Sportswashing is the next frontier of foreign influence in the United States. Authoritarian regimes are investing billions of dollars in the sports that Americans love — from the NBA to WWE, UFC, and, the PGA Tour.
In many cases these investments come with strings attached. Foreign powers aren’t just trying to make money, they’re hoping to launder their reputations and censor their would-be critics in the U.S. This can have potentially dire consequences for Washington foreign policy, given that many of these regimes seek to pull the agenda in a decidedly unrestrained direction via U.S. military entanglements.
Ben Freeman is Director of the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute. He investigates money in politics, defense spending, and foreign influence in America. He is the author of The Foreign Policy Auction, which was the first book to systematically analyze the foreign influence industry in the United States.
A Palestinian man rides a bicycle past a damaged vehicle where employees from the World Central Kitchen (WCK), including foreigners, were killed in an Israeli airstrike, according to the NGO as the Israeli military said it was conducting a thorough review at the highest levels to understand the circumstances of this "tragic" incident, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in Deir Al-Balah, in the central Gaza, Strip April 2, 2024. REUTERS/Ahmed Zakot
Despite a meticulous process in place to ensure aid worker safety in Gaza, the leading cause of death in the humanitarian sector over the last 11 months has been Israeli airstrikes.
Of the 378 aid workers killed worldwide since October 7, more than 75 percent have been killed in Gaza or the West Bank, according to the Aid Worker Security Database. The number of humanitarians killed in Palestinian territory in the last three months of 2023 was more than the deadliest full year ever recorded for aid workers.
This includes an Israeli airstrike Wednesday Sept. 11 on a school being used as a shelter in Nuseirat in Central Gaza. According to reports, 18 were killed, including children and six UNRWA aid workers, the deadliest single event for that organization since the start of the war.
Israeli attacks on aid organizations have become routine, despite systems in place to avoid humanitarian deaths. Through a process called deconfliction, aid groups coordinate with warring parties to avoid being attacked. Popular deconfliction mechanisms used by aid groups in Gaza include clearly marking their assets, arranging their movements with Israeli authorities, and sharing their location with the Israeli military.
However, a disturbing pattern has emerged: Aid groups share their coordinates with Israeli authorities and then are attacked by the IDF at those same coordinates.
Christopher Lockyear, Secretary General of Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF), told the United Nations Security Council in February that “this pattern of attacks is either intentional or indicative of reckless incompetence.” Forty-eight hours earlier, a 120mm Israeli tank shell exploded in a MSF facility in Khan Younis, killing two people and severely injuring six others. It was the second time a MSF facility had been attacked by Israeli forces.
The White House is aware of this trend. In May, a Biden administration report to Congress noted the following:
"One specific area of concern is the impact of Israel’s military operations on humanitarian actors. Despite regular engagement from humanitarian actors and repeated USG interventions with Israeli officials on deconfliction/coordination procedures, the IDF has struck humanitarian workers and facilities. While Israel repeatedly committed to improve deconfliction and implemented some additional measures, those changes did not fully prevent subsequent strikes involving humanitarian workers and facilities.”
“Concern” might be too strong a word to express the White House’s interest in preventing humanitarian deaths. The same day successive Israeli precision drone strikes killed seven aid workers, including one American citizen, from World Central Kitchen — a humanitarian group founded by Chef José Andrés — Biden approved the transfer of over 2,000 bombs to Israel.
Humanitarian organizations can be based in a Western country (including one upon which Israel relies for weapons), have a direct line to the IDF, follow all deconfliction procedures to a T, and still be attacked by the IDF. And when they have been, the Biden administration has done nothing but issue words of concern from the briefing podium. This lesson is not lost on aid workers: After a nurse from Project Hope was killed by an Israeli airstrike in March, the organization’s director of emergency response and preparedness asked his staff if they wanted to start sleeping in a zone deconflicted with Israeli authorities. All of the staff members said no.
What follows is a non-exhaustive list of 14 Israeli attacks on known aid worker locations compiled from media reports, organizational statements, and independent investigations. Reporting by the New York Times and Human Rights Watch was especially valuable. In each case, the aid groups had notified Israeli authorities of their location and movements, their vehicles or facilities were clearly marked as humanitarians, and were often operating in Israeli-designated “safe zones,” but they were attacked anyway by Israeli forces.
The Biden administration held Israel to account for zero of these 14 incidents.
Fourteen times aid groups were attacked after giving the IDF their location
November 18, 2023: Israeli forces attacked a convoy of five clearly-marked MSF vehicles, killing two MSF staff members. MSF had coordinated the convoy’s movement with Israeli authorities and followed the route prescribed by the Israeli military. MSF staff members saw no military targets in the area when they were attacked. MSF requested an explanation from the IDF but received no response.
December 8, 2023: The Israeli Navy fired at facilities affiliated with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in Rafah with 20mm cannon rounds, damaging the west side of the two buildings. UNRWA officials had repeatedly shared the coordinates of the buildings with Israeli officials, including on the same day of the attack. Agency staff told Human Rights Watch that they were unaware of any military targets in the area. Afterwards, the Israeli military said the attack was carried out by mistake.
December 16, 2023: An IDF tank fired several rounds at the Convent of the Sisters of Mother Teresa (Missionaries of Charity), part of the Holy Family Catholic Parish compound in Gaza. The attack displaced the 54 disabled people sheltering there, leaving some without the respirators “that some of them need to survive,” the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem said in a statement.
An aid worker was reportedly injured in the attack. Later that day, an Israeli sniper killed two women sheltering at the church, shooting one woman as she tried to carry the other to safety. When others in the church ran toward the women, Israeli snipers shot them too, wounding several, including two children. Pope Francis condemned the attack, calling it “terrorism.”
Emails between Catholic Relief Services and U.S. Senate staff obtained by Politico show that Catholic Relief Services (one of the largest Christian aid organizations operating in Gaza) had provided the coordinates of the two buildings to Senate staffers, who then relayed that information to the IDF. The IDF confirmed the location of the buildings that Catholic Relief Services requested for protection. The aid group also provided aerial photos of the facilities directly to Israeli authorities. The Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem Church said they shared their GPS coordinates with the IDF several times before the attack.
December 28, 2023: A convoy of U.N. aid vehicles were shot at by Israeli forces in central Gaza as it was returning from delivering aid in the north. The vehicles were clearly-marked with U.N. insignia, traveling along a route designated by the Israeli military and had coordinated its plans with Israeli authorities beforehand.
January 8, 2024: An Israeli tank fired at a clearly-marked MSF shelter in Khan Younis housing more than 100 staff and their family members, killing a five-year-old girl. MSF had previously notified the IDF of the shelter’s location. Israeli forces denied that they fired a round at the shelter, but remnants of an Israeli-made tank shell were discovered right outside the building.
January 18, 2024: An Israeli airstrike struck a residential compound housing staff from the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) in Al-Mawasi, an Israeli-designated safe zone. The blast injured several workers and severely damaged the building. As a result, six emergency medical workers had to leave their posts, and IRC and MAP surgeons suspended their work at Nasser hospital. Forensic evidence suggests the munition used in the attack was a U.S.-made 1,000-pound MK-83 bomb, reportedly dropped by a U.S.-made F-16 aircraft. British officials had used high-level diplomatic channels to ensure the compound was deconflicted with the IDF. A month before the strike, the Israeli military explicitly reassured aid staff through text messages that they were safe. “We’re aware of the location” of the compound, a message from an IDF official read. The MAP employee then clarified whether the building is still safe. “Yes,” replied the IDF official.
Israel provided six different — and often conflicting — explanations for the attack. It said it wasn’t operating in the area; it said it was attempting to hit a target next to the MAP-IRC compound; it said it wasn’t actually a bomb but a piece of the aircraft fuselage. The IDF told The New York Times that they didn’t strike the location at all.
January 31, 2024: Israeli forces bombed the offices of the Belgian development agency, Enabel, completelydestroying the building. Handicap International, an NGO, had offices in the same structure. Belgian Foreign Minister Hadja Lahbib said that Israeli authorities “knew very well that Enabel’s offices were located in this building.” Earlier that day, the Belgian government announced it would not suspend funding for UNRWA, after the Israeli government claimed withoutevidence that UNRWA staff had participated in the October 7 massacre.
In mid-February, Israeli forces claimed it had not bombed the Enabel building, but that it was destroyed when they blew up the building next door for an unspecified military reason.
February 5, 2024: Israeli ships shelled a clearly-marked UNRWA convoy, damaging one of the aid trucks. The convoy was stopped at an Israeli-designated holding point when it was shelled. UNRWA had coordinated the convoy’s movement with Israeli authorities. As a result of the attack, UNRWA had to pause its operations in northern Gaza for nearly three weeks, affecting 200,000 people. Israeli authorities later acknowledged the attack and said it had put in place “prevention measures” to prevent another incident. The next month, the Israeli government blocked UNRWA from providing any food assistance to northern Gaza.
February 20, 2024: Two family members of MSF staff were killed when an Israeli tank fired a shell at a MSF shelter. Seven others, mostly women and children, were injured. A large MSF flag was clearly visible on the side of the building. Israeli forces provided MSF with no warning before the attack and no explanation afterwards.
March 9, 2024: An Anera employee was killed in his home along with his six-year-old son and several neighbors in an Israeli airstrike. The building was registered with the Israeli military as a “sensitive site.” Email records show that Anera had repeatedly shared coordinates and photos of the staff shelter with the IDF, including days before the strike. A precision-guided munition was likely used in the attack.
April 1, 2024: Multiple precision Israeli drone strikes on a World Central Kitchen (WCK) convoy killed seven aid workers, including an American citizen. The Washington, DC-based group had coordinated its route with the IDF beforehand. The vehicles were struck in a deconfliction zone controlled by the Israeli military. WCK founder José Andrés said Israeli forces targeted his colleagues “systematically, car by car.” Forensic evidence backs up Andrés’s claim. “This was not just a bad luck situation where ‘oops’ we dropped the bomb in the wrong place,” Andrés said, pointing to the fact that it was clearly-marked humanitarian convoy with colorful WCK logos on the vehicle roofs, and the 1.8 kilometer distance between the first and the third car in the convoy, each. It was “very clear who we are and what we do,” he added.
IDF Spokesman Danial Hagari said WCK had “coordinated everything correctly with the IDF in advance” and blamed “internal failures.” President Joe Biden said he was “outraged and heartbroken” by the deaths, and called on Israel to investigate itself. But for WCK’s founder, “The IDF cannot credibly investigate its own failure,” Andrés said.
April 9, 2024: A clearly-marked UNICEF aid truck was reportedly hit by Israeli gunfire south of the Salah Al-Din checkpoint. The vehicle was at a holding point when it was struck by several bullets coming from the direction of the Israeli checkpoint. The IDF had approved the convoy beforehand. The Israeli military denied that its troops had fired the shots.
August 27, 2024: A U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) convoy came under fire near an Israeli checkpoint at the Wadi Gaza bridge. As the vehicles approached the checkpoint after receiving multiple clearances to proceed, Israeli troops opened fire, hitting one WFP vehicle at least ten times. Several bullets struck the vehicle’s windows, just above the clearly-visible U.N. insignia and WFP logo emblazoned on the side doors. Israeli officials blamed a “communication error” for the attack.
August 29, 2024: An Israeli airstrike on an Anera aid convoy killed four Palestinians as it was en route to the Emirati Red Crescent Hospital. The route was coordinated and approved by Israeli authorities. Israeli officials claim the lead car the IDF struck was carrying many weapons, but there was no indication that weapons were present. The IDF provided Anera no warning before carrying out the attack.
keep readingShow less
Men carry a coffin of an Iraqi soldier at the Wadi al-Salam cemetery, Arabic for "Peace Valley", who was killed in an attack by Islamic State militants on an army post in a rural area between Diyala and Salahuddin provinces, during the funeral in Najaf, Iraq, May 14, 2024. REUTERS/Alaa Al-Marjani
Recent developments suggest that the ISIS threat has metastasized to a level that the United States believes requires stronger action.
In the span of less than a week, U.S. forces conducted two major operations targeting the group’s forces in Syria and Iraq. A broad joint U.S.-Iraqi operation was launched in Anbar province that reportedly killed at least 14 ISIS militants and was followed by the capture of an ISIS leader accused of assisting members of the terrorist group who had escaped detention in Syria.
The two operations indicate that the U.S. military is taking a more aggressive approach to the terrorist group than in recent years. A report by the New York Times described the Anbar operation, with over 100 U.S. Special Operations forces taking part, as one of the largest-scale anti-ISIS offensives conducted in Iraq since the fall of the caliphate in 2019. American commandos reportedly led the initial raid of the operation during which seven U.S. soldiers suffered injuries.
That these troops’ lives were essentially put at risk testifies to how seriously decision makers in Washington are now taking the ISIS threat, particularly as Washington has reportedly reached agreement with Baghdad that it will withdraw hundreds of the roughly 2,500 U.S. troops currently deployed in Iraq over the next year with a full withdrawal (albeit with a small contingent left in the Kurdish area of Erbil) to be completed by the end of 2026.
“The (Biden) administration believes the U.S. has a strategic stake in Iraq’s stability and that ISIS threatens that stability,” according to Steven Simon, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute who served as a senior director for the Middle East and North Africa on the National Security Council under former President Barack Obama.
“It is noteworthy mostly because (Anbar operation) was launched as the U.S. and Iraq had agreed on the overall reduction in U.S. troop levels and on a training mission for remaining troops,” he added in an email interview with RS.
However, the Anbar offensive appears to have been more than just about preserving the stability of Iraq. According to the Times report, the primary target was a high-ranking ISIS commander responsible for directing the group’s operations in the Middle East and Europe.
Both these regions have recently witnessed an uptick in ISIS-related activity targeting close U.S. allies. The terror group claimed responsibility for an attack on a Shiite mosque in Oman last July that resulted in the death of six people. It marked the first time that the Gulf nation fell victim to ISIS-related terrorism.
Last month, an ISIS-claimed knife attack in Germany, which the alleged perpetrator claimed was motivated by Israel’s ongoing war on Gaza, resulted in the deaths of three people. In the same month, the CIA and Austrian authorities reportedly thwarted an ISIS-linked plot to stage an attack during a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna.
The capture of ISIS leader Khaled Ahmad al-Danda, the man accused of helping escaped ISIS detainees in Syria, adds to the impression that Washington is taking the group’s ambitions more seriously, as indicated by the statement released by CENTCOM following the operation. It included an unusually stark warning from CENTCOM’s commander, Gen. Michael Kurilla, regarding the potential threat posed by ISIS prisoners held in Syria.
“Over 9,000 ISIS detainees remain in over 20 SDF detention facilities in Syria, a literal and figurative ‘ISIS Army’ in detention,” noted Kurilla, who further cautioned that “if a large number of these ISIS fighters escaped, it would pose an extreme danger to the region and beyond.”
The general’s reference to an “’ISIS Army’ in detention” highlights the concern over the possibility that the group is planning to once again attempt to seize large swaths of territory, plans that would require significant additional manpower. Currently the number of ISIS foot soldiers in Iraq and Syria is estimated at around 2,500.
“CENTCOM undoubtedly is attuned to the possibility that if several hundred ISIS detainees were to become free, they could be part of a force that would seize territory,” explained Paul Pillar, a former top counterterrorism and Middle East analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency, in an interview with RS.
“The history of the ISIS ‘caliphate’ that comprised large parts of Iraq and Syria is not that far in the past,” added Pillar, currently a senior non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute.
The Gaza Link
The growing threat posed by ISIS may be related to the ongoing war waged by Israel against Hamas in Gaza. A report released by U.S. governmental agencies at the beginning of the year found that ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria were at record lows in the last quarter of 2023 when the Gaza war was in its early stages.
This situation changed drastically, however, as the Gaza war continued over the following months, with CENTCOM announcing in July that, if current trends in Syria and Iraq hold, ISIS will likely more than double the total number of attacks in 2024 that it claimed in 2023.
The United Nations also noted an uptick in ISIS hostilities during this same period in a report it released in July. According to the report, the terror group intensified its attacks in Syria starting early this year, with March witnessing some of the worst violence instigated by ISIS in the country since the fall of the caliphate (while also noting the operational tempo in Iraq remained contained) five years ago.
It would appear that this sharp rise in ISIS activity may be, at least in part, attributable to the regional reaction to the Gaza war. According to one Pentagon assessment, attacks by Iranian-backed groups on U.S. forces stationed in Syria and Iraq after the Gaza war began last October had hampered operations against ISIS.
Perhaps even more important, the conflict in Gaza seems to have helped ISIS by diverting the resources of Iran and its Shiite allies in Iraq and Syria that were instrumental in the degradation and defeat of ISIS. The Institute for the Study of War noted that Iran and allied groups, notably Hezbollah, have redeployed some of their forces from deep inside Syria, where they were more focused on ISIS and other Sunni extremist groups, to southern Lebanon and areas closer to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights to put pressure on Israel to cease its offensive in Gaza.
According to a brief released by the Washington-based Institute just days after the start of the war in Gaza last October, ISIS stood to benefit from these redeployments, as they reduced pressure on the group within Syria, enabling it to rebuild and take a more aggressive stance.
In that respect, Washington’s continuing “iron-clad” support for Israel in its war in Gaza may be undermining its counter-terrorism efforts in Syria and Iraq.
Indeed, as long as the Gaza war continues, Iran and its allies in Syria and Iraq, which have opposed ISIS since its inception, will prioritize the conflict with Israel over other considerations, effectively removing a major obstacle standing in the way of ISIS’s expansion. This would heighten the threat to U.S. forces and possibly eventually even the homeland itself, something the Biden administration would do well to keep in mind on the 23rd anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.
Since at least 2016, foreign interference in American elections and civil society have become central to American political discourse. The issue is taken extremely seriously by the U.S. government, which has levied sanctions and called out foreign adversaries for sowing “discord and chaos” through their propaganda efforts.
But apparently Washington takes a different view when it comes to American propaganda operations in foreign countries. On Monday, the House passed HR 1157, the “Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund,” by a bipartisan 351-36 majority. This legislation authorizes more than $1.6 billion for the State Department and USAID over the next five years to, among other purposes, subsidize media and civil society sources around the world that counter Chinese “malign influence” globally.
That’s a massive spend — about twice, for example, the annual operating expenditure of CNN. If passed into law it would also represent a large increase in federal spending on international influence operations. While it’s hard to total all of the spending on U.S. influence operations across agencies, the main coordinating body for U.S. information efforts, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), has an annual budget of less than $100 million.
There is obviously no issue with the U.S. government presenting its own public view of what China is doing around the world, and doing so as forcefully as needed. But this bill goes beyond that by subsidizing “independent media and civil society” and other information operations in foreign countries. Indeed, this is already routine. The Global Engagement Center, which will likely play a strong role in implementing the bill, spends more than half its budget on such grants, and USAID, which will also play a lead role, makes grants to foreign media and civil society organizations a key part of its efforts. HR 1157 would supercharge these programs.
Crucially, HR 1157 doesn’t seem to contain any requirement that U.S. government financing to foreign media be made transparent to citizens of foreign countries (although there is a requirement to report grants to certain U.S. congressional committees). Thus, it’s possible that the program could in some cases be used to subsidize covert anti-Chinese messaging in a manner similar to the way Russia is accused of covertly funding anti-Ukrainian messaging by U.S. media influencers.
Such anti-Chinese messaging could cover a wide range of bread-and-butter political issues in foreign countries. The definition of “malign influence” in the bill is extremely broad. For example, program funds could support any effort to highlight the “negative impact” of Chinese economic and infrastructure investment in a foreign country. Or it could fund political messaging against Chinese contractors involved in building a port, road, or hospital, for example as part of Beijing’s globe-spanning Belt and Road Initiative.
Because some dimensions of U.S. information operations could be classified, it can be difficult to get a complete picture of the full range of what they look like on the ground. But a 2021 “vision document” on psychological operations and civil affairs from the First Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg gives a fascinating glimpse.
The document provides a case study (or “competition vignette”) of what an integrated effort to counter Chinese influence could look like in the fictional African country of Naruvu. In the vignette, members of a Special Forces Civil Affairs team spot a billboard with a picture of a port and Chinese characters. Quickly determining that the Chinese are investing in a new deep-water port in Naruvu, the 8th Psyop Group at Fort Bragg’s Information Warfare Center (IWC) works with local and U.S. government partners to immediately develop an influence campaign to “discredit Chinese activities.”
The influence campaign “empowered IWTF [Information Warfare Task Force], in coordination with the JIIM [local and U.S. government partners] to inflame long-standing friction between Naruvian workers and Chinese corporations. Within days, protests supported by the CFT’s ODA [Special Forces Operations Detachment Alpha], erupted around Chinese business headquarters and their embassy in Ajuba. Simultaneously, the IWC-led social media campaign illuminated the controversy.”
Faced with a combined propaganda campaign and intense labor unrest, the Chinese company is forced to back down from its planned port. (Although the vignette continues to an even more Hollywood-ready ending in which U.S. special forces break into the construction company’s offices, confiscate blueprints for the port, and discover that it is actually a Chinese plot to emplace long-range missiles in Naruvu to threaten U.S. Atlantic shipping).
This case study illustrates the extremes information warfare could reach. But of course it is fictional, and most operations funded to counter Chinese influence will be far more mundane and less cinematic. Indeed, some will probably look similar to the activities the U.S. government has bitterly condemned when foreign governments financed them in the U.S. civil society space, such as making social media buys or funding organizations sympathetic to Washington’s perspective.
But it’s still worth thinking about the consequences of such efforts. They are of course likely to make U.S. protests against similar foreign government activities look hypocritical. Beyond that, pumping a flood of potentially undisclosed U.S. government money into anti-Chinese messaging worldwide could backfire by making any organic opposition to Chinese influence appear to be covertly funded U.S. government propaganda rather than genuine expressions of local concern.
As the publics in many nations are likely to be suspicious of U.S. as well as Chinese involvement in their internal affairs, this could easily discredit genuine grassroots opposition to Chinese influence. A historical example is Washington’s funding of Russian civil society groups that criticized the integrity of Russia’s 2011 parliamentary elections. This backfired by allowing Putin to depict the opposition as tools in a U.S. plot and resulted in sharp restrictions on U.S. activity in Russia, including the expulsion of USAID.
Another problem raised by the proposed legislation is the possibility that anti-Chinese propaganda financed by this program will flow back into the American media space and influence American audiences, without any disclosure of its initial source of funding. Protections against U.S. government targeting of domestic audiences are already weak, and what protections do exist are almost impossible to enforce in a networked world where information in other countries is just a click away from U.S. audiences.
It’s easy to imagine U.S.-funded foreign media being used as evidence in domestic debates about China’s international role, or even to attack U.S. voices that advocate for a different view of China that is propagated by a hawkish U.S. government. During the Trump presidency, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), a likely recipient of many of these funds, supported attacks on U.S. critics of Trump’s Iran policy. More recently, congressional conservatives have claimed the GEC has advocated for censorship of conservative voices who disagree with Biden’s foreign policies.
The overwhelming bipartisan majority for HR 1157 is a snapshot of a culture in Washington that seems not to see the risk to U.S. values and interests when we engage in the same covert activities that we criticize in other countries.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.