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Elbridge Colby

Elbridge Colby: I won't be 'cavalier' with U.S. forces

JD Vance came out to support the Pentagon no. 3 pick, but others challenged the nominee's realism

Analysis | QiOSK

In his senate confirmation hearing on Tuesday, Elbridge Colby, nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stood out as one of the few people auditioning for a Pentagon job who say they may want to deploy fewer U.S. troops across the globe, not more.

“If we’re going to put American forces into action, we’re gonna have a clear goal. It’s going to have a clear exit strategy when plausible,” he told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“A lot of my advocacy and commentary as a kind of public intellectual, if you will, has been pushing back against a lot of people who… [are] quite cavalier about the employment of military force.”

Colby said he and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth were on the same page. “We have a team that understands strength for sure, but also understands… the downside risks of the use of military force, and the importance of not being cavalier about… deploying our men and women in uniform.”

If confirmed, Colby’s role, essentially, would be to develop and advance a grand strategy for national defense, a position vital toward steering the Trump administration’s foreign policy direction. Colby had previously served under the last Trump administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017 to 2018.

The confirmation hearing was highly anticipated amid chatter that some congressional Republicans, skeptical of some of Colby’s realist foreign policy positions, could block the nomination.

Apparently anticipating a battle, Vice President J.D. Vance provided Colby’s official introduction Tuesday morning. "In so many ways, Bridge predicted what we would be talking about four years down the road, five years down the road, 10 years down the road. He saw around corners that very few other people were seeing around,” Vance said, calling Colby a friend.

Senators clearly wanted to test that foreign policy vision, particularly on Ukraine, Taiwan, and Iran. Senate Armed Services Committee Chair Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) challenged Colby’s position that “America has a strong interest in defending Taiwan, but Americans can survive without it.”

“Your views on Taiwan’s importance to the United States seems to have softened considerably,” Wicker mused to Colby.

"What I have been trying to shoot a signal flare over is that it is vital for us to focus and enable our own forces for an effective and reasonable defense of Taiwan and for the Taiwanese, as well as the Japanese to do more," Colby responded.

“I have some concerns about what you’ve said in the past, namely if we had to choose between hoping to contain a nuclear Iran and preventing Iran with military force from getting nukes that we should tolerate a nuclear Iran and try to contain it,” Senator Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) told Colby, while acknowledging a written statement from Colby that Iran should be prevented from developing a nuclear weapon.

Cotton asked Colby whether he would “commit to providing the President with credible, realistic military options to stop Iran from going nuclear.” Colby affirmed he would if diplomacy fails, agreeing that a nuclear Iran would be “an existential danger.” Senators grilled Colby on the Trump administration’s Ukraine strategy, much like they did during billionaire investor Stephen Feinberg’s Deputy Secretary of Defense hearing last week.

“I cannot believe that the United States would side with dictators over democracies, over our democratic partners and allies. We must stand with Ukraine,” Senator Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.) said, slamming the recent Trump-Vance-Zelensky debacle which left Zelensky without a deal last week. Senators Tammy Duckworth (D- Ill.), Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), and Angus King (I-Maine) also asked Colby explicitly whether Russia invaded Ukraine.

Saying that he was concerned his comments might disrupt ongoing diplomatic negotiations towards ending the Ukraine war, Colby largely avoided answering questions along these lines.

Other moments went more smoothly. To the approval of senators present, for example, Colby said he’d advocate for higher defense spending levels to prop up the country’s defense industrial base. “I think we’re in a situation where more robust levels of defense spending are clearly good,” Colby said.

Colby had other chances to showcase his realist foreign policy perspective at the hearing.

Although he stressed NATO’s importance as a military alliance, for example, Colby also noted that “we are not in a unipolar, military dominant situation with respect to NATO.” Indeed, he explained that the growing prominence of intergovernmental organization BRICS was a "representation of the changing world dynamic,” where the U.S. would have to contend with the realities of other nations gaining more ground in world affairs.

“We’re no longer in Charles Krauthammer’s unipolar world,” he said, citing the late columnist’s famed 1990 article, which framed the U.S. as the global hegemon. “The Saudis are talking to the Russians and they’re talking to us, that’s how the world is going to be. That’s the reality of the world system as it is now.”

Altogether, senators present expressed mixed feelings toward Colby’s performance. Reports indicate Democrats will unite against Colby’s nomination, meaning even one Republican voting against him may block his ascension to the position. However, Senate GOP sources suggest that Colby faces less resistance now that more controversial Trump picks, like Hegseth and Gabbard, have been confirmed.

At the time of writing, details about when a final vote may take place remain unclear.


Top image credit: Elbridge Colby is seen at Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearings to examine his nomination to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Dirksen Senate office building in Washington, DC, on Tuesday, March 4, 2025. (Photo by Mattie Neretin/Sipa USA).
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Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

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Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

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