A prolonged war in Ukraine may impede what is necessary for the European Union to build — over some years to come — a conventional deterrent capable of coping with a much harsher and more volatile threat environment.
Achieving greater European strategic autonomy will be difficult so long as the conflict in Ukraine rages for a number of reasons —including domestic political polarization, weak economies, and constrained public finances.
Popular opinion appears to be shifting. As the war approaches its third year, rising shares of populations across Europe have voted for parties opposed to the war and/or calling for a negotiated settlement. A July 24 update to European public opinion on the war in Ukraine found that most respondents either anticipated or favored a negotiated settlement to end the war.Political turbulence
Parties of the populist-nationalist right (Alternative für Deutschland in Germany and Rassemblement National in France) and the populist-nationalist left (Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance in Germany and La France Insoumise in France) owe their electoral success in part to their opposition to support for Ukraine as well as to voters’ unhappiness with the sluggish economies of the Eurozone.
Economics Minister Robert Habeck’s (Greens) recent forecast for the German economy in 2024 is a 0.2% contraction, rather than the tepid growth of 0.3% previously forecast.
Reflecting the popular mood in their regions. leaders in Saxony and Brandenburg, Michael Kretschmer (CDU) and Dietmar Woidke (SPD), joined by Mario Voigt, CDU leader in Thuringia, published a call on October 4 for Germany to lead an effort toward a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine war. A peace demonstration in Berlin on October 3, German Unity Day, was led by Sahra Wagenknecht, but also attracted some participation from the SPD’s pro-peace faction.
A just-published Quincy Brief “The Risks to Germany and Europe of a Prolonged War in Ukraine” makes the case that an open-ended commitment to arm and finance Ukraine risks exacerbating the already daunting challenge to Europe’s own defense modernization, given fiscal constraints and high public debt in many EU countries.
Moreover, Thomas Graham, distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former senior diplomat, has advanced the case that European strategic autonomy is necessary and desirable from the standpoint of U.S. interests, and that one of the preconditions for early progress toward this aim is the stabilization of Ukraine.
He further argued that a settlement in Ukraine could, in time, open the way to stabilizing diplomatic measures such as arms control between the U.S.-Europe and Russia, including a revamped Conventional Forces in Europe framework.
The inconclusive war and mounting danger of uncontrolled escalation account, in part, for the turbulent politics across Europe affecting, among others, France and Germany, the traditional engines of European integration. The disabling of the Franco-German tandem weakens the EU’s potential to mount a coherent foreign and security policy, and the economic constraints are very real.
Economic turbulence
The recently published report on the EU economy by Mario Draghi, former chairman of the European Central Bank and Italian prime minister, is a detailed diagnosis and set of recommendations for unlocking growth potential in Europe. The report finds that the most glaring and significant indication of Europe’s sluggish growth and loss of competitiveness is a large gap in growth in Europe’s labor productivity compared to that of the U.S. since the year 2000.
Draghi attributes much of this productivity gap to Europe’s having “missed out on the digital revolution led by the internet and the productivity gains it brought.” To achieve the report’s primary aims — digitizing and decarbonizing the economy and increasing its defense capability — investment as a share of Europe’s GDP would have to rise by 5 percentage points to levels not seen since the 1960s and 1970s.
In defense industrial matters, the report cites the problem of fragmentation and duplication of effort among Europe’s member countries, and calls for Europe-wide coordination and integration of defense investments. By comparison to the United States, European defense spending has a wholly inadequate emphasis on technological innovation and R&D.
Since his appointment in 2019, the main protagonist for European ambitions to reshape defense industrial investment has been Thierry Breton, Commissioner for the Internal Market, a former French Minister of Economy and corporate CEO. A high-visibility turf battle between Breton and Commission president Ursula von der Leyen resulted in the latter’s angry resignation on September 16.
The critically important defense dossier is now the responsibility of Europe’s first Defense Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister and member of the European Parliament. He will face the challenge of finding resources to match the EU’s ambition to play a leading role in defense industrial modernization and will likely favor allowing U.S. and UK firms to compete in EU weapons and equipment procurement, something Breton would have resisted.
Both Kubilius and the new Commissioner for EU foreign policy, former Estonian prime minister Kaja Kallas, will likely insist on tying Europe’s defense industrial investment to meeting Ukraine’s needs in a prolonged war, rather than shifting the emphasis to Europe’s own territorial defense.
Breton has deplored what he sees as France’s having sacrificed its own influence relative to that of Germany within the Commission. The potential of the Franco-German tandem seems to be at a very low ebb, and no other group of members shows the potential to overcome the divisions within the European Union.
Draghi’s compelling diagnosis and recommendations seem unlikely to bring decisive and coordinated action to restore Europe’s competitiveness. While it would not instantly resolve the besetting problems of Europe, an early settlement of the Ukraine crisis is surely one of the crucial preconditions for progress toward European strategic autonomy.
Political turbulence
Parties of the populist-nationalist right (Alternative für Deutschland in Germany and Rassemblement National in France) and the populist-nationalist left (Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance in Germany and La France Insoumise in France) owe their electoral success in part to their opposition to support for Ukraine as well as to voters’ unhappiness with the sluggish economies of the Eurozone.
Economics Minister Robert Habeck’s (Greens) recent forecast for the German economy in 2024 is a 0.2% contraction, rather than the tepid growth of 0.3% previously forecast.
Reflecting the popular mood in their regions. leaders in Saxony and Brandenburg, Michael Kretschmer (CDU) and Dietmar Woidke (SPD), joined by Mario Voigt, CDU leader in Thuringia, published a call on October 4 for Germany to lead an effort toward a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine war. A peace demonstration in Berlin on October 3, German Unity Day, was led by Sahra Wagenknecht, but also attracted some participation from the SPD’s pro-peace faction.
A just-published Quincy Brief “The Risks to Germany and Europe of a Prolonged War in Ukraine” makes the case that an open-ended commitment to arm and finance Ukraine risks exacerbating the already daunting challenge to Europe’s own defense modernization, given fiscal constraints and high public debt in many EU countries.
Moreover, Thomas Graham, distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former senior diplomat, has advanced the case that European strategic autonomy is necessary and desirable from the standpoint of U.S. interests, and that one of the preconditions for early progress toward this aim is the stabilization of Ukraine.
He further argued that a settlement in Ukraine could, in time, open the way to stabilizing diplomatic measures such as arms control between the U.S.-Europe and Russia, including a revamped Conventional Forces in Europe framework.
The inconclusive war and mounting danger of uncontrolled escalation account, in part, for the turbulent politics across Europe affecting, among others, France and Germany, the traditional engines of European integration. The disabling of the Franco-German tandem weakens the EU’s potential to mount a coherent foreign and security policy, and the economic constraints are very real.
Economic turbulence
The recently published report on the EU economy by Mario Draghi, former chairman of the European Central Bank and Italian prime minister, is a detailed diagnosis and set of recommendations for unlocking growth potential in Europe. The report finds that the most glaring and significant indication of Europe’s sluggish growth and loss of competitiveness is a large gap in growth in Europe’s labor productivity compared to that of the U.S. since the year 2000.
Draghi attributes much of this productivity gap to Europe’s having “missed out on the digital revolution led by the internet and the productivity gains it brought.” To achieve the report’s primary aims — digitizing and decarbonizing the economy and increasing its defense capability — investment as a share of Europe’s GDP would have to rise by 5 percentage points to levels not seen since the 1960s and 1970s.
In defense industrial matters, the report cites the problem of fragmentation and duplication of effort among Europe’s member countries, and calls for Europe-wide coordination and integration of defense investments. By comparison to the United States, European defense spending has a wholly inadequate emphasis on technological innovation and R&D.
Since his appointment in 2019, the main protagonist for European ambitions to reshape defense industrial investment has been Thierry Breton, Commissioner for the Internal Market, a former French Minister of Economy and corporate CEO. A high-visibility turf battle between Breton and Commission president Ursula von der Leyen resulted in the latter’s angry resignation on September 16.
The critically important defense dossier is now the responsibility of Europe’s first Defense Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister and member of the European Parliament. He will face the challenge of finding resources to match the EU’s ambition to play a leading role in defense industrial modernization and will likely favor allowing U.S. and UK firms to compete in EU weapons and equipment procurement, something Breton would have resisted.
Both Kubilius and the new Commissioner for EU foreign policy, former Estonian prime minister Kaja Kallas, will likely insist on tying Europe’s defense industrial investment to meeting Ukraine’s needs in a prolonged war, rather than shifting the emphasis to Europe’s own territorial defense.
Breton has deplored what he sees as France’s having sacrificed its own influence relative to that of Germany within the Commission. The potential of the Franco-German tandem seems to be at a very low ebb, and no other group of members shows the potential to overcome the divisions within the European Union.
Draghi’s compelling diagnosis and recommendations seem unlikely to bring decisive and coordinated action to restore Europe’s competitiveness. While it would not instantly resolve the besetting problems of Europe, an early settlement of the Ukraine crisis is surely one of the crucial preconditions for progress toward European strategic autonomy.
