A new bipartisan proposal to ban members of Congress and their immediate family members from trading individual stocks looks to close a glaring conflict of interest between politicians who control massive government budgets, much of which go to private contractors.
The potential for serious conflicts of interest are quickly apparent when reviewing the stock trades of members of Congress's Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the panels responsible for the National Defense Authorization Act, the bill that sets recommended funding levels for the Department of Defense.
The 2024 NDAA authorized $886 billion, approximately half of which will go to contractors.
Five of the six most traded individual stocks by members of the House Armed Services Committee in the past year — Baxter International, Alphabet, NetApp, General Motors and KKR — had contracts with the Department of Defense, meaning that members may stand to benefit from the NDAA via their investments in companies with Pentagon contracts.
Members of the committee’s Senate counterpart, the Senate Armed Services Committee, also traded heavily in stocks. Like the House committee, five of the six most traded stocks by members on the Senate Committee — Cleveland Cliffs, Texas Instruments, Applied Materials, Humacyte and Chevron — had contracts with the Department of Defense.
The new “ETHICS Act,” introduced by Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Gary Peters (D-Mich.), Jon Ossoff (D-Ga.), and Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) addresses this increasingly glaring ethics problem in members personal finances and would prohibit the sort of trades that members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees are currently conducting.
“[I]f you want to serve in Congress don't come here to serve your portfolio, come here to serve the people,” Merkley told NPR
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa is welcomed by UAE's Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan as he arrives for a meeting with UAE's President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, April 13, 2025. Syrian Presidency/Handout via REUTERS
Syria’s new government seeks greater recognition and legitimacy from Western and Arab states, making President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s April 13 visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) important to his war-torn and much-sanctioned country’s future.
After Saudi Arabia, the UAE became the second Gulf Arab state that Sharaa visited as president, illustrating how Damascus and Abu Dhabi both place much value on bilateral engagement despite significant distrust in the relationship.
While accompanying Sharaa in Abu Dhabi, Syria’s Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani expressed the new government’s hope to “strengthen fraternal ties and cooperation” between Syria and the Emirates. UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, often known as MbZ, wished Sharaa success as Syria’s leader and committed Abu Dhabi to supporting Syria’s redevelopment, territorial integrity, and national unity.
Of all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, the UAE was most concerned about the implications of Assad’s fall last December. Abu Dhabi had played a central role in rehabilitating Assad’s regime from late 2018 until his ouster, which posed a major ideological and strategic challenge to the UAE’s leadership.
As a counterrevolutionary actor committed to a certain form of “authoritarian stability” and a status quo regional order, Abu Dhabi firmly opposes Islamist movements and causes, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, in the Arab world. This largely explains the UAE’s past support for Assad, along with anti-Muslim Brotherhood strongmen in Egypt, Libya, and Sudan.
When Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led rebel coalition toppled the Ba’ath regime, Abu Dhabi was worried that other regional Islamist/jihadist groups would be newly inspired and that the new leadership in Damascus would try to export its ideology to other Arab countries, possibly including GCC states.
Nonetheless, by engaging the new Syrian authorities shortly after Assad’s regime fell and hosting Sharaa and Shaibani, the UAE is being pragmatic about Syria’s new reality. Abu Dhabi assesses that by minimizing friction with Syria’s new government, it can steer Damascus away from conduct that could threaten Emirati interests.
At the same time, Sharaa has his own interests in establishing a friendly relationship with the UAE. In desperate need of massive amounts of foreign investment for its reconstruction and development, Sharaa is in no position to turn down help from wealthy Arab states. And given the UAE’s record of sabotaging revolutions in other Arab countries — Emirati support for the 2013 coup in Egypt being a prime example — Sharaa realizes that giving Abu Dhabi a stake in his government’s survival will reduce the chances that the UAE will offer support to any warlord or strongman in Syria who might later challenge Sharaa’s rule.
After all, Sharaa’s grip on power is weak, and he wants to ensure that Abu Dhabi does not see such weakness as an opportunity to roll back HTS’s rapid ascendency through any UAE-backed coup or insurgency.
“The UAE has always been steadfast in its opposition to Islamist parties and especially to activism and revolutionary change in the region,” Merissa Khurma, a non-resident fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute, told Responsible Statecraft. “Their footprint across the MENA region from Egypt to Sudan to Libya reinforces this policy. They are certainly taking a pragmatic approach in engaging Sharaa and are leaning in perhaps in response to Sharaa’s pragmatism.”
“Sharaa has also stated publicly that he and others are not interested in exporting the revolution elsewhere in the region — a step to reassure Arab leaders that most certainly had jitters when HTS toppled the Assad regime on December eighth" she added.
Sanctions
Washington’s Assad-era Caesar Act sanctions remain the main stumbling block to Syria’s reconstruction and development. With these derivative sanctions still strangling Syria’s economy, the UAE and other countries can’t invest in post-Assad Syria without risking their access to the U.S. market. The UAE, other GCC members, and Turkey have all called for lifting of U.S. and European sanctions on Syria.
Indeed, the UAE’s influence in Washington and European capitals offers one very good reason for Sharaa’s efforts to woo the UAE. MbZ has enjoyed a close relationship with President Donald Trump and other western leaders. Syria’s post-Ba’ath government wants Abu Dhabi to persuade the Trump administration to lift, or at least loosen, sanctions on Damascus.
“As a key regional player with considerable influence in both Washington, DC, and the EU, the UAE could serve as a critical geo-strategic partner to Syria's new government,” according to Mira Hussein, a fellow at the Alwaleed Centre at the University of Edinburgh.
“While Saudi Arabia remains an indispensable regional heavyweight and a key facilitator in Syria's reintegration into the Arab fold, the UAE's unique capacity to influence Western policy, particularly with regards to lifting sanctions, positions it as an ally to unlocking economic recovery and long-term stability in Syria,” she told RS.
Nonetheless, the Emirati scholar is not convinced that the UAE is willing to go to bat for post-Assad Syria in Washington due primarily to its lingering suspicions of Syria’s HTS-dominated government.
“While the UAE outwardly shares Syria's position on the desirability of lifting U.S. sanctions, it is unlikely to act as an outspoken advocate for such a shift in Washington, D.C., at this stage,” she said. “Abu Dhabi remains deeply cautious of political Islam in any form, and Syria's new leadership, though rebranded, bears ideological undertones that the UAE leadership has traditionally viewed with extreme suspicion and hostility.”
“Rather than signaling full political endorsement or readiness to leverage its influence in the U.S. on Syria's behalf, the UAE's engagement likely stems from more pragmatic concerns, chief among them is a desire to avoid being excluded in a rapidly evolving regional order shaped by the involvement of Turkey and Saudi Arabia,” Hussein added. “By maintaining a seat at the table, the UAE ensures it retains the ability to shape the future contours of Syria's re-integration and, more broadly, the regional balance of power.”
Qutaiba Idlbi, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center, sees Saudi Arabia, not the UAE, as the main Arab player supporting the Damascus government in Washington.
“Saudi is pushing to make sure Syria attends the World Bank Spring meetings in Washington and has been supporting Syria to get support through the World Bank,” he told RS.
Israel
Israel’s aggressive actions toward post-regime change Syria seriously dims the country’s prospects for restoring the country’s unity and stability. Mindful of the UAE’s normalized relationship with Israel, important security issues concerning Tel Aviv’s conduct were also relevant to Sunday’s visit.
Considering the UAE’s “productive security and political relations with the Israelis,” Abu Dhabi can play a “constructive” role in helping Damascus engage Tel Aviv in manners that decrease Israel’s footprint in Syria, according to Khurma. “No other country in the region can help deliver these messages to Israel than the UAE, whose diplomatic relations have continued with the Israelis despite pressures due to the brutal war in Gaza and rising tides of anger and anti-Israeli sentiments across the region,” she said.
However, Hussein does not believe that Abu Dhabi possesses sufficient leverage over Israel to prevent its encroachment into Syria. “While both the UAE and Israel may have opposing objectives regarding the post-Assad regime, albeit for different reasons, there is little indication that this issue would be broached with the UAE as a potential mediator. The notion that any Arab capital, including Abu Dhabi, could exert pressure on Israel in this regard appears highly implausible,” she explained.
Wider picture
Indeed, there remain challenges. Abu Dhabi’s concerns over HTS and its backing by rivals Turkey and Qatar could fuel serious problems in Syrian-Emirati relations down the road. Sharaa himself has so far acted shrewdly in avoiding alignment with any regional state or bloc that could alienate others.
In this sense, he is proving wiser than Assad, whose alignment with Iran alienated Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states. By engaging all the major Arab states, Turkey, the EU, and Russia, Sharaa is avoiding making a similar mistake.
His visit to Abu Dhabi, noted Idlbi, was “in line with Damascus’s strategy of zero foreign policy problems.”
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Top photo credit: People walk past a gate of the Samsung Electro-Mechanics factory, following U.S. President Donald Trump's imposition of a tariff rate of 46 per cent on Vietnam — later paused — in Thai Nguyen province, Vietnam, April 9, 2025. REUTERS/Thinh Nguyen
Vietnam’s trade fortunes have taken a dramatic turn.
Once slapped with a staggering 46% tariff in President Donald Trump’s initial “Liberation Day” trade offensive, the Southeast Asian nation now finds itself in a much better spot — benefiting from a reduced 10% tariff rate, in line with most other countries. It’s a striking reversal that highlights Hanoi’s stepped-up diplomatic hustle on the global stage.
Vietnam made a significant diplomatic stride recently by dispatching a high-level delegation to Washington, D.C., with the strategic goal of addressing trade imbalances and strengthening economic ties with the United States. In a move that underscored Hanoi's sense of urgency and determination, the Vietnamese government wasted no time in mobilizing its top talent, led by Deputy Prime Minister Ho Duc Phoc, signaling just how seriously the Vietnamese leadership views the issue of trade relations with the U.S.
Deputy Prime Minister Phoc’s visit was carefully orchestrated to engage with key figures in Washington's political and economic spheres. Among the high-profile meetings on the itinerary was a crucial dialogue with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Their Friday discussions reportedly centered on narrowing the trade gap between the two nations and pledges by Vietnam to tackle origin of goods fraud (China has been accused to shipping its products to be sold via countries like Vietnam to avoid tariffs). These and more fair and reciprocal trade practices that would benefit both economies were also reportedly discussed.
One of Trump's priorities has been to bring manufacturing back to the U.S. Textiles have all but moved overseas completely in the last 20 years resulting in the massive trade gap with Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam. Currently the U.S.trade deficit with Hanoi is $123.5 billion.
In anticipation of "Liberation Day" Hanoi cut its own tariffs on several U.S. products including LNG and cars, and also approved Starlink services, and pledged to bring in more imports from the U.S.
During the official visit last week, in addition to engaging with select members of former President Trump’s cabinet, the Vietnamese delegation also sought to strengthen ties within the U.S. legislative branch by meeting with key members of Congress. Notably, they held discussions with Republican Senators Bill Hagerty of Tennessee and Steve Daines of Montana, both of whom have demonstrated a strong interest in Asian economic affairs and the stability of global supply chains.
These meetings provided Vietnam with an opportunity to broaden its support base on Capitol Hill and reinforce bipartisan interest in deepening economic cooperation. By engaging lawmakers with strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, Vietnam is positioning itself as a reliable partner in efforts to diversify supply chains and promote regional stability — an increasingly important priority amid shifting global dynamics.
The diplomatic charm offensive extended beyond just official meetings. The Vietnamese team engaged with think tanks, trade groups, and other stakeholders throughout the Capital Beltway, aiming to strengthen long-term partnerships and build goodwill. The delegation's proactive approach, clear messaging, and high-level representation were widely seen as a diplomatic win for Hanoi.
The stakes are high for Vietnam since they have the third-largest trade surplus with the U.S. after China and Mexico and export more than $100 billion in goods to the U.S. annually, including Nike shoes.
After all, the original punitive tariff imposed by Washington on Vietnam had threatened to strain ties between the two nations at a critical moment — just as they mark 50 years since the fall of Saigon on April 30. As strategic comprehensive partners, the U.S. and Vietnam have built a relationship centered on economic cooperation, regional stability, and shared security interests in the Indo-Pacific.
“As we near the 50th anniversary of Saigon’s fall, the U.S.-Vietnam relationship rests on pragmatism more than sentiment. Vietnam’s youth — over half its population is under 35 — barely recall the war. They’re focused on iPhones, K-pop, and global brands flooding Hanoi’s malls,” claims Alison Huynh, a Silicon Valley investor and host of the Vietnam Summit at Mar-a-Lago, dedicated to fostering U.S.-Vietnam economic ties.
Under the leadership of Communist Party Secretary-General Tô Lâm, Vietnam is charting an ambitious course toward a more advanced economic future. The country has set its sights on becoming an upper-income, knowledge-based, and tech-driven economy by 2045. To achieve this transformation, Hanoi is aiming for annual growth rates approaching 8%, backed by major investments in education, innovation, and digital infrastructure.
This strategic shift comes at a time when Vietnam’s global trade position is gaining new momentum. For American consumers, especially in the post-NCAA championship shopping rush for Nike and Adidas gear (much of it made in Vietnam), the lower tariffs mean more competitive prices. But for Vietnam, it’s more than a short-term win: it’s a signal that the country is ready to play a bigger role in the global economy, not just as a manufacturing hub, but as a rising player in tech and innovation.
Over the past few decades, the U.S. and Vietnam have worked steadily to rebuild and strengthen their relationship, culminating in a formal upgrade to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” This partnership has been grounded in robust economic cooperation, mutual interests in maintaining regional stability, and shared security concerns across the Indo-Pacific.
However, the sudden imposition of a steep tariff risked more than just short-term economic pain. It threatened to disrupt key supply chains, rattle investor confidence, and weaken diplomatic trust — potentially nudging Vietnam closer to alternative economic alliances, including with China or regional blocs less aligned with U.S. strategic goals.
The recent decision by Washington to reduce and pause tariffs on Vietnam could also play a strategic role in managing tensions in the South China Sea. This move is more than an economic gesture — it signals a broader geopolitical alignment. As territorial disputes and regional rivalries escalate in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Washington’s approach to Vietnam reflects an effort to solidify alliances and partnerships in the region. By easing economic pressures, the United States is extending a hand to a key Southeast Asian partner, potentially bolstering Vietnam's economic resilience and encouraging closer diplomatic cooperation.
In an era marked by intensifying great power competition, maintaining relations with Vietnam is not only beneficial for trade but also pivotal for sustaining U.S. influence in the region. Vietnam occupies a strategic position both geographically and politically, sharing maritime boundaries with several contested zones in the South China Sea. Strengthening economic ties through tariff relief could deepen trust and pave the way for greater collaboration on security and regional stability. In this context, economic diplomacy becomes a tool for geopolitical strategy, helping to counterbalance China’s dominance and reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
From Vietnam's side of the court, by capitalizing on favorable trade conditions and embracing forward-looking reforms, Tô Lâm's team is positioning itself to not only maintain momentum, but also redefine its economic identity on the global stage. While the reduced tariffs may be a temporary advantage, if Vietnam sticks to its game plan, the rewards could be lasting.
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Top photo credit: US Army/US Department of Defense
What are the Trump administration’s plans for the U.S. Army at home and abroad?
The question hung over recent House and Senate hearings with Pentagon officials about security challenges facing the United States. “The Department [of Defense (DoD)] is undergoing a global force posture review…No decisions have been made at this time,” the acting assistant secretary for international security affairs, Katherine Thompson, responded at one session when asked about the possibility of changes to the U.S. military footprint in Europe.
For those looking past official statements, however, the writing is on the wall. To meet Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s budgetary and strategic goals, the U.S. Army will have to shrink, and the number of U.S. ground forces in Europe is likely to decline sharply. The Trump administration should not apologize for these changes. Though the moves will face pushback, they are badly needed and will better align U.S. military commitments with the country’s security priorities and available resources.
Since President Donald Trump’s second term began, his national security team has set some clear priorities: ending the war in Ukraine, securing the homeland, and shedding unnecessary costs and defense burdens to focus more attention on Asia. But the administration has been vague about what these goals will mean for the size and shape of the U.S. military and its forward presence overseas, especially in Europe where some 100,000 U.S. forces are currently stationed.
When he was in Europe in February, Hegseth was emphatic that the United States could no longer serve as the continent’s primary security guarantor due to “strategic necessities” including the challenges of competing with China and protecting the southern border. Though such assertions seemed to imply a pending drawdown of U.S. military presence in Europe, the Pentagon has avoided addressing the topic directly since.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio sounded a somewhat different tune on his own trip to Europe in April. Calling media speculation “hysteria and hyperbole,” Rubio argued that the United States had no intention of pulling away from NATO but simply wanted “NATO to be stronger.” Indeed, NATO officials have heard nothing specific from the United States about changes to U.S. military presence in Europe, but their fears and questions remain.
The answers NATO allies seek do not lie on the European continent, however, but in Hegseth’s major initiatives at home: realigning the Pentagon’s massive budget to fit the administration’s national security goals and mobilizing U.S. military power in support of President Trump’s border policies.
First, there is Hegseth’s February 18 memo instructing senior military officials and DoD leaders to draw up plans to cut 8% per year from their budgets for each of the next five years. The exercise is not focused on reducing the defense budget topline, however, but identifying resources that can be reallocated to the Trump administration’s defense priorities, including 17 areas Hegseth exempted from cuts.
Hegseth’s guidance leaves those looking for cost savings with relatively few choices. The protected categories cover many of the Pentagon’s priciest budget items: U.S. operations on the southern border, munitions programs, missile defense, executable ships and nuclear submarines, and military construction in Asia, among others. Notably under-represented on the list is the Army, for instance its prized modernization programs and support to commands in Europe or the Middle East, where Army personnel play the largest role.
Unsurprisingly, then, a recent budget simulation exercise run by American Enterprise Institute found that when making cuts under a strict interpretation of Hegseth’s guidance, the Army inevitably winds up as a significant “bill payer,” meaning that it absorbs a large share of required reductions. To a person, participants in the exercise reported that they had to cut U.S. Army force structure to make the budget math work.
Military planners in the Pentagon are likely to come to the same conclusion. From a budgetary perspective, reducing the size of the Army makes sense because force structure is a major military cost driver. Fewer units mean less money spent on total salary and benefits and lower requirements for training and equipment.
From a strategic perspective, cuts to Army positions match the Pentagon’s intent to shift its focus to Asia. Though the Army would contribute to contingency operations in the Indo-Pacific, the demand for ground personnel would be much lower than the need for maritime and air forces and their warships and aircraft.
If Hegseth moves ahead with his budget realignment, then, reductions in active-duty Army positions are likely. The size and shape of these reductions is harder to predict. The Army vigorously denied reports that it was planning to axe 90,000 active-duty jobs, asserting instead that “End Strength might even go up. We are building more combat power while reducing staff and overhead.”
It is likely that some cuts will occur among Army administrative roles or to the large and redundant staff hierarchies at service and combatant commands. But this will not be enough to free up the resources Hegseth has requested. Active-duty positions will almost certainly have to be eliminated as well, including some of the Army’s brigade combat teams (BCTs) and special operations forces.
On their own, these budget-driven cuts might not affect U.S. Army force posture in Europe. But there’s a second key factor: Trump’s militarized approach to the U.S. southern border — an activity that Hegseth protected in his memo.
So far, the demands of Trump’s push to assert “100% operational control” of the border with Mexico have fallen heavily on the Army. There are now about 6,600 active-duty military personnel, most from the Army, and over 2,000 Army National Guard forces supporting border operations. Units deployed from the active-duty force include a Stryker Brigade Combat Team, aviation units, and headquarters and sustainment support troops. Some of these soldiers come from high readiness units — those intended for crisis response — that were already struggling under high operational tempo from repeated overseas missions.
According to the commander of NORTHCOM, General Gregory Guillot, the border mission will last “years not months,” extending the burden they place on Army forces. In nine months or a year, the currently deployed units will rotate home and new soldiers will take their place. If the mission lasts all four years of Trump’s term, as many as 40,000 ground forces might serve a stint on the southern border.
While operating at the border, soldiers are obviously unavailable for missions overseas, but their unavailability will extend far beyond the end of their physical deployment. Returning soldiers will need a rest and refit period and time to catch up on training and repair equipment.
Ultimately, the combined pressure of force structure cuts and a sustained border security mission will leave many fewer Army personnel available for overseas deployment at any given time. U.S. Army presence in Europe is likely to bear the brunt of this shortfall, with reductions in permanent and rotational forces — up to 10,000 or 20,000 personnel — from Germany or Poland possible and even necessary to balance competing demands. The Army— and especially a smaller Army — can only stretch so far, and Hegseth has made clear that operations on the border rank above U.S. commitments in Europe in the Trump administration’s hierarchy.
Congress will howl against such moves, but reductions in Army force structure and presence in Europe are long overdue. The number of Army BCTs and the size of the service’s special operations and combat support forces remain bloated following the end of the 20-year global war on terror, leaving plenty of room for cuts.
Likewise, U.S. Army presence in Europe has increased significantly over the past 10 years, and now far outstrips what is necessary given the current threat picture, U.S. interests in the region, and the responsibilities of allies.
The Trump administration should not be shy about its plans to right-size the U.S. Army’s force at home and in Europe. Instead, it should champion the budgetary benefits and strategic necessity of critical changes previous administrations have been too tentative to make.
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