The fall of the Baath state in Syria is a serious defeat for Russia (and a disaster for Iran). It would however be a grave mistake to assume that this by necessity makes it a success for the United States.

Moscow and Washington may indeed now face similar challenges in Syria.

Three issues led Russia to intervene in the Syrian civil war to save the Assad regime. First was a general desire to preserve a partner state — one of the very few remaining to Russia after the U.S. overthrow of the regimes in Iraq and Libya, which helped to prop up Moscow’s international influence. Second was a desire to retain Russia’s only naval and air bases in the Mediterranean.

Third was a deep Russian fear that an Islamist victory would lead to Syria becoming a base for terrorism against Russia and its partners in Central Asia. That anxiety was increased by the presence of numerous fighters from Chechnya and other Muslim regions of Russia in the ranks of the Islamist forces in Syria and Iraq.

Moscow’s hope of preserving a partner state has now irredeemably collapsed. As to the terrorist threat, we will have to see. Given the huge challenges it will face in rebuilding the Syrian state, it would seem insane for the new regime led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to sponsor international terrorism; and, as part of his general strategy of disowning his Al Qaeda past, its leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, has promised not to do this.

There will, however, be a question mark over HTS’s ability to control its allies, and some of its own followers. In Afghanistan, the Taliban promised not to back international terrorism when they returned to power, and have apparently kept their word. The Afghanistan-based Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), however, continues to do so; and from some mixture of weak control over parts of Afghanistan and unwillingness to engage in new conflict, the Taliban have not been able fully to prevent this.

This leaves the issue of the Russian naval base at Tartus and air base near Latakia. The Russian squadron based at Tartus has reportedly left the port. This could be either a definitive evacuation or a precautionary move to keep them out to sea until relations with the new regime are clarified. The Russian air base is said to be surrounded by HTS forces, but has not been attacked. It is reported that there has been a deal between Moscow and HTS to guarantee the security of the bases, but, if so, this arrangement may be purely temporary.

Given the extremely complicated and uncertain nature of its relations with all Syria’s neighbors, it might make good sense for the new regime in Damascus to allow the bases to remain (perhaps in return for Russian supplies of oil and food) in order to balance its diplomatic and economic options.

This issue however is intimately tied up with that of the new regime’s policy towards Syria’s ethno-religious minorities, which generally supported the Baath regime out of fear of Sunni Islamist oppression (a fear amply justified by the savage fate of their communities in Syria and Iraq which fell to ISIS).

Where Russia’s bases are situated along the Mediterranean coast lies the heartland of Syria’s Christian and Alawite minorities. The Assad dynasty came from the Alawites, a Shia sect, and, for the past 50 years, the Baath state in Syria has been to a great extent an Alawite one. Alawite militias played a crucial role on the government side in the civil war, and inflicted numerous atrocities on their opponents.

Al-Jolani has promised that there must be no revenge for this, that minority rights will be respected, and that there will be no imposition of severe Sunni Islamist law. Even if he is sincere about these pledges, however, his followers may feel differently.

An HTS-led regime in Damascus that wishes to reassure the Alawites and Christians might see an interest in allowing the Russian bases to remain. A regime fearful of minority revolt (and outside backing for such revolt), however, would likely see the Russian bases as potential support for such rebellion.

For Russia to retain its bases against the will of the new Syrian government, and with the support of local Alawite and Christian forces, would not only require the intervention of Russian ships and aircraft but also the deployment of significant numbers of ground forces. Given the war in Ukraine, it is highly unlikely that Russia has such forces to spare.

Moreover — as with the equally rapid collapse of the U.S. proxy Afghan state — the way in which Syrian state forces melted away in the face of the HTS-led insurgent forces will hardly encourage Russia to continue the fight in Syria.

In a different form, these issues also face U.S. policy in Syria. Will Washington attempt to keep its own bases in Syria (from which it has attacked both ISIS and Baath regime targets)? Will the new regime turn a blind eye to them, or attempt to force them out?

The greatest issue of all for the U.S. to consider is the fate of the Syrian Kurds. During the Syrian civil war, with massive help from the U.S. and the semi-independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, Syrian Kurdish forces (the Democratic Union Party or PYD) occupied a huge swath of northeastern Syria, considerably beyond their core ethnic territory. The U.S. has several bases and logistics operations in the region.

The one outside the country which appears to have been critical to HTS’s victory, and to have profited unquestionably from it, is Turkey and the Turkish government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The HTS offensive emerged from the Turkish-controlled area of northern Syria and could hardly have occurred without Turkish support. HTS’s successful use of drones strongly hints at Turkish aid.

Turkey has two core interests in Syria. The first is to establish a situation in which the three million Syrian refugees in Turkey who fled their homeland during the civil war can return home. That may now be achievable, if the new government in Damascus can establish basic peace and order and receive some international aid. Hundreds of refugees are reportedly already queuing up to cross back into Syria from Turkey.

The second Turkish interest is to reduce the power and territory of the Syrian Kurds, whom it has accused of being allied to PKK Kurdish rebels in Turkey. Simultaneously with the HTS offensive against the Baath regime, the Turkish-backed “Syrian National Army” rebels supported by Turkish airpower launched an offensive against the Kurdish PYD (officially designated by Turkey as “terrorists”), capturing the town of Manbij. This creates a situation in which proxies backed by a NATO member (though an increasingly estranged one) are attacking a U.S. proxy, without the U.S. seemingly being able to do much about it.

If Turkey pushes the new regime in Damascus to join in the attack on the Kurdish-controlled territories in northeastern Syria, this will create dilemmas for Washington akin to those facing Russia in the west. Would the Trump administration abandon its Kurdish allies, in accordance with Trump’s statement that “This is not our fight. Let it play out. Do not get involved?” Or would the demands of “credibility” compel Washington to come to their aid, even at the potential cost of triggering a deep crisis with Turkey?

The Middle East resembles a billiard table, in which the movement of one ball is liable to send the others flying off in different directions and in turns bouncing off each other. The difference is that, unlike in billiards, even the most insightful expert cannot predict in which direction the balls will move; and no outside player has been able to control them.

On the whole, the wisest approach by far would seem to be that of the Chinese, who import much of their energy from the region while determinedly avoiding intervention and taking sides in its conflicts.

For, as a Chinese diplomat said to me many years ago, “Why would we want to get involved in that mess?”