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2021-10-09t093824z_768213779_mt1eyeim240277_rtrmadp_3_us-and-taliban-to-first-talks-since-afghan-withdrawal

US and Taliban take major first step, quietly

The desire to do this without the glare of the media is understandable; the need to do it outside Afghanistan is less so.

Analysis | Middle East
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On Sunday and Monday, a significant event took place outside the public eye: U.S. officials engaged in high-level talks with senior Taliban representatives in Doha, Qatar, to discuss the future of Afghanistan. 

Some observers noted the lack of attention, but it might be a blessing in disguise. While the lack of media glare might raise concerns about Afghanistan slipping off the radar, conducting diplomacy without public scrutiny, media sensationalism, and political grandstanding could create the space for substantive and meaningful change in the war-ravaged country's future.

These talks represent the most substantial and public dialogue between the Taliban and the United States since Washington’s withdrawal almost two years ago. The State Department's statement on the meeting outlined the critical issues that were discussed, including human and women's rights, Afghanistan's foreign exchange reserves, terrorism, and the potential for “confidence building” between Washington and the Taliban.

The U.S. delegation, led by Special Representative for Afghanistan Thomas West, along with Special Envoy for Afghan Women, Girls, and Human Rights Rina Amiri, and Chief of the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan (based in Doha) Karen Decker, held talks with the Taliban’s foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi. 

Interestingly, neither the State Department’s official statement nor West’s Twitter account mentioned Muttaqi by name, while Abdul Qahar Balhki, the spokesperson for the Taliban’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tweeted about it. This could be coincidental, or it might be part of a broader pattern adopted by the Biden administration to amplify engagement with Afghan civil society figures and exiled politicians, while downplaying direct interactions with the Taliban, particularly its senior officials.

As I have previously argued, talking with senior Taliban officials remains important, even if they lack ultimate decision-making power. But it raises questions about why such conversations cannot take place within Afghanistan, as is the case for UK and EU officials. While there might be concerns about diplomatic security, there should be ways to address them, just as Washington’s European counterparts have managed to do. Concerns about legitimizing the Taliban by being seen to engage them publicly became moot the minute then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Mullah Baradar in 2020, and had a photo taken of the occasion.

There is an opportunity cost in not meeting with the Taliban inside Afghanistan. As outgoing Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman recently told the Washington Post, “[i]n negotiating, you have to understand the other side — their interests, as well as their culture, their history.” U.S. diplomacy often views sitting at the table with adversaries as a concession or a display of weakness. 

In reality, however, engaging with the Taliban within Afghanistan will prove an essential initial step for any chance for sustainable progress.


A high level delegation of the Taliban met with US officials in Doha, Qatar, on July 30-31. In this October 8, 2021 photo some of the same officials, including Maulvi Amir Khan Mottaki (center) landed in Doha to engage in talks after the US withdrawal. (Reuters)
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Analysis | Middle East
Dan Caine
Top photo credit: Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Dan Caine conduct a press briefing on Operation Epic Fury at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., March 4, 2026. (DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)

Did Caine just announce the Morgenthau option for Iran?

QiOSK

Gen. Dan Caine’s formulation of American war aims in Iran is remarkable not because it is bellicose, but because it is strategically incoherent.

In a press conference Tuesday morning, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not describe a limited campaign to suppress missile fire, blunt Iran’s naval threat, or even impose a severe but bounded setback on Tehran’s coercive instruments. He described a campaign against Iran’s “military and industrial base” designed to prevent the regime from attacking Americans, U.S. interests, and regional partners “for years to come.” In an earlier briefing he put the objective similarly: to prevent Iran from projecting power outside its borders. Rather than the language of a discrete coercive operation, this describes a war against a state’s capacity to regenerate power.

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Mbs-mbz-scaled
UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan receives Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Presidential Airport in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates November 27, 2019. WAM/Handout via REUTERS

Is the US goading Arab states to join war against Iran?

QiOSK

On Sunday, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Mike Waltz told ABC News that Arab Gulf states may soon step up their involvement in the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. “I expect that you'll see additional diplomatic and possibly military action from them in the coming days and weeks,” Waltz said.

Then, on Monday morning, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) slammed Saudi Arabia for staying out of the war even as “Americans are dying and the U.S. is spending billions” of dollars to conduct regime change in Iran. “If you are not willing to use your military now, when are you willing to use it?” Graham asked. “Hopefully this changes soon. If not, consequences will follow.”

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Why Tehran may have time on its side
Top image credit: Iranian army military personnel stand at attention under a banner featuring an image of an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) during a military parade commemorating the anniversary of Army Day outside the Shrine of Iran's late leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the south of Tehran, Iran, on April 18, 2025. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto)

Why Tehran may have time on its side

QiOSK

A provocative calculus by Anusar Farrouqui (“policytensor”) has been circulating on X and in more exhaustive form on the author’s Substack. It purports to demonstrate a sobering reality: in a high-intensity U.S.-Iran conflict, the United States may be unable to suppress Iranian drone production quickly enough to prevent a strategically consequential period of regional devastation.

The argument is framed through a quantitative lens, carrying the seductive appeal of mathematical precision. It arranges variables—such as U.S. sortie rates and degradation efficiency against Iranian repair cycles and rebuild speeds—to suggest a "sustainable firing rate." The implication is that Iran could maintain a persistent strike capability long enough to exhaust American political patience, forcing Washington toward a premature declaration of success or an unfavorable ceasefire.

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