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2021-10-09t093824z_768213779_mt1eyeim240277_rtrmadp_3_us-and-taliban-to-first-talks-since-afghan-withdrawal

US and Taliban take major first step, quietly

The desire to do this without the glare of the media is understandable; the need to do it outside Afghanistan is less so.

Analysis | Middle East

On Sunday and Monday, a significant event took place outside the public eye: U.S. officials engaged in high-level talks with senior Taliban representatives in Doha, Qatar, to discuss the future of Afghanistan. 

Some observers noted the lack of attention, but it might be a blessing in disguise. While the lack of media glare might raise concerns about Afghanistan slipping off the radar, conducting diplomacy without public scrutiny, media sensationalism, and political grandstanding could create the space for substantive and meaningful change in the war-ravaged country's future.

These talks represent the most substantial and public dialogue between the Taliban and the United States since Washington’s withdrawal almost two years ago. The State Department's statement on the meeting outlined the critical issues that were discussed, including human and women's rights, Afghanistan's foreign exchange reserves, terrorism, and the potential for “confidence building” between Washington and the Taliban.

The U.S. delegation, led by Special Representative for Afghanistan Thomas West, along with Special Envoy for Afghan Women, Girls, and Human Rights Rina Amiri, and Chief of the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan (based in Doha) Karen Decker, held talks with the Taliban’s foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi. 

Interestingly, neither the State Department’s official statement nor West’s Twitter account mentioned Muttaqi by name, while Abdul Qahar Balhki, the spokesperson for the Taliban’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tweeted about it. This could be coincidental, or it might be part of a broader pattern adopted by the Biden administration to amplify engagement with Afghan civil society figures and exiled politicians, while downplaying direct interactions with the Taliban, particularly its senior officials.

As I have previously argued, talking with senior Taliban officials remains important, even if they lack ultimate decision-making power. But it raises questions about why such conversations cannot take place within Afghanistan, as is the case for UK and EU officials. While there might be concerns about diplomatic security, there should be ways to address them, just as Washington’s European counterparts have managed to do. Concerns about legitimizing the Taliban by being seen to engage them publicly became moot the minute then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Mullah Baradar in 2020, and had a photo taken of the occasion.

There is an opportunity cost in not meeting with the Taliban inside Afghanistan. As outgoing Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman recently told the Washington Post, “[i]n negotiating, you have to understand the other side — their interests, as well as their culture, their history.” U.S. diplomacy often views sitting at the table with adversaries as a concession or a display of weakness. 

In reality, however, engaging with the Taliban within Afghanistan will prove an essential initial step for any chance for sustainable progress.


A high level delegation of the Taliban met with US officials in Doha, Qatar, on July 30-31. In this October 8, 2021 photo some of the same officials, including Maulvi Amir Khan Mottaki (center) landed in Doha to engage in talks after the US withdrawal. (Reuters)
Analysis | Middle East
Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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The 8-point buzzsaw facing any invasion of Taiwan

Asia-Pacific

For the better part of a decade, China has served as the “pacing threat” around which American military planners craft defense policy and, most importantly, budget decisions.

Within that framework, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has become the scenario most often cited as the likeliest flashpoint for a military confrontation between the two superpowers.

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