Top photo credit: Times of India/You Tube/Screengrab: US contractors deployed in Gaza in February 2025.
Not Blackwater or Wagner, Americans in Gaza are 100% mercenaries
July 30, 2025
Americans working for a little known U.S.-based private military contractor have begun to come forward to media and members of Congress with charges that their work has involved using live ammunition for crowd control and other abusive measures against unarmed civilians seeking food at controversial food distribution sites run by the Global Humanitarian Fund (GHF) in Gaza.
UG Solutions was hired by the GHF to secure and deliver food into Gaza. The GHF, with the help of the PMCs claims to have provided nearly 100 million meals to Gaza. Israel put GHF in control of what used to be the UN-led aid mission.
The UN, however, has called the new model an "abomination" which “provides nothing but starvation and gunfire to the people of Gaza,” referring to the 1000 Gazans who have been killed near or at the GHF centers since May. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have been accused of shooting and shelling unarmed civilians. The American contractors say they have witnessed it and have been told to use live ammunition in their own crowd control efforts
UG Solutions is one of two American contracting outfits working at the food centers. Both have vehemently denied the contractors’ claims, as has the IDF. The GHF has also put out extensive responses calling the charges categorically false.
Needless to say this raises a ton of questions about the use of American contractors in this particular conflict zone, but also about who they are. From all available information about UG Solutions, they are not operating under the banner, nor protection, of a U.S. agency contract, but of a foreign entity. This expansion of scope, I contend, makes UG Solutions a full-fledged mercenary organization and takes the industry down a very dark path.
What is a mercenary?
The use of Private Military Contractors (PMCs) in Iraq created a gray area between war fighters and private civilians filling combat roles in a war zone. The U.S., not wanting to be seen as occupiers, handed over the governance of Iraq in 2004. In theory, this meant the military mission ended, and the diplomatic mission began.
In practicality, the war raged on and diplomats needed to be protected by non-military members. Civilians working for companies like Dyncorp and Blackwater protected the people tasked with helping the nascent government of Iraq rebuild. Were they mercenaries? The short answer is: Sort of.
The United Nations uses six criteria to define “mercenary.”
Someone who:
- Is specially recruited to fight in an armed conflict
- Directly participates in the hostilities
- Is primarily motivated by private gain (promised significant compensation)
- Is not a national of a party to the conflict
- Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict
- Has not been sent by a state on official duty
Lawyers can haggle over the legal definition of each criterion but, by my count, and having worked for Blackwater in 2004-2005, PMC’s meet four of the six criteria (1, 2, 3, and 5).
Is UG Solutions the next Blackwater?
No. But they share similarities. Blackwater gained notoriety protecting diplomats in Iraq in 2003. The contract to protect the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer, led to contracts under the U.S. Department of State (DoS) protecting the diplomats, Other Government Agencies ( CIA, FBI, etc.), U.S. Senators, and anyone else who wanted to check on the progress being made in Iraq.
Ours was primarily a defensive operation where we protected people and places but had to move around the country to do so. This is also a gray area we had to move around the country with, and without, the people we protected. This meant clearing traffic using the same weapons issued to the U.S. military. Some could argue this was still defensive but the videos of us on YouTube look a lot like offensive operations.
These contracts were issued by DoS to Blackwater who then hired independent contractors (me) to work for them in Iraq. With multiple layers of separation between the grantor of the contract (DoS) and the men doing the work on the ground, it’s been said that Blackwater wasn’t a mercenary group but it hired them.
Going back to the UN definition of mercenary, I contend, this meets four of the six criteria: We were recruited to fight, participated in hostilities, were motivated by private gain, and were not members of the armed forces in the conflict.
Leaking into the gray area created by hiring PMC’s I could make an argument we were also not a national of a party to a conflict as the war was now a “diplomatic” mission between the U.S. and Iraq where Iraq requested U.S. military assistance so we weren’t technically “at war” with Iraq any longer. But hey, I got a diplomatic passport and was told by Blackwater we had diplomatic immunity so I was definitely sent by the state on official duty.
Is UG Solutions the next Wagner Group?
No. Honestly, they don’t share any similarities. Wagner is commonly referred to as a mercenary group but, by the UN definition, they are not. They are an extension of the Russian military. Granted, they recruited from prisons and have committed war crimes, but they aren’t mercenaries. Of the three companies, they are the one which can claim they are not mercenaries.
The primary difference between Wagner and Blackwater is Wagner is a military unit. They conduct offensive operations, take and hold land, and are sent to places where Russia wants to exert influence. It wasn’t until 2023 that Vladimir Putin confessed Wagner was funded by the government. They also have a rank structure and code of conduct similar to the U.S. military. Granted, they don’t seem to abide by it in the same manner as U.S. service members are regulated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), but it exists. That’s more than Blackwater had.
Based on this, they aren’t any more a “mercenary army” than the U.S. military. I know this is going to ruffle some feathers but I didn’t create the criteria so don’t get mad at me.
Is UG Solutions a new kind of mercenary?
Yes. UG Solutions is a mercenary group. They meet every criterion. They are not a party to the conflict in Gaza, were recruited to participate in hostilities, were not sent by the U.S. government, are not a national of a party in the conflict, are not part of a military, and are there for personal gain. I want to make a distinction that UG Solutions, as a company, is a mercenary group. The men working for them are also mercenaries.
Similar to Blackwater, they are primarily doing defensive operations and the U.S. State Department has helped fund the GHF but they are headquartered in the U.S. working for a foreign entity, in a combat zone, for money. It’s time to call it like it is – U.S. companies are directly involved in mercenary work and trying to shield themselves under the guise of being a Private Military Contractor.
So what does this mean?
UG Solutions took the PMC model and moved it forward by contracting with a foreign entity. There is no connection to the U.S. government. No way for them to shield themselves under the American flag. Granted, their mission is ostensibly humanitarian — pointing out that the UN uses contractors for similar operations. They have a point, albeit, a flimsy one. Whistleblowers have come forward to say that they have been engaging in aggressive offensive tactics against an unarmed population of Gazans coming to the GHF sites for food.
The use of PMC’s here has evolved to the point where there is little space between contracting and mercenary work. UG Solutions has moved the line of what is appropriate for U.S. based PMCs both ethically and legally by throwing morality to the wind and working for an organization unaffiliated with the U.S. government. Politicians sit silently as sea change happens refusing to acknowledge, let alone regulate, the private companies working as military proxies. Sadly, this will continue until an incident like the ambush of four Blackwater contractors in Fallujah, Iraq, 2004 happens again.
It's time to call this out for what is: mercenary work. If we refuse to define it, we’ll never have the conversation of whether or not we should continue to use PMCs as a proxy for U.S. military and foreign policy. We owe it to ourselves to address this scope creep before it leads to the more U.S. civilians in a combat zone.
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Top photo credit: Lai Ching-te (William Lai), the President of Taiwan pose with soldier during his inspection of the Navy's Taiwan-built Xu Jiang stealth missile corvettes in Keelung, Taiwan, in July 13, 2024. (JamesonWu1972/Shutterstock)
Trump was right to block Taiwan president's transit through US
July 30, 2025
Earlier this week, the Financial Times reported that the Trump administration denied permission for Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te to transit the U.S. en route to his diplomatic trip to Latin America. The U.S. decision eventually led Lai to cancel his trip, according to the report.
The Trump administration’s blocking of Lai’s stopover has drawn criticism across Washington’s foreign policy establishment, including from think tank experts and former officials. Some critics stress the moral inadequacy of the decision, arguing that the U.S. should not be turning its back on Taiwan, a longtime democratic friend, particularly when the island is subject to increasing diplomatic and military pressure from China. Others point to the danger of eroding deterrence; that is, how Washington’s decision might signal weakness and embolden Beijing at a critical moment.
Such criticisms reflect valid concerns. However, the administration’s decision to avoid high-profile interactions with Lai this time around makes sense given its diplomatic focus on ongoing tariff and related negotiations with China. Moreover, there was considerable risk that Beijing would use Lai’s visit as a justification for intensifying its already escalating saber-rattling against Taiwan, consequently making the state of deterrence more fragile.
Lai’s trip, initially scheduled for early August, would have coincided with Washington and Beijing's active negotiations to reach a trade deal, which is a high priority for Trump’s foreign and domestic agenda. Just this Monday and Tuesday, senior American and Chinese officials were meeting in Stockholm, and talks are expected to resume throughout the coming weeks. Allowing Lai’s stay in the U.S. for a series of high-profile activities, reportedly including an event in New York with a major U.S. think tank, could jeopardize the trade talks.
Historically, China has opposed high-profile political interactions between Taipei and Washington, including Taiwanese presidents visiting the U.S., viewing them as a tool for Taiwan to promote its “independence” and Washington’s implicit endorsement. To be sure, Chinese reactions have varied depending on the geopolitical climate and the perceived political significance. When Taiwan-China relations and U.S.-China relations were relatively stable, and the scope of interactions was kept fairly limited in terms of formality and visibility, Beijing’s responses to Taiwanese presidential stopovers in the U.S. tended to be more tolerant, often not going beyond ritualistic rhetorical objections. But when Taiwan-China relations and U.S.-China relations were tense, and the interactions were seen as politically symbolic, Beijing’s reactions tended to be more belligerent and escalatory.
For example, in 1995, with the approval of the Bill Clinton administration, then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui — a strongly nationalist figure (or pro-independence from China’s viewpoint) who had a conflictual relationship with Beijing — visited New York and delivered a major speech on Taiwan’s transformation from authoritarianism to democracy at Cornell University. Lee’s visit provoked Beijing to recall its ambassador from Washington and ramp up its military threats against Taiwan, which ended up triggering what is known as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis between the U.S. and China.
A more recent case took place when Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen — who had a tense relationship with Beijing due to her firm stance on the issue of sovereignty and independence — visited the U.S. in 2023 and participated in various high-profile activities, including meetings with senior U.S. politicians and a think tank event. Beijing responded by conducting large-scale military drills encircling Taiwan for three days.
In today’s context, tensions in Taiwan-China relations and U.S.-China relations are worryingly high. Beijing is deeply pessimistic about Lai — known for his pro-independence credentials — and has been hostile toward his government. As with his predecessor Tsai, Lai has also remained hardline toward Beijing regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty, if not tougher in rhetoric. Add to this, mutual suspicions between the U.S. and China about their intentions continue to deepen as “great power competition” overshadows their relationship.
Given the fraught dynamics in the U.S.-Taiwan-China triangular relationship, it was likely that Lai’s visit would prompt an aggressive Chinese response that would risk derailing, at least temporarily, the trade talks. Perhaps recognizing the volatility of the situation amid high-stakes negotiations with China, Washington appears to have chosen to avoid provoking Beijing.
Essentially, the Trump administration’s decision to veto Lai’s stopover has no real impact on the concrete cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan. Nor does it suggest the administration will not allow future transits. Behind the optics, the structure of cooperation remains business as usual, as evidenced by the administration’s recent pitch to Congress to expand military aid to Taiwan.
The takeaway here is not that high-profile political engagement with Taiwan has no value, but to think more carefully about the benefits and costs of such symbolic interactions. Taiwanese presidential transits to the U.S. or visits to Taiwan by high-level American officials can be meaningful in terms of demonstrating mutual friendship. But ultimately, practical cooperation, not symbolic visits, will be the decisive factor in U.S.-Taiwan ties and the state of deterrence vis-à-vis China more broadly.
Furthermore, limiting high-profile symbolic interactions with Taipei could better position Washington to practice both deterrence and reassurance vis-à-vis Beijing. By doing so, Washington could avoid creating unnecessary pretexts for Chinese saber-rattling, thereby reducing a potential source of escalation, while continuing to support Taiwan's defense efforts. Simultaneously, Washington’s restrained approach to political engagement with Taipei could help reassure Beijing about the continued U.S. adherence to the One China policy — that it seeks to promote a peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences, not Taiwan’s independence.
All that said, there are legitimate concerns to be raised about how the U.S. blocking of Lai’s transit can give the impression that Washington is willing to compromise U.S. security interests regarding Taiwan for a trade deal with Beijing. Such an impression could mislead Beijing into believing that it can leverage trade talks to extract security concessions regarding Taiwan, such as loosening or cutting U.S. military support for the island.
The revelation from yesterday’s report that the Taiwanese defense minister’s scheduled visit to Washington in June was cancelled after a call between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping further highlights the risk of Beijing’s possible overreach in negotiations.
To ensure negotiations are grounded on realistic expectations, U.S. officials should make it clear to their Chinese counterparts that security and trade issues are to be kept separate, and also advise Trump that it is necessary to avoid such entanglement.
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Top Image Credit: US presidential candidate US Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX) (L) makes his point as US Senator John McCain (R-AZ ) adjusts his shirt collar as they take part in the CNN/Los Angeles Times Republican presidential debate at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California January 30, 2008. Air Force One used by Reagan is in background. REUTERS/Robert Galbraith (UNITED STATES) US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2008 (USA)
How Ron Paul took a battering ram to GOP foreign policy
July 29, 2025
Ron Paul is turning 90 on August 20. At 72, he was a revolutionary.
Today, there is a raucous foreign policy debate within the Republican Party. Populist, realist and libertarian “America First” Republicans argue against endless wars and for fiscal responsibility, while holdover hawks continue to insist on a robust U.S. hand and military presence anywhere they can get it, no matter the cost.
In 2008, there was no debate. While broad public opinion had soured on the Iraq War and President George W. Bush’s approval reached historic lows, the GOP of that era had spent nearly a decade marinating in blind support for militarism, the PATRIOT Act, and torture in the name of “counterterrorism."
War was who Republicans were. It wasn’t a question. It was GOP identity. Sen. John McCain became the 2008 GOP presidential nominee based on that identity, and lost.
Throughout the 2008 Republican presidential primaries, Congressman Ron Paul tried to warn his party that America’s interventionist foreign policy had not only been a disaster in Iraq and Afghanistan, but was bad for America in general — and Republicans in particular.
They couldn’t hear it. Like clockwork, each time Paul criticized U.S. foreign policy during the debates, Republicans accused him of siding with the enemy. After explaining how perpetual American intervention created tension abroad that led to 9/11, Fox News moderator Chris Wallace said to Paul, "You're saying we should take our marching orders from al Qaeda?"
Paul replied, citing the need for a congressional declaration of war, "No, I'm saying we should take our marching orders from the Constitution!"
The other candidates all laughed at Paul. Telling Republicans to tone down the warmongering in 2008 was like telling Sydney Sweeney to lighten up on sex appeal in 2025.
Paul did not win the nomination, but became arguably the most influential GOP candidate in that election precisely because he was the only Republican arguing for a more restrained foreign policy. He became one of the most popular candidates, in terms of raw grassroots support, based on his staunch antiwar message, drawing thousands of supporters to his rallies, disproportionately young.
Paul’s popularity exploded due to one particular debate. As Jim Antle observed at The American Conservative weeks before Paul retired from Congress in early 2013, “On May 15, 2007, the Republican contenders debated in Columbia, South Carolina. Paul argued that American intervention in the Middle East — bombings, sanctions, and efforts to destabilize foreign governments — helped turn local populations and their co-religionists against us, to the point that they would contemplate terrorist attacks like those on 9/11.”
“Are you suggesting we invited the 9/11 attacks, sir?” asked the Fox News moderator.
“Paul had said nothing of the sort,” Antle continued, “but neither did he react to the implication behind the question as forcefully as he might have. Giuliani pounced. ‘That’s an extraordinary statement, as somebody who lived through the attack of Sept. 11, that we invited the attack because we were attacking Iraq,’ he said. ‘I don’t think I’ve ever heard that before, and I’ve heard some pretty absurd explanations for September 11.’”
The audience erupted. After the applause died down Giuliani demanded that Paul take back what he said, “I would ask the congressman to withdraw that comment and tell us he didn’t really mean that.”
That’s when Ron Paul doubled down. He detailed the CIA term “blowback” as an explanation for 9/11, an argument that Bush-Cheney, neocon propaganda-soaked audience definitely did not want to hear and resented Paul for making it.
But after years of foreign policy failure in the Middle East, certain kinds of Republicans were open to Paul’s message. Many independents were drawn to his campaign. Paul also attracted a significant number of progressives (Paul later said he would put his longtime friend, progressive Democrat Congressman Dennish Kucinich in his cabinet). For the Paul faithful, it was all about the ideas.
At the time of Paul and Giuliani’s heated exchange, Rudy was considered the frontrunner and Ron was the gadfly. By the time the 2008 election was over, Paul would receive one million primary votes, more than Giuliani who dropped out. In 2012, Paul doubled that number to two million. The nominees in both cycles, McCain and later, Mitt Romney, both ran and lost on Bush-style neoconservative foreign policy agendas.
The next Republican actually elected president ran on ‘America First’ foreign policy platform that promised to end “endless wars” and even went so far as to claim George W. Bush “lied” America into the Iraq War. He sounded like Ron Paul.
Has Donald Trump always lived up to his antiwar rhetoric? Not even close.
Did he change the foreign policy conversation in the Republican Party? Undeniably.
Today, your typical, red-meat, rightwing Republican might talk about foreign policy in ways that seem closer to Paul than McCain or Romney. Conservatives can denounce foreign intervention and aid and those conversations now fit comfortably on the right. Whereas Paul’s Republican detractors used to love to smear him as siding with terrorists, hawks, neocons, and Democrats who reflexively accuse Trump of being “Putin’s puppet” are immediately suspect to MAGA members. That trick just doesn’t work anymore with most of the Republican base.
Trump ran for president within a post Bush-Cheney GOP that didn’t know what it stood for anymore other than being against Barack Obama. It quickly came to stand for Trump, whatever that might have meant in any given moment, but that upheaval did usher in a radical rethinking of Republican foreign policy.
Paul ran for president when war was the Republican religion, undeniable and unassailable, in which heretics were to be excommunicated. Later, it was so many neocons who would actually jump ship.
What Republican foreign policy is in 2025 is a very different conversation than it was in 2008. Donald Trump might have upended that consensus, but 17 years ago Ron Paul became the first candidate to so fearlessly question it, leading to more challenges and changing even more minds ever since.
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