The Biden administration says it is giving Israel 30 days to address concerns related to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
In a letter to two senior Israeli officials dated Oct. 13, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said, “We are now writing to underscore the U.S. government’s deep concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza, and seek urgent and sustained actions by your government this month to reverse this trajectory.”
But critics are panning the letter, calling it a political gambit that’s too little and too late.
“I don’t know whether I'm terribly naive, I still have the capacity to be shocked, but the degree of cynicism required to set a 30 day limit … which coincidentally, gets you past the election date,” said Daniel Levy, president of the U.S./Middle East Project. Levy spoke about the letter Tuesday during a panel discussion on Israel’s war in Gaza hosted by the Quincy Institute.
The letter warns that a “failure to demonstrate a sustained commitment to implementing and maintaining these measures may have implications (arms embargo) for U.S. policy under NSM-20 and relevant U.S. law.” The problem with this is that “the Biden administration hasn’t done this (ultimatums) throughout” the last year when it could have, according to Levy.
Others wondered, given atrocities are playing out in real time, whether the Biden administration would act on its ultimatum.
“The U.S. giving Israel 30 days to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza or face cuts in weapon shipments is the most dishonest and morally bankrupt announcement I've seen for a long time,” said former UK diplomat Ian Proud on X. “Surely U.S. voters aren't so stupid they won't spot a big can of worms kicked down the street until after the elections?”
Blinken and Austin say that a minimum of 350 aid trucks per day need to enter Gaza through the four major crossings, as well as a fifth crossing that must be opened. Additionally, they want to ensure that Israel is not preventing essential items from entering Gaza by listing them as “dual use.”
They also insist “that there will be no Israeli government policy of forced evacuation of civilians from northern to southern Gaza.”
Dr. Annelle Sheline, Middle East fellow at the Quincy Institute, said that the letter appears to be a “clear acknowledgement” that the Biden administration knows that Israel is flouting laws governing U.S. military assistance.
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Top photo credit: Candidate for the presidency of Romania, Calin Georgescu, and his wife, Cristela, arrive at a polling station for parliamentary elections, Dec. 1, 2024 in Mogosoaia, Romania. Georgescu one the first round in the Nov. 24 presidential elections but those elections results have been canceled (Shutterstock/LCV)
The Romanian Constitutional Court’s unprecedented decision to annul the first round results in the country’s Nov. 24 presidential election and restart the contest from scratch raises somber questions about Romanian democracy at a time when the European Union is being swept by populist, eurosceptic waves.
The court, citing declassified intelligence reports, ruled that candidate Călin Georgescu unlawfully benefitted from a foreign-backed social media campaign that propelled him from an obscure outsider to the frontrunner by a comfortable margin. Romanian intelligence has identified the foreign backer as Russia. Authorities claim that Georgescu’s popularity was artificially inflated by tens of thousands of TikTok accounts that promoted his candidacy in violation of Romanian election laws.
Meanwhile, the European Commission has ordered TikTok to "preserve internal documents and information" related to its recommendation system, adding that it has not yet decided whether TikTok has violated its content moderation policies.
The ruling follows a court-ordered recount of the first round that found no irregularities or evidence of systemic voter fraud. It is not clear what new evidence emerged between the court’s decision to confirm the first round results and the subsequent annulment.
It has not been established even cursorily, let alone to a degree sufficient to pass for legally admissible evidence, that this alleged social media coordination had a specific electoral impact large enough to change or even significantly impact the results of the first round of voting.
It is, after all, not unusual for outsider candidates with little to no name recognition to reap the windfall from widespread anti-establishment sentiment in an election cycle where, as it appears, the more well-known anti-establishment candidates were too distrusted or disliked to hold on to the protest vote.
In a two-round voting system, the second round is itself a built-in corrective that gives voters a separate chance to assess the candidates.
The Constitutional Court, by upending this process, has done more to erode voters’ faith and confidence in the country’s democratic institutions than anything Moscow could have hoped to achieve through its hybrid influence operations. This move has lent credence to Georgescu’s anti-establishment, populist message in a way that is likely to further boost his electoral appeal, making it tactically ill-advised in addition to all the other procedural concerns that have been heaped on it.
It is not insignificant in light of these political considerations that Georgescu’s opponent in the second round, Elena Lasconi, has forcefully opposed the annulment.
“Today is the moment when the Romanian state has trampled on democracy,” she said. “We should have gone ahead with the vote. We should have respected the will of the Romanian people, whether we like it or not, legally and legitimately, nine million Romanian citizens, both at home and in the diaspora, have expressed their preference for a particular candidate by voting.”
There is an unmistakable geopolitical specter looming over Romania’s constitutional crisis. Georgescu is an avowed eurosceptic who — like his Slovakian, Hungarian, and to some extent Bulgarian counterparts — has been critical of NATO’s approach to the Ukraine war at a time when the French and German governments are facing major challenges of their own.
These headwinds augur not just a potential European peeling away from the Biden-led united front on Ukraine, but a larger shake-up in the transatlantic relationship both Washington and Brussels should tackle frankly and proactively, not as a fire to be put out but as an opportunity to place the U.S.-EU relations on a more sustainable strategic footing.
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Top photo credit: Palestinians take part in a "Great March of Return" demonstration, on the Gaza-Israel border, in east of Gaza city in the Gaza Strip. 07 December, 2018. Palestinian Territory, Gaza City (Shutterstock/hosny f. Salah)
The retiring United Nations envoy for the Middle East peace process has insightfully identified a major reason the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians continues to boil and to entail widespread death and destruction.
In a recent interview with the New York Times, Norwegian diplomat Tor Wennesland criticized the international community for relying on short-term fixes such as improving quality of life in occupied territory or diversions such as seeking peace deals between Israel and other Arab states. The crescendo of bloodshed during the past year underscores the ineffectiveness of such approaches.
Needed but not employed was a concerted and sustained diplomatic effort to end the occupation and create a Palestinian state. “What we have seen,” said Wennesland, “is the failure of dealing with the real conflict, the failure of politics and diplomacy.”
Much of Wennesland’s criticism was directed at the international community as a whole, but his points would apply especially to the United States, the patron of the party to the conflict that controls the land in question and resists Palestinian sovereignty.
The polar opposite of the needed diplomatic effort is what has been the dominant strategy of Israel and to a large degree also of the United States: the application of ever more military force. This was true with the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel, the first full-scale Arab-Israeli war after Israel conquered in 1967 what is now the occupied territories of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights.
The central feature of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s policy was a huge airlift of military supplies to Israel. Nixon and Kissinger, viewing the conflict in Cold War terms, considered their policy a success by enabling Israel to turn the tide of battle while shutting the Soviet Union out of a meaningful regional role.
Fast forward to today, and the emphasis is still on military escalation. Israel, in its vain effort to “destroy Hamas” and strike down adversaries on its northern border, is more committed than ever to increasing death and destruction as its default approach toward any security problem. The United States has abetted this approach by gifting $18 billion in munitions to Israel since October 2023.
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria does nothing to discourage these tendencies and may instead encourage them. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded to the events in Syria with celebration and self-congratulations, claiming that Assad’s fall was due to earlier Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah and Iran. The change of regime was an occasion for Israel increasing rather than decreasing its offensive military activity in Syria, including seizure of a previously demilitarized buffer zone along the Golan frontier and airstrikes in and around Damascus on the very weekend that rebels were entering the capital.
During the intervening years since the 1973 war, a couple of U.S. presidents did make genuine efforts to advance an Israeli-Palestinian peace. But the necessary follow-up — largely the responsibility of subsequent administrations — did not occur.
After Jimmy Carter brokered the 1978 Camp David Accords, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin pocketed the resulting peace treaty with Egypt while ignoring the part of the accords dealing with the Palestinians. After Bill Clinton in 2000 laid on the table his "parameters" for a deal, the two sides came closer than ever to a peace agreement, but an Israeli election ended the negotiations and the new Israeli government did not return to the table.
The current impending change in U.S. administrations offers little or no hope for positive change on this subject. After social media posts by President-elect Donald Trump that said nothing about diplomacy and instead talked about “all hell to pay” if Israeli hostages were not released by his inauguration on January 20, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thanked Trump for his “strong statement.”
Ignoring that Israel has both the power and the land and is inflicting many times more suffering on innocent civilians than anything Hamas has done, Netanyahu said that Trump’s statement “clarifies that there is one party responsible for this situation and that is Hamas.”
Echoes of a 1973-style Cold War mentality can be heard today in much discussion of U.S. policy toward the Middle East and overwhelmingly in Israeli rhetoric. The main bête noire this time is Iran, reducing the influence of which is a constantly invoked rationale for hawkish and military-heavy policies.
The Middle East is not the only region that has demonstrated the fallacy of the notion of de-escalating a conflict through military escalation. As Wennesland puts it, “Politics is what ends war, and diplomacy is what ends war.”
It is important to understand what diplomacy in this context does and does not mean. It does not mean routinely giving lip service to a “two-state solution” while doing little or nothing to bring about such a solution.
Nor does it mean seeking agreements for the sake of agreements, motivated in large part by a desire to wave supposed accomplishments before a domestic constituency. This was true of the so-called "Abraham Accords," which were not peace agreements at all but instead were largely about Israel not having to make peace to enjoy formal relations with other regional states, with which Israel was not at war anyway.
It was true as well of the enormous priority that the Biden administration put on seeking a similar agreement with Saudi Arabia, which, even if it had materialized in the form the administration envisioned, would not have served either U.S. interests or the cause of Middle East peace. The administration’s effort along this line was counterproductive not only in further reducing any Israeli incentive to make peace with the Palestinians but also, as President Biden himself admitted, in probably being an additional motivation for Hamas to attack Israel last October.
As for what diplomacy does mean, it includes the concerted and sustained use of diplomatic energy, policymaking bandwidth, and political capital to address directly the core issues underlying a conflict and bring about a result that makes a difference. In the Middle East context, that result needs to include Palestinian self-determination and an end to occupation.
Correct understanding of diplomacy also speaks to what a foreign policy of restraint means. It does not mean isolationism. In areas such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it can mean an increase in diplomatic involvement and in the priority that policymakers give to the goal being sought. As the restraint-minded Quincy Institute puts it in its statement of principles, the United States “should engage with the world” and pursue peace “through the vigorous practice of diplomacy.”
Much damage from the policies that Wennesland laments has been done and cannot easily be reversed. The Israeli settlement enterprise in the occupied territories, which tsk-tsks from the United States have done nothing to stop, have led many observers — though not Wennesland — to believe that a two-state solution is no longer possible.
But even if the requirement of Palestinian self-determination could be achieved only through a one-state solution that provides equal rights for all, the same principle — that peace can be achieved only through vigorous diplomacy and not military escalation — applies.
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Top photo credit: A U.S. Soldier oversees members of the Syrian Democratic Forces as they raise a Tal Abyad Military Council flag over the outpost, Sept. 21, 2019. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Andrew Goedl)
A surprise offensive by Islamist, al-Qaida-linked group Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has forced President Bashar al-Assad out in Syria. In turn, the U.S. is ramping up its long-term involvement in a country already devastated by years of war.
According to a Sunday statement by President Joe Biden, the U.S. has made haste to strike a freshly post-Assad Syria 75 times, allegedly hitting ISIS targets with B-52 bombers and F-15 fighters. “We’re clear-eyed about the fact that ISIS will try and take advantage of any vacuum to reestablish its credibility, and create a safe haven,” Biden explained. “We will not allow that to happen.”
The U.S. has repeatedly struck Syria over the last year, including nine strikes on two allegedly Iran-aligned targets in November. According to U.S. Central Commend (CENTCOM), the strikes were to blunt Iranian backed groups’ capacity to attack U.S. forces combating ISIS in the region.
Meanwhile, an estimated 900 troops are currently stationed in Syria. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Daniel Shapiro said on Sunday that the military presence will be maintained in Syria to prevent an ISIS resurgence. "We are aware that the chaotic and dynamic circumstances on the ground in Syria could give ISIS space to find the ability to become active, to plan external operations, and we're determined to work with those partners to continue to degrade their capabilities," Shapiro said.
Theoretically, U.S. forces are to keep ISIS in check as Shapiro suggests; in practice, U.S. forces also collaborate with the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). And while the U.S. insists such collaboration is limited to anti-ISIS efforts, Al Monitor reported that U.S. troops may have assisted an SDF effort to oust pro-Syrian government forces in villages near Deir ez-Zor in an incident last week, which injured two U.S. soldiers.
Altogether, complex circumstances in Syria have indirectly put NATO allies Turkey and the U.S. in contention with one another. Indeed, Turkey has long opposed the U.S. backed SDF’s quasi-independent Kurdish zone in North-Eastern Syria; the New York Times reported that Turkish forces attacked the U.S.-backed SDF troops over the weekend.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has also signaled interest in Syria’s oil. Right now, the SDF occupies Syrian territory in the northeast that incorporates the vast majority of the country's oil fields.
Then-President Donald Trump attempted to withdraw the troops in 2019 but was stonewalled and misled by his Pentagon. Later, he said in a press conference at the White House with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that "we're keeping the oil. We have the oil. The oil is secure," which then translated into a policy of the troops staying in the country to ostensibly secure the oil for the Kurdish SDF and to keep it out of the hands of ISIS. Yesterday posting on Truth Social, he appeared to signal that the U.S. may not even have that interest, anymore. "Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, & THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!"
Others are in agreement, suggesting it is time for the 900 U.S. military personnel to get out, particularly as ground conditions in Syria are rapidly changing and HTS works to consolidate power.
As retired Lt. Col. Daniel Davis of the Deep Dive podcast tells RS: “100% the first move the United States should make is to get our vulnerable troops out of Syria. They provide no value for the United States, but serve merely as a point of strategic vulnerability. It should’ve ended a long time ago, but definitely should end now.”
Veterans groups are also weighing in. “Instead of recognizing that there are no vital national interests at stake in Syria, President Biden indicated in recent remarks that he intends to double down on a failed strategy by unnecessarily keeping U.S. troops in harm’s way in Eastern Syria,” a joint statement by Americans for Prosperity and Concerned Veterans for America read. “Americans know too well how regime change can lead to endless wars, squandering lives and dollars on interventions that do not serve our national interest.”
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