiwan.

The tip of the spear

On Guam, U.S. decision-makers already have the type of ready response to conflict they are seeking from allies on the frontlines of the region. Guam’s territorial status gives Washington all the unilateral authority it needs to use facilities and project force without encumbrances. In view of uncertain commitments from regional allies in a potential conflict with China, military planners are counting on Guam.

The U.S. military’s certainty about the use of bases and assets on Guam was a highlight of the defense secretary’s visit to the island. “These islands are the tip of America’s spear in the Pacific,” Hegseth said in a DoD release titled “Secretary of Defense Emphasizes Lethality, Deterrence on Guam.” Joint Region Marianas dutifully reported their “efforts and contributions to strategic deterrence, demonstrating U.S. strength and daily preparedness.”

There was no mention during the secretary’s visit of the “secret memo” that framed his trip. Nor was the expectation that Guam would be a major target in the event of conflict with China part of the public discourse. The coded inferences, however, were replete. "You're living in history; you're living in reality, and you're living in a dangerous neighborhood. You are America's power projection and platform," a release reported Hegseth as saying. He caveated force projection from Guam with the statement that “armed conflict in the Indo-Pacom region is the least desirable outcome of any geopolitical differences,” but his expectations were clear. When it came to the U.S. position on Guam, Hegseth’s framing was unmistakably post-attack: “Any attack against these islands is an attack against the U.S. We recognize that, we understand that and we are committed to that.” Any attack would be met with an “appropriate response.” The “secret memo” and the anticipated attack on Guam were clearly in the back of his mind, even if the magnitude of the threat did not pass his lips.

There were other indirect clues about the conflict risk to Guam. While on Guam, Hegseth reached a mutual understanding with the president of the Federated States of Micronesia over airfield and port developments in Yap State. The governor of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands also announced after his meeting with the defense secretary that the U.S. military footprint will expand in Saipan and Rota. These developments are directly related to expectations of insecurity on Guam. As part of the U.S. “distributed and dispersed” operating model, locations along the Mariana-Belau arc are being developed in case assets on Guam are not available. Another clue came from the governor of Guam, who pitched the secretary on a new U.S.-funded hospital that was “capable of handling mass casualties - whether from conflict or natural disasters.”

If the risk of conflict on Guam was woven through Secretary Hegseth’s visit, the one thing not mentioned was preparation for protecting Guam’s civilian population. The U.S. official’s silence on this issue is particularly noteworthy given what he knew about the risks to Guam associated with his Taiwan scenario and his discussions with island officials about alternatives to Guam in a conflict. This silence was even more striking given activity in Japan and Taiwan while the secretary was on Guam. On the day Hegseth landed on Guam, the government of Japan’s Cabinet Secretariat published the outline of a plan to evacuate 120,000 people from Okinawa in the event China invaded Taiwan. On the same day, Taiwan’s agriculture minister announced a plan to provide food to the island’s population for up to one year in the event of a Chinese blockade. While the usual accolades of Guam’s value were rolled out by military officials (“Guam is strategically important to the region and ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific”), there were no direct discussions about the conflict risks or what would be done to protect the people of the island.

Understanding the signals

The Trump administration will be ramping up pressure on frontline countries in the region to make security commitments that align with U.S. objectives and fall under unilateral U.S. decision-making. It is too early to tell how hard countries will be pushed, how far they will go in response and what they will ultimately agree to. The U.S. does not want to go it alone in an aggressive approach to China because it is unlikely to prevail if it does. But the U.S. is also unlikely to get frontline countries in the region to commit to an open-ended American decision to go to war against China. This brings the U.S. back to the importance of Guam and its ability to act unilaterally.

Secretary Hegseth’s stops in Hawaii and Guam on his way to the Philippines and Japan were meant to signal U.S. presence, force projection and the ability to act militarily on its own in the region. As frontline countries are pressured to support the aggressive U.S. strategy outlined in the “secret memo,” they may be looking at how the U.S. is acting in the places where it already has unilateral authority. High-level visits that do not directly address the risks posed by the U.S. strategy, plans that assume the spread of conflict among U.S.-controlled islands and a failure to address the most fundamental elements of population security in conflict are likely not persuasive signals about U.S. readiness and approach to war.

This article was republished with permission by The Guam Daily Post