Germany’s Bundestag parliament has voted to pass a constitutional amendment that would authorize increases in defense, infrastructure, and some foreign aid spending, financed through increased borrowing.
"The decision we are taking today... can be nothing less than the first major step towards a new European defense community,” said likely incoming chancellor Friedrich Merz. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen commented that the vote “sends a very clear message to Europe that Germany is determined to invest massively in defense."
The vote comes amid pressure from the European Community (and the Trump administration) to increase its overall defense spending and begin to wean off military dependency on Washington. Over the last several weeks, Merz and France’s Emmanuel Macron have issued a clarion call regarding this and concerning Ukraine, where they have also pledged assistance in a new “coalition of the willing.”
Debt-averse Germany has had strict limits, currently only allowing for borrowing equal to .35% of its GDP. This new amendment cleared the two-thirds vote required in the Bundestag and would exempt any defense spending or foreign aid for countries “attacked in violation of international law” from borrowing restrictions.
In addition to loosening borrowing limits for defense spending and foreign aid, 500 billion euros will be earmarked for infrastructure borrowing, as stipulated by the Greens, whose votes were needed for the two-thirds majority.
The amendment is set for a vote in Germany’s second chamber, the Bundesrat, on Friday. At first, the outcome seemed uncertain as some regional governments voiced opposition to raising the debt limit. However, the head of Bavaria’s State Chancellery announced today that Bavaria’s six members in the Bundesrat would vote in favor of the amendment, ensuring that the measure will likely have enough votes to overcome the two-thirds majority requirement in that chamber.
Aaron is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft and a contributor to the Mises Institute. He received both his undergraduate and masters degrees in international relations from Liberty University.
Top Photo: A general view of the Parliament as German Bundestag President Baerbel Bas delivers words of commemoration on the occasion of the one-year anniversary of Hamas' October 7 attack, ahead of a session of the lower house of parliament Bundestag, in Berlin, Germany, October 10, 2024. REUTERS/Lisi Niesner
Top image credit: Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov (L), Armenia's Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan (R) and Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu pose for a picture before the Armenia-Azerbaijan talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan May 10, 2024. REUTERS/Pavel Mikheyev
On March 13, speaking to reporters backstage at the 12th Global Baku Forum, Jeyhun Bayramov, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, unexpectedly broke the news that Armenia and Azerbaijan had finally agreed to all 17 points of their framework agreement on the establishment of peace and interstate relations.
This apparent breakthrough comes some four years after the negotiating process began in the wake of Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. While such diplomatic triumphs are to be applauded, especially as an alternative to continued threats of military violence, the devil is in the details. And the details leave much to be desired.
Bayramov, when announcing this news, stressed that Azerbaijan now expects Armenia to implement changes to its constitution to remove a reference in the document’s preamble to Armenia’s declaration of independence, which Baku says implies territorial claims against Azerbaijan by mentioning the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with the then-Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic.
The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed up with a statement that stressed that such changes are “a prerequisite to allow the signing of the negotiated text.” In addition, the MFA noted the need to dissolve the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, the international body co-chaired by France, the U.S., and Russia and empowered to spearhead a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While Yerevan had effectively already expressed support for this in the event of the agreement’s signing, it would symbolize, in Baku’s view, a definitive Azerbaijani victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev later echoed these sentiments and added that “we do not trust any of their words. Because these are not people we can trust, including today’s government.”
The Armenian side, noticeably caught by surprise by Azerbaijan’s “unilateral statement,” explained that Yerevan had accepted “the proposals of Azerbaijan on the two unresolved articles” of the draft agreement. Furthermore, Yerevan stressed its view that “the Peace Agreement is ready for signing” and that they are “prepared to initiate consultations with the Republic of Azerbaijan regarding the time and venue for the signing of the Agreement.”
Those two previously unresolved articles of the agreement concerned the absence of any third-party presence along the border and the mutual withdrawal of claims from international courts. The former is a reference to the presence of European Union civilian monitors on Armenia’s side of the border, whose mandate was recently extended by two years. Yerevan appears to have acquiesced to Baku’s wording of these two points, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan saying that following consultations with his security council “the current content can be considered a compromise option acceptable to Armenia.”
Any current optimism deserves equal, if not greater, levels of accompanying caution as Azerbaijan continues to present further concessions by Armenia, including constitutional changes, as the only means by which the agreement can be signed.
These developments take place as American pressure builds on Iran and discussions between the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia advance, potentially indicating Yerevan’s consideration of the broader international dynamic when agreeing to these additional compromises. Not to mention Armenia’s own interest in precluding, or forestalling, any escalation of violence in the region.
As Russia has been distracted by its war in Ukraine, a unique window of opportunity, amplified by Moscow’s own strategic miscalculations, presented itself to Armenia to decrease its dependencies and exploit new openings.
With the new Trump administration seeking an end to the war in Ukraine and even a potential reconfiguration of U.S.-Russia relations writ large, Armenia’s window of opportunity may be fading. If Russia is able to secure a favorable agreement in Ukraine and, more importantly for the South Caucasus, the start of a broader strategic discussion with the U.S. and NATO, Moscow’s ability to devote renewed attention to its other border regions will likely increase. These broader shifts have also resulted in a European Union that is struggling to adjust to and define its own role in this rapidly shifting world, potentially contributing to Yerevan’s calculations.
Over the last few years, Armenia has made an overt effort to normalize relations with Turkey in the hopes of decreasing its overreliance on Russia and better connecting itself to Europe and elsewhere. In addition to Armenia’s closed border with Azerbaijan, the Armenia-Turkey border has been closed for over 30 years, severely limiting Yerevan’s strategic maneuverability and its economic potential. However, Ankara has linked its normalization with Yerevan directly to advancements in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations, the outcome of important Azerbaijani leverage in Turkey and a uniquely close relationship between the two countries.
Armenia likely hopes that this development — Azerbaijan’s obstinance notwithstanding — will be enough for Turkey to press ahead with normalization of relations and the opening of the border, though Ankara has previously said progress will be connected to the signing of the agreement between Yerevan and Baku.
The agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan follows weeks, if not months, of speculation that Azerbaijan is preparing to escalate militarily against Armenia with the intention of pressuring Yerevan to accept Baku’s demands. This is reminiscent of previous Azerbaijani tactics, threatening continued violence in order to exact concessions from Armenia.
This negotiating process has been ongoing while at least 23 Armenians are being held and tried in Baku over their involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, as Azerbaijan continues to occupy internationally recognized Armenian territory, and as Baku continues to demand Armenia open the so-called Zangezur corridor for unhindered Azerbaijani traffic, amongst other stipulations.
The most important development to watch is whether the finalized agreement will be signed and ratified in short order or if Azerbaijan will not acquiesce to this until Armenia implements changes to its constitution, a process not expected to take place before parliamentary elections in June 2026.
In addition, Turkey’s response will also be critical: Is this finalized, but not yet signed, agreement enough for Ankara to move its normalization process with Yerevan forward?
While this agreement has receivedinternationalsupport, Washington and other capitals must not lose sight of the still unresolved elements of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and their outstanding disputes.
An intense rivalry with decades of heavy baggage cannot merely be resolved by the (still absent) stroke of a pen. In an atmosphere of deep mistrust and lingering insecurities, real peace will likely take a generation to build. There is still much hard work to be done, and the signing and ratification of any agreement would only be the first step along the winding road ahead.
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Top photo credit: Amb. Chas Freeman in 2011 (New America Foundation/Flickr/Creative Commons)
Almost exactly 16 years after the Israel lobby won a bitter high-profile battle against a key appointment by the then-director of national intelligence, it seems to have one won another, virtually without firing a shot.
The abrupt withdrawal this week of the appointment of Daniel Davis, who has criticized Israel’s conduct of its war in Gaza, as deputy director of national intelligence for mission integration under DNI Tulsi Gabbard reportedly resulted from complaints by pro-Israeli forces within the Trump administration and Congress, as well as outside groups, including the Anti-Defamation League.
The withdrawal recalled a much more protracted and dramatic fight over the appointment by former DNI Adm. Dennis Blair (Ret.) of former Amb. Chas Freeman, Jr., a legendary Foreign Service Officer and former senior Pentagon official, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) at the outset of the Obama administration in March 2009. After several weeks of controversy and in the face of fierce and arguably defamatory criticism, Freeman took himself out of consideration.
Davis, a senior fellow at Defense Priorities and a retired Army officer who helped expose the failures of the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan during the Obama administration, fell victim to what had been a quiet campaign to prevent his appointment that surfaced publicly Wednesday when the Jewish Insider website reported that he had been tapped for the job.
The Insider reported that, as recently as January 12, Davis had called Israel’s Gaza campaign “ethnic cleansing” and Washington’s support for the war “[o]n a moral level…a stain on our character as a nation, as a culture, that will not soon go away.” It also quoted him as saying “the ramifications [of a military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities] “could be “terrible for us and for Israel.”
Pro-Israel forces were quick to pounce. The ADL immediately denounced Davis’ appointment on X as “extremely dangerous,” noting that he “has diminished Hamas’s 10/7 attack, undermined US support for Israel’s right to defend itself, and blatantly denies the grave threat the Iranian regime poses to global stability and American interests.”
Opposition was also reportedly voiced by more traditional, pro-Israel Republicans within the administration and Congress, and, while the New York Times noted that his criticisms of Israel were “similar to certain critiques by liberal Democrats,” the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Agency, Virginia Sen. Mark Warner told Politico Davis was “utterly unqualified.”
While the result was the same, Davis’ moment in the D.C. spotlight was mercifully brief compared to the three-week ordeal undergone by Freeman in February 2009 when Blair hand-picked him to chair the NIC, which, among other responsibilities, is tasked with producing National Intelligence Estimates — that is, the consensus judgments on a given issue of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies.
A polyglot with unusually wide-ranging experience, Freeman served as chief interpreter during Richard Nixon’s historic 1972 trip to China, deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in the 1980s and ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War. He was also principal deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, among other posts.
Freeman was also known for his outspoken, iconoclastic, and often critical views of U.S. foreign policy, including the George W. Bush administration’s “global war on terror” and Washington’s de facto support of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.
“Our unconditional support …aids and abets the adoption of policies [by Israel] that are unilateralist, militarist, counterproductive, and inevitably self-defeating,” he noted in a lecture at MIT a few months before his appointment as NIO chair in a typical observation that enraged the Israel lobby, particularly hardline neoconservatives whose views generally aligned with Israel’s Likud Party. (Two decades of Freeman’s lectures on the Middle East, China, and U.S. foreign policy can be found here.)
The campaign, conducted mainly through the blogosphere and on Capitol Hill, was spearheaded by Steven Rosen, a former top official at the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). In the first of nearly daily blog posts published by the hardline neoconservative Middle East Forum, Rosen called Freeman’s views on Israel a “textbook case of old-line Arabism” and his appointment “profoundly disturbing.”
“Chas Freeman Is Bigoted And Out Of Touch” was the headline of an editorial by The New Republic’s then-publisher Martin Peretz, who claimed that the decorated ambassador was “bought and paid for” by the Saudi government via his chairmanship at the time of the Middle East Policy Council (MEPC), a Washington-based think tank that was partially funded by members of the royal family.
The current editor of The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg, likewise argued that Freeman, “well-known [sic] for his hostility toward Israel,” was also “a well-known advocate for the interests of Middle Eastern autocracies.” He was particularly incensed that the MEPC had published “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” an article by foreign policy realist scholars John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, that was denounced by, among other pro-Israel groups, the ADL as a “classical conspiratorial anti-Semitic analysis…”
The charges didn’t end with his alleged attitudes toward Israel and the Middle East. In his Wall Street Journal op-ed, Gabriel Schoenfeld and other neoconservative commentators claimed Freeman was unfit due to what they alleged was his downplaying of China’s military buildup, his past service on an advisory board of China’s largest oil company, and his alleged defense of Beijing’s bloody 1989 crackdown against protests in Tiananmen Square based on an uncontextualized excerpt from a post by Freeman in a private Internet discussion group of China hands.
A number of China experts known for their human rights advocacy, however, rejected the charge that he was a “panda hugger” and affirmed that he was a “stalwart supporter of human rights” during his China-related service at the embassy and the State Department.
The neoconservative campaign against Freeman also received pushback from more establishment media sources, including Washington Post columnist David Broder; Time’s Joe Klein, who called the attacks “assassination;” Foreign Policy’s David Rothkopf (“lynching by blog”); The Atlantic’s Andrew Sullivan; and Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria, who hosted Freeman on his CNN program, “GPS.”
Seventeen retired ambassadors, including several former U.S. ambassadors to Israel, also came out in support in a letter to the Journal. But much of that pushback came either after weeks of online attacks or, as in his “GPS” appearance, after Freeman had taken himself out of consideration.
Unlike Gabbard, DNI Blair stuck by his appointee throughout the assault, even testifying before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee to rebut the various charges that had been leveled against Freeman just hours before Freeman announced he was withdrawing.
In a statement issued immediately after his withdrawal, Freeman was characteristically direct both about the campaign against him and its implications. “The outrageous agitation that followed the leak of my pending appointment will be seen by many to raise serious questions about whether the Obama administration will be able to make its own decisions about the Middle East and related issues,” he wrote. “I regret that my willingness to serve the new administration has ended by casting doubt on its ability to consider, let alone decide what policies might best serve the interests of the United States rather than those of a Lobby intent on enforcing the will and interests of a foreign government.”
Asked by RS for his reaction to Davis’s withdrawal, Freeman emailed:
“Daniel Davis is a morally grounded, articulate, and intellectually honest realist. He has always focused on the national interests of the United States, as anyone familiar with his online and other commentary can attest. He's exactly the sort of person who should be speaking truth to power in the Trump administration. But …the Israel Lobby insists on Israel – not America – first, and opposes the American intelligence community engaging in the sort of objective analysis that Israel insists its own intelligence agencies provide. …Can any honorable person now hope to serve our country in positions of public trust without being subject to baseless but incapacitating caricature by special interests?”
It's a question worth asking.
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Top photo credit: A Russian army soldier walks along a ruined street of Malaya Loknya settlement, which was recently retaken by Russia's armed forces in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict in the Kursk region, Russia, in this still image taken from video released March 13, 2025. Russian Defence Ministry/Handout via REUTERS
President Zelensky should have pressed ahead with peace talks in August 2024, rather than invading Kursk. Ahead of talks between Presidents Trump and Putin this week, he has no cards left to play.
According to the New York Times on Sunday, Ukrainian troops are all but gone from the Russian Kursk region. At the peak of last August's offensive, Ukraine held 500 square miles of the Russian territory. After fierce fighting it holds just a sliver of that today.
It is perhaps ironic that President Volodymyr Zelensky’s audacious offensive took place in the midst of secret talks in Qatar towards a partial ceasefire. It is no coincidence that Russia’s offensive in Kursk over the past week took place while Ukraine was agreeing with the U.S. on the notion of a possible ceasefire during talks in Saudi Arabia.
The inauguration of President Trump in January made U.S.-led pressure to end the fighting both inevitable but also, more importantly, predictable. It is absolutely clear to me that for President Putin, retaking Kursk was essential to putting him in the best possible place to negotiate.
Zelensky had gambled on improving his hand of cards in future ceasefire talks by being able to trade land in Russia for the return of land in Ukraine. That gamble has failed. Prior to the past week, based on the Institute for the Study of War battle map, Russia had already occupied three-to-four times more land in Ukraine than was seized in Kursk.
Over the past 11 years, I have witnessed Russia’s preference for upping the military ante to put themselves in the strongest possible position before striking a deal. What has happened over the past week has been, in many respects, a carbon copy of the tactics Russia used immediately before the agreement of the Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 peace deals.
After the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk seized power following the February 2014 ouster of President Yanukovych, the Ukrainian army launched an Anti-Terror Operation to regain control of the Donbas. This led to considerable success on the Ukrainian side and the recapture of several large towns. With Ukrainian forces reaching the outskirts of Luhansk and Donetsk cities, the Russian military stepped into the conflict. On August 29, 2014, Russian formations encircled the town of Ilovaisk, inflicting a bloody defeat on the Ukrainian formations who are thought to have lost up to four hundred personnel. Just days later, the First Minsk agreement was signed, offering concessions to the separatists in the form of progress towards devolution.
The Ukrainian side didn’t push forward with devolution or a promised ‘national dialogue’. While the line of contact largely held, there were repeated violations of the ceasefire and casualties on both sides, including civilian casualties in the separatist areas which were verified by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. In late January 2015, Russian backed Wagner troops mounted a brutal and, ultimately, successful encirclement of the town of Debaltseve, causing a withdrawal of Ukrainian troops.
This battle of Debaltseve precipitated the negotiations in Minsk on February 11-12 to agree to the second Minsk agreement, with Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande at the talks. Minsk II strengthened the requirements on the Ukrainian side to push forward with devolution in the Donbas. Russia finally called a halt to the fighting on 18 February, as the UN Security Council endorsed the Minsk II deal.
The reported Russian encirclement in Kursk over the past week is audacious. According to reports, several hundred Russian troops crawled around nine miles through an unused gas pipeline to emerge behind Ukrainian formations. This caused panic and confusion among the Ukrainian formations who retreated, as larger Russian formations drove into the area from the west and east, threatening a complete encirclement.
The Ukrainians dispute this record of events, and have been backed up by the Institute for the Study of War, which told Western media on Friday that it has “observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces” in Kursk or anywhere else along the frontline in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, if reports are true, it offers further proof of Russia’s penchant for encirclement, going back to World War II, and the encirclement of the German army outside of Stalingrad. All across the Ukrainian front line during 2024, Russian forces have mounted a series of small tactical encirclements to capture villages and towns. Pro-Russian military bloggers were gleeful that the Kursk encirclement was made possible by gas pipes that were empty because of Ukraine’s decision to halt Russian gas transit to Europe as of January 1.
Let’s be clear, Ukraine had been fighting hard to keep hold of the Kursk bridgehead as part of Zelensky’s land-trade gamble. This year saw a major Ukrainian counter-attack, following a build-up of military material from western donor nations. At best, this Ukrainian operation ended in a draw, with some Russian gains in the west of Kursk and some marginal Ukrainian gains north of Sudzha.
Even if Ukraine had held onto its remaining bridgehead in Russia, it would have gone into any US-brokered peace talks in a weaker position than it was in August. In characteristic fashion, President Zelensky has this week been being throwing out chaff about President Putin avoiding the possibility of a peace deal. But, right now, and to echo President Trump’s words during their fated Oval Office meeting, he has the weakest hand of cards.
U.S. Special Representative Steve Witkoff has announced that Presidents Trump and Putin may speak in the coming week. I assess that President Putin will go into that conversation ready to settle if he receives the assurances that he seeks.
The question for Washington is what incentive they can offer to Putin to line up behind a ceasefire? UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and European leaders have been advancing, frankly unworkable, ideas about tightening sanctions on Russia to force a settlement. But Putin will not agree to stand down his troops and face yet more sanctions having gained the upper hand. Anyone who believes that he will is, I am sorry to say, quite deluded.
The biggest hint of what might persuade Putin was provided by the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte this week in an interview with Bloomberg. In possibly the most consequential ‘mm-hmm’ of this century, he offered the strongest signal that Ukrainian membership of the military alliance may now have been taken off the table. This is Russia’s top ask of any peace process. If President Trump makes that offer explicit and unequivocal, then I judge that President Putin would embrace a ceasefire and peace talks.
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