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Congress wants crack at Biden's new $13.7B Ukraine aid package

Digging in for the long war apparently needs a constant replenishment of funds, even before the last $20 billion is fully spent.

Analysis | Europe

The White House dropped this little nugget on the Friday before the Labor Day weekend: it wants a new aid package totaling $13.7 billion, on top of the already approved $40 billion for Ukraine from May. We are just now getting some idea of what and why it wants the money now, but there are number of questions remaining.

Apparently members of Congress are noticing too, as they got back from break today. Sen. Jon Tester (D-Mont.) told Defense News that he is asking the Secretary of Defense for a run down.

“I’m not opposed to it; I just want to know what’s in it,” said Tester. Armed Services Committee members Sens. Tim Kaine, D-Va., and Thom Tillis, R-N.C., are also looking for a briefing, according to the website.

So what do we know?

According to our own reporting, the White House and Pentagon have announced over $12 billion in weapons transfers to Ukraine this summer. This is from the $19 billion earmarked for military assistance out of that $40 billion package (the rest going to humanitarian and economic aid). There should be some $6 billion left for weapons, according to the math. But the Defense News article is vague: It just suggests (via a quote from Armed Services Committee Chair Jim Inhofe) that there is only "roughly" $2.8 billion left in Presidential Drawdown Authority funds, which takes directly from the stockpiles. There are other streams available too.

According to Defense News, the new package is in addition to all that and would require Congressional approval. The $13.7 billion reportedly includes $11.7 billion for "security and economic assistance" (some $7.2 billion of that for military aid) through December. It also seeks an additional $2 billion to reduce domestic energy costs driven up in part by the war.

A further breakdown:

The $7.2 billion in new Ukraine (military) aid includes another $3.7 billion in presidential drawdown authority and a further $1.5 billion to replenish items sent to Ukraine from U.S. stockpiles. Another $3 billion, under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, would allow the Pentagon to contract for new weapons and equipment for Ukraine.

Separately, the Pentagon would get just under $1.6 billion to continue the U.S. troop presence bolstering NATO’s eastern edge after Russia invaded.

Inhofe, of course, is cross that there isn't more money in the request, noting that the money from the first package expires Oct. 1. He says they should have enough for $2 billion per month in PDA funds, which is what they had in the last pot of dough.

“This aid package is insufficient to provide the Ukrainians with what they need to win,” Inhofe said on Twitter. “The Biden admin is now explicitly arguing to provide Ukraine with less military aid than Congress gave them several months ago in a massive bipartisan vote. Congress will have to lead again.”

“It’s clear that Congress will have a lot of work to do to improve a Ukraine aid package when we return."

The White House apparently wants to push this through the major continuing resolution bill that funds the government through December. Some Republicans are instead calling for a "clean" stand-alone bill (which would be more open to debate).

What we do know is there is a lot of money and weapons sloshing around and it is difficult to keep track of it all. We also know that the White House is digging in for the long war, even reportedly planning for a separate named command with a general and its own budget. We also know the Pentagon is running out of its own stockpiles. It's a Washington shell game — look away for a second and you may lose the thread. We'll do our best to watch, and keep updating.


U.S. Northern Command personnel move medical supplies for distribution at New York's Javits Medical Station as part of the U.S. military's COVID-19 response (U.S. Army Photo by Pvt. 1st Class Nathaniel Gayle)
Analysis | Europe
Trump Zelensky
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Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

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