On the eve of a new round of negotiations between the world’s powers and Iran to restore the 2015 nuclear deal, the vast majority of voters believe that the United States should use diplomacy — and not military force — to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, according to a recent poll from Data For Progress.
In a survey of 1,330 likely voters, 78 percent of respondents said Washington must use its best diplomatic tools to “put an immediate end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program,” while only 12 percent agreed with the statement that the United States “must go to war with Iran in order to slow down its nuclear weapons development.” (It should be noted that despite the poll’s wording, the U.S. intelligence community and the International Atomic Energy Agency have not at this time made an assessment that Iran is embarking on a nuclear weapons program.)
The poll shows a range of potentially strong messages for those who advocate a return to the Iran nuclear deal. It also indicates that, even after two years of President Joe Biden dragging his feet on a return to the accord, Americans have little appetite for alternative approaches to resolving the issue.
In a second framing of the question, 74 percent of likely voters polled said they supported a deal that would use international monitoring to stop Iran’s nuclear program from progressing. On the other side, eight percent favored military action that would set the program back “by years,” and five percent supported the current path, even if it would allow Iran to develop a weapon in the next year.
Notably, the survey showed that a slim majority (56 percent) of Republicans would support a “new agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear program,” even if that accord was based on the original deal.
If Iran does manage to develop a nuclear weapon, respondents said overwhelmingly that they would primarily blame either Biden or former President Donald Trump. Responses fell along partisan lines, with 62 percent of Democrats blaming Trump and 61 percent of Republicans putting the responsibility on Biden’s shoulders.
Connor Echols is the managing editor of the Nonzero Newsletter and a former reporter for Responsible Statecraft. Echols received his bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University, where he studied journalism and Middle East and North African Studies.
FILE PHOTO: Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Bob Menendez (D-NJ) hold a news conference on the death of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi and the humanitarian crisis in Yemen on Capitol Hill in Washington, U.S., December 12, 2018. REUTERS/Yuri Gripas/File Photo
Top Photo: U.S. House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA) and Senate Foreign Relations Chair, Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), listen as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses a joint meeting of Congress at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, U.S., July 24, 2024. REUTERS/Craig Hudson
The upcoming House of Representatives Rules Committee Package is sure to include a section requiring the consideration of a bill that would sanction the International Criminal Court (ICC), therefore shielding Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu from arrest.
The ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, as well as former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and Hamas leader Ibrahim Al-Masri in November 2024 for their actions in Gaza, alleging war crimes and crimes against humanity. ICC judges said that the Gaza blockade "created conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population in Gaza, which resulted in the death of civilians, including children, due to malnutrition and dehydration.”
A House Resolution introduced by over a dozen House Republicans, titled the”‘Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act” is meant “to impose sanctions with respect to the International Criminal Court engaged in any effort to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any protected person of the United States and its allies.”
The bill found that “The United States and Israel are not parties to the Rome Statute or members of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and therefore the ICC has no legitimacy or jurisdiction over the United States or Israel.” Because of the lack of jurisdiction, the co-sponsors assert, “The ICC’s actions against Israel, including the preliminary examination and investigation of Israel and issuance of arrest warrants against Israeli officials, are illegitimate and baseless and create a damaging precedent that threatens the United States, Israel, and all United States partners who have not consented to the ICC’s jurisdiction.”
The bill further states that “if the International Criminal Court is engaging in any attempt to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any protected person,” the President shall then impose sanctions. These sanctions can be placed on any “foreign person” who directly aided or engaged in efforts to assist the ICC in investigating, arresting, detaining, or prosecuting a protected person. This could include financial or material assistance.
Despite calling the arrest warrant for Netanyahu “outrageous,” President Biden had previously opposed sanctioning the ICC for seeking arrest warrants against Benjamin Netanyahu. However, President Trump notably approved sanctions in September 2020 on members of the ICC who were “involved in the ICC’s efforts to investigate US personnel.”
The ICC has no actual enforcement authorities, leaving detention and arrest to the 125 members countries that are party to the Rome convention. But it is fully voluntary. It appears, according to the text, that the bill is authorizing Congress to impose sanctions on any foreign actor (who could be from a partner or allied country) and their families if they helped to detain Netanayhu on behalf of a member state. What this would look like in practice is unclear. Ireland and the Netherlands (a NATO alliance member) have both indicated that the Israeli prime minister would be arrested if he set foot on their soil.
The decision to include H.R. 23 in the Rules package is not without its opponents. Congressman Thomas Massie (R-Ky) dissented on X: “The United States is a sovereign country, so I don’t assign any credibility to decisions of the International Criminal Court. But how did a bill to protect Netanyahu make it into the House rules package to be voted on immediately after the Speaker vote? Where are our priorities?!” His office declined to comment further when RS inquired.
It is important to note that the package cannot be voted on until House leadership appoints the committee, which may come with additional challenges, as previous speaker Kevin McCarthy was forced to appoint three Freedom Caucus members to the last Rules Committee, and these three members regularly joined Democrats to vote down legislation submitted by Republican leadership.
Reports indicate that the appointments will likely happen by this Friday.
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Top Image credit: Elon Musk gives a tour to U.S. President-elect Donald Trump and lawmakers of the control room before the launch of the sixth test flight of the SpaceX Starship rocket, in Brownsville, Texas, U.S., November 19, 2024 . Brandon Bell/Pool via REUTERS
President-elect Donald Trump likes to posture as a tough guy, and he’s not above veiled threats of military action against stated adversaries as a tool of influence. But at times he can be quite harsh in his rhetoric about the big weapons makers and their allies in the political sphere, too, as he was in a September speech in Milwaukee:
“I will expel the warmongers from our national security state and carry out a much needed clean up of the military industrial complex to stop the war profiteering and to always put America first. . . . We’re going to end these endless wars.”
Campaign statements rarely make it into actual policies untouched, and Trump’s critique of the military industrial complex is likely to be no exception. In his first term, from 2016 to 2020, Trump reversed course from his campaign statements about contractors ripping off the government to form a close bond with the arms industry once in office, especially when it came to taking credit for the jobs created by dubious policies like the arming of the Saudi regime during its brutal war in Yemen, continuing to tout overseas sales to countries like Saudi Arabia and their economic impacts at home even after the murder of U.S.-resident journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
Whether or not Trump goes after the warmongers and war profiteers in earnest, the fact that he called them out in public in such harsh terms was newsworthy in its own right — he was far more critical in tone and substance than any statement of any recent Democratic presidential candidate. At a minimum, it means that there is an appetite in Trump’s base for a less interventionist foreign policy and a firmer hand with military mega-firms like Lockheed Martin and RTX (formerly Raytheon).
The answer regarding which companies may benefit most from Pentagon spending in the new administration will likely be determined by rough and tumble politics, not well-informed debates over strategic priorities. And when it comes to exerting influence over Pentagon spending and policy, so far the military mega-firms like Lockheed Martin and RTX are being outmaneuvered by the emerging military technology firms clustered in and around Silicon Valley.
Trump confidante and government efficiency czar Elon Musk is best known to most Americans for the civilian undertakings of SpaceX and Tesla, but his empire is increasingly moving into military contracting, from launching military satellites to creating a military version of his Starlink communications system that has been used to supply reliable internet service to the Ukrainian military in its fight against Russia.
Going forward, the biggest cash cow for SpaceX may be the Starship system, which is designed to put huge payloads into space, a capacity that the U.S. military is seeking as it postures itself for a possible conflict with China. These interests could incline Musk to leave military tech projects alone, or even push to increase them, when his agency releases its proposals for remaking the federal budget.
In December, Musk drew praise from some Pentagon budget critics for his verbal assault on Lockheed Martin’s troubled F-35 combat aircraft, but he was careful to say that it would be replaced with greater reliance on the drones built by his Silicon Valley colleagues. The Silicon Valley argument for swapping out piloted aircraft for drones is couched in strategic and budgetary terms, including a claim that a force that relies on drones would be cheaper to build and maintain. But these claims of efficiency and cost effectiveness have yet to be proven, so shifting towards emerging technologies may or may not save money.
In addition to Musk, the military tech sector can rely on support from Vice President-elect J.D. Vance, who worked for five years at a firm owned by Peter Thiel, founder of the surveillance and military data crunching firm Palantir, before his successful 2022 run for the Senate, with millions in financial support from Thiel.
In addition, Trump’s choice for second-in-charge at the Pentagon — a position that is intimately involved in the day-to-day operations of the department — is Stephen Feinberg of Cerberus Capital, a firm with a long history of investing in arms companies, including emerging tech firms, as it did early last year when it bought hypersonic and defense test systems businesses from TransDigm Group.
What do the tech executives want? More Pentagon contracts, less regulation in the purchase of new systems, and a foreign policy that relies on technological superiority to restore U.S. global military dominance. In some respects these demands overlap with the interests of Lockheed Martin and the other big contractors, but the Pentagon may have a hard time funding legacy systems like F-35s, aircraft carriers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles along with ambitious new projects based on emerging technologies. So there could be a budget brawl between the incumbent contractors and the Silicon Valley upstarts, with the winner determining the shape of U.S. weapons procurement choices for years to come.
Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin Chief Financial Officer Jay Malave has expressed his hope that for the Pentagon, efficiency could be consistent with increasing the department’s budget:
“With government efficiency, you could see elements of addition by subtraction, so ultimately, you could see a higher budget request than what we've seen from the prior administration, but it could be as a result of some things either being curtailed or canceled, and other things being prioritized.”
If Malave is right, and the Pentagon gets another big funding boost under cover of a campaign for “efficiency,” both sides of the old guard versus new tech fight within the arms sector could end up doing just fine — at our expense, and the expense of other needed programs for which “efficiency” may mean deep cuts.
Congress and the public need to keep a close eye on both wings of the military industrial complex under the new administration, demanding that decisions about what weapons to purchase and what strategy to pursue be made through carefully considered deliberations conducted in the public eye, not the needs of politically-wired companies that want to feed on the Pentagon budget to pad their bottom lines well into the future.
Robin Brooks, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, took to X recently to declare that "there needs to be a ban on any academic papers that interpret Russia’s resilient GDP as a sign that sanctions aren’t working." I found it remarkable that he should acknowledge the unexpected resilience of Russia’s economy yet try to disbar analysis which might suggest, therefore, that sanctions had failed.
Brooks produces some interesting analysis, and at the heart of his statement lies an important argument that others have taken up recently: that Western powers didn’t impose tough enough sanctions on Russia at the start of the Ukraine crisis, but could still impose such a catastrophic economic cost on Russia that Putin will, for the first time, be forced to back down.
Let’s take a look at what a maximum pressure policy in 2014 might have involved.
Putting a complete block on the import of Russian oil and gas has always been the go-to sanctions target for Western pundits. Russian goods exports in 2014 amounted to almost $500 billion. With over two thirds of those exports oil and gas, and the EU accounting for most trade, a total ban would have blown a $200 billion hole in Russian exporters. It would also have opened a gaping hole in state finances as roughly one half of Russian state revenue comes from taxes levied on oil and gas. This would undoubtedly have limited Russia’s ability to continue massive investment in its military which had been ongoing since 2011.
However, this would have also had catastrophic consequences for energy security in many parts of Europe, including in countries that received 100% of their gas from Russia such as Finland, the Baltic States, and Bulgaria. Germany at that time received 40% of its gas from Russia. That would have caused energy shortages, huge energy inflation and cost of living challenges, with the EU still locked in a cycle of low growth, low productivity, and negative interest rates following the global financial crisis.
Of course, European countries may simply have accelerated their move away from Russian energy, but this process wouldn’t have happened overnight. President Obama only lifted the 40-year U.S. ban on oil and gas exports in December 2015, which ushered in a rapid rise in U.S. liquefied natural gas exports to Europe in particular.
The gradual shift to higher cost U.S. LNG has had massive political and economic consequences in Germany which is suffering from deindustrialization. Its governing coalition just collapsed due to a rise in far right and far left populist populism amid the economic fallout. A much more extreme version of the political earthquakes we are witnessing today in Europe would simply have happened sooner had the West imposed a full blockade on Russian energy in 2014.
Another idea from that time was to cut Russia off from SWIFT — or the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications. According to the Financial times, cutting Russia off from SWIFT would render Russia unable to transact export business in foreign currencies at all. This would have devastated Russia’s export dependent economy. It would have bankrupted state-owned companies like Rosneft, Gazprom and Rostec, as Western financial sector sanctions had already induced serious liquidity problems, in particular at oil giant Rosneft. Without export earnings, its biggest state firms going under, Russia would have been unable to build up its reserves to underwrite the huge cost of a war which it launched in 2022.
However, cutting Russia off from SWIFT is also what Bloomberg described as the economic version of Mutually Assured Destruction, at least for Europe. European importers would have struggled to pay for Russian imports (see my comments above on the impact of losing access to Russian energy). They also would have been unable to receive payments for exports to Russia, therefore cutting them off from a huge market.
EU companies exported $100 billion worth of goods to Russia in 2014. EU political leaders were never going to sign up for this.
In 2014-2015 Russia had refrained from a full-scale invasion of Ukraine because it wanted to try to retain reasonably good relations with France and Germany — and the Minsk Agreement seemed to offer the chance of this. Even hawkish UK foreign policy makers in Whitehall described a move on SWIFT as the “nuclear option”; so devastating that it might tip Putin towards heeding his most hawkish advisors and invading Ukraine (or worse) — at a time when Ukraine was vastly less able to resist than it was in 2022.
Freezing Russia’s international reserve assets in 2014 might theoretically have been more damaging then than it was in 2022. Russia in late 2014 was reeling from the November oil price collapse. The Central Bank vainly hosed $100 billion in reserves at the foreign exchange markets in the run up to the Black Tuesday rouble meltdown of December 16, 2014. Had Russian assets already been frozen, Russia’s central bank may have been unable to prevent an even more devastating currency collapse.
But I remain skeptical that this would have made a significant difference to Russian policy in Ukraine. Even after Black Tuesday, Russia retained available reserves of $400 billion. Had the West frozen assets in their jurisdictions of around $200 billion, Russia could still have covered eight months of imports. What Russian policy makers learned from Black Tuesday was that a weak ruble was a strength, in increasing the ruble value of oil and gas exports which were traded in U.S. dollars.
Quite unrelated to Western sanctions, Russia embraced a weak ruble as an article of economic policy, a point few pro-sanctions/pro-war advocates in the West seem to appreciate. That allowed Russia, as I’ve said many times before, to rebuild its reserves ahead of the war in 2022. Seizing Russian assets in 2014 may simply have accelerated that process and emboldened Russia to war sooner.
I was at the front line of imposing sanctions on Russia for 10 years, yet I have never believed that a tougher line on sanctions in 2014 would either have prevented war in Ukraine or been politically and economically deliverable in Europe.
I recognize the frustration that commentators feel about the ineffectiveness of sanctions. It’s always important to remember that any foreign policy needs a clear goal and measures of success. The purpose and justification for sanctions against Russia has or should have been to limit, halt and/or reverse aggression against Ukraine. Damaging Russia’s economy, even though that hasn’t happened in a way analysts like Brooks would have hoped, is not the yardstick against which we should be measuring sanctions.
Putin has said he would like sanctions relief as part of a possible future peace deal, but sanctions have at no point over the past eleven years looked likely to constrain his decision making.
Suggesting new ways to inflict economic pain on Russia is therefore missing the point. We should be asking how we can end the war, rather than suggesting the same old ideas that will undoubtedly prolong it.
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