This week Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the President of Ukraine, arrived in Washington, D.C. to, amongst other things, make the case for why President Biden and the U.S. Congress should provide tens-of-billions of dollars in additional assistance for Ukraine, as it continues to defend itself from Russia’s illegal invasion.
In an impassioned speech before a joint session of Congress, Zelensky thanked the United States for its support of Ukraine and made the case for even more assistance. “We have artillery, yes, thank you. But what we have, it isn't enough, honestly.”
On Friday, the House answered Zelensky’s plea by passing the omnibus spending bill (largely along party lines) that will fund the federal government for the remainder of fiscal year 2023, and includes $45 billion in emergency assistance to Ukraine. The Senate already approved the measure and the president signed it shortly thereafter.
As Responsible Statecraft and others have pointed out, the United States has already allocated $68 billion to Ukraine, so this $45 billion would push total U.S. spending on Ukraine since the war broke out to approximately $113 billion.
There are a variety of measures that can help to put this remarkable amount of U.S. taxpayer money into context. For starters, it’s more aid than the United States has supplied to any country in one year since at least the Vietnam War. It’s also far more than the $84 billion Russia is expected to spend on its military in 2023. In fact, U.S. assistance to Ukraine is more than every country in the world spends on its military, save for the United States and China. The $113 billion is also nearly as much as the omnibus bill allocates for baseline spending at the State Department and the Department of Homeland Securitycombined, and it’s almost as much as the $118.7 billion the United States will spend on medical care for all U.S. military veterans.
Given that the omnibus bill funds the entire federal government in 2023, it’s also useful to compare Ukraine aid to spending on domestic priorities. And, frankly, there’s no comparison. Even by the bill’s own accounting, spending on Ukraine dwarfs spending on most domestic priorities. For example, in the same sentence that Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee responsible for releasing the omnibus bill, announced the massive increase in Ukraine aid, he made clear that this was around $4 billion more than “communities across the country recovering from drought, hurricanes, flooding, wildfire, [and] natural disasters” would receive.
Perhaps most tellingly, if Ukraine were a U.S. state it would rank 11th in terms of the amount of federal funding it receives, according to government spending data. In other words, in the past 12 months Ukraine has been awarded more U.S. taxpayer dollars than 40 U.S. states.
While pundits from across the ideological spectrum proclaim there is no “blank check” for Ukraine Americans should, at the very least, discuss just how big of a check we’re willing to write, particularly with American households reeling from soaring inflation and a stagnating economy that may be headed into recession in 2023.
The question is not whether the United States should support Ukraine, the question is how much Washington should support Ukraine in the months and possibly years to come. While the United States should support Ukraine as it continues to defend itself from Putin’s reckless invasion, it is well past time that Americans had a genuine conversation about just how much U.S. taxpayers should pay for this support.
![Following a largely preordained election, Vladimir Putin was sworn in last week for another six-year term as president of Russia. Putin’s victory has, of course, been met with accusations of fraud and political interference, factors that help explain his 87.3% vote share. If this continuation of Putin’s 24-year-long hold on power makes one thing clear, it’s that he and his regime will not be going anywhere for the foreseeable future. But, as his war in Ukraine continues with no clear end in sight, what is less clear is how Washington plans to deal with this reality. Experts say Washington needs to start projecting a long-term strategy toward Russia and its war in Ukraine, wielding its political leverage to apply pressure on Putin and push for more diplomacy aimed at ending the conflict. Only by looking beyond short-term solutions can Washington realistically move the needle in Ukraine. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, the U.S. has focused on getting aid to Ukraine to help it win back all of its pre-2014 territory, a goal complicated by Kyiv’s systemic shortages of munitions and manpower. But that response neglects a more strategic approach to the war, according to Andrew Weiss of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who spoke in a recent panel hosted by Carnegie. “There is a vortex of emergency planning that people have been, unfortunately, sucked into for the better part of two years since the intelligence first arrived in the fall of 2021,” Weiss said. “And so the urgent crowds out the strategic.” Historian Stephen Kotkin, for his part, says preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty is critical. However, the apparent focus on regaining territory, pushed by the U.S., is misguided. “Wars are never about regaining territory. It's about the capacity to fight and the will to fight. And if Russia has the capacity to fight and Ukraine takes back territory, Russia won't stop fighting,” Kotkin said in a podcast on the Wall Street Journal. And it appears Russia does have the capacity. The number of troops and weapons at Russia’s disposal far exceeds Ukraine’s, and Russian leaders spend twice as much on defense as their Ukrainian counterparts. Ukraine will need a continuous supply of aid from the West to continue to match up to Russia. And while aid to Ukraine is important, Kotkin says, so is a clear plan for determining the preferred outcome of the war. The U.S. may be better served by using the significant political leverage it has over Russia to shape a long-term outcome in its favor. George Beebe of the Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft, says that Russia’s primary concerns and interests do not end with Ukraine. Moscow is fundamentally concerned about the NATO alliance and the threat it may pose to Russian internal stability. Negotiations and dialogue about the bounds and limits of NATO and Russia’s powers, therefore, are critical to the broader conflict. This is a process that is not possible without the U.S. and Europe. “That means by definition, we have some leverage,” Beebe says. To this point, Kotkin says the strength of the U.S. and its allies lies in their political influence — where they are much more powerful than Russia — rather than on the battlefield. Leveraging this influence will be a necessary tool in reaching an agreement that is favorable to the West’s interests, “one that protects the United States, protects its allies in Europe, that preserves an independent Ukraine, but also respects Russia's core security interests there.” In Kotkin’s view, this would mean pushing for an armistice that ends the fighting on the ground and preserves Ukrainian sovereignty, meaning not legally acknowledging Russia’s possession of the territory they have taken during the war. Then, negotiations can proceed. Beebe adds that a treaty on how conventional forces can be used in Europe will be important, one that establishes limits on where and how militaries can be deployed. “[Russia] need[s] some understanding with the West about what we're all going to agree to rule out in terms of interference in the other's domestic affairs,” Beebe said. Critical to these objectives is dialogue with Putin, which Beebe says Washington has not done enough to facilitate. U.S. officials have stated publicly that they do not plan to meet with Putin. The U.S. rejected Putin’s most statements of his willingness to negotiate, which he expressed in an interview with Tucker Carlson in February, citing skepticism that Putin has any genuine intentions of ending the war. “Despite Mr. Putin’s words, we have seen no actions to indicate he is interested in ending this war. If he was, he would pull back his forces and stop his ceaseless attacks on Ukraine,” a spokesperson for the White House’s National Security Council said in response. But neither side has been open to serious communication. Biden and Putin haven’t met to engage in meaningful talks about the war since it began, their last meeting taking place before the war began in the summer of 2021 in Geneva. Weiss says the U.S. should make it clear that those lines of communication are open. “Any strategy that involves diplomatic outreach also has to be sort of undergirded by serious resolve and a sense that we're not we're not going anywhere,” Weiss said. An end to the war will be critical to long-term global stability. Russia will remain a significant player on the world stage, Beebe explains, considering it is the world’s largest nuclear power and a leading energy producer. It is therefore ultimately in the U.S. and Europe’s interests to reach a relationship “that combines competitive and cooperative elements, and where we find a way to manage our differences and make sure that they don't spiral into very dangerous military confrontation,” he says. As two major global superpowers, the U.S. and Russia need to find a way to share the world. Only genuine, long-term planning can ensure that Washington will be able to shape that future in its best interests.](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/media-library/following-a-largely-preordained-election-vladimir-putin-was-sworn-in-last-week-for-another-six-year-term-as-president-of-russia.jpg?id=34283894&width=600&height=600&quality=90&coordinates=483%2C0%2C483%2C0)
