According to the data, 55 percent of Americans do not think Congress “should authorize additional funding to support Ukraine in the war with Russia,” while 45 percent said Congress should approve more.
Another 51 percent say the U.S. has “done enough” to “stop Russian actions in Ukraine,” while 48 said Washington has not done enough.
For comparison, according to CNN, 62 percent of Americans polled just after Ukraine was invaded said the U.S. should be doing more.
Not surprisingly, the responses tracked heavily on partisan lines. On the question of Congressional funding, 71 percent of Republicans, 38 percent of Democrats, and 55 percent of independents said no more funding. On the promotion of more aid, it was flipped, with 62 percent of Democrats, 28 percent of Republicans, and 44 percent of independents saying Congress should authorize more. Whether one identified as a “liberal” or “conservative” dictated support for more or less aid respectively.
How this will play out in the expected vote for more Ukraine aid this fall is anyone's guess, as it will depend on how much and through what kind of package the new funding will be proposed. A handful of Republican lawmakers have already promised a fight, either to stop the aid entirely or to put conditions on it before passing.
This doesn’t mean that Americans aren't still in favor of assisting the Ukrainians, however. Solid majorities in the CNN/SSRS poll want to share intelligence with Ukraine (63 percent) and offer military training (53 percent). Less than 50 percent want to continue giving Kyiv weapons (43 percent). Only 17 percent want U.S. soldiers on the ground participating in combat with the Ukrainians.
The poll also doesn’t bode well for Biden’s handling of major foreign policy issues. Some 53 percent disapprove of how he is handing the war in Ukraine; 56 percent disapprove of how he is handling Russia; and 57 percent disapprove of how he is handling the relationship with China.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (L), Russian President Vladimir Putin (R), Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan pose for a group picture during the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, China September 4, 2016. REUTERS/Damir Sagolj
On September 26-27 the Fletcher School at Tufts University hosted a workshop on “Global repercussions of Russia-West economic warfare.” It brought together two dozen experts, both academics and practitioners, to discuss the impact of the sweeping sanctions imposed on Russia by some 50 countries in the wake of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The meeting, organized by Tufts professors Christopher Miller and Daniel Drezner, did not come up with a decisive answer to the key question: are the sanctions working — and the related question, should they be wound up, continued, or intensified?
In part, this is because Western leaders have been vague when it comes to defining the goals of the sanctions, which have shifted over time. Initially, the goal was to deter Russia from launching the invasion. That did not work. So then the goal was to crash the Russian economy, force a bank run and collapse of the ruble, which would hopefully cause Russian elites, and/or the Russian people, to rise up against Putin and force him to abandon the war. For a week or two, that seemed to be working. But the Russian Central Bank imposed strict controls to stop the outflow of capital and ended the convertibility of the ruble. The Russian economy did not collapse.
After that, the goal shifted to one of attrition, increasing the cost to Putin in the hope that it will make him more willing to come to the negotiating table and end the war. By ratcheting down the declared goals, leaders can keep insisting that the sanctions are working.
Edward Fishman, a former U.S. Treasury official, said the “Goal was to shock the system, create chaos, and force Russian policy makers to redirect attention to developments inside Russia.” But we underestimated the skill of Russian financial managers and the extent to which they had been preparing for sanctions in the wake of the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Maximilian Hess, author of the new book, “Economic War: Ukraine and the Global Conflict Between Russia and the West,” argued that Putin has been preparing Russia for economic war with the West since the passage of the Magnitsky Act in 2012, which sanctioned individuals involved in the death of Russian banker Sergei Magnitsky.
Historically, sanctions have only worked in about one third of the cases. Success only comes if they are multilateral, involving a majority of key economic players. In the case of Russia, there was unexpected solidarity amongst the Europeans and between the Europeans and the U.S., which hit Russia hard given its dependence on oil and gas exports to Europe. However, only a few nations outside the West joined the sanctions (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia). China, India, Turkey and others increased their trade with Russia, buying the oil which was no longer flowing to Europe.
Despite the relative lack of success, sanctions are a popular tool, in large part because they are better than the alternatives — doing nothing, or going to war. They may be more important as a way of signaling political commitment amongst allies, rather than for their economic impact. Peter Harrell, a former National Security Council official, noted that “sanctions have been a growth industry over the past 20 years,” starting with Bill Clinton’s use of sanctions to target drug cartels and expanding as part of the post-9/11 War on Terror.
The U.S. was later encouraged by the success of the sanctions on Iran, which forced it to negotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 limiting its nuclear program. However, the Russian economy is much larger, more diverse, and globally integrated than that of Iran, so the impact of the sanctions has been more modest. Harrell concluded that we “need to be realistic about what sanctions can achieve, and not expect that they are a magic bullet.”
While the sanctions were extensive, they mainly focused on the financial sector — cutting Russia out of the SWIFT financial transaction network, barring transactions with most Russian banks. Interestingly, Fishman revealed that the decision to freeze the Central Bank’s assets was only taken after the full-scale invasion. However, the West feared that an abrupt interruption of Russian energy exports would cause inflation to spike, so oil and gas continued to flow into Europe through 2022. And the banks handling payments for oil and gas exports were exempt from the sanctions.
The U.S. controls critical nodes in the finance sector, and the dollar remains the main currency for international trade and investment. But Elina Rybakova of the Peterson Institute pointed out that Washington has no such critical leverage over energy markets, and is still struggling to come up with ways to monitor and regulate the export of critical dual-use technologies.
Meanwhile, Harvard’s Craig Kennedy alluded to the fact that sanctions can be a negative-sum game, harming the country that is imposing them just as much as the target. This has certainly been true for Germany, hit by a 400% rise in the price of natural gas in 2022.
Organizer Daniel Drezner pointed out there has been a number of unintended consequences for which ramifications have yet to be unpacked. They include the rise of a “shadow fleet” of uninsured tankers shipping Russian oil to India and China, and the expansion of a shadow network of financial transactions facilitating Russia’s evasion of the sanctions.
By making it harder for Russians to export capital, the sanctions have boosted investment in the Russian economy, and has tied the business elite — the main advocates of Westernization — even more closely to the Kremlin. The war has further institutionalized the militarization of Russian economy, polity and society and it might be very hard to get the country off that path in a post-Putin future.
Finally, Drezner noted one important unintended consequence for Russia — that the war united the West, led Sweden and Finland to join NATO, and Germany to rearm. This nullifies a decades-long strategic goal of Russia to separate Europe and the U.S.
Analysts agreed to the assertions that the sanctions, for all their limitations, are squeezing the Russian economy’s prospects for long-term economic growth, particularly with regard to access to the investment and technology to develop new oil fields. Sergei Vakulenko, a fellow at Carnegie’s Russia Eurasia Center, argued that Russia is “facing graceful decline [in oil output] but not a sudden drop.” That seems to be a price Putin is willing to pay to continue his war in Ukraine.
It is hard to say how (and when) this conflict will end or what the end state will be. Will a future Russia rejoin the West at some point? Or is Russia destined to become a resource base for China and other nations now unaligned with the West or willing to “multi-vector” on the geopolitical landscape?
keep readingShow less
Traders work on the floor at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in New York City, U.S., August 8, 2024. REUTERS/Brendan McDermid
It’s hard to see the past year in the Middle East as anything other than an unmitigated disaster.
Over 41,000 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza by Israel’s nearly yearlong bombardment of the territory, and significant obstruction of food and medicine shipments as a form of collective punishment against the population following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack across the border that claimed 1,163 Israeli lives.
But not everyone has been harmed in the rapidly spiraling conflict. Investors in weapons stocks have enjoyed record gains over the past year, dramatically outperforming the major stock indexes in a stock rally that analysts are attributing to violence and instability in the Middle East.
The war has now spread to Lebanon, which Israel invaded last week, and Iran, where Israel assassinated leaders of the IRGC, Hezbollah and Hamas, actions that Iran retaliated against with massive strikes against targets inside Israel.
How Israel pursues its murky war aims in both Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, as well as a promised escalation against Iran, remains to be seen. The Biden administration, having spent the better part of the year promising an imminent ceasefire in Gaza and quietly urging Israel to show greater care for protecting civilian lives, has little to show for its efforts as the U.S. simultaneously continues to provide billions of dollars of weapons to Israel to execute on its rapidly expanding war.
That handout of taxpayer funds to Israel coupled with Israel’s, and global, demand increasing for weapons in a period of instability, has been jet fuel for stock prices.
Lockheed Martin, the world’s largest weapons firm and the manufacturer of the F-35 aircraft that Israel uses in its regular bombings of Gaza, at the close of trading on October 4, has produced a 54.86% percent total return in the one year following the October 7th attacks, outperforming the S&P 500 by about 18%.
Or, put another way, a $10,000 investment in the F-35 manufacturer right before the October 7 attacks would, one year later, have produced a $5,486 total return. A similar investment in an S&P 500 index fund would have produced only $3,689.
The weapons profits weren’t limited to Lockheed.
The second largest weapons firm, Raytheon, provides “bunker buster” bombs to Israel, weapons that are prohibited for use in areas with high civilian populations. Israel has repeatedly used these weapons in high density areas in both Gaza and Lebanon, producing high civilian casualties.
Demand for these weapons and others have driven up Raytheon’s stock price and generated massive returns for investors. Raytheon’s total return for investors in the past year is 82.69%, outperforming the S&P 500 by about 46%. A $10,000 investment in Raytheon before the October 7 attacks would have produced a $8,269 total return.
Another producer of bunker busters, General Dynamics, which produced the BLU-109 bombs used by Israel to assassinate Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut and leveled multiple residential buildings in the process, enjoyed smaller gains but still returned a 37% total return for investors, beating the S&P 500 by over 3%.
While profiting off war may be distasteful for some, defense analysts at major investment banks grilled weapons executives in earnings calls last October about how the companies, and their investors, might profit from the war in Gaza.
“Hamas has created additional demand, we have this $106bn request from the president,” said TD Cowen’s Cai von Rumohr, during General Dynamics’earnings call on October 25, 2023. In a question posed to General Dynamics executives on the call, von Rumohr asked, “Can you give us some general color in terms of areas where you think you could see incremental acceleration in demand?”
One year later, those analysts have been proven correct and Israel’s war grinds on as the White House finds its bids for ceasefires repeatedly rejected while, in seeming contradiction, supplying Israel with the weapons to continue fighting.
On September 26, the White House approved a $8.7 billion aid package for Israel that will largely be spent on munitions and armaments from major weapons firms, bringing the total U.S. security assistance to Israel since October 7 to nearly $18 billion. The same day, Israel, in defiance of the U.S., rejected a call for a ceasefire with Hezbollah, no doubt driving “incremental acceleration in demand” for weapons.
keep readingShow less
In half a century of public life, U.S. President Joe Biden has demonstrated unwavering support for Israel. In this photo Biden is welcomed by Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu, as he visits Israel amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel, October 18, 2023. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo
In half a century of public life, U.S. President Joe Biden has demonstrated unwavering support for Israel. In this photo Biden is welcomed by Israeli Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu, as he visits Israel amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel, October 18, 2023. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo
On Monday, Brown University’s Costs of War project released a report detailing America’s monetary commitment to Israel since October 7, 2023, which concludes that The United States has approved at least $17.9 billion on military aid to Israel, the highest given in a single year since the U.S. began giving Israel aid in 1959. Israel is also the biggest recipient of aid from the United States since World War II, and has multiple unique arms and aid agreements with the United States, although notably no formal defense treaty.
In addition to direct aid to Israel, the United States has increased its military footprint in the region to around 43,000 ever since the Hamas attacks in October 2023. The Associated Press, which covered the COW report, estimated that an additional $4.86 billion has been spent on this increase in military operations.
The increased military presence has included President Biden sending additional troops to the region, striking Iran-aligned Houthi targets in Yemen, sending two carrier strike groups to the Mediterranean, and assisting Israel in intercepting Iranian launched missiles. The report does not include any additional assistance that may be given to Israel after its invasion of southern Lebanon in late September.
Israel has been receiving billions every year since it signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, with President Obama setting the annual aid amount to $3.8 billion through 2028.
The report also states the uniqueness of Israel’s aid situation with the United States: “Israel receives favorable financing arrangements related to U.S. military aid. For example, U.S. aid is provided on a ‘cash flow’ basis, which means that Israel is able to finance multi-year purchases from the U.S. based on future commitments, before the funds have been officially appropriated by Congress.” The report also points out that “unlike any other country in the world, Israel is allowed to spend 25% of its routine annual military aid from the United States on its own arms industry.”
Besides the increased financial cost of participating in Israel’s escalations, the human toll must be accounted for. Hamas fighters killed around 1,200 people in Israel on October 7, and Israel has killed at least 42,000 people in Gaza since. Additionally, almost 700 Palestinians have been killed in the West Bank since October 7, 2023, as well as 1,400 people in Lebanon (Hezbollah fighters and civilians alike).
American soldiers have also been placed in a position of higher vulnerability. The roughly 3,500 soldiers spread out across Iraq and Syria have been subject to increased attacks from Iranian-backed militia groups since October of 2023, and could serve as a tripwire for a larger conflict.
The United States is almost certain to further involve itself in this conflict. To assist Israel in its response to Iran’s missile barrage, the American CENTCOM chief was sent to meet with Israeli defense officials on Sunday. Messaging around supporting Israel has been consistent as well. In a State Department briefing from October 3, spokesperson Matthew Miller said, “We have made clear from the start that we are committed to the defense of Israel and that we will remain committed to the defense of Israel.” He added, “our security partnership with them dates back decades, and we expect it to continue well into the future. We are also having conversations with them about the shape of that campaign [against Iran], the scope of that campaign, what their targets are going to be, but I don’t want to get into it beyond that.”
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.