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When 100 new B-21 bombers just isn't enough

This week in The Bunker: one defense contractor bets big bucks that the Pentagon will buy more

Analysis | Military Industrial Complex

The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.

Bomber builder losing money … for now

When playing Pentagon poker, when is a loss not a loss? When reading the tea leaves convinces you that today’s loss will yield a bigger win tomorrow. You knew this was coming as soon as the Air Force general in charge of dropping nuclear bombs dropped one last month: The Pentagon’s planned buy of 100 B-21 bombers isn’t enough. He really, honestly, truthinessly needs 145 of the bat-winged warplanes.

Things have changed since that original number was set in 2011, and it just won’t do in today’s world, General Anthony Cotton, chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, said March 18. “The production rate that was agreed upon was, I think, in [that] geopolitical environment. That’s a little different than the geopolitical environment that we will face for decades to come,” he said. “Hence, I, as a customer, would love to see larger production rates.”

So, as day follows night, 35 days later Northrop announced that it was taking a $477 million loss on its B-21 program. Largely, that’s so it — wait for it! — can build more of the highly-classified bombers, faster. Much of that sum is dedicated to an unspecified production “process change” for the B-21. “That process change supports the accelerated production rates,” Kathy Warden, Northrop’s CEO, said April 22. “We can ramp beyond the quantities in the program of record,” she added, referring to the Air Force’s piddling 100-bomber buy. “Which is something that we and the government decided was important for the optionality to support the scenarios that they have been looking at to increase the current build rate.”

“Optionality”?

Of course, pretty much everything about the B-21 Raider, including its “build rate” — how many a year we’ll get to buy — remains secret. But Northrop’s website does have a handy-dandy FAQ section dedicated to the bomber. “The U.S. Air Force has stated plans to acquire at least 100 aircraft,” it says. “Some defense analysts believe that the Air Force should plan to purchase at least 200 B-21s.” Gotta wonder how much of a bonus the PR whiz pocketed who added “at least 200.”

The B-21 made its first flight late in 2023, and five more bombers are now under construction in California. Capable of carrying both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, the B-21 is slated to go operational in 2027. Calculating its cost can be challenging. Bloomberg reported in 2022 that the 100 bombers would cost $89.1 billion to produce, or $891 million a copy. But that’s based on 2019 dollars. While the bomber may have some ability to elude enemy radar, it can’t elude inflation.

But not to worry. That’s why we have Congress. On Sunday(!), April 27, GOP lawmakers proposed that the Pentagon needs $150 billion more, including $4.5 billion “for acceleration of the B-21 long-range bomber aircraft(PDF).

Why isn’t good enough good enough?

Hurray for Lockheed! Sure, that’s not The Bunker’s usual take on the Pentagon’s biggest contractor. But on April 22, the company did something refreshing. Instead of challenging competitor Boeing’s recent winning bid to build the Air Force’s new F-47 fighter, it decided to improve the existing Lockheed-built F-35.

Now granted, the F-35 continues to be plagued by cost, production, and readiness woes. But when defense contractors lose a major contract, many opt to file a “bid protest” with the Government Accountability Office in hopes of reversing the decision. It rarely works and only serves to delay the program.

In this case, Lockheed has instead decided to cram some of the unspecified new technologies it has developed for its losing F-47 sixth-generation bid into the fifth-generation F-35. “There are techniques and capabilities … that were developed for [our F-47 bid] that we can now apply here,” Lockheed CEO Jim Taiclet said. “We’re basically going to take the [F-35's] chassis and turn it into a Ferrari.” That’s pretty funny, because four years ago the Air Force’s top officer said the F-35 was already a Ferrari. (And for all those years you thought the “F” in F-16s, F-35s, etc., stood for “Fighter.”)

But what’s not funny is something else Taiclet said: “My challenge here on my aeronautics team is, let’s get 80% of six-gen capability at half the price … they wouldn’t have agreed to this if they didn’t think there was a path to get there.” (But don’t think that’ll be a bargain. Best estimates suggest that F-47s will end up costing $300 million each, meaning a supercharged F-35 would cost $150 million.)

Why should it take losing a contract to compel a contractor to build something nearly as good for half the price? No doubt there’s some Lockheed hyperbole there. But it’s no more hyperbolic than the hypersonic frenzy used to justify the F-47. Here’s an inside tip: Foreign foes are never as threatening as those with an (in)vested interest in fighting them claim. And its corollary: Shiny new U.S. weapons are never as good when they roll off the assembly line as they are at conception.

The death of decapitation

You may have seen images of Pope Francis in his open coffin last week. That’s because the Vatican wanted you to see them. But what if some terror group — or rogue state — didn’t want the world to know their leader had been killed by a U.S. missile strike, or offed during a capture-or-kill mission that defaulted to the death option?

That’s no longer a theoretical question. “Synthetic media may allow terrorist organizations to simulate the continued presence of deceased leaders, undermining public belief in their deaths,” Army Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Fecteau wrote April 23 at West Point’s Modern War Institute website. “Generative AI is not just a tactical threat; it is a strategic disruptor that challenges the foundations of belief, perception, and reality in modern warfare.”

In other words, the next time a good guy kills a bad guy, AI could generate a fake living bad guy to declare: “You missed.”

Here’s what has caught The Bunker’s eye recently

Shield of dreams

Declaring you’re going to build a “Golden Dome” missile shield and building it are two very different things, NPR’s Geoff Brumfiel explained April 22.

Walking the plank

James Holmes of the Naval War College autopsies the 1989 blast aboard the USS Iowa that killed 47 sailors and details how and why the Navy compounded the tragedy with its disgraceful investigation, April 23 in The National Interest.

War game

A new book by Phil Tinline, reviewed in the New York Times April 27, examines a 1967 magazine article that argued that war is “the essential economic stabilizer of modern societies.” It was a crafty hoax, but so well done, that it infects U.S. society even today.

Thanks for infecting The Bunker with your attention this week. Consider forwarding it to friends so they can subscribe here.


Top image credit: Project on Government Oversight
Analysis | Military Industrial Complex
POGO The Bunker
Top image credit: Project on Government Oversight

Bombers astray! Washington's priorities go off course

Military Industrial Complex

The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.


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Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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Syria sanctions
Top image credit: People line up to buy bread, after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria December 23, 2024. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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